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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY 
BELGIUM 
Representatives 
MM. BIEFNOT Yvon 
CHEVALIER Pierre 
KELCHTERMANS Lambert 
KEMPINAIRE Andre 
PECRIAUX Nestor 
SARENS Freddy 
SEEUWS Willy 
Substitutes 
MM. DE DECKER Armand 
GHESQUIERE Ferdinand 
LA VERGE Jacques 
MONFILS Philippe-J.F. 
OTTENBOURGH Yvan 
THISSEN Rene 
WINTGENS Pierre 
FRANCE 
Representatives 
MM. BASSINET Philippe 
BAUMEL Jacque5 
BEIX Roland 
CARO Jean-Marie 
COLLETTE Henri 
DURAND Adrien 
FORNI Raymond 
FOURRE Jean-Pierre 
GALLEY Robert 
GOUTEYRON Adrien 
JEAMBRUN Pierre 
JUNG Louis 
MASSERET Jean-Pierre 
OEHLER Jean 
SEITLINGER Jean 
TtiYRAUD Jacques 
VALLEIX Jean 
VIAL-MASSAT Theo 
Substitutes 
MM. ALLONCLE Michel 
ANDRE Rene 
AUT AIN Fran~ois 
BIRRAUX Claude 
BOHL Andre 
CROZE Pierre 
DHAILLE Paul 
GAITS Claude 
de GAULLE ~ean 
GRUSSENMEYER Fran~is 
HUNAULT Xavier 
KOEHL Emile 
LAGORCE Pierre 
LE GRAND Jean-Fran~is 
LEMOINE Georges 
PISTRE Charles 
ROGER Jean 
WORMS Jean-Pierre 
GERMANY 
Representatives 
Mr. ANTRETTER Robert 
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott 
Mr. B0HM Wilfried 
PS 
SP 
CVP 
PVV 
PS 
CVP 
SP 
PRL 
CVP 
PVV 
PRL 
CVP 
PSC 
PSC 
Socialist 
RPR 
Socialist 
UDF-CDS 
RPR 
COS· 
Socialist 
Socialist 
RPR 
RPR 
Dem. Left 
UCDP 
Socialist 
Socialist 
UDF-CDS 
Ind. Rep. 
RPR 
PC 
RPR 
RPR 
Socialist 
cos 
UCDP 
Ind. Rep. 
Socialist 
Socialist 
RPR 
RPR 
UDF (App.) 
UDF 
Socialist 
RPR 
Socialist 
Socialist 
ROE 
Socialist 
SPD 
SPD 
CDU/CSU 
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MM. BUCHLER Hans SPD 
B0HLER Klaus CDU/CSU 
HOLTZ Uwe SPD 
IRMER Ulrich FOP 
KITTELMANN Peter CDU/CSU 
MENZEL Bruno FOP 
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard CDU/CSU 
M0LLER Giinther CDU/CSU 
REDDEMANN Gerhard CDU/CSU 
von SCHMUDE Michael CDU/CSU 
SOELL Hartmut SPD 
SPRUNG Rudolf CDU/CSU 
STEINER Heinz-Alfred SPD 
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta SPD 
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich CDU/CSU 
Substitutes 
MM. BINDIG Rudolf 
FELDMANN Olaf 
Mrs. FISCHER Leni . 
MM. JUNGHANNS Ulrich 
LENZER Christian 
LUMMER Heinrich 
MAASS Erich 
MARTEN Gitnter 
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike 
MM. MATSCHIE Christoph 
MICHELS Meinolf 
PFUHL Albert 
PROBST Albert 
REIMANN Manfred 
SCHEER Hermann 
SCHLUCKEBIER Giinter 
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Comelia 
Mr. ZIERER Benno 
ITALY.· 
Representatives 
MM. BENASSI Ugo 
CACCIA Paolo 
Mrs. FALCUCCI Franca 
MM. FILETTI Cristoforo 
FlORET Mario 
FOSCHI Franco 
GABBUGGIANI Elio 
MANCIA Tommaso 
MANZOLINI Gianni 
MARTINO Guido 
MEZZAPESA Pietro 
P ARISI Francesco 
PECCHIOLI Ugo 
PIERALLI Piero 
RODOTA Stefano 
RUBBI Antonio 
SINESIO Giuseppe 
STEGAGNINI Bruno 
·'· 
Substitutes 
MM. ANDREIS Sergio 
CAPANNA Mario 
CARIGLIA Antonio 
COLOMBO Vittorino 
F ASSINO Giuseppe 
FIANDROTTI Filippo 
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela 
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio 
GRECO Francesco 
MESORACA Maurizio 
SPD 
FOP 
CDU/CSU 
CDU/CSU 
CDU/CSU 
CDU/CSU 
CDU/CSU 
CDU/CSU 
SPD 
SPD 
CDU/CSU 
SPD 
CDU/CSU 
SPD 
SPD 
SPD 
FOP 
CDU/CSU 
PDS 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
MSI-DN 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
PDS 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Republican 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
PDS 
PDS 
PDS 
PDS 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Verdi 
Prol. Dem. 
PSDI 
Chr. Dem. 
Liberal 
Socialist 
PDS 
Chr. Dem. 
PDS 
PDS 
MM. NEGRI Giovanni 
PASQUINO Gianfranco 
RAUTI Giuseppe 
RUBNER Hans 
SA VIO Gastone 
SCOV ACRICCHI Martino 
TRIGLIA Riccardo 
LUXEMBOURG 
Representatives 
Mrs. ERR Lydie 
Mr. GOERENS Charles 
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle 
Substitutes 
MM. DIMMER Camille 
KONEN Rene 
REGENWETTER Jean 
NETHERLANDS 
Representatives 
Mr. AARTS Harry 
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN 
Elisabeth 
MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob 
EISMA. Doeke 
STOFFELEN Pieter 
van VELZEN Wim 
VERBEEK Jan Willem 
Substitutes 
MM. DEES Dick 
EVERSDIJK Huib 
JURGENS E.C.M. 
van der LINDEN Rene 
Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van 
APPELDOORN Marian H.J. 
Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas 
Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine 
PORTUGAL 
Representatives 
MM. AMARAL Femando 
BRITO Raul Femando 
CANDAL Carlos 
FERNANDES MARQUES 
Joaquim 
MACHETE Rui Manuel 
PINTO ·Carlos 
ROSET A Pedro 
Substitutes 
Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela 
MM. ALEGRE Manuel 
CURTO Abilio Aleixo 
MARTINS Alberto de Sousa 
PO<;AS SANTOS Joao Alvaro 
REIS LEITE Jose Guilherme 
RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano 
Radical 
lnd. Left 
MSI-DN 
SVP 
Chr. Dem. 
PSDI 
Chr. Dem. 
Soc. Workers 
Dem. 
Soc. Chr. 
Soc. Chr. 
Dem. 
Soc. Workers 
CDA 
Labour 
CDA 
D66 
Labour 
CDA 
VVD 
VVD 
CDA 
Labour 
CDA 
CDA 
Labour 
Labour 
Soc. Dem. 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Soc. Dem. 
Soc. Dem. 
Soc. Dem. 
Soc. Dem. 
Soc. Dem. 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Soc. Dem. 
Soc. Dem. 
PCP 
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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES 
SPAIN 
Representatives 
MM. AL V AREZ Francisco 
BORDERAS Augusto 
CUCO Alfons 
DIAZ Lorenzo 
FABRA Juan Manuel 
HOMS I FERRET Francesc 
LOPEZ HENARES Jose Luis 
MARTINEZ Miguel Angel 
MOYA Pedro 
PERINAT Luis Guillermo 
de PUIG Lluis Maria 
ROMAN Rafael 
Substitutes 
MM. BARRIONUEVO Jose 
BOLINAGA Imanol 
DIAZ DE MERA Agustin 
Mrs. FRIAS Milagros 
MM. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel 
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Santiago 
NUNEZ Manuel 
PALACIOS Marcelo 
RUIZ Alberto 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
Representatives 
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BANKS Tony 
COX Thomas 
Earl of DUNDEE 
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REDMOND Martin 
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Sir Donald THOMPSON 
MM. THOMPSON John 
WARD John 
Substitutes 
MM. BOWDEN Andrew 
Sir Anthony DURANT 
Baroness HOOPER 
MM. HOWELL Ralph 
HUGHES Roy 
Sir John HUNT 
Mr. LITHERLAND Robert 
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Miss NICHOLSON Emma 
MM. RATHBONE Tim 
ROWE Andrew 
People's Party 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Soc. and Dem. 
Centre 
People's Party 
C.i.U .. 
People's Party 
Socialist 
Socialist 
People's Party 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Basque Nat. 
People's Party 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Socialist 
Socialist 
People's Party 
Socialist 
Socialist 
People's Party 
United Left 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
SLD 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
SLD 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
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MINUTES OF PROCCEDINGS 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 1st June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opening of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the 
Assembly. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of 
the thirty-eighth ordinary session (Doe. 1300). 
7. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1312). 
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of 
WEU. 
9. Composition of political groups (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, Doe. 
1311). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 11.35 a.m. with Mr. Lagorce, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the session 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Provisional President declared open 
the thirty-eighth ordinary session of· the 
Assembly of Western European Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
3. Address by the Prorisiolllll President 
The Provisional President addressed the 
Assembly. 
4. Tributes to two former members 
of the Assembly 
The President notified the Assembly of the 
deaths of Mr. Pontillon, former President of the 
Assembly, and Mr. Sarti, former Vice-President 
of the Assembly. 
The Assembly paid tribute to their memory in 
observing a minute's silence. 
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5. ExamiiUltion of credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6 ( 1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe informing 
the Assembly that the credentials of the repre-
sentatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 
had been ratified by that Assembly. 
6. Obserrers 
The Provisional President welcomed the 
observers from Austria, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden 
and Turkey. 
7. Election of the President 
Only one candidate was proposed for the post 
of President, namely, Mr. Soell. 
In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously 
not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Pres-
ident by acclamation. 
Mr. Soell was elected President by accla-
mation. 
At the invitation of the Provisional President, 
Mr. Soell took the Chair. 
MINUTES 
8. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
9. Election of six Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
Six candidates were proposed for eight posts 
ofVice-President, namely, Mrs. Err, Mr. Fourre, 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Foschi, Mr. 
Kempinaire and Mr. Machete. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
Mrs. Err, Mr. Fourre, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 
Mr. Foschi, Mr. Kempinaire and Mr. Machete 
were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation. 
10. The situation in Yugoslavia 
(Motion for a m:oiiJIIWUIIItion with a re~~uest 
for urgent procedure, Does. 1316 tllld 1317) 
The President announced that a request for a 
debate and a motion for a recommendation on 
the situation in Yugoslavia had been tabled by 
MM. Caro, De Decker, de Puig and others with 
a request for urgent procedure. 
In accordance with Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine 
this request for urgent procedure immediately 
after the adoption of the draft order of 
business. 
11. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the first part of the session 
(Doe. 1300) 
The President proposed the adoption of the 
draft order of business. 
The draft order of business for the first part of 
the session was adopted. 
12. The situation in Yugoslavia 
(Motion for a m:ommetulation with a request 
for urgent procedure, Does. 1316 and 1317) 
In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider 
the request for urgent procedure on the motion 
for a recommendation on the situation in Yugo-
slavia. 
Speakers: MM. De Decker and Martino. 
The request for urgent procedure was agreed 
to. 
The debate would take place on Tuesday, 2nd 
June, in the afternoon. 
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13. Changes in the membership of comminees 
In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
changes in the membership of committees: 
Defence Committee 
Belgium 
- Mr. Kelchtermans as a titular member and 
Mr. Sarens as an alternate member; Mr. 
Laverge as an alternate member; 
Spain 
- Mr. de Puig as a titular member and Mr. 
Moya as an alternate member; 
United Kingdom 
- Mr. Thompson and Lord Newall as titular 
members; MM. Hardy and Ward as 
alternate members. 
Political Committee 
Belgium 
- MM. Wintgens and Seeuws as titular 
members; MM. Chevalier and Kelch-
termans as alternate members; 
Spain 
- Mr. Moya as a titular member and Mr. 
Gonzalez-Laxe as an alternate member; 
United Kingdom 
- Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Speed as 
titular members; MM. Redmond and 
Bowden as alternate members. 
Technological and Aerospace Committee 
Belgium 
- Mr. Sarens as. a titular member; MM. 
Monfils and Kempinaire as alternate 
members; 
United Kingdom 
- Mr. Litherland and Sir Donald Thompson as 
titular members; Mr. Cox, Miss Nicholson 
and the Earl of Dundee as alternate 
members. 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
Belgium 
- MM. Thissen and Biefnot as titular 
members; MM. Ottenbourgh and Pecriaux 
as alternate members; 
MINUTES 
Spain 
- Mrs. Guirado as an alternate member; 
United Kingdom 
- The Earl of Dundee and Mr. Thompson as 
alternate members. 
Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges 
Belgium 
- Mr. Ottenbourgh as a titular member and 
Mr. Biefnot as an alternate member, 
United Kingdom 
- Baroness Hooper as an alternate member. 
Belgium 
Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations 
- Mr. Ghesquiere as a titular member 
MM. Wintgens and Monfils as alternat~ 
members; 
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United Kingdom 
- Mr. Hardy and Sir Anthony Durant as 
titular members; .Mr. Banks and Baroness 
Hooper as alternate members. 
U. Address by Mr. 'fill Eekelen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put 
by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Rathbone 
Stegagnini, Caro and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. ' 
15. Date, time tuUI orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m. 
APPENDIX FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. De Decker (Chevalier) 
Kelchtermans 
Kempinaire 
Pecriaux 
Sarens 
France 
Mr. Bassinet 
Gaits (Beix) 
Caro 
Durand 
Forni 
Fourre 
Lagorce (Jeambrun) 
Jung 
Masseret 
Valleix 
Germany 
Mr. Antretter 
Mrs. Blunck 
MM. Bohm 
Reimann (Biichler) 
Marten (Biihler) 
Holtz 
Feldmann (lrmer) 
Lenzer (Kittelmann) 
Maas 
(Meyer zu Bentrup) 
Miiller 
Reddemann 
17obst (von Schmude) 
Sprung 
Stein er 
Vogel 
Italy 
MM. Giagu Demartini 
(Benassi) 
Fassino (Caccia) 
Mrs. Falcucci 
MM. Rauti (Filetti) 
Fioret 
Savio (Foschi) 
Martino 
Mezzapesa 
Pari si 
Colombo (Pecchioli) 
Pieralli 
Mesoraca (Rodota) 
Rubbi 
Sinesio 
Stegagnini 
Luxembourg 
Mrs. Err 
Mr. Goerens 
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette 
Netherlands 
MM. De Hoop Scheffer 
Tummers (Jurgens) 
Stoffelen 
van Velzen 
Dees (Verbeek) 
Portugal 
MM. Rodrigues (Amaral) 
Brito 
Candal 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium Germany 
MM. Biefnot 
Seeuws 
France 
MM. Baumel 
Collette 
Galley 
Gouteyron 
Oehler 
Seitlinger 
Thyraud 
Vial-Massat 
Mr. Menzel 
Mrs. Terborg 
Italy 
MM. Gabbuggiani 
Mancia 
Manzolini 
MM. Fernandes Marques 
Mrs. Aguiar (Machete) 
MM. Po~as Santos (Pinto) 
Roseta 
Spain 
MM. Diaz de Mera (Alvarez) 
Borderas 
Cuco 
Diaz 
Fabra 
Lopez Henares 
Martinez 
Moya 
de Puig 
Roman 
United Kingdom 
MM. Atkinson 
Litherland (Banks) 
Cox 
Rowe (Earl of Dundee) 
Dame Peggy Fenner. 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Sir Russell Johnston 
Lord Kirkhill 
MM. Parry 
Redmond 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Rathbone (Speed) 
Sir Donald Thompson 
MM. Thompson 
Ward 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
Eisma 
Spain 
MM. Horns I Ferret 
Perinat 
United Kingdom 
MM. Faulds 
Jessel 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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SECOND SITIING 
Monday, 1st June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1312). 
2. Composition of political groups (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, 
Doe. 1311). 
3. A new security order in Europe (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1309 and amend-
ments). 
4. WEU after Maastricht (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Political Committee, Doe. 1308). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soel/, President of the Assembly, ~n the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in th~ appendix. 
2. Adoption Of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. " 
•. 
3. Changes ;, the ~"rship of a committee 
In accordance with 'Rule 40 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
changes in the membership of the Technological 
and Aerospace Committee proposed by the 
Italian Delegation: 
- MM. Colombo and Savio as titular 
members in place of MM. Stegagnini and 
Malfatti. 
4. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1312) 
The report of the Presidential Committee was 
presented by Mr. Caro, former President of the 
Assembly. 
The Assembly ratified the action of the Presi-
dential Committee. 
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5. Com]IOsition of ]IOiitical groups 
(Presentation of ll1ld debate on the report of the Committee on 
Rules of Procetlure ll1ld Pri•ileges ll1ld rote on the draft order, 
Doe. 1311) 
The fresident informed the Assembly that 
Mr. Pieralli and nine of his colleagues had 
tabled a motion for a decision on paiagraph 4 of 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 
. 1318. 
In accordance with Rule 52 (2), the motion 
was referred without debate to. the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
The report of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. 
Thompson, Chairman and Rapp6rte~. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Pieralli. 
The debate was closed; 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agreed to. (This order will 
be published as No. 81) 1• 
6. A new security order in Europe 
(Presentation of ll1ld debate on the report of the Politiclll 
Committee ll1ld rote on the draft recommeiUiation, 
Doe. 13091l11d amellflmellta) 
The report of the Political Committee was 
presented by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur. 
l. See page 19. 
MINUTES 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Hardy. 
Mrs. E", Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Jankowitsch (Observer from 
Austria), De Hoop Scheffer, Vacaru (Observer 
from Romania), Rubbi, Atkinson, Miiller and 
Roseta. 
Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Rockenbauer (Observer from 
Hungary), Feldmann, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and 
Mr. Pahtas (Observer from Greece). 
The debate was closed. · 
Mr. Caro, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
2. At the end of paragraph (iv) of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add: 
" and suggesting that increased concentration 
should be directed to these approaches. " 
Speakers: MM. Hardy and Caro. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
3. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out " effective ". 
Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 
MM. Caro, Hardy, Caro, Stoffelen and Hardy. 
The amendment was withdrawn. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Atkinson: 
1. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add a new' paragraph: 
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"7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, 
the leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming 
Helsinki summit to review current machinery 
for the prevention of conflict and the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, with a view to estab-
lishing a process of binding arbitration and 
peace enforcement. " 
Speakers: MM. Atkinson and Caro. 
The amendment was agreed to·. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 516) 1• 
7. WEU after Maastricht 
(Prese11tatio11 of tUUl debate 011 the report of the 
Political Commi"u, Doe. 1308) 
The report of the Political Committee was 
presented by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur. 
Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Antretter and Fioret. 
The debate was adjourned. 
8. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd 
June 1992, at 10 a. m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m. 
1. See page 20. 
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APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Biefnot 
Kempinaire 
Pecriaux 
Sarens 
France 
Mr. Bassinet 
Gaits (Beix) 
Caro 
Durand 
Lagorce (Jeambrun) 
Valleix 
Germany 
Mr. Antretter 
Mrs. Blunck 
MM. Bohm 
Italy 
Reimann (Biichler) 
Pfuhl (Holtz) 
Feldmann (lrmer) 
Maas 
(Meyer zu Bentrup) 
MUller 
Sprung 
Stein er 
MM. Fassino (Benassi) 
Giagu Demartini (Caccia) 
Mrs. Falcucci 
MM. Fioret 
Savio (Foschi) 
Mancia 
Martino 
Mezzapesa 
Pari si 
Colombo (Pecchioli) 
Pieralli 
Rodota 
Rubbi 
Luxembourg 
Mrs. Err 
Mr. Goerens 
Mrs. Lentz-Comette 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
De Hoop Scheffer 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
(Eisma) 
MM. Tummers (Jurgens) 
Stoffelen 
van Velzen 
Portugal 
MM. Brito 
Femandes Marques 
Machete 
Po~as Santos (Pinto) 
Roseta 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium Germany 
MM. Chevalier 
Kelchtermans 
Seeuws 
France 
MM. Baumel 
Collette 
Fomi 
Fourre 
Galley 
Gouteyron 
Jung 
Masseret 
Oehler 
Seitlinger 
Thyraud 
Vial-Massat 
Mr. 
Mrs. 
Mr. 
Italy 
MM. 
Biihler 
Kittelmann 
Menzel 
Reddemann 
von Schmude 
Terborg 
Vogel 
Filetti 
Gabbuggiani 
Manzolini 
Sinesio 
Stegagnini 
Spain 
MM. Lopez Valdivielso 
(Alvarez) 
Borderas 
Cuco 
Diaz 
Fabra 
Lopez Henares 
Nuiiez (Martinez) 
Moya 
Diaz de Mera (Perinat) 
Roman 
United Kingdom 
MM. Atkinson 
Litherland (Banks) 
Cox 
Rowe (Earl of Dundee) 
Faulds 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Hardy 
Miss Nicholson. (Jessel) 
Sir Russell J ohnston 
Lord Kirkhill 
Mr. Parry 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Lord Newall (Speed) 
Sir Donald Thompson 
MM. Thompson 
Ward 
Netherlands 
Mr. Verbeek 
Portugal 
MM. Amaral 
Candal 
Spain 
MM. Horns I Ferret 
de Puig 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Redmond 
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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ORDER 81 
on the composition of J}olitical groups 
The Assembly, 
INVITES the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine whether there should be a 
change in the minimum number of representatives or substitutes required to form a political group, 
bearing in mind the ratio to be established between this number and the total number of representa-
tives to the Assembly. 
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RECOMMENDATION 516 
on a new security order in Europe 
The Assembly, 
(i) Concerned about the revival of ethnic, territorial, nationalist and other conflicts in Central and 
Eastern Europe; 
(ii) Aware that the young and still fragile democracies in this region are all encountering serious eco-
nomic crises resulting from the transformation of their societies and economies; 
(iii) Recalling the principles of the November 1990 Charter of Paris in which all signatories con-
firmed their intention to maintain freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of minorities; 
(iv) Regretting the failure of CSCE attempts to solve conflicts, but noting the efforts being made at 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting to enhance the capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention, crisis 
management and the peaceful settlement of conflicts and suggesting that increased concentration 
should be directed to these approaches; 
(v) Welcoming the Treaty on European Union which should allow the member countries of the 
European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the 
requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of developing a joint foreign and 
security policy, which might in time lead to common defence; 
(vi) Noting that the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit give the WEU Council the ability to 
take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters; 
(vii) Underlining that the common foreign and security policy, and the accompanying further defi-
nition of WEU's role and the development of a common European defence policy will in the future 
also help to prepare Europeans to assume their responsibilities and contribute to the management of 
international crises and contingencies in which military assets could be required; 
(viii) Recalling that the positive aspect of the two Gulf exercises in 1987-88 and 1990-91 has demon-
strated that WEU can act as an effective European forum for establishing political concertation and 
practical co-operation among member countries in crisis situations in which their security interests are 
affected; 
(ix) Considering that Western Europe has a vital interest in present developments in Central and 
Eastern Europe insofar as the foundations are now being laid for parliamentary democracy and a 
market economy in nations which should eventually be able to join the European Union, in order to 
give greater assurances of peace and security for the whole of Europe; 
(x) Recalling Recommendation 500 on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe for European security, adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Starting this year, associate the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland with 
WEU; 
2. Conclude a peace-keeping agreement with those countries and accordingly hold, at least twice a 
year, a meeting of the Council enlarged to include their ministers for foreign affairs and defence; 
3. Also hold, at least once a year, consultations at ministerial level extended to the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria and Romania; 
4. Establish in WEU an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in 
order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe; 
5. Endow WEU with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions in consultation and 
co-operation with NATO and, where necessary, effectively to implement ad hoc contingency plans, tai-
lored to possible theatres of operation, including those within Europe; 
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6. Take all preparatory measures needed to provide WEU peace-keeping and peace-restoring forces 
at short notice if they are required for CSCE or United Nations operations on European territory and 
for WEU operations in the framework of agreements as mentioned in paragraph 2 of this recommen-
dation; 
7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the leaders 
of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the prevention of 
conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a process of binding arbi-
tration and peace enforcement. 
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Tuesday, 2nd June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (Presentation of 
the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the 
Council, Doe. 1315) ; Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
2. WEU after Maastricht (Resumed debate on the report of 
the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommen-
dation and draft order, Doe. 1308). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was- opened at 10.20 a.m. with Mr. Soel/, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendtuu:e register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. ChairmtUIShip-in-OJ]ice of the Council -
presentation of the second part 
of the thirty-serenth annual report of the Council, 
Doe. 1315 
Address by Mr. Kin/eel, Minister for Foreign 
A/lairs of Germany, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. K.inkel answered questions put by Mr. 
Hardy, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Aguiar, MM. 
Muller, Lopez Henares, Mrs. Blunck and Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
·. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair. 
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4. WEU after Maastricht 
(Ru111Mil tkbtlte 011 the report of the Politictll Committee llllll 
rota 011 the draft recomme1Ulatio11 llllll draft oiYUr, Doc.1308) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: Mr. Roman, Mrs. Ozver (Observer 
from Turkey), MM. Muller, Tummers, Parisi, 
Liapis (Observer from Greece), Machete, Toskay 
(Observer from Turkey), Roseta, Pahtas 
(Observer from Greece), Tarschys (Observer from 
Sweden), Eisma, Wielowieyski (Observer from 
Poland), Giagu Demartini and Caro. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, 
Chairman, replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to. 
(This recommendation will be published as 
No. 517) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agreed to. (This order will 
be published as No. 82) 2• 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m. 
1. See page 24. 
2. See page 26. 
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APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium 
MM. Biefnot 
Kempinaire 
Pecriaux 
Sarens 
France 
Mr. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Gaits (Beix) 
Caro 
Lagorce ( Collette) 
Durand 
Masseret 
Valleix 
Germany 
Mr. Antretter 
Mrs. Blunck 
MM. Reimann (Biichler) 
Marten (Biihler) 
Pfuhl (Holtz) 
Fe/dmann (Irmer) 
Mrs. Fischer (Kittelmann) 
MM. Maas 
(Meyer zu Bentrup) 
Muller 
Probst (von Schmude) 
Stein er 
Mrs. Terborg 
Mr. Vogel 
Italy 
MM. Fassino (Benassi) 
Giagu Demartini (Caccia) 
Mrs. Falcucci 
MM. Rubner (Filetti) 
Fioret 
Savio (Foschi) 
Mancia 
Martino 
Mezzapesa 
Pari si 
Colombo (Pecchioli) 
Mesoraca (Rodota) 
Rubbi 
Sinesio 
Luxembourg 
Mrs. Err 
Mr. Goerens 
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
De Hoop Scheffer 
Eisma 
Tummers (Jurgens) 
Stoffelen 
van Velzen 
Dees (Verbeek) 
Portugal 
MM. Rodrigues (Amaral) 
Brito 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium MM. Seitlinger 
Thyraud 
MM. Chevalier Vial-Massat 
Kelchtermans 
Seeuws Germany 
MM. Bohm France Menzel 
Reddemann MM. Forni Sprung Fourre 
Galley 
Gouteyron Italy 
Jeambrun MM. Gabbuggiani Jung Manzolini Oehler 
Mrs. Aguiar (Candal) 
MM. Fernandes Marques 
Machete 
Spain 
Reis Leite (Pinto) 
Roseta 
MM. Ruiz (Alvarez) 
Borderas 
Diaz 
Fabra 
Lopez Henares 
Nuiiez (Martinez) 
Moya 
Diaz de Mera (Perinat) 
Roman 
United Kingdom 
MM. Cox 
Bowden (Earl of Dundee) 
Faulds 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Hardy 
Bowel/ (Jessel) 
Sir Russell J ohnston 
Lord Kirkhill 
MM. Parry 
Redmond 
Sir John Hunt 
(Sir Dudley Smith) 
Sir Donald Thompson 
MM. Thompson 
Ward 
MM. Pieralli 
Stegagnini 
Spain 
MM. Cuco 
Horns I Ferret 
de Puig 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Atkinson 
Banks 
Speed 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 517 
011 WEU after MllllStrkht 
THE AssEMBLY welcomes the fact that the treaty drawn up in Maastricht in December 1991 
permits the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing 
a European Union meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of 
developing a joint foreign and security policy; 
It wishes this treaty to be ratified by all member countries; 
It is satisfied to note that the strengthening of WEU and the development of its activities are 
taking their place. in the process of setting up the union; 
It considers, however, that the wording of the declarations by the nine member countries of 
WEU is not precise enough; 
It notes that the WEU Council will consequently have to take forthwith a number of important 
decisions; 
It also notes with satisfaction that the decisions taken in Maastricht give the WEU Council the 
ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters; 
It recalls that the Maastricht Agreements are but one stage in the building of the European 
Union and that priority should still be given to setting up a union with substantial powers in the area of 
external and security policy; 
It further recalls that no time-limit has been set for the validity of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
It emphasises that the modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU an instrument for maintaining 
peace throughout Europe; 
IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Implement without delay, in areas within its purview, the decisions contained in the nine-power 
declarations in Maastricht and to this end: · 
1. Make it known that the modified Brussels Treaty remains one of the juridical bases of the union 
and that WEU, as it exists in its ministerial and parliamentary bodies, is, in parallel with the organs of 
the European Union, a part which will have its place in the European structure; 
2. Decide without delay the points to be considered in negotiations leading to the accession to 
WEU of each of the member countries of the European Community that apply for membership so as to 
ensure that accession signifies that new members adopt in full the principles guiding the joint foreign 
and defence policy, thus allowing WEU to intervene, if necessary, to apply them; 
3. Explain what is meant by the status of observer for those countries if they do not accede to 
WEU; 
4. Explain what is meant by the status of associate member of WEU for countries which are not 
members of the Community; 
5. Draw up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in 
some of WEU's operational activities; 
6. Make it abundantly clear to what extent accession to the Community may be granted to coun-
tries which do not intend to join WEU; 
7. Arrange forthwith the synchronisation of dates and places of meetings and the harmonisation of 
WEU's working methods with those of the European Union without, however, reducing the number 
and importance of specifically WEU ministerial meetings; 
8. Proceed here and now with installing the Permanent Council in Brussels and specify which 
responsibilities will then be assigned to the permanent representatives of member countries to NATO 
and to the European Community respectively; 
9. Continue to develop a defence and security policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties in 
force; 
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10. Examine how it is possible to organise the development of effective methods for conflict pre-
vention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes for use in 
the framework of the CSCE, the European Political Union or the United Nations; 
11. Have a directive drawn up and adopted on exports of armaments by member countries in the 
light of the decisions taken by the European Council in the context of joint foreign and security policy; 
12. Follow up quickly the intention expressed in Maastricht to set up a European armaments agency 
in the framework ofWEU, associate the activities of the IEPG closely with those ofWEU in this area 
and, with this in mind, continue to transmit to the Assembly the annual report of the IEPG; 
13. Associate the European Commission with the activities of that agency; 
14. Set all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly in the institutional framework of WEU; 
15. Instruct a working group to examine Europe's requirements in respect of deterrence in the new 
circumstances with a view to defining a European concept of the role of nuclear weapons and devel-
oping consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons; 
16. Seek agreement with NATO on adapting to the new European security requirements the appli-
cation of reciprocal " transparency " between the two institutions in accordance with the principles laid 
down in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in both political and operational matters; 
1 7. Specify the conditions for " complementarity " between WEU and NATO, in particular in regard 
to exchanges with countries which are not members of these organisations, in connection with possible 
operations designed to maintain peace inside and outside Europe; 
18. Establish procedure for consultations at an appropriate level prior to NATO ministerial 
meetings on matters on the agenda of those meetings; 
19. Pursue exchanges with those Central and Eastern European countries which so wish with a view 
to ensuring that the progressive rapprochement of those countries with the European Union is 
extended to include defence matters; 
20. Ask signatory states to correct the error in paragraph 6 of Article J .4 of the Maastricht Treaty 
noted in its reply to Written Question 297 before the text is submitted for ratification; 
21. Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council con-
siders the starting date is 1948, 
THE AsSEMBLY STRONGLY URGES 
That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration. 
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The Assembly, 
ORDER 82 
on c~operation between the Assembly of WEU 
and the European Parliament 
THIRD SITTING 
Welcomes the fact that the heads of state or of government of the member countries of WEU, 
meeting in Maastricht, decided to encourage " closer co-operation between the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament "; 
Considers that such co-operation is necessary and that it can be based only on the principles of 
equality between the two assemblies, the granting of reciprocal advantages and respect for responsibil-
ities and procedure specific to each of them; 
Believes that periodical meetings between committees of the two assemblies responsible for 
political affairs would allow useful exchanges of views on matters of common interest, 
INSTRUCfS ITS PRESIDENT 
1. To examine, with the President of the European Parliament, the conditions in which such 
co-operation might be organised by the two assemblies; 
2. To inform the Assembly of the conclusions of that exchange of views so that, accordingly, the 
Chairman of the Political Committee may take appropriate follow-up action. 
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Tuesday, 2nd June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. WEU: the operational organisation (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1307, addendum and 
amendments). 
2. Application of United Nations Resolution 757 (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the Defence Com-
mittee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1319 
and amendment). 
3. Arms export policy (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1305). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soe/1, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Anendance register 
The names of the representatives and 
subsitutes who signed the register of attendance 
are given in Appendix I. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. WEU: the operatioiUll organisation 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of tile Defence 
Comminu and vote on the draft recommelfdlltion, 
Doe. 1307, addendum and amendments) 
The report of the Defence Committee was 
presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and 
Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. 
Steiner, Lopez Henares and Caro. 
The debate was closed. 
Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Moya on behalf of the Socialist Group: 
3. In the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation, leave out paragraph (vii). 
Speakers: MM. Moya, Caro and Sir Dudley 
Smith. 
The amendment was negatived. 
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An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman: 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) and 
insert: 
" deciding the parameters for closer military 
co-operation in the fields of logistics, 
transport and training and considering an 
eventual mandate for action;" 
Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Sir 
Dudley Smith. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman: 
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after "production" add "and reduc-
tion". 
Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Sir 
Dudley Smith. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. 
Moya on behalf of the Socialist Group: 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 7. 
Speakers: Mr. Moya, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
and Sir Dudley Smith. 
The amendment was negatived. 
Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen. 
In accordance with Rules 35 (2) and 36 (b) of 
the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded 
to vote by roll-call on the amended draft recom-
mendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
MINUTES 
agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix 11) 
by 34 votes to 23 with one abstention. Fifteen 
people who had signed the register of attendance 
did not take part in the vote. (This recommen-
dation will be published as No. 518) 1• 
Speakers (explanation of vote): Mr. Steiner, 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Stoffelen, De Hoop 
Scheffer, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Caro. 
4. Application of United Nations Raolution 757 
(Pruatlllion of flllll debtzte on tlu report 
of tlu Defence C6mminu 
t111d vote on tlu drqft m:omtneiUitltWn, 
Doe. 1319 tllld IUfleiUlment) 
The report of the Defence Committee was 
presented by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, 
Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston, MM. 
Stegagnini, Tummers, Caro, De Decker and 
Rodrigues. 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Miiller, Haekkerup (Observer 
from Denmark), Roseta, Soysal (Observer from 
Turkey) and Martino. 
Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Parisi, Scovacricchi, Eisma, 
Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Savio. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, and Sir 
Dudley Smith, Chairman, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Feldmann: 
1. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add a new paragraph: 
1. See page 31. 
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"Take immediate initiatives to ensure that 
war criminals will be judged following the 
guidelines of the proposal of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 
May 1992." 
Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston and Sir Dudley 
Smith. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 519) 2• 
5. Arms export policy 
(Presentation of and debtzte on tile report 
of tlu Tecllnologictzl tllld Aero&JHW C6mminu 
and vote on tlu drqft m:ommetulation, Doe. 1305) 
The report of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee was presented by Mr. Aarts, 
Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Gonzalez-Laxe and P~as 
Santos. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Aarts, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lopez 
Henares, Chairman, replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to. 
(This recommendation will be published as 
No. 520) 3• 
6. Date, time and orders of the dtly 
of the neXt sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd 
June 1992, at 10.30 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m. 
2. See page 33. 
3. See page 34. 
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APPENDIX I 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Parisi 
Colombo (Pecchioli) 
MM. De Decker (Chevalier) Pieralli 
Kelchtermans Sinesio 
Pecriaux Stegagnini 
Sarens 
Luxembourg 
France 
Mrs. Err 
Mr. Caro Mr. Goerens 
Mrs. Lentz-Comette 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Mr. Antretter 
Mrs. Blunck MM. Aarts 
MM. Reimann (Biichler) De Hoop Scheffer 
Pfuhl (Holtz) Eisma 
Mrs. Fischer (Kittelmann) Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
MM. Meyer zu Bentrup (Jurgens) 
M tiller Mr. Stoffelen 
Zierer (Reddemann) Mrs. Soutendijk van 
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Scovacricchi (Caccia) Por;as Santos (Brito) 
Rubner (Filetti) Femandes Marques 
Fioret Machete 
Savio (Foschi) Reis Leite (Pinto) 
Martino Roseta 
Mezzapesa Curto (Candal) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium MM. Gouteyron 
Jeambrun 
MM. Biefnot Jung 
Kempinaire Masseret 
Seeuws Oehler 
Seitlinger 
Thyraud 
France Valleix 
Vial-Massat 
MM. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Beix Germany 
Collette 
Durand MM. Bohm 
Fomi Biihler 
Fourre Irmer 
. Galley Menzel 
Spain 
MM. Ruiz (Alvarez) 
Borderas 
Cuco 
Garcia Sanchez (Diaz) 
Fabra 
Gonzalez-Laxe 
(Horns I Ferret) 
Lopez Henares 
Nunez (Martinez) 
Moya 
Diaz de M era (Perinat) 
Mrs. Guirado (de Puig) 
Mr. Roman 
United Kingdom 
Baroness Hooper (Atkinson) 
Mr. Cox 
Earl of Dundee 
Mr. Faulds 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Lord Newall (Jessel) 
Lord Mackie of Benshie 
(Sir Russell Johnston) 
Lord Kirkhill 
MM. Parry 
Redmond 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Mr. Rathbone (Speed) 
Sir Donald Thompson 
MM. Thompson 
Ward 
MM. von Schmude 
Sprung 
Italy 
Mrs. Falcucci 
MM. Gabbuggiani 
Mancia 
Manzolini 
Rodota 
Rubbi 
United Kingdom 
MM. Banks 
Hardy 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on WEU: the operational organisation 
(Doe. 1307) 1• 
Ayes .......................................... 34 
Noes .......................................... 23 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
MM. Aarts 
Ruiz (Alvarez) 
Baroness Hooper (Atkinson) 
MM. P()fas Santos (Brito) 
Caro 
De Decker (Chevalier) 
De Hoop Scheffer 
Earl of Dundee 
Mr. Fabra 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
Mr. Femandes Marques 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Antretter 
Mrs. Blunck 
MM. Borderas 
Reimann (Biichler) 
Cox 
Cuco 
Garcia Sanchez (Diaz) 
Eisma 
Ayes 
MM. Savio (Foschi) 
Goerens 
Lord Newa/1 (Jessel) 
Lord Mackie of Benshie 
(Sir Russell Johnston) 
Mr. Kelchtermans 
Mrs. Fischer (Kittelmann) 
Mrs. Lentz-Comette 
MM. Lopez Henares 
Meyer zu Bentrup 
Mezzapesa 
MUller 
Noes 
Mrs. Err 
MM. Faulds 
Pfuhl (Holtz) 
Gonzalez-Laxe 
(Horns I Ferret) 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
(Jurgens) 
Lord Kirkhill 
Abstentions 
Mr. Tummers (Verbeek) 
MM. Diaz de Mera (Perinat) 
Reis Leite (Pinto) 
Zierer (Reddemann) 
Roseta 
Sarens 
Sir Dudley Smith 
MM. Rathbone (Speed) 
Stegagnini 
Sir Donald Thompson 
Mrs. Soutendijk van 
Appe/doorn 
(van Velzen) 
Mr. Ward 
MM. Nunez (Martinez) 
Moya 
Parry 
Pecriaux 
Mrs. Guirado (de Puig) 
MM. Roman 
Stein er 
Stoffelen 
Mrs. Terborg 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 518 
on WEU: the operational organisation 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming and endorsing the WEU declaration made at Maastricht on 1Oth December 1991, 
whereby member states agreed on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence 
identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters; 
(ii) Pleased that member states are decided to strengthen the operational rOle of WEU in the 
longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time 
lead to a common defence; 
(iii) Delighted at the reaffirmation, therefore, of WEU's paramount role as the unique instrument to 
express Europe's defence identity, and determined to continue to provide the parliamentary dimension 
required to oversee WEU's operational responsibilities; 
(iv) Confident that the setting up of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n will enable WEU to play a 
fuller operational role in co-operation with all other bodies concerned with verification, crisis man-
agement and environmental control; 
(v) Recalling recommendations: 
- 456 on naval aviation; 
- 469 on the state of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre 
and the north; 
- 488 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf; 
- 493 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region; 
- 498 on the Gulf crisis: lessons for Western European Union; 
- 502 on arms control: force reductions and the role of multinational units; 
- 505 on the role of women in the armed forces; 
- 512 on operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis, 
as well as Written Question 294 put to the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on 17th December 1991; 
(vi) Gratified that so many of its recommendations above have been accepted by the Council, at least 
in part, and trusting that all its recent recommendations, touching on the operational aspects ofWEU, 
will now be re-examined with a view to implementation within WEU's new operational context; 
(vii) Conscious that as long as a minimum nuclear deterrent is to be maintained by any WEU 
member state it should remain effective and credible; 
(viii) Considering that Europe's arms procurement needs would be best served by creating a European 
Armaments Agency which would associate all European countries so wishing, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Take the necessary decisions at the next ministerial meeting to give substance to the WEU 
declaration at Maastricht by: 
(a) agreeing the arrangements for setting up a WEU military planning cell with appropriate and 
detailed terms of reference; 
(b) deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport 
and training, and giving the necessary mandate for action to the relevant WEU bodies; 
(c) confirming the need for a committee of WEU chiefs of defence staff and considering the cre-
ation of a WEU military committee; 
(d) progressing the idea of earmarking certain forces for WEU and giving particular consider-
ation to the creation of a European rapid action force to comprise elements of the future 
European corps and airmobile units from those WEU member nations possessing such 
forces; 
2. Investigate as a matter of priority the various areas for possible WEU action once an operational 
organisation is in place; 
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3. Define the status and responsibilities of associate members and observers to include the possi-
bility of participation in WEU's operational activities (notably the work of the Torrej6n Centre) and 
also give due consideration to including other NATO states or European Community associates in 
WEU operations on an ad hoc basis; 
4. Ensure that the WEU satellite centre in Torrej6n establishes firm links with: 
(a) the WEU military planning cell to be established in Brussels; 
(b) NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee; 
(c) the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre; 
(d) the Open Skies Consultative Committee; 
5. Set up a defence representatives procurement sub-group to examine ways to bring WEU and 
IEPG closer together, instituting a special liaison with the IEPG secretariat in Lisbon; 
6. Include co-operation on armaments production and reduction on the agenda for discussion with 
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe; 
7. Encourage France and the United Kingdom in co-operation if possible to maintain an effective 
and credible minim1lfll nuclear deterrent and, in parallel, consider the desirability of instituting a WEU 
" nuclear consultation group " to give practical expression to the principles of nuclear deterrence reite-
rated in the Hague Platform as well as helping to define a European opinion on nuclear disarmament 
and anti-proliferation measures; 
8. Ensure that all arrangements aimed at giving a stronger operational role to WEU are discussed 
with the Atlantic Alliance to make them fully compatible with present and future military dispositions 
designed to safeguard allied collective defence and institute channels of communication to maintain 
such transparency and complementarity between NATO and WEU. 
32 
TEXTS ADOPTED FOURTH SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 519 
on the application of United Nations Resolution 757 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis; 
(ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is 
currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia; 
(iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on 
Saturday, 30th May 1992; 
(iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro 
to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective; 
(v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the 
application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appro-
priate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measures should be 
considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect; 
Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines 
of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 520 
on arms export policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalls the international public debate during and immediately after the Gulf war expressing 
embarrassment regarding earlier large sales of arms to Iraq and calling for reductions in the interna-
tional sale of armaments; 
(ii) Is preoccupied that continuing uncontrolled international armaments transfers might worsen 
existing tensions and latent conflicts in a number of world regions; 
(iii) Also fears that economic difficulties among the members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact may 
encourage the development of the black market in armaments because of the large stocks that exist; 
(iv) Welcomes therefore the declared determination of the CSCE member countries to support the 
new United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers and to provide it with comprehensive 
information; 
(v) Underlines the rising danger of nuclear proliferation and know-how and the imperfection of 
existing international regimes responsible for preventing the dissemination of chemical and biological 
weaponry and of missile technology; 
(vi) Welcomes therefore the decisions of France and the People's Republic of China to sign the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty- and of North Korea to join the nuclear safeguards agreement; 
(vii) Also welcomes the decision of the European Community, the United States, Russia and Japan to 
establish an international Science and Technology Centre in Russia in order to discourage scientists of 
the former Soviet Union from selling nuclear, biological and chemical know-how to third coun-
tries; 
(viii) Recalls the need to restrict arms exports and to harmonise arms export policies and regulations 
governing dual use items within the European Community prior to the abolition of frontiers and 
internal controls on 1st January 1993; 
(ix) Also recalls the special responsibility of Western European Union in the arms export area since 
it has implications for the defence and essential security interests of its member countries; 
THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Elaborate and implement the necessary decisions of the European Union for a harmonised arms 
export policy restricted in accordance with common criteria identified by the European Council in 
Luxembourg; 
2. Take a joint initiative in the United Nations in order: 
(a) to make the information to be sent in to the United Nations Register oflnternational Arms 
Transfers a binding obligation for all United Nations member countries and enforceable by 
sanctions; 
(b) to call on all United Nations states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safe-
guard agreements making the United Nations Security Council responsible for supervising 
their observation; 
(c) to strengthen the IAEA's role by increasing its budget, giving it the power of sanctions and 
placing it under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations; 
(d) to draw up an international convention in order to complement the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and to prevent the export of nuclear know-how or technology; 
(e) to call for the early conclusion of a worldwide convention on chemical weapons and to make 
the chemical list of the Australia Group a worldwide exportation ban list under United 
Nations supervision; 
(f) to make the missile technology control regime a worldwide regime; 
3. Call upon the next Munich economic summit to held in July 1992 to support vigorously the 
strengthened role of the United Nations in monitoring a worldwide arms export regime; 
4. Urge its member countries to provide financial contributions for establishing and operating the 
International Science and Technology Centre in Russia. 
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Wednesday, 3rd June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
Western European Union for the financial year 1992 (Pre-
sentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1303). 
2. New Euro-American relations (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1310 and amendment). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10.40 a. m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union 
for the financial year 1992 
(Pruentation of the report of the Committee 
on Budgetary A/Jain turd Admini&tration turd 11ote 
on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1303) 
The report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by 
Lord Mackie of Benshie, Rapporteur. 
Speaker: Mr. Rathbone, Chairman. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to. 
(This recommendation will be published as 
No. 521) 1• 
Mr. Fourre, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
l. See page 38. 
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4. New Euro-American relations 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Political Committee and 11ote 
on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1310 and amendment) 
The report of the Political Committee was 
presented by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Antretter, Rodrigues, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Fabra, Machete, 
Nuiiez, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Caro, 
Roseta, Mrs. Terborg and Mr. Lamminen 
(Observer from Finland). 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Soell, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers. 
Speaker (point of order) : Lord Mackie of 
Benshie. 
Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. I) was tabled by Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward: 
1. At the end of paragraph (v) ofthe preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add: 
" insisting in this connection that, in 
accordance with the Maastricht Agreement, 
the Franco-German Eurocorps must b.e placed 
under WEU authority and that its arrange-
ments must strengthen the alliance military 
structure; " 
MINUTES 
Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Caro, 
Soell and Stoffelen. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation 
will be published as No. 522) 1• 
1. See page 39. 
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5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m. 
APPENDIX FIFfH SilTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Rauti (Filetti) 
Fioret 
MM. Kelchtermans Savio (Foschi) 
Pecriaux Mancia 
Sarens Martino 
Mezzapesa 
France Pari si 
· Colombo (Pecchioli) 
MM. Baumel Rubner (Rodota) 
Gaits (Beix) Rubbi 
Caro Sinesio 
Fourre 
Hunault (Galley) 
Valleix Luxembourg 
Germany Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens 
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Lentz-Comette 
Mrs. Blunck 
Mrs. Fischer (Bohm) 
MM. Biichler Netherlands 
Pfuhl (Holtz) 
MUller MM. De Hoop Scheffer 
Reddemann Eisma 
Soell Stoffelen 
Zierer (Sprung) Eversdijk (van Velzen) Dees (Verbeek) Stein er 
Mrs. Terborg 
Mr. Vogel Portugal 
Italy MM. Rodrigues (Amaral) 
Curto (Brito) 
Mr. Fassino (Caccia) Po~as Santos (Femandes 
Mrs. Falcucci Marques) 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium 
MM. Biefnot 
Chevalier 
Kempinaire 
Seeuws 
France 
MM. Bassinet 
Collette 
Durand 
Fomi 
Gouteyron 
Jeambrun 
Jung 
Masseret 
Oehler 
Seitlinger 
Thyraud 
Vial-Massat 
Germany 
MM. Biihler 
Irmer 
Kittelmann 
Menzel 
Italy 
Meyer zu Bentrup 
von Schmude 
MM. Benassi 
Gabbuggiani 
Manzolini 
Pieralli 
Stegagnini 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
Jurgens 
MM. Machete 
Reis Leite (Pinto) 
Roseta 
Spain 
MM. Ruiz (Alvarez) 
· ··norderas 
Cuco 
Diaz 
Fabra 
Lopez Henares 
Nufiez (Martinez) 
Moya 
Lopez V aldivielso 
(Perinat) 
Palacios (de Puig) 
Roman 
United Kingdom 
Baroness Hooper (Atkinson) 
Lord Newa/1 
(Dame Peggy Fenner) 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Lord Mackie of Benshie 
(Sir Russell Johnston) 
Lord Kirkhill 
Mr. Parry 
Sir Dudley Smith 
MM. Atkinson (Speed) 
Thompson 
Rathbone (Ward) 
Portugal 
Mr. Candal 
Spain 
Mr. Horns I Ferret 
United Kingdom 
MM. Banks 
Cox 
Earl of Dundee 
MM. Faulds 
Hardy 
Jessel 
Redmond 
Sir Donald Thompson 
l. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 521 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Westem European Union 
for the financial year 1992 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that: 
FIFfH SITTING 
(a) in Maastricht the ministers of the WEU member countries decided to transfer the 
Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels; 
(b) the budget of the Secretariat-General of WEU for 1992 does not consider the financial impli-
cations of this transfer and is therefore of a provisional nature; 
(c) credits in this budget, in particular those relating to the mission expenses of members of the 
Secretariat-General of WEU, are estimated on the basis of restrictive criteria; 
(d) the budget of the Institute for Security Studies sets out the financial requirements of that 
Institute without modifying the organogram authorised last year; 
(e) the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are extremely cost-effective; 
(/} problems relating to staff policy are still being studied by the co-ordination bodies concerned 
and that, among these, the problem of financing the pension scheme is becoming increas-
ingly important; 
(ii) Welcoming the fact that the budgets of the ministerial organs ofWEU are presented clearly and 
efficiently and allow a detailed examination of those organs' needs, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Give the Secretariat-General the wherewithal to exercise its activities during a period which, 
although transitional, is no less important and complex; 
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural changes that are envisaged on the occasion of the transfer 
of the Secretariat-General to Brussels and of the measures taken in respect of staff not wishing to be 
transferred; 
3. Inform the. Assembly of decisions taken in regard to staff policy in the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations, particularly in respect of the financing of the pension scheme. 
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RECOMMENDATION 522 
on new Euro-American relations 
The Assembly, 
(i) Agreeing that the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the 
further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effec-
tiveness of the Atlantic Alliance and that the enhancement of the role and responsibility of the 
European members is an important basis for transforming the alliance; 
(ii) Noting that NATO's Rome declaration on peace and security calls for a new security archi-
tecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe com-
plement each other; 
(iii) Convinced that the Atlantic Alliance will be of lasting value as long as it provides the essential 
transatlantic link, demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe; 
(iv) Recognising that the development of WEU as the instrument for a common European security 
and defence policy is a logical and inevitable consequence of a determined effort by European coun-
tries to achieve greater integration; 
(v) Convinced that the creation of genuine multinational forces in a European framework, which 
could be deployed in both NATO and WEU operations, is the best guarantee for future security in 
Europe, insisting in this connection that, in accordance with the Maastricht agreement, the Franco-
German Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that its arrangements must strengthen 
the alliance military structure; 
(vi) Considering that in some quarters in the United States there is still uncertainty due to lack of 
insight into and understanding of the motivation of Western European nations for developing a spe-
cific European security and defence identity, notwithstanding the multiple exchanges and consulta-
tions taking place in the different existing organs and institutions of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(vii) Recognising the useful role being accomplished by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in 
making European views known to the foreign policy and defence community in the United States; 
(viii) Aware that, notwithstanding the repeated assurances given by the present American adminis-
tration, there is uncertainty over the level and corresponding effectiveness of American troops based in 
Europe; 
(ix) Recalling that, in Rome, all NATO member states pledged to support all steps in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and to give practical assistance in helping them to succeed 
in this difficult transition; 
(x) Considering the apparent growing anomaly between the determination of the United States to 
exert political influence on developments in Europe and its diminishing will and ability to maintain a 
military presence and financial-economic commitments in Europe; 
(xi) Considering that notwithstanding the recent Canadian decision to withdraw all its forces from 
Europe, Canada remains committed to NATO and Europe's security by retaining the ability to send 
contingency forces and must therefore be included in the transatlantic dialogue with WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Define more clearly, in consultation with its transatlantic allies, the respective roles of the armed 
forces of NATO, WEU and the United States in maintaining security and peace in Europe; 
2. Establish with the United States more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance of United 
States forces in Europe; 
3. Continue to support the role of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in making European 
views on security better known across the Atlantic, also by publishing and disseminating more widely 
the results of its work; 
4. Co-ordinate more closely the policy of allied partners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the 
security needs of the new democracies in Central Europe, while recognising that, for the moment, no 
formal security guarantees can be provided; 
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5. Take account of the fact that a new concept of security means developing capabilities allowing 
the deployment at the appropriate time of political, as well as diplomatic, economic, financial and mil-
itary means for peace-keeping and peace-restoring; 
6. (a) Reinforce the joint allied political instruments in order to make sure that, in crisis pre-
vention, a joint assessment can be made as a precondition for co-ordinated action; 
(b) Establish a joint high level group consisting of political, diplomatic, economic and military 
experts in order to make up-to-date threat assessments and develop adequate models to respond to 
such threats. 
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Wednesday, 3rd June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Address by Mr. Riihe, Minister of Defence of 
Germany. 
2. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France. 
3. The development of a European space-based observation 
system (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1304 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Soe/1, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Anendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly 
A candidate had been proposed for one of the 
two remaining posts of Vice-President, namely, 
Mr. Martinez. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
President by acclamation. 
Mr. Martinez was elected Vice-President by 
acclamation. 
4. Address by Mr. Riihe, Minister 
of Defence of Germany 
Mr. Riihe, Minister of Defence of Germany, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Riihe answered questions put by Baroness 
Hooper, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Borderas, 
Fioret, Stegagnini, Lopez Henares, Caro, van 
der Linden and Pahtas (Observer from Greece). 
The sitting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.15 p. m. 
5. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister 
of Defence of France 
Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France, 
addressed the Assembly. 
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Mr. Joxe answered questions put by Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Stegagnini, Pahtas 
(Observer from Greece), van der Linden and 
Martinez. 
The sitting was suspended at 5.15 p.m. and 
resumed at 5.20 p.m. 
6. The development of a European space-based 
observation system 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 
and POte on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1304 and amendments) 
The report of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee was presented by Mr. Valleix, 
Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Borderas and F ourre. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lopez 
Henares, Chairman, replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Fourre: 
1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, after " WEU Satellite Centre " 
add " , a first step towards the future creation of 
a European agency for verification by satellite, ". 
Speakers: MM. Fourre, Valleix and Lopez 
Henares. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Fourre: 
2. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, after " experience " add, " on 
MINUTES 
the one hand, " and, at the end of the paragraph, 
add "and, on the other, of national agencies". 
Speakers: MM. Fourre and Lopez Henares. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Fourre: 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "wider organisations with a 
European, Atlantic or universal vocation" and 
insert " any other organisation " . 
Speakers: MM. Fourre, Stegagnini and 
Valleix. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. 
Fourre: 
4. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add the following paragraph: 
"Reaffirm its will to set up in successive 
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stages, of which the Satellite Centre is the first 
step, a European agency for verification by 
satellite. " 
Speakers: MM. Fourre and Lopez Henares. 
The amendment was negatived. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 523) 1• 
7. Date, time 1111d orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting 
were agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 4th 
June 1992, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.,20 p.m. 
1. See page 44. 
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43 
TEXT ADOPTED SIXTH SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 523 
on the dnelopment of a European space-based observation system 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcomes the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and the fact that the management team 
to study conditions for developing a European space-based observation system has started work; 
(ii) Emphasises that this first multinational effort to make use of space to establish a control system 
for international peace-keeping and security is unique in the world; 
(iii) Underlines the importance of obtaining public support in order to carry out the planned project; 
(iv) Considers the definition of the tasks of the system requires a more intensive, regular dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly than has been the case hitherto; 
(v) Recalls its Recommendations 465 and 466; 
(vi) Welcomes the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty and trusts it will be ratified as soon as pos-
sible by all the countries concerned; 
(vii) Is convinced that, in setting up the observation system, WEU should take the fullest possible 
advantage of the services and experience, on the one hand, of the European Space Agency (ESA) in car-
rying out earth observation programmes and, on the other, of national agencies; 
(viii) Recalls the work carried out by the IEPG in the context of the Euclid programme on radar tech-
nology and satellite observation; 
(ix) Considers it essential for the principle of transparency to be applied to the interpretation of sat-
ellite data and for all aspects of the activities of the Centre and observation system as a whole to be 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny, 
THE AssEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Design the planned system in such a way as to serve the security of WEU member countries and 
also to be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation; 
2. Inform the Assembly regularly 
(a) about each stage of the entry into service of the Satellite Centre, its organogram and the 
progress of feasibility studies; 
(b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the Centre and establish the 
observation system; 
3. Define 
(a) the consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite verification and for the tasks of the 
WEU Satellite Centre; 
(b) the exact significance of the expression crisis observation and the consequences of closer 
WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of the Centre and of the space-based 
observation system; 
and submit its conclusions to the Assembly; 
4. At the earliest possible opportunity, contact the European Space Agency (ESA) in order to work 
out with it the possibilities for co-operation between WEU and ESA in space-based observation and 
arrange to be represented at the next meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in Spain in November 
1992; 
5. Contact the IEPG to co-ordinate the work carried out by that group on space technology in the 
context of the Euclid programme with WEU's activities in this area; 
6. Keep the public better informed about its space policy. 
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SEVENTH SITTING 
Thursday, 4th June 1992 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Address by Mr. Bjorck, Minister of Defence of Sweden. I 2. Arms control: CSCE and WEU (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1306). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Soe/1, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Examination of credentials 
The President informed the Assembly that he 
had received the requisite documents from the 
Dutch Parliament, informing the Assembly of a 
change in the credentials of the Netherlands 
Delegation, to the effect that Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman became a representative in place of 
Mr. Jurgens, who became a substitute. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly ratified the credentials 
of these members of the Netherlands Dele-
gation, whose ratification had not been commu-
nicated by the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, subject to 
conformity with their subsequent ratification by 
that Assembly. 
4. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly 
A candidate had been proposed for the last 
remaining post of Vice-President, namely, Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
President by acclamation. 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman was elected Vice-
President by acclamation. 
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The President informed the Assembly that the 
order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents 
according to age was Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 
Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Machete, Mr. 
Fourre and Mrs. Err. 
5. Changes in the membership of committees 
In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
changes in the membership of committees pro-
posed by the Spanish Delegation: 
Political Committee 
- Mr. Horns I Ferret as a titular member. 
Technological and Aerospace Committee 
- MM. Gonzalez-Laxe and Lopez Henares as 
titular members; 
- Mr. Lopez Valdivielso as an alternate 
member. 
Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges 
- Mr. Diaz de Mera as a titular member 
and Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe as an alternate 
member. 
Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations 
- Mr. Horns I Ferret as an alternate 
member. 
MINUTES 
6. Address by Mr. Bj6rck, Minister 
of Defence of Sweden 
Mr. Bjorck, Minister of Defence of Sweden, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Bjorck answered questions put by Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Caro, V alleix, 
Stoffelen, Steiner, Stegagnini, de Puig and 
Martinez. 
7. Arms control: CSCE and WEU 
(Pme11tatio11 of tUUl debate 011 the report 
of the De/e~~ee Comminu 
tUUJ IIOtt 011 the dnz/t reeommtrultJtioll, Doe. 1306) 
The report of the Defence Committee was 
presented by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Moya. 
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Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
Speaker: Mr. Fabra. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to. 
(This recommendation will be published as No. 
524) 1• 
8. Adjournment of the session 
The President adjourned the thirty-eighth 
ordinary session of the Assembly. 
The sitting was closed at 11.55 a.m. 
l. See page 48. 
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RECOMMENDATION 524 
on arms control: CSCE and WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the signing of the Maastricht Agreements which give new impetus to the building of 
the European Union and offer prospects of future joint defence; 
(ii) Aware of the challenge to WEU raised in the Maastricht agreements which make WEU an 
integral part of the European Union and, in the long run, the instrument of a joint defence policy; 
(iii) Pleased that the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU declaration confirm the role of WEU and 
therefore of its parliamentary Assembly as Europe's paramount defence body both at present and for 
the foreseeable future; 
(iv) Congratulating the Council and the Secretary-General on the various initiatives taken by WEU 
in the realm of arms control, notably over verification and for open skies, and pleased generally with 
the fuller and more constructive answers given to Assembly recommendations; 
(v) Taking into account the development of the peace and disarmament process now under way in 
Europe and in particular welcoming the 1992 Vienna document as a major contribution to this process; 
(vi) Aware of the importance of current negotiations on European security and arms control being 
held in the framework of the Helsinki meeting; 
(vii) Following attentively the process of political and military restructuring in the states of the 
former Soviet Union; 
(viii) Convinced that WEU must take part in the system of peace and security outlined by the 
organisation and operation of the new CSCE structures and that consequently our own Assembly 
should take every opportunity to support the development of the CSCE Assembly, both politically and 
practically; 
(ix) Considering that there should be much greater co-operation between the CSCE and the North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council, even to the extent of combining the two; · 
(x) Recalling Recommendations 481, 513 and 514 and restating in particular two recommendations 
which it urges the Council to tackle without further prevarication: 
" Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of 
recent changes but which safeguards European interests; 
Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environ-
mental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study 
and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this 
important domain; ", 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Pursue its' action to promote peace and disarmament in co-operation with all international 
organisations dealing with security problems, in particular by encouraging close co-operation between 
the member countries of WEU so that they may express a joint position during the negotiations at the 
CSCE conference in Helsinki and future conferences; 
2. Afford political and practical assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries in over-
coming problems linked with military and strategic reorganisation by helping to speed up the imple-
mentation of decisions essential for their full integration in the collective security system being set up 
in the framework of the CSCE; 
3. Establish contacts with the" neutral" countries applying for membership of the European Com-
munity so as to examine jointly the evolution of the present situation, the future of European security 
and progress to be made to meet the commitments entered into in Maastricht; 
4. Establish co-operation links with Central and Eastern European countries so wishing; 
5. Contribute to the adoption and application of the new confidence- and security-building mea-
sures (CSBMs) to be included in the Helsinki final document by co-ordinating member countries' 
action in this area; 
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6. Promote the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its immediate application to all the CSCE coun-
tries, in particular the new states of the CIS, by taking part in the name of WEU in procedure for infor-
mation, control and verification of disarmament; 
7. Help to apply the Open Skies Treaty by offering the support and means available to WEU, for 
instance the Torrej6n observation satellite centre; 
8. Through its deliberations, contribute to planning the future European defence system and the 
reduction of armed forces to allow the establishment of a true security system corresponding to the new 
geostrategic situation of the European continent; 
9. Resolutely support plans to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and to reduce nuclear 
weapons, by adopting joint positions, bearing constantly in mind the strict application of the non-
proliferation treaty (NPT), encourage the establishment of a register of arms transfers by the United 
Nations and complete this initiative with measures aimed at limiting arms exports at world level; 
10. Take the following immediate steps, under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office: 
(a) continue the WEU consultations in Vienna which have proved so effective an impetus for 
NATO action in the domain of arms control; 
(b) ensure that such consultations bring a positive approach to helping refine disarmament dis-
cussions among the Twelve in Helsinki; 
(c) further specific arms control initiatives already begun with certain CIS states, notably 
Russia; 
(d) include discussion on a possible CSCE security treaty and on open skies co-operation at the 
forthcoming ministerial meeting between the WEU Nine and the Central and Eastern 
European Eight; 
(e) consult the non-WEU members of NATO with a view to establishing the NACC as part of 
the infrastructure of the CSCE. 
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 1st June 1992 
SUMMARY 
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
4. Tributes to two former members of the Assembly. 
S. Examination of credentials. 
6. Observers. 
7. Election of the President. 
8. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
9. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
10. The situation in Yugoslavia (Motion for a recommen-
dation with a request for urgent procedure, Does. 1316 
and 1317). 
11. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part 
of the session (Doe. 1300). 
12. The situation in Yugoslavia (Motion for a recommen-
dation with a request for urgent procedure, Does. 1316 
and 1317). 
Speakers: MM. De Decker and Martino. 
13. Changes in the membership of committees. 
14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Stegagnini, 
Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 11.35 a.m. with Mr. Lagorce, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The sitting 
is open. 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, I declare open the thirty-eighth ordinary 
session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
3. Address by the ProJ?isional President 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - It is with 
sadness that I open the session of our Assembly 
today as Provisional President. 
We had all expected to renew Mr. Pontillon's 
term of office so that he could preside over our 
work for a third year. But he took his leave of us 
before the end of his second term, shortly after 
l. See page 15. 
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the death of Mr. Sarti, who had long been a 
Vice-President of our Assembly. 
I shall not reiterate what Mrs. Lentz-Cornette 
said about them at the opening of the Berlin 
symposium nor the tribute I paid them at the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in Stras-
bourg. I should simply like to say today how 
sorry I am that Mr. Pontillon was not personally 
able to complete the task he was so attached to. I 
should also, however, like to confirm my con-
viction that his successor whom we are about to 
appoint and whom I wish every success, will be 
able to inspire in this Assembly the drive 
and courage to make ambitious plans and the 
wisdom to put them into effect. 
His task will not be easy. We are entering an 
era where forces that had long been at work but 
which we had generally failed to appreciate are 
setting a new scene before us, whose broad fea-
tures need to be defined. 
We thought that Europe had learnt the lesson 
of two world wars and cast out the evil spirits of 
nationalism. But now these illusions are gone. 
Barbarism is again knocking on the door. 
Shortly after signing the Paris Charter which 
was destined to found a new order of justice and 
peace as regards respect for human rights and 
those of the citizen, people are at each others' 
throats and massacres are taking place before 
our very eyes, whilst we just look on, incapable 
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The President (continued) 
of finding the right answer in a situation for 
which we were unprepared. 
At least these problems in Europe are of a 
limited nature but that is not true of the threats 
to our civilisation from certain wide-ranging 
trends whose progress has the inexorability of 
geological change. 
The steady increase in the world's population, 
with tragic effects in certain regions, the growth 
of pollution and the spread of famine and 
disease in certain areas of the world throw doubt 
on whether we can preserve our islet of pros-
perity on a planet where most societies have not 
been able to cope with the revolution brought 
about by modem technology. 
Lastly, there are fresh threats arising from the 
increase in ethnic or religious fanaticism com-
bined with the problems brought about by the 
inability to manage growth in both population 
and industry. 
Yet our development is the consequence of 
rational progress involving the simultaneous 
evolution of technology, the economy and society. 
There is everything to fear from a world where 
logic is disregarded because irrational forces are 
unleashed. Modem science, for example, is 
employed to realise dreams of ethnic, ideo-
logical and religious hegemony. The dangers of 
the proliferation of the technology of producing 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery must be accorded all our vigilance 
because we in Europe, with the twelve years that 
the Nazi regime lasted, have had experience of 
the vast disasters that such a sickness can bring 
to our societies. 
Faced with these new dangers, we have to find 
new solutions. Deterrence based on ranges of 
weapons that include arms of mass destruction 
and large military forces does not seem appro-
priate for warding off the threats just mentioned 
and preventing fresh risks. But before devising 
new equipment we must define the ends we have 
in mind. The aims that we would have liked so 
often to define are now thrown into doubt. It is 
the very object of our political resolve that we 
have to reconsider. 
As a result, new divisions are surfacing among 
Europeans. Our ideals are identical, but the 
guiding principles of the policies to implement 
them differ materially. Some of us believe that 
the European Union should become a new 
centre of decision and that its aim, in 
accordance with what has already been stated in 
the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, 
should be universal. As long ago as October 
1954 in Paris, our countries, they recall, were 
already deciding to take the necessary steps to 
promote unity and encourage the progressive 
integration of Europe. Others believe that, on 
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the contrary, we should restrict the field of 
responsibility of the European Union to avoid 
creating a split in an Atlantic Alliance, of which 
it is an essential part. Yet others would prefer to 
see this union enlarged to meet the expectations 
of the many governments wanting to join the 
nucleus around which the new Europe is being 
built. Lastly there are others who are particularly 
sensitive to the need to enlarge gradually ip order 
to preserve enough homogeneity in the union 
for it to cons~itJ.lte 1p1 effective decision centre. 
We can still go forward, however, taking the 
necessary steps enabling Europe to establish its 
identity as time goes by. We simply have to 
avoid arguing about the principles that guide us 
and remember that we share the same ideals. 
Concrete agreements will then enable the coun-
tries which wish to act to do so. The others must 
be careful not to be an obstacle. What cannot be 
done by Twelve should be done by Nine and we 
must allow those of the Nine wanting to equip 
themselves with the means of joint action to 
make their contribution in that way to the 
implementation of decisions taken in the wider 
context whose credibility their initiatives will 
· enhance. 
The declaration published by the Nine in 
Maastricht stressed the operational nature of 
WEU. It is on this basis that we can build the 
instrument of political security. The very exis-
tence of this means of action will be an encour-
agement for the definition of a bolder policy and 
the strengthening of the joint will. If Europe had 
shown its will to act in Yugoslavia, the bloody 
events that we are witnessing would perhaps not 
have taken place. Today, the ability to 
intervene, when it comes to the violation of 
human rights, is an essential deterrent factor. 
There is consensus among Europeans on the 
creation of an order of justice and peace in 
Europe, whatever our differences of view on 
what the principles of a European security 
policy should be. But it is primarily on the 
shoulders of Western Europe that the heavy 
burden of creating the most effective instru-
ments for achieving this aim falls. 
It is all the more important that the discus-
sions we are about to start should lead to recom-
mendations giving clear expression to the voice 
of the European assembly, .the organisation 
responsible for security and defence. Rarely will 
a message - if we manage to word one - have so 
much effect. 
4. Triblltes to two former members 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - May I ask 
you to stand in silence for a few moments 
in memory of two former members of this 
Assembly, Robert Pontillon and Adolfo Sarti. 
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(Members rose and observed a minute's 
silence) 
S. Examilllltion of credentials 
The PRE~IDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of t}le day is the examination of the cre-
dentials of the new representatives and substi-
tutes nominated since our last session whose 
names have been published in Notice No. 1. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, these credentials have been attested 
by a statement of ratification from the President 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
I welcome our new parliamentary col-
leagues. 
6. Observers 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, may I extend a welcome to the 
observers from Austria, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden 
and Turkey. 
I welcome them and at the same time the 
members of the Permanent Council attending 
this part-session. 
I also extend a cordial welcome to the 
members of the European Parliament who are 
following our work. 
7. Election of the President 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the election of the President 
of the Assembly. 
Rule 7 ( 1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down 
that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau 
of the Assembly. 
In addition, Rule 10 (2) and (10) of the Rules 
of Procedure states that no representative may 
stand as a candidate for the office of President 
unless a proposal for his candidature has been 
sponsored in writing by three or more represen-
tatives, and representatives who are members 
of governments may not be members of the 
Bureau. 
I have received only one nomination, that of 
Mr. Soell. The nomination has been properly 
made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. 
If the Assembly is unanimous I propose that 
Mr. Soell be elected by acclamation. 
Is there any opposition? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
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I therefore proclaim Mr. Soell President of the 
Assembly of Western European Union. May I 
offer him my congratulations and call upon him 
to take the Chair. 
(Mr. Soell then took the Chair) 
8. Address by the Presitlent of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, first and foremost, I must convey my 
sincerest gratitude to you for the honour you 
have done me and the confidence you have 
placed in me by electing me to preside over your 
work. This has always been an important, del-
icate task. It will be so more than ever during the 
session now starting, since we shall have to draw 
the full consequences of one of the most 
important and also, it must be said, the least 
well thought-out aspects of the Maastricht agree-
ments: the security of Europe. You may be sure 
that I realise the full significance of the task with 
which you have entrusted me and that I shall do 
everything in my power to ensure that our 
Assembly continues usefully to guide gov-
ernment action, as it can flatter itself on having 
done throughout the period of WEU's reacti-
vation. 
However, it is with sadness that I embark 
upon this task which would have fallen to 
Robert Pontillon if a cruel illness had not pre-
maturely cut short his presidency. I do not wish 
to repeat here the words of his predecessor, our 
friend Charles Goerens, when he spoke on our 
behalf at Robert Pontillon's funeral or those of 
the President of the Berlin symposium, Mrs. 
Lentz-Cornette, but I must recall how much 
energy he devoted, literally until the last day of 
his life, to carrying out his presidential mission 
and ensuring the success of his last two tasks. 
First, there was the Berlin symposium on rela-
tions with Central and Eastern Europe which he 
would so much have liked to carry through to 
the end and which the cruelty of fate did not 
allow him to preside over when he had done so 
much to promote it. The symposium was in fact 
of considerable importance and will help to 
guide our work in the years to come. 
The session starting today is also largely his 
work. It was he who radically changed the pro-
grammes drawn up by the Assembly committees 
so that the session might be devoted entirely to 
action to be taken on the Maastricht agreements, 
thus allowing us to convey as pertinent a 
message as possible on what is the centre of the 
political debate today. 
It is therefore with modesty that I undertake 
to continue the work that was initially his 
because I believe that this is why you elected me 
and because the prospects it offers seem very 
largely to meet the requirements of the situation 
and I consequently endorse them. 
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The undertaking of devoting most of this part-
session to the Maastricht agreements is never-
theless a delicate one, for two reasons. 
First, the agreements are now at the heart of 
debates in our parliaments, either about the rati-
fication of the treaty itself or on the occasion of 
constitutional revisions that several of our coun-
tries have had to make in order to be able to 
progress towards ratification. This is no small 
matter and, in some parliaments, fundamental 
questions are raised leading to very heated dif-
ferences of view. 
However, we know - and the Council con-
firmed this in its answer to a written question 
put to it at the beginning of the year by 
Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political Com-
mittee - that the section of the Maastricht agree-
ments that directly concerns WEU is not part of 
the treaty proper that has to be ratified in our 
countries, although it is very closely linked with 
it, as was stressed by Mr. Genscher, then 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, when he 
received the Presidential Committee in Bonn in 
January. Hence we must be careful that our 
assessments of the two declarations adopted by 
the nine member countries of WEU do not 
appear to be judgments on the treaty itself and 
that these assessments do not spill over into 
debates which do not directly concern these two 
texts. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the heads of state 
or of government, while wishing to launch a 
defence Europe, thus confirming the decisions 
taken in the last eight years in the context of the 
reactivation of WEU, did not take a final 
decision on what that Europe would be or how it 
would fit into the European Union that they 
were preparing. They were probably divided on 
this matter and therefore postponed, perhaps 
until 1996 or 1998, taking the decisions that 
they could not take in 1991. 
We must not just take note of these hesita-
tions. On the concrete questions that have 
arisen, our role, after debates which will no 
doubt be lively and controversial, is to draw 
conclusions that are as precise as they can be on 
the basis of the guarded, tardy information that 
the Council gives us about its own work. Our 
debates must bring to the fore the expression of 
political will that alone can give substance to the 
" European security identity " our governments 
have decided to create, while setting 
strengthened transatlantic relations on a new 
footing. 
Our first task will obviously be to examine the 
institutional and operational provisions adopted 
in Maastricht and how the Council has started 
to implement them. Now is an appropriate time 
to do so since in a few days' time the Council is 
to meet at ministerial level to review what has 
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already been done and to decide on the imple-
mentation of what has not yet been done. It will 
therefore receive our recommendations at the 
right moment to be guided by them. 
The reports listed on the order of business for 
this part-session show that this review will, to 
say the least, be provisional and that much 
remains to be done. We should probably first 
pay tribute to the steps taken by the military 
authorities in our countries to make progress in 
the areas attributed to them by the governments 
in Maastricht. The efforts they have made in 
considering the security of tomorrow's Europe, 
in spite of all the uncertainty about the evo-
lution of risks to international peace, in spite of 
the general reduction in defence budgets in our 
countries and in spite of the new technological 
requirements of a defence no longer polarised on 
a specific threat, are quite remarkable and 
afford every reason to be optimistic about 
Europe's ability to adapt itself to an entirely new 
situation. The reports adopted by our Defence 
Committee and Technological and Aerospace 
Committee record this and show how we believe 
these efforts should be pursued. 
Conversely, implementation of the political 
and institutional decisions taken by the Nine in 
Maastricht seems very slow, probably because, 
in our particular area, decisions by the heads of 
state or government have been insufficiently 
thought through. It also stems from the fact that 
many of these decisions involve other countries 
whose options are not always adopted clearly 
enough, be they members of the European Com-
munity hesitating about the requirements of par-
ticipating in joint defence, our transatlantic 
friends and allies who are wondering about 
Europe's place in their own security concerns or 
our friends in Central and Eastern Europe who, 
very understandably, find it hard to assess how 
important security matters are for them because 
of the pressure of urgent priorities. Hence it is 
not surprising that the reports by our Political 
Committee which deal specifically with these 
aspects of the situation are more reserved about 
the decisions taken by the Nine in Maastricht 
and their implementation. In particular, it 
should be noted that the Council has had to 
postpone until the middle of this month the vast 
meeting of WEU Ministers and those from any 
Central and Eastern European countries who 
wish to attend to examine the requirements of a 
security system covering the whole of Europe. 
Here it should also be noted that, by holding the 
Berlin symposium, the Assembly preceded the 
Council by taking an initiative which is fully in 
line with the Maastricht decisions. 
I think the message which our Assembly has 
always addressed to the governments and whose 
terms are to be found in the texts proposed by 
the committees, can be summed up in one 
phrase: a true European security identity 
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depends on the will of the peoples and govern-
ments to apply the treaties and, in particular, the 
modified Brussels Treaty. It is understandable 
that, in the uncertainty of recent years in 
Europe, one might have wondered whether there 
were not a better basis for establishing a joint 
security policy. This can no longer be confined 
to organising a defence system. It also embraces 
joint diplomatic and economic efforts to ensure 
peace on our continent' and to overcome the 
crises arising there. The assistance being given 
by the European Community to the new demo-
cracies in the Centre, East and South-East of 
Europe already fits into the framework of a 
security policy conceived in this way. 
Also, about to open the Assembly's debates as 
I am, I must say something about the military 
conflict now going on in the former Yugo-
slavia. 
First, this fighting is not just a tragedy for the 
people in that region. It is already a European 
tragedy. It may even become a disaster for the 
development of the whole of Europe if this neg-
ative example is followed and if we fail to react 
in an appropriate manner to the massacre of 
thousands of innocent people, the expulsion of 
hundreds of thousands of others and the sys-
tematic destruction of the economic foundations 
of the states recently created by the international 
community. Should the sanctions decided by the 
Security Council not lead quickly to an effective 
cease-fire, our governments should then, 
together with our American friends and our 
partners in the alliance, examine as a matter of 
urgency whether it would not be possible to 
create, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in certain 
parts of Croatia, safe havens for civilians like 
those set up in northern Iraq. Consideration 
should also be given to the possibility of taking 
action by air and by sea to neutralise the heavy 
artillery that is causing such serious destruction 
in these regions. The preparation of measures of 
this kind is perhap~ already inducing the respOn-
sible authorities to revise their policy. 
However, the Maastricht decisions reveal hes-
itation by governments about the balance that 
will have to be ensured between the various 
aspects of this policy. 
However, we have to note that, in its present 
form, the modified B111ssels Treaty offers the 
possibility of considerably increased co-oper-
ation in armaments matters and the 
organisation of forces, provided EurQpeans want 
this. It allows such co-operation to be extended 
to others if they share this resolve. It offers a 
useful instrument for the establishment of peace 
based on the recognition of states and frontiers, 
respect for the rights ·of minorities and freedom 
of exchange of all kinds throughout the 
European continent, because it safeguards the 
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possibility for nations to determine the nature 
and extent of their commitments. 
Our Assembly has always opted very firmly in 
favour of a union of Europeans round what, yes-
terday, was the Community and has now 
become the European Union. It welcomes unre-
servedly the progress of this Union on the 
occasion of the Maastricht agreements and the 
fact that the twelve governments agreed that 
WEU is playing a full part in the process of 
European Union. However, noting in particular 
that, from the economic and defence stand-
points, the nations of Europe were not all 
adopting the same approaches or advancing at 
the same rate, the Assembly has endeavoured to 
warn public opinion and the governments not to 
be too hasty in aligning the institutions of a 
Europe which will be a long time in the making 
even if this means not tackling each problem 
according to its own criteria. Accession to the 
Community must correspond to a will and to 
economic capability. Accession to WEU can be 
achieved only through accession to the modified 
Brussels Treaty and all it implies. The essential 
coherence between a joint defence and security 
policy pursued in the framework of the 
European Union and the joint organisation of 
defence in that of WEU will be achieved better 
by respecting the responsibilities of each 
organisation than by a mechanism that gives 
artificial priority to an institutional edifice. 
No one is more aware than I am of the need to 
proceed rapidly to ensure, in all areas, the 
securj.ty needed by all the European countries 
which are at present picking their way through 
the dangers in a situation beyond their grasp. 
There is indeed no guarantee that the factors 
that can advapce Europe along the road to 
peace, stability and progress now will still be 
there tomorrow. However, it is precisely because 
it is urgent to act that we must start without 
delay to offer effective co-operation to countries 
in the east of Europe and to integrate them in 
our economic system as well as our security 
system. This is also the reason why each 
question must be handled on its own merits. The 
time which one way or another will be necessary 
for achieving a harmonious European Union 
does not mean that Europe of the Twelve, in 
areas within its purview, or that of the Nine, for 
matters that concern it, should delay imple-
menting the integration of Europe as a whole. 
There will be time later to examine how to give a 
satisfactory shape to something which can at 
present be seen only vaguely. Of course, the 
undertaking on which we are embarking for a 
whole continent is unprecedented. However, the 
lesson can be learned from the history of nine-
teenth century Germany that such an approach 
may be wider and more effective than an 
approach which is perhaps more organised but 
does not base the institutional system it aims 
to establish on the solution to problems now 
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arising, and which will inevitably continue to 
arise for a long time to come, because of the 
complexity of European society. 
In short, the institutional work started long 
ago by the members of the European Com-
munity, continued in Maastricht but still far 
from complete, must not be given priority over 
the necessity and urgency of an undertaking that 
concerns Europe as a whole and which leads to 
all countries which really wish being progres-
sively associated with what we are in the process 
of building. The sooner each nation is called 
upon to play a part, however modest, in this 
edifice, the better we shall be safeguarded 
against the risk of part of E~rope fee~ing ~eft on 
one side by a European Umon offenng 1t only 
one choice: to join or not to join. 
In the light of these considerations, I would 
like to sketch out the tasks I now have to 
shoulder. 
First I shall naturally continue the work 
started' by the Assembly by devoting this part-
session to the follow-up to the Maastricht agree-
ments. The months ahead will be crucial because 
all our countries have to pursue the debate 
already started in most of them on the ratifi-
cation of the treaty. Our Assembly can but be 
satisfied that France has already taken a decisive 
step towards the revision of its constitution 
made necessary by the implications of the Maas-
tricht Treaty and that the House of Commons in 
the United Kingdom has voted in favour of rati-
fication. While it is to be hoped that the treaty 
will be ratified everywhere, it is already clear 
that the questions which have arisen during this 
debate go well beyond the text submitted for rat-
ification and concern the way each of our 
nations views its participation in the Europe of 
tomorrow. We shall certainly have to give 
further consideration to the aftermath of Maas-
tricht in the parliamentary year now starting 
particularly as, where WEU is concerned, the 
Council will have to give positive substance to 
the not very well thought-out decisions included 
in the two declarations by the Nine. This will 
provide me with an opportunity to. str~n~hen 
the dialogue between the two WEU mstltutlons. 
Furthermore, one of those declarations con-
tains a wish by the governments that our 
Assembly develop its relations with the 
European Parliament, probably so ~s to 
emphasise the place WEU should occupy m the 
process of European Union. The establishment 
of exchanges between the two assemblies seems 
to me desirable from every point of view and I 
intend to make every effort to that end. 
However, such relations require prior clarifi-
cation on the one hand about the Council's 
intentions and on the other about what is 
expected of the European Parliament. 
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On the Council side, it merely has to confirm 
its will to continue to apply the modified 
Brussels Treaty in full, including Article IX, i.e. 
to consider WEU as a whole of which our 
Assembly is a legal part. Such confirmation 
appears necessary in view of certain ambiguities 
that we have noted in the governments' conduct 
in regard to the Assembly and the increasingly 
lax way in which they seem to interpret the com-
mitments they entered into in 1954, in par-
ticular as regards the future of WEU, its 
enlargement and the role of its Assembly. 
Regarding the European Parliament, _the 
purpose is to ensure that exchanges are held m a 
manner that respects the vocation, responsibil-
ities and rights of both assemblies, each based 
on its own treaty and, although their represen-
tation is different, each the result of elections in 
member countries in conditions adapted to the 
specific nature of each one. In other w~rds, our 
dialogue should be based on a footmg that 
ensures equality and reciprocity and avoids the 
exchange of ideas leading to a confusion of 
responsibilities, particularly in the eyes of 
the public, not always adequately informed of 
the functional complexity of parhamentary 
Europe. 
Finally - and not the most pleasant of my 
tasks- I shall have to pursue with the Council 
the tedious effort of getting it to understand that 
the reactivation ofWEU, the opening of increas-
ingly extensive relations with a growing number 
of countries and their parliaments have budg-
etary implications which, although not great, are 
nevertheless such that the Assembly is no longer 
able to respond to the requests addressed to it 
from all sides. Our requests are moderate. They 
do not seek to place us on the same kind of 
footing as the European Parliament or eveJ?. that 
of our national parliaments. We merely wtsh to 
be able to respond to the most urgent require-
ments of the situation. However, I shall certainly 
not manage to win the Council's acceptance 
unless each one of you approaches his or her 
own government and helps to convince i~ that an 
effort in this matter has become essential. 
These are the main concerns I have in mind in 
accepting the mission you have given me. They 
will not be unbearable if you are good enough to 
maintain the confidence that you have just 
shown in me. The substance of our debates, at 
recent sessions and in committee, allows me to 
believe that we shall be able to continue together 
to pursue a task that is useful for Europe and 
effective for the peace that we hope will hence-
forth be more firmly established in Europe as a 
whole and in the rest of the world and to tackle 
with optimism the questions raised by the future 
ofWEU. 
It is therefore with great confidence in the 
future of Western European Union and its 
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Assembly that I propose moving on to the 
business of our thirty-eighth session. 
9. Election of six Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the election of six Vice-
Presidents of the Assembly. 
Rule 7 ( 1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down 
that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau 
of the Assembly. 
In addition, Rule 10 (2) and (10) of the Rules 
of Procedure states that no representative may 
stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-
President unless a proposal for his candidature 
has been sponsored in writing by three or more 
representatives and representatives who are 
members of governments may not be members 
of the Bureau. 
Six nominations have been submitted in the 
prescribed form. 
They are, in alphabetical order, those of 
Mrs. Err, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Foschi, 
Mr. Fourre, Mr. Kempinaire and Mr. Machete. 
The other places will be filled later. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, as I hope, I 
propose that these Vice-Presidents be elected by 
acclamation. 
Is there any objection? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare them elected as Vice-
Presidents of the Assembly. 
10. The situation in Yugoslaria 
(Motion for a recommetuiation with a request 
for urgent procedlt*- Does. 1316 and 1317) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have to 
tell the Assembly that I have received a motion 
for a recommendation on the situation in Yugo-
slavia with request for urgent procedure from 
Mr. Caro, Mr. De Decker, Mr. de Puig and more 
than ten others, and a request for a debate under 
urgent procedure on the situation in the former 
Yusgoslavia from Mr. De Decker and ten others, 
Documents 1316 and 131 7. The latter proposal 
has not yet been circulated. 
As the motion for a recommendation is more 
specific than the request for a debate under 
urgent procedure and covers the same subject, I 
propose that the Assembly should vote on the 
motion for a recommendation immediately after 
the adoption of the draft order of business. 
58 
FIRST SITTING 
11. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the first part of the session 
(Doc.l300) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the adoption of the draft 
order of business for the first part of the session. 
The draft is to be found in Document 1300 
dated 27th May 1992. 
Before calling on the Assembly to adopt this 
draft, I must tell you that if the Assembly 
accepts the motion for a recommendation with 
request for urgent procedure on the situation in 
Yugoslavia, I intend to propose the following 
changes to our orders of the day. The debate 
under urgent procedure would take place 
tomorrow afternoon after the debate on Sir 
Dudley Smith's report, WEU: the operational 
organisation. The opening of the debate on 
Mr. Goerens's report, WEU after Maastricht, 
would be brought forward and would come at 
the end of this afternoon's business. The debate 
would continue and, if possible, end tomorrow 
morning. Lastly, the debate on Mr. Aarts's 
report on arms export policy would take place 
after the debate under urgent procedure and 
hence at the end of business for tomorrow 
afternoon. 
For the moment, however, I invite the 
Assembly to adopt the draft order of business as 
it stands. 
Is there any objection? ... 
The draft order of business is adopted. 
As the order of business for this part-session is 
particularly full, I propose to the Assembly that, 
under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, there 
should be a time-limit of five minutes for each 
speaker in all our debates, apart from chairmen 
of committees and rapporteurs. 
May I remind you that, under the same rule, 
this proposal has to be voted upon by the 
Assembly without debate. 
Is there any objection? ... 
It is so agreed. 
12. The situation in Yugoslaritz 
(Motion for a recommendation with a request 
for urgent procedure, Does. 1316 atui 1317) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- We come 
now to the motion for a recommendation with a 
request for urgent procedure on the situation in 
Yugoslavia, Documents 1316 and 1317. 
This request, in accordance with Rule 44 of 
the Rules of Procedure, has been made by at 
least ten representatives. May I remind you that 
only the following may speak: one speaker for 
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the request, one speaker against, and one repre-
sentative of the Bureau speaking on its behalf. 
Under Rule 32 (7) no representative may 
speak for more than five minutes. 
I call Mr. De Decker to give the reasons for 
this request. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, as you yourself said in your 
address, the situation in Yugoslavia is growing 
more critical every day. I feel it would be wholly 
unthinkable for our Assembly to meet for this 
part-session without an urgent debate on the 
Yugoslav question and the measures that should 
possibly be taken by our organisation to bring 
peace to this situation, calm warlike minds and 
bring help to civilians. 
Article VIII of the treaty very clearly states 
that the Council of Ministers of WEU may meet 
whenever the security of Europe is threatened. 
The motion for a recommendation which has 
been tabled and signed by members of the three 
main groups in our Assembly refers to that 
article. 
For my part, and on behalf of all the signa-
tories, I should simply like to ask that, in 
accordance with our Rules of Procedure, we 
should apply the urgent procedure so that 
tomorrow, as you have already pointed out, 
Mr. President, after discussing the matter in the 
Defence Committee, we can have an urgent 
debate on this tragic Yugoslav question. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I wish to raise a point of 
order. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - I 
request that the question requiring urgent 
debate be referred to the Political and Defence 
Committees first so that they can prepare the 
ground for the debate on the situation in Yugo-
slavia. 
I think that the Assembly and the presidency 
should rule first on this request because, in my 
view, it is essential that tomorrow's debate 
should be effective. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against this request? ... 
Does the Chairman of the Defence Com-
mittee wish to speak? ... 
Does any representative of the Bureau wish to 
speak? ... 
We shall now take the vote on the request for 
debate under urgent procedure. 
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I propose, should the latter be adopted, that 
the motion for a recommendation be referred to 
the Defence Committee. 
We shall now vote on the request for urgent 
procedure. 
The urgent procedure is adopted. 
I propose that the debate on the subject be 
held on Tuesday afternoon after the vote on the 
report by Sir Dudley Smith on WEU: the opera-
tional organisation. 
I therefore propose that the draft order of 
business be amended as I suggested earlier. 
Is there any objection? ... 
It is so decided. 
13. Changes in the membership of commiUees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the 
changes in the membership of committees con-
tained in Notice No. 1 which has already been 
distributed. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The changes are agreed to. 
14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. van 
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I 
invite to the rostrum. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of 
WEU) (Translation). - Before I come to my 
report, Mr. President, may I offer hearty con-
gratulations on your election as President of the 
WEU Assembly. I am sure you will capably 
carry forward the work of your predecessor, 
Senator Robert Pontillon, whose untimely death 
we lament. 
I look forward to our future co-operation. The 
first occasion may well occur soon in London if 
you present the political guidelines of the draft 
budget for 1993 to the Council. 
(The speaker continued in English) 
Mr. President, parliamentarians, ladies and 
gentlemen, tomorrow Denmark is set to ratify 
the Maastricht Treaty by referendum. The 
Danish people will thus be the first in the 
European Community to sanction by universal 
suffrage their leaders' commitment and their 
parliament's approval for a process which began 
with the Single European Act in Luxembourg 
and whose objective is European union. The 
emergence of a European sovereignty endorsed 
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by our peoples is the sine qua non for the 
framing of an effective foreign and security 
policy, i.e. one which has a defence arm. The all 
too numerous flashpoints in the eastern part of 
our continent and the bloody convulsions in the 
former Yugoslavia are a daily reminder of how 
urgent it is to make rapid progress towards a 
common European security and defence policy. 
Since the Maastricht declarations, the intergov-
ernmental organs of our organisation have made 
every effort to lay the foundations for this 
long-haul enterprise. 
The work of your parliamentary Assembly 
over this same period testifies to a particularly 
encouraging convergence of ideas throughout 
our organisation. Here I pay tribute to both the 
quality and direction of the reports which we 
will be debating this week. 
On lOth June next, the WEU Council, 
enlarged to include the political directors and 
their counterparts from the defence ministries, 
will meet in London for a final examination of 
the draft political declarations and mandates 
which are to be submitted to ministers on 19th 
June in Bonn. 
I should like to make just a few comments on 
three key items which will be on the ministerial 
agenda: first, relations between WEU and the 
other European member states of the European 
Community or tlie Atlantic Alliance; secondly, 
the development of WEU's operational role; 
and, thirdly, relations between WEU and the 
countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe. 
WEU is an integral part of the process leading 
to a European union. At the same time, it is 
firmly anchored in the Atlantic Alliance. Institu-
tional relationships will, therefore, be tailored to 
the specific characteristics and needs of these 
two fundamental elements of European security. 
Finding itself at the heart of a dynamic twofold 
process, WEU will assert itself both as a partner 
and as an active player - the more so as soon as 
its ministerial organs are in Brussels. 
WEU is now beginning to develop structures 
which will be both complementary to and com-
patible with those of the alliance. The necessary 
practical arrangements will have to be worked 
out between the alliance and WEU as these 
operational structures are set up. 
This working relationship will allow for the 
intensification of WEU member states' co-ordin-
ation on alliance issues, with a view to intro-
ducing WEU joint positions into the alliance 
consultation process for further discussion. The 
synchronisation of meetings, the harmonisation 
of procedures and close co-operation between 
the WEU and NATO secretariats will help bring 
this about. 
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The formulation of joint positions will be 
undertaken by WEU's Permanent Council and 
its various working groups. Their initial intro-
duction into the alliance consultation process is 
likely to be entrusted to the representative of the 
WEU presidency. 
As regards co-operation between secretariats, 
the purpose will be to ensure a full and regular 
exchange of information as well as the smooth 
running of synchronised meetings. Concrete 
steps to meet these requirements are being 
worked out and will be further discussed with 
NATO. Because WEU and NATO share the 
common purpose of ensuring collective defence 
and will have to co-operate in a very practical 
way, the answers will probably be among the 
easiest to work out once the WEU Council and 
secretariat have settled in Brussels. It may not 
be so easy with the European institutions as the 
answer will largely depend on the future division 
of labour between the European institutions and 
WEU for the implementation of the forth-
coming common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). 
On WEU's relationship with the European 
Union, the Maastricht declaration is unam-
biguous: " The objective is to build up WEU in 
stages as the defence component of the 
European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, 
at the request of the European Union, to elab-
orate and implement decisions and actions of 
the union which have defence implications. " 
Thus, a triangular relationship will evolve 
which will generate a specific European strategic 
culture and gradually lead to the setting up of 
the institutional mechanisms needed to develop 
the defence component of the European Union. 
In a WEU framework to start with or after 1996 
under a different name within the evolving 
European Union institutions, all elements of 
European defence will always simultaneously 
constitute the European pillar of the alliance. 
WEU's enlargement to the three other 
members of the European Community and, in 
parallel, the acceptance of associate status by the 
other European members of the alliance will be 
crucial to the meaningful and concrete devel-
opment of WEU's relations with both the 
European institutions and the alliance. 
The problems of WEU's future enlargement 
are by far the most sensitive it has to solve in 
implementing the Maastricht declarations. The 
creation of a new status of associate member is 
something of a novelty for a security organ-
isation. But it is crucial to achieve our goal of 
completing the construction of the European 
pillar and strengthening Atlantic solidarity. 
Relations between member states and asso-
ciate member states will be based on two funda-
mental principles. The first principle is the 
settlement of mutual differences by peaceful 
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means, in accordance with the obligations 
resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations 
Charter, the commitments entered into under 
the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
Charter of Paris, and other generally recognised 
principles and rules of international law. This 
implies refraining from resorting to the threat or 
use of force in their mutual relations. 
The second principle is that the security guar-
antees and defence commitments in the treaties 
which bind the member states within Western 
European Union and within the Atlantic 
Alliance are mutually reinforcing. They should, 
therefore, not be invoked in disputes between 
member states of either of the two organi-
sations. 
An associate member, while participating 
fully in meetings of the WEU Council, will not 
vote. It will be able to support a decision but not 
block a consensus. At the request of a majority 
of member states, meetings may be restricted 
to full members. Liaison arrangements are 
envisaged for future WEU operational activities. 
As for observers, the detailed provisions are 
being finalised. 
Member states of the European Community 
which have accepted the invitation to accede to 
WEU will be asked to subscribe to the same 
undertakings as previous candidates, and also to 
the two commitments emanating from Maas-
tricht, namely: to develop WEU as the defence 
component of the future European Union and as 
the means to strengthen the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance; and to endorse the status 
of associate members and observers. 
Agreement between the Nine, which is 
expected to result from the ministerial meeting 
on 19th June 1992, is a prerequisite for the start 
of negotiations on accession. Discussions with 
all categories of applicant states will begin and 
be concluded at the same time. 
By demonstrating its commitment to NATO's 
essential functions, its willingness to shoulder 
new responsibilities and to involve all the 
European allies in its activities, WEU has suc-
ceeded in assuring the United States that its fear 
of being treated as an ally of last resort, to be 
called upon in the event of disaster, was 
groundless. I believe that now most Americans 
understand that the affirmation of the European 
defence identity and the definition of military 
capabilities answerable to WEU will also 
underpin and strengthen their commitment in 
Europe. 
What force level will the United States public 
consider acceptable without feeling that Wash-
ington is more concerned with European 
security than with the Europeans themselves? 
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That answer is still awaited. Will the likelihood 
of continued instability in Eastern Europe and 
beyond the U rals be enough to sustain Am er~ 
ica's will to maintain forces at a truly deterrent 
level on our continent? Realism must convince 
us not to bank on an indefinite extension of the 
reprieve which we currently enjoy. 
A second set of questions to be addressed 
relates to the scope and instruments of WEU's 
future operational role. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
(Translation). - The central question here is: 
should a European command structure be 
created, and how would it relate to the alliance's 
changing military structures? 
WEU has shown itself to be a useful 
instrument for out-of-Europe contingencies. 
Europe needs to develop and maintain capabil-
ities for intervention when and where the 
political will to intervene exists. Accordingly, 
European multinational forces should be struc-
tured so that they can be used by NATO in 
collective defence scenarios and by WEU in 
European contingencies as well as out-of-
Europe. 
WEU cannot be relegated to an " out-of-
Europe " role only. The strengthening of NATO 
depends both on a clearer definition of the 
respective roles of the Europeans and the Amer-
icans and on a WEU contribution to collective 
defence on the European continent. 
It is quite clear that, unless it becomes more 
operational, WEU cannot be an asset, to the 
alliance nor develop into the defence arm of a 
European political union. 
Various types of action can be envisaged at a 
pre-contingency planning stage within WEU. All 
the mechanisms set up at the time of the Gulf 
crisis could be reactivated at very short notice. 
But this is not enough. 
The creation of a planning cell responsible for 
contingency planning and for matching the 
forces answerable to WEU to its missions as 
defined by the Council of Ministers will be 
decided in Bonn on 19th June. 
The planning cell will mainly be responsible 
for: preparing contingency plans for the 
employment of forces under WEU auspices; pre-
paring recommendations for the necessary 
command, control and communication arrange-
ments; keeping an updated list of units and com-
binations of units which might be assigned to 
WEU for specific operations; preparing exercise 
plans; contributing to the wider debate on the 
development of a military capability for 
WEU. 
Work on setting up the satellite centre on the 
basis of the implementation plan adopted last 
January has continued. Much progress has been 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. van Eekelen (continued) 
made in staff recruitment, building refur-
bishment and equipment procurement. The 
centre should begin operation towards the end 
of the year. On the recommendation of the study 
management team, the contract for the main sat-
ellite sy.stem feasibility study has been awarded 
to a consortium of firms from WEU member 
states, headed by Dornier. This study will cover 
the operation of, and timetable for, the estab-
lishment of the space and ground segments. 
Lastly, the Maastricht declarations opened 
up the prospect for convergence between WEU, 
the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG) and Eurogroup. I hope that the relevant 
decisions will be taken by the end of the year; 
this would promote the standardisation and 
interoperability of equipment and logistic 
support. 
A strong transatlantic relationship, where eco-
nomic competition and security requirements 
must be kept separate, is vital for the future of 
European defence, but WEU member states are 
also concerned to develop specific links with the 
new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe 
on the basis of consultations and, from now on, 
regular exchanges of information. 
A series of fact-finding missions, initially to 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and then 
to Bulgaria and Romania and the three Baltic 
republics, gave an insight into these countries' 
security concerns as they move· towards pluralist 
democracy and a mark~t economy. WEU will 
endeavour to bear these concerns in mind when 
framing its own positions, especially on arms 
control and disarmament. 
The new democracies of Central Europe do 
not always wish to air their views on security in 
the widest framework. WEU offers a more 
restricted forum for co-operation, particularly to 
those countries which have already signed an 
association agreement with the European Com-
munity. Faced with their legitimate expecta-
tions, WEU cannot shy away from establishing a 
security co-operation link, and that means 
giving thought to criteria for a special rela-
tionship. 
The countries of WEU see the strengthening 
of their dialogue with the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe as making a significant con-
tribution to the new peaceful order emerging in 
Europe. That requires an interaction between 
the European institutions, NATO and the CSCE 
to establish a partnership which will be as much 
pan-European as Euro-Atlantic since it will span 
a geographical area from Vancouver to Vladi-
vostok. That partnership will embrace the 
political, military, socio-cultural, economic and 
environmental aspects of security. Stability, a 
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prerequisite for a more balanced development, 
depends on Europeans getting ambitious co-oper-
ative measures off the ground in all these areas. 
But success will be more likely if these projects 
are based on a range of regional initiatives. The 
parliamentary Assembly and the Institute for 
Security Studies will , continue to play an 
important role in developing these contacts; 
The humanitarian nightmare in Yugoslavia is 
worsening. I am pleased that you, Mr. President, 
decided to have a debate under urgent pro-
cedure. You know my feeling that Western 
Europe should have reacted more forcefully 
to the succession of broken cease-fires and 
aggressive acts against the civilian population. 
Admittedly, our countries could not become 
enmeshed in an uncontrollable situation without 
having clearly defined their common objectives. 
In 1945, Europe outlawed war. Since July 1990, 
the credibility of the European enterprise has 
been severely tested by the escalating conflict in 
the Balkans. Without an independent opera-
tional capability, Europe's diplomatic efforts are 
likely to remain ineffective. 
I am sure that you share with me a feeling of 
frustration and anger at the way the last com-
munist regime in Europe has trampled 
underfoot the principles which have served us so 
well in fostering change through the CSCE 
process. Attempts to control territory by force, 
to create new borders unilaterally and forcefully 
to expel minorities cannot be tolerated. The 
Community and the United Nations have 
rightly agreed on economic sanctions. WEU 
should be prepared, if mandated, to support 
their enforcement. It should also consider pos-
sible military implications., using its exper-
ience of humanitarian actions and embargo 
enforcement. 
Let us not forget the lessons of history: to seek 
peace without demonstrating the resolve to 
create it or safeguard it means in the final 
analysis - and to paraphrase the words of Arthur 
Koestler - having to be content with just being 
left in peace. But for how long? 
May I conclude by conveying to you my 
astonishment at the all too frequent and sur-
prising comments made by quality newspapers 
about the future of WEU. On 16th May, for 
example, one of the leading London dailies 
stated, in the same breath as it were, that WEU 
was destined to be the nucleus of a future 
European defence identity, but had an uncertain 
role. Such contradiction demonstrates that we 
must not let up in our public awareness cam-
paign. All in all, the initiatives taken in this field 
by your Assembly, the Secretariat-General and 
the Institute for Security Studies are consid-
erable, especially if we remember just how 
modest the resources available for this purpose 
actually are. 
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The Maastricht summit confirmed WEU's 
dual mission to be the embodiment of the 
European defence identity and the European 
pillar of NATO. Clear evidence that the 
European defence identity really exists is pro-
vided by events, starting with WEU's reacti-
vation, its involvement in the Gulf crisis and its 
enlargement to Spain and Portugal. It has been 
recognised by our North American allies, who 
are closely following our work and reacting to 
the decisions which give substance to that 
identity. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in 
Copenhagen and then in Rome, acknowledged 
the fact that it is a key element in our common 
security. WEU's role is quite clear. Its dual 
responsibility is to act as a melting pot for ideas 
and framework for action regarding the defence 
structures which will be available to the 
European Union; in so doing, it will strengthen 
the European pillar of the alliance. 
Admittedly, we are only in the early stages of 
realising this ambitious project. The adjustment 
of the decisions taken in a bilateral framework 
and in the context of intergovernmental and 
multilateral co-operation in WEU will be 
achieved progressively. This will also be so for 
the smooth-running of the mechanism of WEU 
and NATO in the framework of the alliance. 
The success of our endeavours will largely 
depend on the spirit in which we conduct our 
day-to-day work. I hope that it will fall to me to 
reach the goal to which I attach such great 
importance and to succeed in convincing the 
remaining sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic 
of our deep commitment to a Euro-Atlantic 
security relationship and a European defence. 
All those who see the realisation of European 
union by the end of the century as a priority task 
can take pride in the achievements chalked up 
since 1986. Those achievements should also fill 
us with confidence in Europe's ability to 
respond to the formidable challenge of bringing 
back into the fold, by peaceful means, those 
peoples who have been left outside for fifty years 
and helping them to prosper in a democratic 
environment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Secretary-General, for your address. I am sure 
you will not mind answering questions from 
members of our Assembly. 
I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. 
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Netherlands) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I want to ask the 
Secretary-General a question on what he said 
about Western European Union and Yugoslavia. 
He talked about what he sees as Western 
European Union's task in the implementation of 
measures that it may take under the treaty. On 
the BBC's Newsnight programme on 22nd May 
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he referred to this as a European operation. 
Would the Secretary-General explain what he 
means when he calls on WEU in the context of 
Yugoslavia to do its duty and take action? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of 
WEU) (Translation). - My answer to Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman is that I explained in my 
statement this morning what I see as the main 
problem. Firstly, principles that we have 
adopted as pillars of our policy not only in 
Western European Union but also in European 
political co-operation are being violated in this 
case. Secondly, I stressed that Western European 
Union can only function in connection with 
political decision-making. 
Political decisions should be taken either in 
the United Nations or within European political 
co-operation itself. For me, the main point is the 
example we set at the time of the Gulf war. First 
there was an embargo on Iraq. At one time there 
were thirty-nine ships from WEU countries 
involved in enforcing the United Nations 
embargo. This was followed by joint action by 
WEU countries to help the Kurds with their 
humanitarian problem. 
What I see as WEU's task is this. A decision 
should be taken that can be seen as a mandate 
for the members of Western European Union. If 
necessary, this mandate might be followed by a 
demonstration of military capability. Military 
capability is often intended to deter rather than 
as an offensive element. WEU would thus be 
demonstrating a capability that would make 
operations more credible. It · does not matter 
whether this is a monitoring operation or a 
peace conference or some other kind of medi-
ation. In this way strength can be added to the 
embargoes imposed by the European Com-
munity or the United Nations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Secretary-General. 
I call Mr. Rathbone. 
Mr. RATHBONE (United Kingdom).- I begin 
by paying tribute to the Secretary-General's 
efforts. First, he has raised the profile of 
Western European Union in the minds of 
nations and ministers around the world. Sec-
ondly and more specifically, he has attempted to 
seek a more dynamic role for Western European 
Union to help alleviate the tragedies developing 
in Yugoslavia. 
I also wish to ask a question. The Secretary-
General drew attention to various aspects of the 
future role of WEU. He referred to the role that 
the Assembly has often taken in leading WEU to 
assess its future role, and mentioned the limited 
resources available to ensure future security in 
Europe. What would the Secretary-General con-
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sider to be a helpful step for him and this 
Assembly to take to persuade our political 
masters of the political importance of our 
debates, conclusions and recommendations for 
action that will be crucial to the future security 
of our continent? · 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of 
WEU). - Like Mr. Rathbone I very much 
endorse the leading role that the Assembly 
has played on several occasions, especially 
in relation to our contacts with countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. At a time when it 
was not possible for the Council to do so for-
mally, the Assembly took many initiatives which 
have since been taken up and endorsed by the 
Council of Ministers. 
One of the most useful strategies that we have 
recently devised is that of a meeting between the 
President of the Assembly and the Chairman of 
the Budget Committee, before the budget is 
drawn up, to establish the budget's strategic 
guidelines and explain the possibilities and con-
straints and, above all, make clear what together 
- Council and Assembly - ~e hope to accom-
plish. When congratulating PresideD:t Soell on 
his election I mentioned that I thought that the 
first chance - hopefully before the summer - for 
a meeting between the Permanent COuncil in 
l.pndon and the Chairman of the Budget Com-
mittee of the Ass:embly coUld be in that vein. We 
would have the discussions that we once had 
with President Pontillon and which we both 
found useful. Those discussions can certainly 
deepen now that Maastricht is behind us and we 
have a clear vision of the future. Together, the 
Council and the Assembly are taking practical 
decisive steps. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Secretary-General, I do not think you made any 
reference in your speech to the Franco-German 
summit held at La Rochelle on 21st May. 
What are your views on the Franco-German 
decision taken by the two countries on that 
occasion at the highest level of responsibility? 
The La Rochelle summit drew a number of 
protests from the United States, which may 
perhaps be exaggerated but have undoubtedly 
created a climate of suspicion there about the 
reality of European solidarity - that of Europe 
as a whole and not merely of a few allies - and 
about the European resolve to maintain a strong 
common defence. 
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I feel therefore that it would have been helpful 
if you had given the Assembly your own views as 
the person responsible for the organisation's 
policy. I would be grateful if you could let us 
have your personal opinion; I am not referring, 
therefore, to the views of the Council of Min-
isters which will certainly be voiced in more 
appropriate places at meetings held on the 
subject. 
The matter is also important for another 
reason. On 1st July, as you know, Italy will be 
taking over the chairmanship of the Council of 
Ministers and on the same day the United 
Kingdom will be taking over the chairmanship 
of the European Community; the position of 
Italy and the United Kingdom is not the same as 
that of Germany and France. 
WEU should adopt a clear stance mediating 
between the approach of the countries which are 
about to assume responsibility at the highest 
level in Europe and that recently given 
expression in the Franco-German decision. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-Genera/ of 
WEU). - I did not speak about the Franco-
German corps. I thought that, as the two min-
isters immediately involved are to address the 
Assembly on Wednesday, it would be better to 
leave the issue to them. Mr. Stegagnini asked me 
my personal opinion and, with all modesty, I am 
prepared to give that. 
I have always supported the idea of the 
Franco-German corps, but in a wider context. 
The initiative is too important to leave to two 
countries, crucial as they may be to Europe's 
defence. Clearly, without Franco-German recon-
ciliation, the position in Europe would have 
been very different. 
My reasoning is, first, that France has taken 
the idea to state clearly that it is prepared to 
contribute forces to a new, multinational 
framework and is departing from its policy of 
seeking independence for its forces except in 
extreme cases. It has shown that it is now pre-
pared to contribute specific units to the Franco-
German corps. 
Secondly, if the new framework gives us a jus-
tification - as a result of public opinion in both 
countries - for maintaining French forces on 
German territory, there should also be some 
German forces on French territory. 
For those reasons, I feel quite positive. 
My only concern - and the La Rochelle 
communique has allayed my fears consider-
ably - is that it is unclear for which bodies that 
European corps will be available. Could it be 
used independently by a country without links 
with NATO or WEU? In that respect, I have 
found nothing objectionable in the La Rochelle 
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communique. That important initiative brings 
our countries closer together. The European 
corps will not be the only force answerable to 
WEU. I believe - indeed, the British Secretary 
of State for Defence has said that he is prepared 
to do so - that we should make certain forces 
answerable to WEU. We expect Portugal to 
make an announcement in the meeting on 19th 
June and I hope that all member states of WEU 
will clarify what military forces will be made 
available and, in the wording of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which of them will be answerable to 
WEU. 
The European corps will be an important 
element but not the only one. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - May I, 
Secretary-General, in turn congratulate you on 
your address and applaud your tireless efforts 
not only in maintaining WEU's position but 
also, through the organisation, in strengthening 
the idea of an active European identity in 
defence matters. 
In your report, as at our last session, you 
referred to the grave situation in Yugoslavia, of 
which we are conscious in all our work and in all 
the material that we write. 
In one part of your speech, you very rightly 
say that without an independent operational 
capability, European diplomatic efforts are 
doomed to failure. Unfortunately, we still have 
no such independent operational forces which 
means, without wishing to take your words too 
far, that everything we do is useless. 
It is a sad thing to say, and I do not wish to 
make too much out of this thought of yours, but 
in public opinion that is the way things are. The 
work of information that you urge we should 
perform must therefore be pursued with even 
greater energy. 
The question I should like to ask is this. If we 
obtain the operational forces, which fortunately 
we are all asking for now, can we be more 
useful? 
As you well know, Secretary-General, if we 
had had these forces in August 1991, we could 
not have intervened because it was not an inter-
national conflict. The whole arsenal of diplo-
matic law allows us to intervene only in inter-
state conflicts. Since this conflict was internal to 
one state, the independence of Slovenia and 
Croatia being far from recognised, we were up 
against a legal barrier: there could be no inter-
vention, only humanitarian action on a small 
scale. 
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Do you not consider it urgent for WEU to 
start work to set up a legal and diplomatic 
" arsenal " - to stay with this word - of 
universally-recognised instruments and not 
solely based on resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council, which would enable 
us to use this form of intervention that everyone 
is talking about and make it credible? We would 
then be able to act immediately, without having 
to wait for the Security Council or even, as some 
request, the CSCE, to give Europeans instruc-
tions to do something. 
Without the existence of legal status, formu-
lated and recognised at world level, WEU will 
have no means of intervening in the future. May 
I therefore ask you this question: do you intend, 
Secretary-General, to ask the Council of Min-
isters to embark on useful work in this field as 
soon as possible? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of 
WEU) (Translation). - Mr. President, I am very 
grateful to Mr. Caro for his kind words and also 
for giving me his place in the order of business 
for which I apologise. 
As regards his question, my reply is unequivo-
cally yes. 
Moreover, I must say that provided the 
political will is there WEU is already able to act. 
We proved this during the Gulf crisis. We 
mounted an operation in a few weeks consisting, 
at one period, of thirty-five ships to enforce the 
embargo on Iraq. In September and October, I 
personally was in favour of similar action, not to 
get involved immediately in the fighting, but to 
show that we do have a certain capability. With 
a fleet in the Adriatic, outside territorial waters, 
I am convinced that the bombing of Dubrovnik 
would not have happened. And that situation 
still exists. 
With some land force capabilities, we also 
perhaps might have been able to help bring 
about a situation where a cease-fire or an 
agreement between the parties could have been 
contemplated. Things have probably gone on 
too long now, but that is a matter of history. 
As regards your specific question, the reply 
has already been given to some extent, since the 
states concerned have been recognised. The 
earlier argument of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a country no longer applies, at 
least not to Bosnia and Croatia. It could apply to 
Kosovo if civil war were to break out and I am 
rather pessimistic about the situation there. 
Nevertheless, it is my impression that in the 
CSCE and the United Nations some rights of 
intervention are in the process of becoming 
recognised. Already, the measures set up by the 
CSCE in Helsinki go much further, without the 
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agreement of Yugoslavia but fortunately with 
the agreement of all the other countries. So there 
is already some movement towards recognising 
the right of intervention but this is certainly one 
of the problems which we shall need to discuss 
together, preferably in Helsinki, and WEU 
should formulate a position of principle on this 
subject. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom).-
In the middle of his excellent speech, the Secre-
tary-General made a throwaway remark about a 
reprieve in the stationing of American forces in 
Europe. Can the Secretary-General elaborate on 
that and say whether he thinks that it is likely to 
be a short reprieve or whether the result of the 
presidential election, either way, might release 
the next President to say " No more "? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of 
WEU). - Sir Geoffrey raises an important 
question and, of course, I do not have the 
answer. When I make speeches in member coun-
tries I always point to 1994 as a crucial year. I 
hope that by the end of 1994 all Russian forces 
will have left European countries. They may not 
have left the Baltic states, but they should have 
by then. Certainly, they will have left eastern 
Germany and Poland. For our public and the 
American public that will point to a new situ-
ation. The question then becomes pressing: is 
the present force posture still necessary or can 
we reduce it? 
I think that it is likely that some American 
presence will remain, although one of the three 
presidential hopefuls may have a different view. 
My recipe has always been that it is time to con-
clude a clear arrangement - sometimes I even 
call it a transatlantic bargain - in which we 
Europeans make it clear what we can and will do 
for our own security and point to the functions 
that, at least until the end of this century, we 
cannot fulfil and where we need an American 
contribution. I hope that, to complement our 
role, the Americans would be able to fulfil such 
functions as we Europeans may need help with. 
66 
FIRST SITTING 
It is not for us to dictate anything to the Amer-
icans or for them to dictate anything to us. 
Therefore, it must be a dovetailing exercise. 
That would enhance enormously our capabilities 
and could provide a meaningful argument to 
Congress as to why the Americans should 
remain in Europe. That is important and the 
Council and we parliamentarians still have some 
work to do in explaining to the Americans that 
we want them to remain in Europe, that we want 
to preserve the alliance and that the work of 
WEU is of the essence, not only for Europe but 
for the alliance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Secretary-General, for your speech and for your 
replies. 
15. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following 
orders of the day: 
1. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Presidential Committee, Document 
1312). 
2. Composition of political groups (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges and vote on the draft order, Doc-
ument 1311). 
3. A new security order in Europe (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Political Committee and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Document 1309 and 
amendments). 
4. WEU after Maastricht (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Political Com-
mittee, Document 1308). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
{The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.) 
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(Rapporteur), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Caro, Mr. Hardy, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Caro, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Caro, 
Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Caro. 
7. WEU after Maastricht (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Political Committee, Doe. 1308). 
Speakers: Mr. Goerens (Rapporteur), Mr. Antretter, 
Mr. Fioret. 
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendllnce register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accord-
ance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Changes in the membership of a committee 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Assembly must approve the following changes in 
the membership of the Technological and Aero-
l. See page 18. 
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space Committee proposed by the Italian Dele-
gation: 
Mr. Colombo and Mr. Savio as titular mem-
bers in place of Mr. Stegagnini and Mr. 
Malfatti. 
These changes have been published in Notice 
No. 2 which has been circulated. 
They are submitted to the Assembly for ratifi-
cation under Rule 40 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The changes are agreed to. 
4. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1312) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of the report 
of the Presidential Committee on action by the 
Presidential Committee, Document 1312. 
I call Mr. Caro, the Rapporteur. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, may I again congratulate you on your 
election. You will be following in the footsteps 
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of our friend Robert Pontillon as a result, unfor-
tunately, of his death, but you are one of those 
most gifted with the authority and knowledge 
needed to enable our Assembly to pursue the 
work begun by your predecessor and to guide it 
along the exciting but difficult road before it at 
the end of this century: namely that leading to 
the construction of political Europe. You may 
rest assured that you will have the most active 
support of the majority, if not all the members 
of this Assembly. 
Our friend Robert Pontillon has taken his 
leave of us. We shall long remember this Pres-
ident who, with his friendly courtesy and devo-
tion to the cause of Europe, gave himself so fully 
to the work of this Assembly and chaired the 
Presidential Committee on whose behalf I have 
the honour to present this report. The vacant 
chairmanship of the committee was occupied at 
short notice by Mr. Sinesio, one of our friends 
and colleagues but no longer a member of the 
Assembly because he did not stand for re-
election to his national parliament. On behalf of 
my colleagues I should like to thank him for all 
the work he did and the masterly way he pre-
sided over our proceedings. 
The report by the Presidential Committee is 
simple and need not call for any in-depth 
debate. In summary form it gives a general 
picture of the activities of this body with its 
wide-ranging responsibilities, being both poli-
tical and administrative. 
As you will see in part I of the report, its 
political action has mainly covered the organ-
isation of the work not only of the plenary 
Assembly but also of its committees and staff, 
including the Assembly secretariat, the infor-
mation service, which is providing us with 
increasingly efficient help, and in fact all the 
personnel working for us. 
The biggest task, of course, was to try to con-
centrate our activities on the major political 
event constituted by the Maastricht agreements 
and to present to the Assembly - in the form of 
the order of business which we adopted this 
morning - the most coherent procedure pos-
sible. I can never sufficiently stress the impor-
tance of the coherence of the work performed 
within our Assembly and I am sure that all of 
you, ladies and gentlemen, will readily recognise 
the common thread linking all th~ reports before 
us. It is clear at this part-session even more than 
before that one report cannot be read without 
the others. If there are any lessons to be drawn 
from this part-session, they will need to be 
drawn globally, whether the problems are those 
of arms control, institutional organisation, 
greater Europe waiting at the door of Europe of 
the Nine, and our relations across the world. 
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Our action therefore has and must have an even 
wider audience in the Europe of the future 
where we shall be both a full member of defence, 
the alliance and Atlantic security, and the spear-
head of the European identity as a political unit. 
As such WEU will be an appropriate institution 
for debate with our friends of Central and 
Eastern Europe who, freed of the constraints of 
the communist organisation, are setting out on 
the thrilling adventures of freedom and parlia-
mentary democracy; they too like us need the 
guarantee of security in every field. 
This is the spirit in which the work of the 
Presidential Committee has been done. One 
illustration is the Berlin symposium on Central 
and Eastern Europe, which most of you went to. 
With the wide-ranging attendance of this sym-
posium it was possible to list the many problems 
arising in the new European situation and to 
help find common ground in the different coun-
tries' interests: namely, common political action 
to fit in with the objectives that the member 
countries of WEU have set themselves, the 
enlargement of WEU and of the Community of 
the Twelve and relations with countries turning, 
in their positive attitudes, towards our 
organisation of Western Europe. 
Both in relation to the Berlin symposium and, 
more particularly, with regard to the presidency 
of the Council of Ministers of WEU I should like 
to pay a particular tribute to our German col-
leagues to whom we owe our thanks for the 
faultless organisation of the symposium and to 
the Chairman-in-Office whom, alas, we shall not 
see with us again. I hope that the absence of 
Mr. Genscher, who has rendered invaluable 
service to Western European Union, is only tem-
porary. 
The big issue, of course, has been the tragedy 
in Yugoslavia which weighs on our thoughts, 
eats at our hearts and leaves us at a loss, because 
we have no way of stepping in. It continues to 
grow in importance and gravity. It began last 
summer, in the first few days of August to be 
precise, when we saw the first warning signs of 
what was to become an interethnic flare-up 
within the former federation. At the present 
time, it represents the quintessential question 
for Europe and for WEU in particular. It is not 
my responsibility to go into this problem in 
detail. We shall have an opportunity to speak on 
this subject in connection with the reports that 
are to follow, but I wanted to make it clear that 
the Presidential Committee has had this issue 
constantly in mind. 
Our relations with the European Parliament 
and also with the Assembly of the Atlantic 
Alliance are one of our main concerns. The 
reports to be presented, in particular that by 
Mr. Goerens, will afford an opportunity to 
discuss them again. There will also be the dis-
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cussion on WEU after Maastricht and the 
excellent report by Sir Dudley Smith when we 
will be able to consider relations with the North 
Atlantic Assembly. The Presidential Committee 
sees increasing coherence in the co-ordination 
with these two parliamentary bodies as 
essential. 
Discussion is under way about the CSCE 
Assembly. It has not yet been set up. It will be 
our Assembly's task to reach a joint, coherent 
position with the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in order first to avoid duplication and 
second to lay down procedures and methods of 
work enabling Western European V nion to 
remain what I referred to some time ago as the 
European spearhead in security and defence 
matters. 
As regards administrative matters, the Presi-
dential Committee has taken particular care to 
monitor the work of our Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration and has given 
it every form of support wherever possible. 
When discussing the report on budgetary and 
administrative affairs, to be presented by our 
eminent colleague, Mr. Rathbone, we shall be 
able not only to consider the factors involved in 
the preparation of our budget, especially for 
1992, but also the light in which the Assembly 
sees its relations with the Council. We cannot 
confine our role merely to receiving papers 
brought out after meetings of budget experts. 
We wish to be involved at the level of political 
decision-making and not left to discuss things 
once all has been settled among the governments 
in the Permanent Council. 
In this connection, the Presidential Com-
mittee is happy to record the efficiency of the 
Assembly secretariat. Whenever possible we try 
to improve it. You have no doubt noted that in 
spite of the budgetary constraints imposed upon 
us, which delayed decision-making, we have 
finally been able to offer our Spanish and Portu-
guese friends an administrative post, and, 
although this probably falls below their expecta-
tions, it is a start. We shall have to take up these 
matters again so that every one here, whether a 
member of the Assembly or of the staff, can feel 
to be in his proper place with equality of rights 
for all, and in a position to be the credible 
spokesman for public opinion with govern-
ments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I assume the Assembly agrees that the com-
mittee's action be ratified. 
Are there any objections? ... 
It is so decided. 
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5. Composition of political groups 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on 
Rales of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the drtl/t order, 
Doe. 1311) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges on the composition 
of political groups and vote on the draft order, 
Document 1311. 
I take this opportunity to inform the Assem-
bly that Mr. Pieralli and nine of his colleagues 
have tabled a motion for a decision on para-
graph 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure. 
I call Mr. Thompson, Rapporteur and Chair-
man of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
Mr. THOMPSON (United Kingdom). - I con-
gratulate you, Mr. Soell, on your election as 
President of the Assembly. I am sure that you 
will carry out your duties in the same fashion as 
your eminent predecessor. 
The Assembly decided that the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges should exam-
ine a matter raised in a letter from Mr. Benassi 
and other members of the Assembly. It requested 
that the committee consider an amendment to 
Rule 39, paragraph 4. The amendment reads as 
follows: " A group shall consist of not less than six 
representatives or substitutes." The committee 
met on 13th May to consider that issue. 
The letter from Mr. Benassi explained that the 
reason for the request resulted from the recent 
parliamentary elections in Italy. The letter also 
suggested that the proposal had the aim of guar-
anteeing the maintenance of the Unified Euro-
pean Left Group of the Assembly. 
Before commenting on this proposal on behalf 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges, I feel that the Assembly deserves an 
explanation as to why my name is included as a 
sponsor of the motion. When I was informed of 
the letter from Mr. Benassi, it had been signed 
by only nine members of the Assembly. Accord-
ing to Rule 52, paragraph 2, " Motions for deci-
sions to amend the Rules of Procedure may be 
tabled by ten or more representatives". It would 
have been possible under this rule to refuse to 
accept the motion on a technical point. I felt, 
however, that it was more appropriate for the 
committee to debate the issue and present a 
recommendation to this session of the 
Assembly. Therefore, I added my name to 
ensure that a decision could be made by the 
committee and the Assembly. 
The Assembly has always recognised the value 
of political groupings which assist the organ-
isation both in administration and in developing 
policy. To support those activities, a budget to 
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allow groups to carry out their duties is 
included, based on a fixed sum, plus a further 
sum calculated on the basis of the number of 
members in each group. The accounts are 
subject to audit. 
The content of the motion rested entirely on 
the changing political situation in one of the 
member countries, and was an attempt to ensure 
the maintenance of the Unified European Left 
Group in WEU. While recognising the value of 
the group's contribution to the Assembly's work, 
the committee felt that, if such a request were 
acceded to, it might lead to requests to amend 
the Rules of Procedure each time developments 
in the political situation in a member country 
led to changes in the political composition of its 
delegation. 
The committee also felt that any future 
enlargement of WEU would necessarily involve 
changes in the structure of the political groups 
that were difficult to foresee. Representatives 
will be aware of the possibility of significant 
interest by other European nations in eventually 
applying for membership of our Assembly. As 
and when those applications are considered, and 
possibly accepted, there will be an increase in 
the number of delegates, who will in turn 
probably join a political grouping. That possible 
increase in membership will affect the future 
structure of the Assembly and its political groups. 
The examination of the issue has been of 
value as it has highlighted the structure of 
political groups in the Assembly. The rule t.o. fix 
the minimum number of members of a political 
group at nine was, I understand, based on 10% 
of the Assembly's total membership - at that 
time numbering eighty-nine. Our membership 
now numbers one hundred and eight, and if the 
10% policy is to continue to apply, we must con-
sider increasing the minimum membership of 
the political groups. The committee will be dis-
cussing that issue in the near future. 
As a principal pillar of European democracy, 
our Assembly provides full opportunity for rep-
resentatives to raise issues either in committee 
or in the Assembly. The power of argument in 
debate can persuade the Assembly to accept a point 
of view - the most important facility available. 
In view of the very important issues raised, 
the committee unanimously agreed to recom-
mend to the Assembly that it should reject the 
application to change the rules and I therefore 
move that motion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - As a 
signatory, along with other members of the 
Italian democratic party of the left, of the 
motion for a decision that Mr. Thompson is 
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asking the Assembly not to approve, I should 
like to make a brief statement. 
I understand, though I regret them, the rea-
sons prompting the Rapporteur and the com-
mittee not to accept our proposal. We have 
therefore decided to withdraw it. 
I should like to inform the Assembly that, 
along with other Italian parliamentarians 
belonging not only to my group but also to other 
political groups, we have drawn up a new 
motion for decision that the committee can 
examine later and give its reply at the second 
part-session in December. This text makes no 
change to the quorum called for in the Rules of 
Procedure but lays down that the Assembly can 
authorise the Presidential Committee, in excep-
tional cases, to waive the requirements of Rule 
39 (4). The Presidential Committee's decision 
must be unanimous and would be valid for a 
year only and apply solely to an existing parlia-
mentary group. 
For the moment I shall not explain why we 
have specified a time-limit of one year or why 
we recommend, in order to reassure the Assem-
bly, that the decision should be taken unani-
mously by the Presidential Committee. 
I simply hope that at the next session I receive 
a positive reply from the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure on this particular point. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I repeat 
that your proposal will be referred without 
debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges which will report back as laid 
down in Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure. 
The debate is closed. 
We shall now vote on the draft order in Doc-
ument 1311. 
Under Rule 35, the Assembly votes by show 
of hands unless ten or more representatives or 
substitutes present in the chamber request a vote 
by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The draft order is adopted 1• 
6. A new security order in Europe 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Political Committee and rote 
on the draft reeommendation, Doe. 1309 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Political Committee 
l. See page 19. 
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on a new security order in Europe and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Document 1309 and 
amendments. 
I call Mr. Caro, Rapporteur of the Political 
Committee. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Ladies 
and gentlemen, it is my task on behalf of the 
Political Committee to present the report on the 
new security order in Europe. It is very much a 
current topic and one within which all the issues 
have to be embraced. This report may obviously 
leave some of you dissatisfied given the pace of 
events and the diversity of our possible reac-
tions. 
The real issue is whether we, as Western 
European Union, are able to respond to the 
general expectation of direct action by us to 
improve the chances of peace in Central and 
Eastern Europe and to equip ourselves effec-
tively for the purpose. 
Clearly, in the event of a crisis directly or indi-
rectly affecting one of our member countries, we 
have to apply the treaty. As we know, Western 
European Union, which forms part of the Atlan-
tic structure, has out-of-area territorial responsi-
bilities - outside, that is, the area of influence of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, which is limited to 
the territories of the member countries of the 
alliance - and is thus responsible for dealing 
with problems that could arise outside the 
national territories of these member countries, 
as required for one thing by Article VIII of our 
treaty. 
With the terms of the security problem now 
entirely changed with the disappearance of the 
Warsaw Pact and the progress towards demo-
cracy and international personality of the coun-
tries of the former communist bloc, what pattern 
can the European security effort take to be in 
harmony with these countries and bearing in 
mind what we can contribute from our expe-
rience or in terms of the effectiveness of the 
agreements or treaties that we are party to? 
In this matter it is possible, theoretically at 
least, to imagine a whole series of measures. 
Among these in particular is the large-scale oper-
ation of the CSCE from Vancouver to Vladi-
vostok, though this is not, properly speaking, the 
territorial sphere of such action as could be 
mounted by WEU-CSCE which began with 
thirty-two members and has now fifty-four. 
When we see, particularly after the remark-
able address by our Secretary-General this 
morning, the complications that we encounter, 
even as nine, in achieving a political consensus 
among our governments on action to be taken, 
we can easily imagine that at CSCE level such 
agreement could well become more complex, 
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and that, without prejudging the political will of 
the CSCE member countries, puts it mildly. 
But we do belong to CSCE and I think that 
one of the factors that we could remember in 
debating all our reports today is the essential 
role of WEU, whatever the institution or organ-
isation responsible for organising or safe-
guarding the peace, and therefore for planning 
and, if necessary, intervening. WEU can and 
must act in the CSCE framework with a role that 
we define. 
Another field calling for imagination is that of 
bilateral and multilateral consultation and agree-
ment. We are already aware that in the context 
of the Atlantic Alliance or in the more limited 
area of external policy and, of course, at the eco-
nomic level, there are discussions going on 
which, for the EC, involve the great debate on 
enlargement. These are political discussions and 
diplomatic negotiations, I might say exercises of 
style that are absolutely essential if we are to 
prepare, forestall and codify. 
As far as we are concerned, the report that I 
am presenting today takes us into a more con-
crete area: that of the practical methods we 
could define and the means to use and the objec-
tives to be attained. It takes a practical approach 
and is the outcome of a formal request initially 
made by three governments of Central Europe: 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, now gen-
erally known as the " triangle " of countries. 
These three countries, having experienced 
similar vicissitudes, through a democratic pro-
cess that was not the same but led on to the same 
new life as sovereign democratic countries with 
a pluralist parliamentary democracy, have 
started talks amongst themselves and estab-
lished close permanent relations to co-ordinate 
their action, particularly in the spheres of 
security, trade and relations with the western 
countries. 
These three countries have asked the Atlantic 
Alliance countries, and hence WEU, for a solid 
guarantee of their security. The starting point, 
the key word, is this request for a guarantee. We 
have to help them define the request, but we also 
have to respond to it. You know the path fol-
lowed by this request. In reality it was a request 
for American support, i.e. to be covered by the 
Atlantic shield. The reply given was that, for 
reasons clear to all, links between these three 
countries and the Atlantic Alliance were not as 
simple to organise as could be wished, but that 
there was surely a formula more within their 
- and therefore our - grasp, namely to try to 
organise relations to achieve this security guar-
antee requested by the three countries in the 
form of closer links with Western European 
Union. 
That is the basis of this report. All the pre-
amble and all the proposals are built on this 
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exchange among the three countries making the 
request. Our Assembly set to work with the 
political will to reply positively to the request. 
Once we crossed this threshold, the question was 
what method to propose to our Council of Min-
isters. 
What appeared to be the simplest is associ-
ation, keeping the most relevant features of our 
treaty. The idea is to organise co-operation 
between these countries and all the subsidiary 
bodies of Western European Union, excluding, 
of course, full participation in the governmental 
or parliamentarian political organs, since that 
full participation in the two bodies would be 
tantamount to joining. 
But for the time being we are talking not 
about accession, but about co-operation and 
methods. For the time being, we are confined to 
studying this notion of association which you 
will recall we tackled at the mini-session of our 
Assembly in Palermo, which is where this notion 
of association broke surface. 
What can be done to give these countries the 
feeling that Western European Union has taken 
their need for guarantees on board without 
at the same time prejudging any form of 
accession? 
The method adopted was inspired by the prec-
edent set by the Council of Ministers at the time 
of the Gulf war. Then the Council of Ministers 
held its meetings in the presence of representa-
tives of states that were not members of WEU 
but were intimately concerned in the conduct of 
operations in the Gulf, members who were all 
part of the alliance and were invited regularly. It 
is true that the Council's organisation of these 
meetings, enlarged to include non-member 
observers, was designed to deal with a particular 
event, namely armed conflict. 
Here we are reasoning, situations of armed 
conflict aside, to attempt to establish rules and 
regulations tailored to the situation of the three 
countries which made their request as one of a 
series of proposals to do with the development 
of their own countries, particularly economic 
and social development, as we well know. 
Hence this report makes the proposal that 
these three countries have representatives at 
ministerial level as a basis for Council meetings 
enlarged to include these countries. The min-
isters would of course be ministers for defence 
and foreign affairs. A peace-keeping agreement 
between WEU and these three countries is 
foreseen as a basic step. This agreement would, 
for both Council and Assembly, be a permanent 
foundation, not in conflict with the precedent 
applied during the Gulf war, for the closest 
co-operation possible with the three countries. 
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It is clear that - to be frank - only Article VIII 
at the political and military level could be 
invoked because Article V only comes into force 
after accession. This does not mean that these 
peace-keeping agreements could not relate to a 
whole series of points covered by the solidarity 
between members of WEU, which would enable 
us to move forward and thus create a model that 
we could offer to all who wish to join WEU, 
without becoming members straight away. This 
means we have to consult, at the Atlantic level 
of course but also at the level of Central and 
Eastern Europe, because countries other than 
these three are also interested. I am thinking in 
particular of the Baltic states, Bulgaria and 
Romania. At present, we are at the first stage of 
this rocket of co-operation in Central and East-
em Europe, though in no way predetermining 
what political follow-up we should take to our 
proposal. The report to the Assembly attempts 
to prepare this model and requests that it be 
considered at ministerial level. 
If need be, I am of course available to the 
Assembly to reply to questions on the possible 
content of such a co-operation agreement and on 
setting up this enlarged co-operation council. 
For the time being I prefer to confine myself to 
the principle which, of itself, is already suffi-
ciently important to command the attention of 
the Assembly in its discussions today. May I, as 
a reminder, make one simple observation which 
we could later come back to in the various dis-
cussions: it concerns the word association. 
Please, let us have no academic debate on 
whether we should use the term associate, co-
operator, etc. Let us keep things clear. Under the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, we know 
that by the end of the year we are required to 
accept new members which are the three of the 
Twelve which are not yet of the Nine: Denmark, 
Ireland and Greece. Among these countries 
there could be one or more which for the time 
being sets such conditions that it would not, at 
least in the eyes of the Assembly, be acceptable 
as a full member but only as a part-member with 
a part-agreement excluding certain articles of 
the treaty. It could be a kind of association. We 
cannot place all of them on the same footing in 
this case. A new name would be needed in each 
case. It is a relatively minor problem of 
semantics, I think, or political vocabulary. We 
could return to this question once the sub-
stantive political debate is over. 
As regards Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic 
countries referred to in the draft recommen-
dation, we should have the closest possible rela-
tions with them as was the case with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and we must 
inform them of our way of thinking on the basis 
of the proposals I have the honour to put to you, 
so that they can put forward proposals to us, if 
they so desire. 
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Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the draft recommen-
dation repeat, in rather more up-to-date 
wording, proposals that we have already made. 
They are more specific, in particular as regards 
the operational role ofWEU. We shall no doubt 
refer to them in connection with other reports; 
we cannot allow serious crises that threaten 
European security to pass without doing some-
thing; we need universally adopted principles 
allowing WEU to intervene when it is the 
political will of its Council, without being 
delayed by procedures, to provide further cover 
or consent. All this has to be organised in 
advance. 
If we wish to take preventive action we must 
be able to move very quickly. If we are unable to 
take such action it has to be said that the means 
at our disposal are inadequate. It is with this in 
mind that we repeat the request for suitable 
operational instruments, in harmony with any 
action that may be taken by the Atlantic 
Alliance and, of course, with such action as is 
open to us under the treaty governing our activ-
ities. 
I should like to add that we must not now be 
afraid to face up to what Mr. Genscher said in 
reply to the following question that we put to 
him in our role of interpreters of public opinion, 
namely, how is it that, on the one hand, Maas-
tricht was accompanied by activity, imagination 
and texts in plenty, whilst at the same time the 
tragedy in Yugoslavia unfolds without our poli-
tical power concentrated on Maastricht being 
able to stop it? The reply by the Chairman-in-
Office was: "It is very sad to say, and very 
painful for us, but we have been overtaken by 
events." 
However, the Assembly cannot be reproached 
with failing to anticipate this when there was 
still time. The tone and demands of the Assem-
bly's proposals may now perhaps be more firm 
and certain than they were last summer, but as 
regards the essential they converge on the same 
requirement: namely, political Europe can only 
come into existence if it shows the public that it 
is capable of preventing tragedies such as those 
occurring in Yugoslavia. 
I am quite happy to join the members who 
criticise the Council, but I should also like to tell 
the Council, with them, that while each indi-
vidual member state has demonstrated its poli-
tical will to do all in its power to stop the con-
flict, taken together they have forgotten one 
thing - or if they have not forgotten it they have 
not attached to it the same logic - and that is 
that rooted in the ability to intervene politically, 
and if necessary militarily, is the reality of 
Europe's political existence; the failure to act 
and to intervene deals a fatal blow to the idea of 
the political Europe of tomorrow. 
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What purpose does it serve us to approve the 
development of political union and the organ-
isation of European security, as we have already 
done in a first stage in the French Parliament or 
as our British colleagues have also done, if we 
have no reply to give our colleagues who are less 
enthusiastic about Europe and afraid about 
sharing power and who accuse us very often of 
selling national sovereignty cheap, whereas 
instead the object is to set up a complementary 
body for the better exercise of national sover-
eignty? How can we counter their fears if we do 
not at the same time show that a new and more 
effective way of keeping the peace is inherent in 
our position? How can we resist the impact of 
their contradictions, giving hesitant and some-
times embarrassed replies when they show us we 
are simply being politicians while the people and 
public opinion, for their part, are still uncon-
vinced? 
As the Secretary-General said this morning, 
the need to inform is vital. I take my hat off to 
our Institute which is making considerable 
efforts in this field but we have to work on 
public opinion in the towns, villages and local 
associations. Are there any of us who have not 
noticed that when we want to hold public 
meetings simply on the subject of Europe or 
security, or even disarmament if we are very 
courageous, apart from a few specialists, uni-
versity professors and others with political inter-
ests, it is difficult to attract ordinary people who 
trust us and want to understand? 
The future of Europe cannot be built without 
them. As you know, we went to Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland. We also went to other 
countries and everywhere we were struck by the 
fact that these people - as was the case earlier in 
Spain and Portugal - see democratic renewal 
and rediscovery of Europe in terms of rejoining 
Western Europe. For them it is a popular, deep-
rooted notion, and we should learn from them. 
Europe is not just a matter for the elite. 
We still have a long way to go. Let us try to get 
there fast. We have lost all too much time since 
August 1991 because, despite all our asking, we 
have remained uncertain though hopeful. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Mr. Caro. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Thank you 
very much, Mr. President. I should like to 
welcome you to your position. 
This is an informative and relevant report. By 
and large, the Political Committee's Rapporteur 
commended it. I do not propose to make a long 
speech, but there are two amendments in my 
name which are straightforward and which were 
substantially supported this morning by the 
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Socialist Group. I shall give the arguments for 
them this afternoon. I think that that would 
relieve me of any obligation to trespass on the 
Assembly's time, as I do not for one moment 
think that anyone would object to them. I trust 
that in due course the committee will signify its 
acceptance of them. 
In the first two paragraphs of the preamble, 
the report recognises the major problem facing 
Europe and the fragility that it presents to the 
new democracies of the East - the problem of 
militant nationalism, a nationalism that may be 
dismissive of external hostility or opposition. 
Few members of the Assembly would dissent 
from the assessment of the situation in the 
report and fewer still would dissent from the 
view that the major purpose of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe must be 
the pursuit of peace, the resolution of conflict 
and the building of co-operation. 
In a relevant debate in Strasbourg a month 
ago, a number of pointed remarks were made 
about the CSCE - which, in terms of its funda-
mental responsibility, could not possibly claim 
to have achieved great success. It was pointed 
out that it would be wiser for the CSCE not to 
seek to extend and broaden its interests and 
responsibilities and that it should concentrate 
more vigorously on its major role of building 
upon at least the first basket of the Helsinki 
Accord. The duplication that may be developing 
is likely to be wasteful of the energy that could 
be used more wisely for purposes for which 
Europe is crying out. 
Without being unduly militaristic, I think that 
we could all accept the aims espoused in the 
draft recommendations - the establishment of 
forms of military co-operation and joint 
planning and the acceptance of responsibility. 
WEU should accept that it has a role in the man-
agement of response to crises. As Mr. Caro pro-
claimed, our interest in the stability and peace 
of the whole of Europe must remain funda-
mental. For that reason, I accept the recommen-
dations. They could lead not so much to action 
after the development of a crisis as to a contri-
bution towards prevention. It would be better to 
learn how to unfurl an umbrella before a storm, 
rather than subsequent to saturation. 
As I said, I have tabled two amendments. The 
first would remind the CSCE of the present 
reality, to which I have already referred. The 
second would delete the word " effective " from 
the reference to WED's role in the Gulf crisis. 
As I have said previously in this Assembly 
- perhaps rather too colourfully - there was an 
excess of self-congratulation after the Gulf con-
flict. I did not believe that it was justified then, 
and in hindsight the termination of exercise 
Desert Storm hardly justified that self-congra-
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tulation. In any case, it is not for us to claim 
effectiveness - that is for the verdict of the 
external observers and, above all, of history. An 
excessive claim could be counterproductive, and 
I would prefer that it were not made. 
If real progress is made in the establishment of 
the new order referred to in Mr. Caro's report, 
we shall not need to make claims of virtue. The 
fact of peace and the achievement of stability 
can and will speak for themselves. It is at that 
point that we should request Mr. Caro to accept 
the amendment so that we can avoid the trium-
phalism to which some people seem prone. 
(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Jankowitsch, Observer from Austria. 
Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Observer from Austria) 
(Translation). - Your kind invitation enables a 
member of the Austrian Parliament, repre-
senting the national parliament of a neutral 
country, to address this Assembly for the first 
time in its history. 
The reason why we accepted without the 
slightest hesitation is that we recognise the 
importance of this Assembly and are aware of its 
central and traditional role in the formulation of 
security policy in Europe. 
But we also thought that it was important to 
seize this opportunity to open a new dialogue on 
a subject of equal importance to the countries 
attached in one way or another to the Atlantic 
Alliance and those which have taken and are still 
taking a different direction in their security 
policy: namely, independence and, for most of 
them, like Austria, a European form of neu-
trality. 
This dialogue we feel is particularly important 
at a time when the end of the East-West conflict 
and the simultaneous appearance of other 
sources of tension call for new thinking and new 
departures in the organisation of European 
security. 
It is clear that a country like Austria, a 
member of the community of western values, a · 
parliamentary democracy and a country on the 
threshold of joining the European Community 
does not wish to - and cannot - be absent from 
this thinking which affects our future com-
munity of joint security, because the security of 
Europe and our own security is something we 
believe in. 
We also know, Mr. President, that this wish to 
participate in your discussion - a direct result of 
our choice of Europe - may prompt a number 
of questions among the members of this 
Assembly. 
You may well ask what a country which has 
been practising an advanced and even open 
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form of neutrality from the days of the cold war 
has to offer for European security or rather new 
inter-linked and - we hope - complementary 
systems of security built on the ruins of the old 
East-West system. 
Should we not, before entering into the dis-
cussion and before formulating any contribu-
tion, abandon this policy of neutrality which 
many in Western Europe consider out of date 
and irrelevant since the collapse of the Berlin 
wall and therefore destined to disappear? 
I must tell you, Mr. President, that Austrians 
today are familiar with this dilemma as they are 
with the contradictions that may arise between 
Europe's new security systems, in which your 
organisation will certainly have a major role to 
play, and the practice of neutrality inspired by 
another age, or at least another part of the 
century. 
Since there are these questions and doubts, it 
is important to explain a security policy like that 
of Austria which has never refused to accept, 
even at the height of the cold war, a number of 
basic commitments which, even at that time, far 
exceeded the limits of conventional neutrality 
and were inspired by a spirit of solidarity, a 
spirit of sharing the common burden, but also a 
European spirit. 
I refer principally to Austria's commitments 
under the United Nations' system of collective 
security, the most recent illustration being my 
country's participation in the action of the 
United Nations against the Iraqi aggressor. 
It is my country's habit to join with others in 
common political security, witness the fact that, 
up to now, 30 000 Austrian soldiers have served 
with the troops of the United Nations peace-
keeping forces. My country already has lengthy 
experience in joint actions to maintain peace 
and international stability. 
Hence it is on the basis of these commitments, 
this attitude of openness and solidarity towards 
the safeguarding of peace and stability and the 
rejection of aggression and violations of interna-
tional law, that we shall review our future role in 
the new joint security system in Europe. As I 
have already said today this review will concern 
both our security as Europeans and the security 
of Austria itself. 
May I ask you then, Madam President, to con-
sider Austria as a partner for whom the word 
solidarity is no empty concept but, above all, a 
challenge that we should like to meet in com-
pany with you, and other countries of Europe 
inspired by the same ideals. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. 
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Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands) 
(Translation). - Madam President, if the tem-
perature in this chamber was indicative of the 
debate, we could have something to look for-
ward to. 
Madam President, the report that we are dis-
cussing here this afternoon that was so elo-
quently presented by the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, 
is really the signal for the debate we will be 
having later this week. The debate also concerns 
the reports by our President, Mr. Soell, Mr. 
Goerens and Sir Dudley Smith. This morning in 
our Federated Group, led by our esteemed 
Rapporteur, but then with a different hat on, we 
said we should really have an opportunity to 
discuss these reports together. But that is not to 
be. So I would ask you to regard my comments 
as an introduction to what will be coming 
tomorrow or the day after. 
This report, too, reflects the current situation 
very accurately. As I think the Rapporteur 
rightly said in his introduction a few moments 
ago, we must beware of conducting this debate 
too much in terms of theoretical models. What 
was once Yugoslavia shows only too clearly that 
that will not get us very far. We talk for a long 
time, and we talk a great deal, but - as Mr. Caro 
has quoted the Council of Ministers- we have 
certainly not achieved a great deal. 
What has happened in the past week? We 
Europeans have talked a great deal within this 
Assembly, in the context of WEU and of the 
Europe of the Twelve, but - and I have no 
pleasure in saying this - it was the American 
Secretary of State, James Baker, who said less 
than a week ago: we Americans are slowly losing 
patience. For me, as a Dutchman and above all a 
European, that was a sign that some rethinking 
is needed: we will surely have to do a great deal 
more than we have done so far. In other words, 
we have been warned to beware of theoretical 
models. It is a good thing that we are having a 
separate debate on Yugoslavia tomorrow after-
noon, because we can discuss it at rather greater 
length. 
I hasten to say that the report we are dis-
cussing here this afternoon is both clear and 
good, and I shall argue strongly in favour of it. I 
feel that Mr. Caro's report and recommenda-
tions appeal for a selective policy. What do I 
mean by that? What Mr. Caro proposes as 
regards the association of the Visegrad countries 
with Western European Union does something 
that, I feel, has not been done enough in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to date: it 
makes a selection. What do we see in the North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council? All the countries 
on a level, no selectivity: Kyrgyzstan is in the 
same position as Hungary. What is important 
about this report, in my opinion, is that it does 
not make the same mistake. I feel - and I have 
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already agreed to this in the Political Committee 
- that our Rapporteur should be complimented 
on this. This selectivity must be maintained. In 
this respect it is a good thing that a start is being 
made with the three Visegrad countries and that 
a cautious approach is being adopted as regards 
Bulgaria and the Baltic states and, later, Roma-
nia. Let us wait and see what the elections in 
Romania produce, if they are held as planned, 
and then pass judgment. I look forward to 
hearing what our Romanian colleague has to say 
in a moment. 
Secondly, if we are going to talk about a new 
security order in Europe, the link with NATO 
and the United States is essential. I am glad that 
the Rapporteur makes no bones about this in his 
report, because they are two sides of the same 
coin. Either we say in Europe: we can and will 
do the rest ourselves. That is not what I think, 
Madam President, but others do. Or we say: we 
want to keep you Americans involved in the 
defence of Europe in some way. This seems to 
me to be the obvious line to take and the one 
that is accepted here. We will be reverting to this 
in the next few days, when we will undoubtedly 
be discussing the reports on and reactions to the 
organisation of the Franco-German corps. As 
I see it, this raises more questions than it 
answers. 
Madam President, there is not enough time 
for me to comment on our role with respect to 
Yugoslavia and three vital elements in this 
context: legitimacy, vital interest and the role 
played by public opinion. I hope to revert to this 
tomorrow afternoon, when we discuss Yugo-
slavia. 
All that is left for me to say is that the Europe 
we are living in at the moment is a Europe that 
combines opportunities and risks, where one 
massive threat has been replaced by all kinds of 
other threats. It is a Europe that is forcing us 
-as Mr. Caro rightly does in his report- to look 
first at the substance of the policy and only then 
at the institution, the organisation that has to 
implement that policy. We in this Assembly, in 
Western European Union, should also take this 
to heart. Mr. Caro's report makes a start in the 
right direction. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Vacaru, Observer from Romania. 
Mr. VACARU (Observer from Romania) 
(Translation). - Madam President, ladies and 
gentlemen. The meeting of the thirty-eighth 
session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union is taking place at a vital moment for the 
future of our continent, as underlined by both 
the subjects and the content of the reports on the 
order of business. So I should like to congrat-
ulate the Rapporteur and especially Mr. Caro, 
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who has produced a detailed text and who bases 
relevant conclusions on in-depth analysis. 
In our opinion, European security can only be 
conceived as indivisible and at the level of the 
continent as a whole. Any tendency to create 
new distinctions based on geographical, poli-
tical, economic, cultural or other criterih repre-
sents a kind of conditioned reflex that we must 
get rid of if we wish to avoid erecting new walls 
- even if they are only psychological ones - and 
reliving the sad past of our divided continent. 
We should also avoid the temptation of intro-
ducing selective criteria which, after the events 
of 1989-90, could only be relative. Security on 
the continent of Europe is indivisible, and any 
discrimination would cause new sources of ten-
sion to spring up. 
Romania feels these facts very strongly in 
view of its geographical position in a zone where 
at present tension is rising. On the one hand, 
there is the break-up of Yugoslavia, with its neg-
ative impact on the situation in the Balkans, and 
on the other, there is the armed conflict in 
sectors of the left bank of the Dniestr in the 
Moldovan Republic with its direct implications 
for the political and military stability of this area 
of Europe and for the process of 
democratisation and reform itself. 
The Romanian Delegation calls upon the par-
liamentary delegations at this session to support 
the preservation of the independence and terri-
torial integrity of the Moldovan Republic so that 
all actions directed against a sovereign and inde-
pendent state are brought to an end. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the construction of a 
Europe of peace, democracy and unity implies 
there be equal access for all states to existing 
institutions and understandings. Unfortunately, 
we are still far from achieving comparable levels 
of security since some countries enjoy a double 
or even triple layer of security, whereas certain 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are 
only protected, apart from their own defence 
capabilities, by structures now being set up 
within the framework of the CSCE. 
This is one reason why the countries of 
Eastern Europe have over the last two years 
voiced their wish for closer contact with the 
structures of NATO and WEU. 
With the prospect of European Union opened 
up by the Treaty of Maastricht and having in 
mind the fact that negotiations on the associ-
ation agreement between Romania and the 
European Communities began on 19th May of 
this year - Bulgaria is also negotiating its associ-
ation agreement - I feel that the two-speed 
treatment proposed by the draft recommen-
dation in items 1, 2 and 3 could have a negative 
impact on the development of security and the 
strengthening of confidence in the east of the 
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continent. In fact, the proposals contained in the 
paragraphs I have just mentioned do not entirely 
reflect the concern and difficulties rightly 
pointed out in the first two sections of the pre-
amble. 
In my view, they are even likely to accentuate 
the feeling of insecurity in certain Eastern Euro-
pean countries which, because of the conse-
quences of the Y alta Agreement, have had to 
provide, like the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, Hungary and Poland and in spite of 
the will of their people, what political experts 
have named the cordon sanitaire between West-
em Europe and the former USSR. 
I can confidently assert that my country has 
never been a factor of insecurity; it has never 
attacked another state at any time. The history 
of my country is simply one of its own 
defence. 
I should like to emphasise how greatly the 
Romanian people suffered as a result of the sys-
tematic disregard for human rights under the 
communist regime. It was in order to enshrine 
our irreversible commitment to respect for the 
dignity of the individual in law that Article 20 of 
the new constitution enacted by the Romanian 
Constitutive Assembly reads: " If there is con-
flict between the pacts and treaties on the funda-
mental rights of man to which Romania is a 
party and internal law, international law shall 
take precedence. " 
I think this is a strong reason for suggesting, as 
I do, that in paragraph (iii) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation we should use the 
exact wording of the Charter of Paris to which 
reference is made, namely to maintain freedom 
of expression for all as well as " the rights of 
persons belonging to national minorities". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Vacaru, you have run out of time. Would you 
please end your statement. 
Mr. VACARU (Observer from Romania) 
(Translation). - To conclude, and referring to 
the present situation in Romania, I would like to 
point out that the forthcoming legislative and 
presidential elections will mark the end of the 
second transition stage when the votes of the 
electors will enable government to function nor-
mally and the democratic institutions of 
Romania to develop. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Rubbi. 
Mr. RUBBI (Italy) (Translation). - A new 
security order must be established first and 
foremost to deal with these threats. The ques-
tion is, who should put it together and where? I 
greatly appreciate the Rapporteur's efforts to 
identify in Europe and for Europe the centres 
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where this order should be established. I think, 
however, that a prior question is the role which 
the United Nations should play in ensuring the 
collective security system which the world needs 
today and which could provide the umbrella for 
regional systems, like the one we wish to set up 
in Europe. I have to say that I feel there is some 
reluctance to discuss this. 
During a recent visit by an Assembly dele-
gation to Washington the problem was raised 
with our American hosts but the impression 
gained was one of marginal consideration, if 
any, of the role of the United Nations in 
working out strategies for the situation which 
came about with the end of the cold war. And 
yet the most recent crises in the Gulf and in the 
former Yugoslavia tell us that the United 
Nations is the right place for the adoption of 
instruments for international action. 
So if we really wish to dispel the fears of 
single-state dominance in the control of world 
and regional processes, the only way is to rely on 
the authority of the United Nations, a principle 
we must also observe in working out the new 
architecture of Europe. In a similar way, security 
structures in Europe should revolve around the 
CSCE, understood as a " regional agreement " as 
proposed by Mr. Genscher some time ago. 
The CSCE should therefore become the focal 
point of the collective security system which 
needs to be set up in the new Europe. In that 
case, however, it must be given wider powers 
and new machinery enabling it to act to prevent 
conflicts, manage crises and resolve tensions 
peacefully. 
Clearly, however, we shall be obliged to stay 
with the existing structures at least for a long 
time to come, as Mr. Caro said. The problem, 
therefore, is how to resolve security and defence 
problems through those structures, and how to 
co-ordinate this action in accordance with the 
general aims of the United Nations and of the 
CSCE. 
A new security order in Europe needs both 
the Atlantic Alliance and a Western European 
Union which should become for all purposes the 
military arm and defence policy component of 
the EC. 
I would stress that our Assembly must declare 
itself with conviction on two points which are 
the source of the doubts which are still with us 
and our differences of opinion. 
The first concerns our relations with the 
United States and NATO. There is no intention 
of loosening these ties which go beyond the 
simple grounds of alliance. There is no reason 
for fears of this kind to persist across the 
Atlantic. 
The second point is the issue of the pro-
gressive political transformation of NATO as 
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mentioned at the Rome summit last November 
and of the new links of complementarity and 
co-operation with the European defence struc-
tures as provided in the Maastricht Treaty. 
There can be no denying a specific European 
dimension in foreign and defence policy. The 
process of political union would itself remain 
defective and incomplete. But common Euro-
pean defence can only be achieved by agreement 
and effort involving all its member countries. If 
the Franco-German initiative moves in this 
direction there is no reason for harbouring sus-
picions. 
In conclusion, I believe that on this point also 
the Assembly must give clear and reassuring 
answers. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Atkinson. 
Mr. ATKINSON (United Kingdom).- I con-
gratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, on once 
again producing a most clear and effective 
report, this time bringing together many of the 
current views on the enhancement of Europe's 
security, most notably those expressed at the 
Berlin symposium which, unfortunately, most of 
the British Delegation could not attend because 
they were seeking re-election to our par-
liament. 
The opening paragraphs of Mr. Caro's explan-
atory memorandum remind us, as our Secretary-
General did this morning, that despite the end 
of war in Europe in 1945 and the end of the cold 
war in 1990, while we are sitting here Europeans 
are killing Europeans and our European heritage 
is being destroyed, and we have no effective 
means thus far to bring to an end such death and 
destruction. 
As we will be reminded in greater detail in 
tomorrow's emergency debate on the situation 
in Yugoslavia, during the past year we have seen 
attempts by Serbs to deny self-determination 
first to Slovenia, then to Croatia, now to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and, I have no doubt, shortly to 
Kosovo and Vojvodina, which may yet involve 
the intervention of neighbouring states, as has 
happened before. 
So far, every attempt to bring peace by the 
European Community, the CSCE and the 
United Nations has failed. In addition, we are 
seeing civil wars in Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Arme-
nia, Georgia and Russia, which may yet involve 
war between some of those states. Again, despite 
the commitments of all those states to uphold 
the Helsinki principles of resolving peacefully 
such disputes between nationalities and of pro-
tecting minorities, it is now clear that the CSCE 
process is not yet working as intended. 
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Although there is no shortage of ideas in 
Mr. Caro's report, there remains a complete 
void on recommendations for effective action, 
which is why I will propose Amendment 1 later. 
It would add a new recommendation that our 
leaders be urged at the Helsinki summit next 
month to stop the talking and to establish the 
means, first, to avoid and secondly, if necessary, 
to end any such future conflict in Europe. 
My proposals are based on several of those 
put forward at the Berlin symposium and refer 
to Mr. Caro's explanatory memorandum. They 
are for all fifty-one CSCE-participating states to 
agree a process for binding arbitration to which 
all national and ethnic disputes should be sub-
mitted, either by the parties concerned or, as at 
present under the existing machinery, by third 
parties. Such machinery can provide for refe-
renda to establish demand for self-determi-
nation by democratic means. It can recommend 
the peaceful change of frontiers, as provided for 
under the Helsinki process. Both represent 
a logical extension of our existing CSCE 
machinery and institutions. 
It must now be clear that such a process will 
not be effective without that final authority of 
peace enforcement as a last resort, which to date 
no one has dared propose, although there are 
plenty of offers to supply such a force from 
NATO, the French and Germans, and/or 
through WEU. 
It is this, the means of peace enforcement and 
peace-making in Europe, not just peace-keeping, 
that must be decided by the Helsinki summit 
next month. However, ~hat is not yet on the 
agenda. The object of my amendment is to 
ensure that it is on the agenda, so that hence-
forth no petty Balkan Saddam Hussein - no 
local Serbian warlord leading so-called irregulars -
intent on the death of fellow Europeans, the 
destruction of our heritage, such as in Dubrov-
nik, or on the enforced displacement of peoples, 
such as is taking place, will be tolerated. 
If our CSCE leaders do not face up to what is 
happening in Europe today and if they fail to act 
accordingly in Helsinki next month, we should 
all fear for the future security of our continent. 
For that reason I hope that the Assembly will 
support Amendment 1 later this afternoon. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Miiller. 
Mr. MULLER (Germany) (Translation). -
The simple world of security policy that we have 
known for decades in a bipolar system in which 
friend and foe were clearly labelled, with a few 
neutrals in between, has ended. We now find 
that century-old situations, which we believed 
would determine events for decades to come, 
have practically vanished from the maps and 
history books. I am thinking of the Y alta Con-
ference, which in essence founded the bipolar 
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system in Europe, but I go even further back, to 
the treaties that followed the first world war, to 
Versailles and the other local treaties, and to the 
collapse of the former empires, the tsarist 
empire, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and 
the Ottoman empire. All of that has reappeared 
and become reality at the present time. 
We are finding that ethnic and nationality 
problems are back on the agenda and that the 
simple ideological differences have, as it were, 
disappeared. We are finding that the CSCE 
system, in which we placed great hopes and 
which has made a positive contribution to devel-
opments, is not yet able to handle the current 
problems, for otherwise the events in the Bal-
kans and particularly in Yugoslavia could not 
have taken place as they have. 
We are also aware that at present perhaps only 
the United Nations is in a position to deal with 
this situation. We saw that in connection with 
the Gulf conflict. The question of the extent to 
which regional bodies, among which WEU 
might perhaps be included, play a part under 
Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the 
United Nations is one that must be carefully 
examined. In any case, it was not possible to 
prevent the horrible events in Yugoslavia with 
the aid of the CSCE. And it seems that only 
now, when the United Nations has made up its 
mind to adopt a tough resolution and impose 
sanctions, has any real effect been achieved. 
For us in Western European Union this is a 
clear demonstration that, if a peace-stabilising 
element is to be created in Europe, this can only 
be done with a united political posture and with 
a European Political Union which has its own 
defence arm. This of course means WEU. How-
ever, it seems to me that this line was not 
unequivocally adopted at Maastricht, and that 
far too much attention was paid to questions of 
economic policy, the market, and currency, and 
too little to the important questions of European 
Political Union and security policy. 
It seems likely that we can solve this problem, 
even within Europe, only by arriving at a two-
speed policy. With the Franco-German Euro-
corps as a starting point, followed by the cre-
ation of WEU as the real instrument of security 
and defence policy of a European Politi-
cal Union- this is the way to create guarantees 
in Europe against conflicts that would be settled 
by force. 
Sarajevo has already stood as a very bad 
example in the history of Europe, for the first 
world war was triggered by the murder com-
mitted there. I cherish the hope that the bad 
example of Sarajevo will convince us Europeans 
in 1992 that only a common security and 
defence policy, in which all the partners carry 
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clear responsibility, can in the long term prevent 
fresh conflicts from breaking out in Europe. 
With this in mind, we should welcome the 
report of our colleague, Mr. Caro. But we should 
not forget that we have to act promptly. We 
have not much more time for debate. All 
Europe's problems are perfectly obvious. Now 
that the systems have broken down we need only 
take a look at the map. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Roseta. 
Mr. ROSETA (Portugal) (Translation). -
Thank you very much, Madam President. May I 
congratulate Mr. Caro on his excellent report 
which I think gives a superb introduction to the 
reports under discussion in this first part of the 
thirty-eighth session. The same can be said of 
Mr. Goerens's, Mr. Soell's and Sir Dudley 
Smith's reports and also with regard to other 
equally important reports in December on Euro-
pean security, as for instance Mr. Martinez's 
report on security in the Mediterranean. But I 
shall return to this point. 
The East-West conflict has ended, but it is 
clear that this did not betoken the end of ten-
sions, and even less the end of history. All these 
are optimistic illusions that have often prevailed 
at different times during human history when 
people have thought that solving a problem 
opens the gate to heaven. New sources of tension 
have arisen; nationalisms that had been sup-
pressed for decades have flared up, and this situ-
ation calls for a new order of security and for a 
fresh common effort to prevent Europe from 
regressing seventy years in its eastern part, 
which would be truly lamentable and dangerous 
from every point of view. 
Therefore the first step is to reflect on our 
joint security, and we made a very good start at 
the Berlin symposium. I should also like to con-
gratulate Mr. Soell on his election to the presi-
dency and for the active part he played in that 
conference with the whole German Delegation, 
as well as for the way in which we were wel-
comed. That initiative constituted a very useful 
point of departure for this reflection on the new 
order of security in Europe. 
I agree with our Rapporteur that we shall now 
place the accent on conflict prevention. 
I believe that Europe cannot risk seeing a rep-
etition, as in Yugoslavia, of conflicts leading to 
violence. The solution must involve the creation 
of conflict-prevention mechanisms at different 
levels and in concentric circles, as has already 
been mentioned, thus avoiding our having to 
react to crises after they have arisen. It was real-
istic of our Rapporteur to propose this in para-
graph 4 of the recommendation. 
Meanwhile the main theme of the reports to 
come is the emphasis that should be placed on 
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preventing conflicts from breaking out. This 
must always be in our minds and, indeed, in our 
actions. Here I would point to the need to pay 
attention not only to the political and military 
realities and to the nationalisms of which I 
spoke, but also to associated questi~ns affecti~g 
security, whether of an economtc or soctal 
nature and questions relating to the rights of 
minorities and to human rights because if these 
are not considered and, where possible, resolved 
they are time-bombs that will sooner or later go 
off. 
CSCE is important in conflict prevention, but 
it is not sufficient. On the other hand neither do 
I think that it will be completely possible for an 
organisation so large that it stretches from V an-
couver to Vladivostock to promote human and 
minority rights; I do however think it should ~e 
possible for us to put complementary concentnc 
circles into operation even in the field of conflict 
prevention. 
I should like to emphasise two further points. 
I believe that, as is in fact proposed, when a con-
flict breaks out WEU should be able quickly to 
consider the situation. To this end, it should set 
up a specific mechanism . of its own enabling 
governments to . consult imm~d~ately . a~out 
emergency situatiOns. In my opmton thts tdea 
has much merit and I should like expressly to 
indicate my agreement with it. 
With regard to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the rec-
ommendation, it is clear, at least to me, that a 
neutral country could not possibly be admitted 
as a member of our organisation. It would be 
like squaring the circle - it would be irrational 
and completely illogical for an organisation ded-
icated to promoting joint security to have neu-
tral countries as members. It would not make 
sense, indeed it would be logically impossible. 
Therefore I think it is only elementary logic 
that neutral countries cannot be admitted to full 
membership. 
This being so, as regards those countries that 
are unwilling or unable to change their present 
status, or are far from our area or have different 
traditions, close to neutrality, I believe we can 
progress to a situation in which they could have 
associate status as is proposed in the cases of the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. 
I should be glad if our thinking about neutral 
countries could be extended to other countries 
such as Austria; perhaps our Rapporteur has not 
developed this aspect, but we shall be able to do 
so when discussing other reports. I should like to 
congratulate my friend and representative of 
that country, Deputy Jankowitsch, who has 
spoken here for the first time. What I mean is 
that for the purposes of our discussion he could 
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in some way also take part in our work even 
before his country has joined the European 
Community. 
Lastly, with reference to Mr. Martinez's 
report, may I say that this does not exhaust the 
question of European security; it is a good report 
but, as is obvious, it could not deal with eve~­
thing and it is not complete. European secunty 
has much to do with the Mediterranean and 
there is no doubt that in his various capacities 
our Rapporteur will undertake to make this con-
nection with the security of the southern shore 
of the Mediterranean which is as important as, if 
not more so than, the security of the eastern 
front of our continent. 
. 
(Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Rockenbauer, Observer from Hungary. 
Mr. ROCKENBAUER (Observer from Hun-
gary) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and 
gentlemen, a glance at the map of Europe reveals 
a picture of a continent of two parts: the west 
where frontiers between states are fading away, 
and the east where, on the contrary, new fron-
tiers are emerging. Whilst the Maastricht agree-
ments are helping to found European Union, the 
Balkans are deep in bloody combat, the Cau-
casus is still a theatre of war and there seems to 
be no guarantee of full control of the ex-USSR 
nuclear arsenal. 
Admittedly this instability is relatively new 
because it only arose with the collapse of the 
communist regimes. The federal states were 
united by the single party, the minorities did not 
fight each other and nuclear weapons were 
under central command. 
One might wonder whether the bipolarity of 
yesterday was not better than the disorder of 
today. You who have always known democracy 
certainly cannot regret the disappearance. of 
these regimes; those of us who have had to hve 
under these dictatorships regret it still less. 
But must we resign ourselves to anarchy 
growing out of the ruins of dictatorship? I think 
not. And I do not believe I am wrong in saying 
that if the question were put to our Portuguese~ 
Spanish or Greek friends they would take the 
same view. 
Have we then to conclude that the peoples of 
Central and Eastern Europe are incapable of 
living in a democracy? Obviously not, and we 
are all able to advance many explanations for 
the instability now affecting Central and Eastern 
Europe to varying degrees. 
The fundamental question that we must really 
answer is whether the instability in Eastern 
Europe is unavoidable. The question is all the 
more relevant, I feel, because security in this 
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region is essential for Western Europe. My per-
sonal conviction is that the stability of the east is 
necessary for the prosperity of the west. As for 
the new democracies, they cannot hope to solve 
their economic problems or become part of 
Western Europe without effective security. It is 
the whole of the continent of Europe which 
shares this need for security. 
The events taking place in the former Yugo-
slavia must inevitably serve as a precedent, par-
ticularly to the countries in that region. The fact 
is that the crisis in Yugoslavia may well teach 
that a war of territorial conquest can be waged 
in the east of Europe, human rights denied and 
voices of minorities stifled, or, alternatively, 
that all these affronts to the rule of law will not 
be tolerated on our continent. 
If nothing is done to halt this crisis, the whole 
of the area could be drawn into a process of dis-
integration. In fact, the different local crises feed 
each other: this type of link can be shown to 
exist between the Balkan crisis and the one in 
Karabakh. 
The danger is perceived by a growing number 
of western observers and we are very pleased to 
see the increasingly active efforts being made 
internationally to solve the Balkan crisis. 
However, the pressure being exerted to ensure 
respect for international law is only one aspect 
of responding to the crisis. In addition to 
coercive measures, I think that what is wanted, 
if a lasting and global solution is to be found, is 
to further the integration of countries under-
taking to comply with a number of 'Conditions. 
It is to that end that the three Visegrad coun-
tries have concluded association agreements 
with the EC which should, in the not too distant 
future, lead on to full membership when the nec-
essary conditions are met. I am convinced that, 
if this comes true, it will encourage others to go 
up the road -of greater respect for international 
rules. 
The same is true of security questions. 
The Maastricht agreements significantly 
strengthen the role of WEU by making it a key 
component in the defence of the European 
Union, which is why Hungary, having signed an 
association agreement with the European Com-
munity, wants to become an associate member 
of WEU as a step towards becoming a full 
member. We feel the proposals in Mr. Caro's 
document offer great encouragement. We hope 
they will be accepted by the Assembly. 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, NATO 
members are invited to become WEU associate 
members. I think it important that WEU study 
the possibility of extending this status to the 
three signatory states of the Visegrad treaty and 
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that the WEU Assembly conclude association 
agreements in the short term with the parlia-
ments of the three Visegrad countries. These 
agreements would withhold voting rights from 
the newcomers but enable their participation in 
WEU's work to be more active, for we would 
have the greatest satisfaction in participating in 
the work of the WEU committees. 
The Defence Committee and the External 
Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament 
have for some weeks been discussing Hungary's 
defence doctrine. All parties represented in par-
liament agree on the need to maintain the 
closest possible relations with all international 
organisations. It seems all the more important to 
intensify our relations with WEU because its 
role is becoming increasingly significant. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Feldmann. 
Mr. FELDMANN (Germany) (Translation). -
May I begin by congratulating my colleague in 
the Bundestag, Hartmut Soell, on taking over 
this important office at a very interesting time. I 
wish him the best of luck and the necessary 
support from those concerned in his tenure of 
office. 
May I also associate myself with the congratu-
lations to Mr. Caro on the recommendations he 
put forward on behalf of the Political Com-
mittee for a new security system in Europe. It 
was a good piece ofwork and, as he himself said, 
a realistic one, giving a good overview of the 
existing opportunities for creating a new security 
system in Europe. It is, of course, saddening that 
the previous speaker from Hungary had to ask, 
even rhetorically, whether the bipolar world had 
not provided more security for the East 
European countries than the security order 
which was now crystallising so very slowly in 
Europe. What we need is a pan-European 
security system, not a purely Western European 
or a purely Atlantic security system. We do not 
want the East Europeans to fall into a security 
gap in which anarchy reigns. 
The images of three concentric circles selected 
and conceived by Mr. Caro describe the whole 
situation very vividly. I greatly welcome his 
clear advocacy, as Rapporteur, of an active role 
for the CSCE in securing peace in Europe. The 
conflict-prevention framework, stretching from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok, is very important, 
but it is equally important that the principle of 
consensus should be transformed into a prin-
ciple of action. We now have to some extent the 
consensus principle minus one. We must get 
away from a community of values alone and 
develop into a community of decision and 
action. You have put forward many ideas 
on this subject and indicated many new 
approaches, Mr. Caro. But we must all go away 
and thiJik much harder about the range of 
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instruments with which we can ensure that the 
CSCE is capable of action. The CSCE must be 
able to show that it has teeth, even if they are 
NA TO's teeth, or those of WEU, which have yet 
to grow. The CSCE must not only take deci-
sions, it must also be capable of implementing 
them. 
The example of Yugoslavia is repeatedly men-
tioned, as it was in today's debate. It is of course 
saddening to see how little we have been able to 
do, but I think it would be wrong of us, as Euro-
peans, to keep on giving the impression here 
that we achieved nothing in Yugoslavia. We 
brought peace to Slovenia and, in fact, even to 
the greater part of Croatia. Thank heaven, 
armed conflict has not broken out in Kosovo, 
though people there are, of course, suffering. So 
we did manage to achieve something. We must 
always be thinking: what would ~ave happened 
if we Europeans had taken no hand in the situ-
ation? 
When we are talking about military attacks, 
we must realise that a military attack in a civil 
war is a very delicate and complicated matter 
and one with wide repercussions. It is, of course, 
high time for us to deploy and exhaust all pos-
sible means of political pressure in Bosnia-
Herzegovina - we Europeans possess such 
means, as do the Americans - before military 
power is unleashed, with all its unpredictable 
consequences. Tomorrow morning's debate will 
give us the opportunity of discussing that in 
more detail. 
Mr. Caro describes his second circle as being 
NATO and the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council, which could bring in the Americans 
and the CIS states. 
Western Europe of course appears as the third 
circle. Mr. Caro drew this circle very large, going 
far beyond the restricted circle of this parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU. Maastricht of 
course provided us with the big breakthrough, as 
Charles Goerens's report shows. 
I fully agree with the ideas that Mr. Caro 
expressed about association. What he said on 
this subject in worthy of close attention. WEU 
gained strength from Maastricht with reference 
to association as well. 
There is perhaps one more thing we should 
do. We should give more weight to a common 
restrictive European arms export commission. A 
new security system should also include a policy 
for the control of arms exports. We must intro-
duce more openness and transparency into this 
field. We must agree upon joint rules on arms 
exports, and joint prohibitions. This is urgent, 
because only next year, in 1993, we shall have a 
single internal market in Europe, with all the 
complications this may entail for the export of 
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arms. Perhaps Mr. Caro could say something 
more about that. 
In closing, may I refer briefly to the Franco-
German army corps. That is not just a Franco-
German initiative. Nor should it give rise to any 
opposition between Europeans and their Atlan-
tic colleagues. We have been reproached today 
with doing too much theorising in this 
Assembly. That corps is the concrete expression 
of the common defence policy, the nucleus of a 
European policy on defence. As I said, it is not 
and must not be simply a Franco-German initi-
ative. It is in fact a brick in the common 
European security edifice. In 1995 this army 
corps is due to be expanded, with the partici-
pation of as many Europeans as possible. I am 
very glad that the Belgians have expressed their 
support for this, and I hope that the Spaniards 
will do so as well. Why should we permit many 
co-operative projects between Europeans in the 
field of armaments, but be very suspicious of 
them at the military level? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Your 
speaking time has expired, Mr. Feldmann. 
Mr. FELDMANN (Germany) (Translation). -
I have nearly finished, Mr. President. 
Even though there may be many overlaps in 
the three Circles about which Mr. Caro spoke, 
and some lack of clarity about the various tasks, 
the important thing is that things are going along 
the right track. The direction is right, as you 
have rightly said. We are all pulling on the same 
rope, but it is even more important for us to pull 
in the same direction on the same rope, if we are 
to achieve a security system in Europe. In this 
European security framework, we can have 
security only with one another, not against 
one another. I therefore welcome Mr. Caro's 
report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I shall start by complimenting Mr. Caro on his 
remarkably interesting and full report. It gives 
us the opportunity to set in context the issue of a 
new security order. I also enjoyed listening to 
my friend Mr. Roseta's speech as so much of 
what he said was good, solid, Portuguese 
common sense. It is refreshing to listen to that 
sometimes, instead of the high-flown rhetoric 
that we often hear in this chamber. I found it 
somewhat difficult to take Mr. Feldmann's 
speech. I do not think that he understands the 
real dangers of the Franco-German Eurocorps 
but I shall come to that tomorrow when we 
debate Mr. Soell's report. 
Everyone in this chamber should hang their 
head in shame over the issue of Yugoslavia. 
While we have been wringing our hands and 
saying how terrible the situation is, tens of thou-
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sands of people have died because none of our 
countries was prepared to take action. I noted 
what Mr. van Eekelen said this morning - if we 
had had the guts to do it, we could have blown 
out of the water the Yugoslav ships that were 
shelling that wonderful city of Dubrovnik and 
shot out of the air those planes that were mur-
dering innocent civilians. However, we pre-
ferred to say, "Oh, well - we must not inter-
fere. " While we did that, people died. I shall say 
no more, but none of us has the right to be 
proud of the present position. 
I share Mr. Caro's concerns about Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic - all those countries are anxious. They 
would not wish to see the tragedy in Yugoslavia 
unfold in their part of the world. That is why 
I very much welcome the North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council, which I believe will help 
to create an atmosphere to help those demo-
cracies. Once again, NATO is the natural and 
best security partner for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
The NACC is an interlocking network in 
which institutions such as the CSCE, the Atlan-
tic Alliance, the European Community, the 
Council of Europe and WEU complement each 
other. That is surely the best safeguard for the 
freedom, security and prosperity of all European 
and North American states. If that is what the 
NACC is all about, we must pay more attention 
to it. We need to examine it in more detail than 
we have had the opportunity of doing. In setting 
the stall out, Mr. Caro has ensured that we 
should consid~r the organisation further and 
develop it. That is the way to prevent another 
tragedy such as the one currently unfolding in 
Yugoslavia. As all of us know, there is more than 
a 50:50 chance of just such a tragedy happening 
again. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece. 
Mr. PAHTAS (Observer from Greece) (Trans-
lation). - May I congratulate you on your 
election, Mr. President. We are sure that you 
will be an excellent President and we wish you 
every success. 
I should also like to congratulate Mr. Caro 
and to thank him for his most interesting and 
important report which gives us food for 
thought on the development of a new security 
order. 
Quite clearly, the political changes which have 
put an end to the cold war and the hegemony of 
defence systems are having major repercussions 
in all areas of international life and open a new 
page in history. The time has come for us Euro-
peans to redefine our objectives and policies and 
to take greater responsibility for the security and 
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defence of Europe. We have to go forward both 
in formulating a policy and in the matter of 
security, failing which it would be illusory to 
talk about a common foreign policy. 
One requirement for achieving our aim is 
clearly to strengthen the institutions of the 
CSCE and to provide it with the instruments 
and means of action needed to create permanent 
machinery for conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement and the peaceful settlement of disputes 
in order to promote peace, security, devel-
opment and co-operation in the regions so that 
more disputes like the present Yugoslav crisis no 
longer break out on our continent and so that it 
will be possible to intervene constructively in 
resolving other world problems such as the 
Israeli-Arab conflict and the Kurdish or Cypriot 
problems. 
An essential requirement for putting an end to 
ethnic quarrels is the definition of a statute for 
minorities within the CSCE because, as the 
Rapporteur stresses, the policy of encouraging 
the principle of self-determination for all minor-
ities would only create more problems in an 
already unsettled area in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans. 
The CSCE is the most appropriate organ-
isation for determining how the rights and pro-
tection of minorities are to be reconciled with 
state sovereignty so that those rights can be pro-
tected within existing state frontiers. A court of 
arbitration set up within the CSCE could play an 
important role in preventing or resolving con-
flicts and crises. 
Clearly any extension of the powers of the 
CSCE can succeed only if it goes hand in hand 
with the revival of the European social space, 
the definition of new priorities, the convergence 
of economies and living standards and the 
removal of regional inequalities. That is another 
aspect of the problem which must be taken into 
account. 
The long-term aim of the development of a 
European security and defence policy within the 
European Union must be the establishment of a 
pan-European security system acceptable to all 
the member countries of the CSCE. 
As things stand at present, however, the cre-
ation and development of a Community security 
and defence policy may offer the only means of 
dealing with the urgent problems. The most 
effective way to bring this about is the imme-
diate extension of WEU to countries belonging 
to the European Community and wishing to 
join. 
At the same time there is an urgent need to 
study and create a European security zone 
extending beyond the WEU area embracing a 
number of countries in Central Europe and the 
Balkans, and not only to associate them in 
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European security but to conclude with them an 
agreement for the maintenance of peace and 
continuous co-operation. Our Rapporteur's pro-
posals to that end in the draft recommendation 
are to be welcomed. 
We must therefore take steps to establish a 
new type of relationship with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans 
aimed both at consolidating peace and security 
in the region and promoting economic devel-
opment. 
Mr. President, we must press forward with the 
construction of Europe. Political union cannot 
be achieved by monetary union alone. We also 
need a common defence. As the defence com-
ponent of European Union, WEU must play its 
role in bringing this about. If it fails to do so we 
shall be left with our documents, speeches and 
meetings while others will be taking action and 
making decisions. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur of the Political Com-
mittee. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I should 
like to thank all the speakers for their comments 
on the report. 
I have taken good note of the points made by 
Mr. Hardy, whom I thank of course for endors-
ing the report. I understand very well the 
concern he expresses through one of his amend-
ments, that any self-satisfaction or self-congra-
tulation should be avoided. The psychological 
handling of a report is just as important as its 
vocabulary and ideas. I should just like to 
suggest a small change, but I .think that we shall 
be able to agree on his second amend-
ment which I can accept without difficulty. 
To Mr. Jankowitsch I should like to say only 
one thing, which comes from both mind and 
heart: there is nothing against Austria speaking 
to us or taking initiatives concerning us in the 
European security organisation. The reason we 
have not been able to do more as yet is to be 
found in attitudes of which we are all aware and 
which have kept Austria a little on the sidelines 
of the creation of Europe. Everything has 
changed so much, however, that I think I can say 
that all our countries look upon Austria as a 
member entitled to take a full part in all 
European activities. 
My thanks also go to Mr. De Hoop Scheffer 
for his support. One of the points on which we 
can feel most firmly agreed is that a pragmatic 
approach is needed for us to be effective, taking 
our lead from observed facts and not assump-
tions. What is quite certain is that, applying 
these principles to the practical problems facing 
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us, we are now in a position to go about the first 
stage in the construction of European security 
with other countries which have recently 
achieved democracy and are part of our family 
because Europe is first and foremost a matter of 
a shared culture. 
I thank Mr. Vacaru for his speech because the 
participation of non-member countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe is of the greatest 
importance for us. In the friendliest way pos-
sible I should first like to advise him to speak 
directly and frankly as this will enable us to 
move ahead. This allows me to speak frankly 
and directly to him and to ask if he is not mis-
taken about our action. When I spoke a short 
time ago I explained that this action was taken 
at the express request of a group of three coun-
tries which consulted together and after long 
negotiations have finally posed the problem of 
Western European Union in political terms of 
working together, co-operation or membership. 
As I said when I spoke earlier, let no one misun-
derstand us and make us say what we are not 
saying and will not say, particularly in the case 
of Romania. 
Developments in Romania have been as they 
are. We are aware of them and are also following 
them in the Council of Europe which has been 
extended to include Romania. Here in Western 
European Union we do not confine ourselves to 
geopolitics; we are also concerned with col-
lective security, controlled through a democratic 
system guaranteed by our treaties to which the 
countries of Central Europe are acceding by way 
of free elections after years of obscurantism 
which sometimes destroyed even the spirit of 
their people; now, however, they are acting with 
us again and moving in the same direction. This 
does not mean that we have not used somewhat 
different or, in modem parlance, selective 
methods as and when appropriate. The aim, 
ladies and gentlemen, is, however, the same. I 
hope that you will not continue in trying to per-
suade the Assembly that the adoption of the 
report I have presented would be interpreted as 
a negative move. I do not think this is the way in 
which we can go forward together. 
In response to the amendment which you 
suggest but cannot in fact table, concerning 
members of minorities in paragraph (iii) of the 
preamble to the draft recommendation, I fully 
accept the spirit of your proposal. But as we ask 
that these rights shall be for all which includes 
all citizens and all individuals including minor-
ities, I think that your point is answered when 
the two ideas are taken together. My explanation 
should meet your point. 
To Mr. Rubbi I would say again that his 
concern to maintain a European military ins-
trument in Europe responds to a need which is 
vital for affirming our identity and providing the 
resources to back a common political intent. 
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At this session we shall be talking about this 
again in connection with various reports and 
from angles which will not necessarily be the 
same as this afternoon, but will enable us to 
work out convergent positions and I note that 
this morning we heard our Secretary-General 
taking the same line. This is the direction we 
must take and I shall come back to this in my 
replies to other speakers including Mr. Atkinson 
in particular. 
I thank him for his amendment which raises 
no problems whatsoever. He could have tabled 
it in connection with one of the other reports 
dealing perhaps more directly than mine with 
the CSCE. Nevertheless, with his permission, I 
should like to interpret his amendment as calling 
on WEU as well. A request to the leaders of the 
CSCE to set up machinery for the prevention of 
conflict and for security measures is an excellent 
idea. This is why I agree with the member. If the 
depth and interest of the reports produced by 
WEU, which has authority for defence and 
security in Europe and military responsibility 
for what we call the area outside the Atlantic 
Alliance, were recognised by all international 
organisations I believe that this recommen-
dation would apply to us also, and I am sure you 
will agree with me, Mr. Atkinson, that if the 
leaders of the CSCE do not create the machinery 
we suggest they should establish, we should our-
selves do so as quickly as possible so as to say to 
them: " If you do not know what to do we will 
tell you. " This is one of the guarantees we can 
claim for WEU in the relationships we have to 
establish. 
A moment ago Mr. Feldmann spoke of us as 
the heart of all these concentric circles. It is 
WEU's role to be closely involved in all organ-
isations or bodies which deal at varying distance 
with the problem of security in Europe. This 
applies to the European Union - Maastricht 
gives the right to these demands - it applies also 
to the CSCE but we have not yet reached that 
point; and of course it applies to the Atlantic 
Alliance of which we are a part while wishing to 
retain our separate identity. 
Mr. MUller, with his way of describing the 
unpleasant memories of history, again spoke on 
the advice to be given to the Assembly and to 
our organisation in this part of the world which 
is particularly unsettled. It would be possible to 
go on for ever discussing the consequences of the 
end of the reign of the Hapsburgs and the 
uncertain and probably threatening future of 
this interface between the influence of the 
Ottoman empire and that of the Austro-Hun-
garian empire. We are in an area where one day 
it will be necessary to go beyond the stage of 
inter-ethnic relations and to ensure that the 
factors that bring such groups together take prec-
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edence over these relations and conflicts of 
interest. 
This reminds me of the debates we have had 
elsewhere and particularly in the Council of 
Europe discussing the Palestinian problem with 
the Jews and the people living in Israel. How 
many times have I, as a Deputy for Alsace, said, 
with colleagues, to both Arabs and Jews seeking 
the answer to an uncertain future: look at 
Alsace, look at the French and Germans who 
have killed each other for years and were 
enemies for centuries because of their undying 
hatred! What have they done? They have shaken 
hands and have replaced hate by fraternity. It is 
on the basis of such brotherly feelings that 
Europe can look for unity around the French 
and Germans. Every time an advance is possible 
French and Germans are at pains to prove to 
their colleagues, partners, members of par-
liament and ministers, and not in vain, that it 
provides security and a guarantee for progress. 
Well, tomorrow we must hope that Croats and 
Serbs, and Romanians and Moldavians speaking 
Romanian and Russian will understand that 
there is something else which we are perhaps 
alone able to prove at the moment because we 
have put behind us the horrors of conflict and 
hatred and now preach the message of union 
and fraternity. In this respect the last years of 
the 20th century will prove that our countiies 
are doing a great deal for civilisation. 
I should like to compliment Mr. Roseta, to 
whom I always listen with great interest in this 
Assembly. However, I shall pick out the word 
neutrality from his speech. We are now at a 
point in history when neutrality is no longer pos-
sible. It no longer means anything and it is 
perhaps a reason for remaining loyal to our 
countries, which have taken different positions, 
to which we should attach only relative, I almost 
said historic, importance. One cannot be neutral 
about human rights. One cannot be neutral 
about protection of the earth, about devel-
opment and about security under democratic 
control. The old ideas of neutrality are therefore 
perfectly respectable and indispensable in the 
formulation of our doctrine for the modem 
world, but the progress Europe is now making 
and the new security order in the world, which is 
the title of the report I have introduced, can only 
be achieved by people in the committed coun-
tries. In this area neutrality is no more than a 
temporary refuge and only the committed will 
be able to clothe these ideas in a reality accep-
table to our peoples. I thank Mr. Roseta for 
having touched on one of the most impor-
tant points of current international politics. 
I should like to thank Mr. Rockenbauer for 
supporting the Political Committee's proposals. 
It is essential that our Assembly should be able 
to develop continuously with the representatives 
of your parliaments or at least of the three 
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Visegrad countries. This is a test for us. We are, 
in some measure, the people who have to 
implement a political will expressed by this 
Assembly but also, in the sight and eyes of the 
whole world, a laboratory in which this new 
form of co-operation with Central and Eastern 
Europe will be worked out. 
My only regret, possibly because we are not 
well-organised, is that we do not see among us 
enough of you Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and 
Poles with whom we want to build this new form 
of security in Europe. Please broadcast this 
appeal. We make appeals to each other. I have 
received yours, please take up mine and ask 
your three neighbouring countries to send large 
numbers to discuss these problems with us. This 
will be easy in committee soon. Then we shall go 
on with this discussion at public sessions, 
beginning in December, with as many colleagues 
as possible from Central Europe. 
I can accept almost all Mr. Feldmann's pro-
posals but I spoke earlier about the Franco-
German issue differently even if Mr. 
Feldmann's point of view should be borne in 
mind. First and foremost we share the same 
values, and it is only on their basis that we can 
join together to intervene. We do not act as 
police for the sake of being police or guarantee 
security for the sake of security. We act in 
accordance with the values which we cherish 
and are at the very root of our civilisation. On 
this point Mr. Feldmann has corrected my 
report to positive effect and I wish to thank him. 
By his insistence at each meeting on recalling 
the integrity of relations between WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance, whatever the areas where we 
have responsibility for security, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg has enabled me once again to call upon 
everyone, including our governments, the gen-
eral public and the media, to drop the impli-
cation that WEU and others wish to leave the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
For us the Atlantic Alliance is not only the 
origin but also the framework in which security 
was hammered out to give us almost half a 
century without warfare despite various alarms 
and crises. In the light of this performance what 
statesman or parliament would try to bring 
down so strongly-built a house, capable as it is of 
adaptation and development? In WEU when we 
speak of Europe it is automatically of the 
alliance. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has given me the 
opportunity to say this yet again. 
To Mr. Pahtas, I say yes to enlargement; it is 
on everyone's lips and mentioned in the Maas-
tricht Treaty. We know that we are moving 
towards the extension of our area which will be 
defined when the time comes; I believe that the 
big intergovernmental conference of 1996 will 
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enable us to set the main lines. I fully agree 
about association and co-operation but either 
way on an equal footing. Equality of rights and 
treatment is at the basis of our understanding 
and co-operation. Because you have pleaded 
most eloquently that the entry of new members 
will make WEU more effective, I should like to 
launch through you an appeal and to ask you to 
think about this idea which is fundamental for 
us. Anyone who becomes a full member is a 
member for both rights and obligations of the 
whole treaty. Our treaty is a single whole; it is on 
its basis that we have succeeded in obtaining the 
right for WEU as part of European construction 
to play a full role in political union. It is my 
dearest wish that all new members should 
tomorrow accept all the articles of the treaty. If 
they cannot they will be associates but speaking 
to a country like yours, you may well imagine 
that I think maximum, not minimum. 
I will conclude with a few words about our 
former colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, who has 
sent us a very interesting note now being dis-
tributed. I beg all members of the Assembly to 
read it. In particular it includes a very inter-
esting recent letter from Professor Antanavicius, 
Chairman of the Standing Committee for the 
Economy in Vilnius, dated 7th April 1992, in 
which he explains Lithuania's basic needs. 
This will be the second stage in our reflections 
if, ladies and gentlemen, you can approve this 
report which, as you have all recognised, had the 
sole purpose of serving as a kind of political 
anticipation, providing us with the means of 
resolving the great problem of security and 
establishing a new order in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Mr. Caro, for your very full reply, particularly 
on the history of Franco-German relations. 
Three amendments have been tabled to the 
draft recommendation in Document 1309. They 
will be taken in the following order: Amend-
ment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy, Amendment 3 
tabled by Mr. Hardy and Amendment 1 tabled 
by Mr. Atkinson. 
Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy reads as 
follows: 
2. At the end of paragraph (iv) of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add: 
" and suggesting that increased concentration 
should be directed to these approaches ". 
I call Mr. Hardy to move his amendment. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I said 
during my speech that my remarks would cover 
the argument in favour of the two amendments 
which I tabled. As Mr. Caro takes an extremely 
acceptable view of this amendment, which I 
trust is shared by the overwhelming majority of 
members of the Assembly, I need not detain the 
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Assembly any longer. I shall formally move the 
amendment and trust that Mr. Caro will 
respond appropriately. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I agree. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I will now 
put Amendment 2 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Hardy reads as 
follows: 
3. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out "effective". 
I call Mr. Hardy to move his amendment. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- There is a 
slight problem with the amendment, not so 
much its content as what it shows. It demon-
strates that we are still some way from the ideal 
of European unity. I think that Mr. Caro 
approved of the amendment in its English 
version but found the French text somewhat dif-
ferent - it is one of those little problems of lin-
guistics which crop up from time to time. 
As the Assembly may recall, I did not want it 
to approve the report while that report con-
tained a word that may have been overcon-
fident, complacent or excessive in some way, 
and I suggested removing the word" effective". 
The amendment is as simple as that. I think that 
most people would approve of the English 
version, but, unfortunately, the French trans-
lation presented some difficulty for the Rappor-
teur. I did not wish to cause Mr. Caro great diffi-
culty, and I think that he has a form of com-
promise that will overcome that difficulty. I 
would be perfectly happy to accept his com-
promise, as it meets my objection to the text of 
his report in its English form. · 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom).-
I want to speak against the amendment because 
I want to ask Mr. Hardy to think again and 
withdraw it. I shall tell you why. We have been 
battling hard to persuade the Americans that 
this organisation made a major contribution in 
the Gulf war and in the Iran-Iraq war. If we take 
out the word "effective", we play into the 
hands of those in Congress who say: " You Euro-
peans have done nothing at all." We know that 
we did an enormous amount. That was 
recognised by President Bush. 
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If you take out this word, Peter, you will undo 
all the good that we did and we will shoot our-
selves in the foot. I hope that you will agree that 
this is not being complacent; rather I am trying 
to emphasise that we played a constructive and 
effective part. I appeal to you to withdraw the 
amendment for that reason. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -What is the 
committee's view? 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - In the 
light of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's request to 
Mr. Hardy may I, before stating my view, first 
ask Mr. Hardy whether he maintains or with-
draws his amendment? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Sir 
Geoffrey places me in great difficulty. Those 
who heard my speeches during the Gulf debates 
will recall that I was strongly in favour of 
support for the United Nations forces. Indeed, I 
criticised a number of member states that did 
not make any notable contribution. In the 
debates that followed the Gulf war, there 
appeared to be a general slapping on the back in 
every member state, including those that made 
little contribution, and that is why I think that 
the word " effective " is not justified. I do not 
like such over-smug, complacent and arrogant 
expressions of satisfaction. 
However, I would not wish to weaken the 
position of WEU vis-a-vis the United States -
which I believe ended the Gulf war at least forty-
eight hours too soon and in a manner that was 
both inglorious and dishonourable. I should 
very much prefer the compromise that has been 
suggested, which I accept is necessary at least for 
linguistic reasons if for no other reason. I should 
prefer to accept the compromise suggested by 
Mr. Caro rather than withdraw the amendment. 
If I withdrew it, not only would that be embar-
rassing, but it would appear to support the 
rather excessive view that many people in this 
Assembly took after the Gulf war. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Now I 
am embarrassed, Mr. President. The compro-
mise I had worked out with Mr. Hardy was a 
sound one but the exchange of views which has 
just taken place on a question of substance is of 
the greatest importance. Our document is, in 
fact, public and everyone has read it or can read 
it. It has appeared in the media. A decision to 
delete the word " effective " in relation to 
WEU's military action in the Gulf becomes a 
matter of great political importance and 
I cannot give my support. I would say to 
Mr. Hardy, and I hope that this is what Mr. 
Stoffelen, our Chairman thinks too, that the 
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Political Committee would very much like Mr. 
Hardy to withdraw his amendment. Otherwise, 
in the light of the debate we have had on the 
question of substance, I would be obliged to 
keep to the wording of my report and to ask that 
we all approve it. After what has been said, Mr. 
Hardy, please play the game and withdraw your 
amendment and we will resume the debate on 
this form of words another time. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). -This is a 
formal statement. The committee did not have 
an opportunity to discuss the amendment, so it 
does not have an opinion on the proposal to 
remove the word" effective". The draft recom-
mendations have been unanimously accepted by 
the committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- To avoid 
great embarrassment to the Rapporteur, who 
had agreed a compromise, and to the Chairman 
of the committee, who was a party to the 
amendment this morning, it is with misgivings 
and regret that I withdraw the amendment. 
I trust that people will take rather more care 
before making agreements than appears to have 
been the case this afternoon. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amend-
ment 3 is therefore withdrawn. 
Mr. Atkinson has tabled Amendment 1 which 
reads as follows: 
1. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add a new paragraph: 
" 7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, 
the leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming 
Helsinki summit to review current machinery 
for the prevention of conflict and the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, with a view to estab-
lishing a process of binding arbitration and 
peace enforcement. " 
I call Mr. Atkinson to move his amendment. 
Mr. ATKINSON (United Kingdom). - During 
the debate, speaker after speaker deplored the 
lack of effective action to prevent the present 
wars in our continent of Europe in the former 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. 
Speaker after speaker also spoke in favour of a 
peace-making force - perhaps a WEU force -
within the context of the CSCE process. My 
amendment urges that those views be brought to 
the attention of the leaders of the fifty-one par-
ticipating states who will meet at the Helsinki 
summit next month. They should agree an 
effective means of finding arbitration to resolve 
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such disputes decisively and to establish a 
means of enforcement - the teeth of which were 
called for by Mr. Feldmann. I am delighted that 
Mr. Caro, the Rapporteur, supports my 
amendment. I hope that the Assembly will do 
the same. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the opinion of the committee? 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, as the committee has been unable to look 
at this amendment it has no formal opinion. My 
personal view is that it fits in with the ideas con-
tained in the report and those expressed in com-
mittee. I would repeat what I said a short time 
ago that there is no request but a commitment 
resulting from the work of our Assembly. If we 
had had the time I would have amended the 
amendment to read: " proposes to furnish 
the CSCE with adequate means, " but that is 
another matter. 
In taking this decision, Mr. President, I would 
hope that if the Assembly could agree it will 
itself check whether what is requested in this 
paragraph will be done at the CSCE, because the 
Council will have to give us a fairly speedy reply. 
The matter is urgent and we cannot simply ask 
other organisations to do things which we can 
offer them ourselves. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We shall now proced to vote on the amended 
draft recommendation in Document 1309. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will be taken by show 
of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted'. 
7. WEU after Maastricht 
(Presentlltion of tUUl debate on tlu report of tlu 
PoUtical Committee, Doe. 1308) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Political Committee 
on WEU after Maastricht, Document 1308. 
1. See page 20. 
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I call Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political 
Committee. 
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, I should first like to congrat-
ulate Mr. Hartmut Soell on his election as Pres-
ident of our Assembly. I join with all previous 
speakers who have praised his many qualities 
which, I am sure, will guarantee the success of 
everything he does in the interests of the 
Assembly and for the benefit of European Union. 
It now falls to me to introduce the debate on 
Western European Union after Maastricht. 
With the unanimous support of the committee 
it gives me much pleasure to present to you the 
result of our work on a subject of primary and 
immediate importance, since the ratification 
procedure is already under way in most coun-
tries of the European Community. Another 
reason why it is of crucial importance is that 
Western European Union is at the heart of the 
debates on the future of European security, of 
the Nine, of the Twelve and, therefore, of the 
European Community and even of Europe as a 
whole. 
Its starting point, of course, is to be found in 
the articles of the European Union treaty con-
cerned directly with security and defence, not 
forgetting the nine-power declaration annexed 
to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty. It then 
goes on to deal as fully ·as possible with the 
political aspects of WEU's new deeply-involved 
role in the establishment of the European Union. 
WEU has been given an important task but 
the means available to it under the modified 
Brussels Treaty do not always match its ambi-
tions. Western European Union is called upon 
to take part in the development of a European 
Union comprising its nine members, together 
with three others, two of which are members of 
the Atlantic Alliance, and a third country, 
Ireland, which has always been neutral. 
Let us add a few complications; this European 
Union is very much in the sights of countries 
exploring the possibility of co-operating with the 
Twelve in a wide variety of ways ranging from 
simple dialogue to association and even going as 
far as full membership. 
Furthermore, the task of Western European 
Union is not made easier by the fact that it has 
to establish its position among a number of 
organisations with responsibility for security 
and defence. 
Ordinary people - and how could it be dif-
ferent - also find it very difficult to identify the 
distinguishing features of the Atlantic Alliance, 
NACC, the CSCE and Western European Union, 
and of the Franco-German initiative setting up a 
joint army corps but leaving it open to others 
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without prejudice to undertakings given in other 
organisations. 
I think it fair, therefore, to say that confusion 
reigns even in our own parliaments. This being 
so, it is necessary to list the problems. 
Let us begin with the treaty itself. It must not 
be forgotten that a feature of the discussions 
which preceded the signature of the Maastricht 
agreement was a debate on the federal character 
or otherwise of the European Community. The 
debate was not resolved because some countries 
regard federalism as extreme centralisation. By 
contrast, the version reported by Mr. Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, who was then the German 
Foreign Minister, took it to be synonymous 
with a decentralised Europe. In the absence of 
agreement on the content of the expression, 
federal character, the differences were glossed 
over by using the term European Union in the 
treaty submitted to the parliaments and peoples 
of our countries for approval. 
In this treaty some chapters· are more specific 
than others and here I refer particularly to 
chapter 1 for which there is a precise timetable 
with clearly defined criteria. This does not apply 
to the chapters on the implementation of secur-
ity policy, called for by the signatories of the 
Maastricht Treaty or to the new policies giving 
the Executive Committee in Brussels a right of 
initiative. 
What is to be covered by parliamentary ratifi-
cation? The treaty and its additional protocols, 
of course, but the question we had to consider in 
the Political Committee was whether the decla-
ration of the Nine, made known to the Twelve, 
falls within the constitutive part of the treaty or 
not. In seeking to clarify the position I sent a 
written question to the Council whose reply, 
may I say, does not err on the side of clarity. It 
reads: " The declaration is politically linked to 
the constitutive part of the treaty." 
We were left in the dark as to whether it is to 
be ratified or not, i.e. whether the declaration of 
the Nine annexed and linked politically to tl:.e 
treaty is to be ratified in Ireland, Denmark and 
Greece, which are not yet members of WEU, 
and in the nine parliaments of the other coun-
tries which now form the European Union. 
We must not over-complicate things, how-
ever. I just wanted to show, with this example, 
that politics is not an exact science and that clar-
ification will require further questioning by the 
Council. 
I should like to read paragraph 22 (a) of my 
report, which quotes a section of the treaty: 
" The common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions related to the security of 
the union, including the eventual framing of a 
common· defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence. " Here again, I do 
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not know whether ordinary people or even 
ordinary members of parliament will under-
stand much from this. What difference is 
there between a common defence policy and a 
common defence to which that policy might lead 
in time? This example proves that everything 
has not yet been settled or worded with the nec-
essary precision and clarity. 
May I also quote paragraph 29 of my report 
which refers to the treaty: " Paragraph 6 says 
that' with a view to furthering the objective of 
this treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 
in the context of Article XII of the Brussels 
Treaty, the provisions of this article may be 
revised ... on the basis of a report to be presented 
in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, 
which shall include an evaluation of the progress 
made and the experience gained until then '. " I, 
together with the members of the Political Com-
mittee, would point out that the Brussels Treaty 
has only ten articles, so how is it possible to refer 
to Article XII? This paragraph of the treaty 
which at first sight seems anodyne no doubt also 
conceals some afterthoughts among the authors. 
If I am looking at the Deputy Secretary-General 
of Western European Union, this does not mean 
in any way that I am accusing him of this inac-
curacy, because he did not draft the treaty. It is 
simply because I know that he is deeply involved 
in this question and because I did not wish to 
pass over this extremely important detail in 
silence. 
What is the point of the question I have just 
raised? It is Article XII of the Brussels Treaty 
modified by the 1954 Paris Agreements. That is 
why we asked the Council to share our concern 
and have asked the authors of the Maastricht 
Treaty to correct the mistake. The Council says 
that it is a minor one, but we cannot accept this 
view. Where a treaty is involved absolute 
accuracy is essential as we are required to 
comply with it in both letter and spirit as fully as 
possible. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the 
question of the possible enlargement of Western 
European Union to include other countries and 
in other forms is no clearer. For the sake of sim-
plicity I will put the countries which might 
co-operate with Western European Union in one 
way or another into a number of categories. 
Let us take first the countries which already 
belong to the European Union but are not 
members of Western European Union; these are 
Ireland, which is neutral, Denmark and Greece, 
which are members of the Atlantic Alliance. The 
treaties and declarations allow these countries to 
apply to join Western European Union. A reply 
should be given before the end of this year to 
any application which may be made. Only one 
country, Greece, has applied; the others have 
not yet made the slightest move. 
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There are other countries interested in 
Western European Union. Turkey is a case in 
point. Mr. Ozal and all the Turkish representa-
tives who have spoken either here or in Palermo 
have always said that there was only one pos-
sible form of future relationship between Turkey 
and Western European Union and that is for 
Turkey to be a full member. These declarations 
and attitudes are not designed to simplify the 
task of the political authorities who have to deal 
with these problems. 
What is the answer? I recall that when 
Western European Union was extended to 
include Spain and Portugal, the basis for doing 
so was the so-called Cahen doctrine of first 
opening membership to countries already 
actively involved in the construction of Europe. 
This, of course, presupposes that these countries 
already have the opportunity to take part in the 
construction of Europe. This was indeed the 
case for Spain and Portugal. 
The texts are clearer for some other countries. 
They do not allow them to join as full members 
immediately unless there are relations between 
them and the European Community in another 
form. It is for us to raise the question and for the 
European Community to give an answer. 
Then there are countries which want to be 
members of both the European Community and 
Western European Union. This is the case of the 
three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, which signed the Visegrad agreements, 
and Romania and Bulgaria all of which are not 
going to be joining the European Community in 
the near future. Nevertheless, the Assembly has 
looked at the future position of these countries 
because we are aware that the European Com-
munity will be keeping them waiting. The three 
countries bound by the Visegrad agreement and 
Romania and Bulgaria, to which we should add 
the Baltic countries, call for special attention 
because, unless the European Community gives 
the signal, they may be faced by additional 
difficulties. The prospect of a signal from the 
European Community combined with the aus-
terity policy applied by the governments of 
those countries, which offers the only means of 
joining the market economy, is the only way of 
making their peoples understand that the sacri-
fices they are called on to make have some 
meaning. 
It has to be added that even if these countries 
want to join the Atlantic Alliance and Western 
European Union there is no way they can join 
the European Community in the immediate 
future. For obvious reasons, the fact that 
their economies lag so far behind those of the 
members of the European Community holds 
them back. 
There are other countries where the situation 
is the reverse. These are the countries which 
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would find no difficulty in operating within an 
economic Europe and a single market but would 
have to overcome a number of obstacles as 
regards security and defence. I am referring to 
the neutral countries with a high standard of 
living unwilling to abandon their neutrality. I 
believe, however, that if any country wishes to 
become a member of the European Community 
and of the European Union, and to be repre-
sented in all the areas required for that com-
munity to be a genuine political and economic 
entity, including foreign and security policy, ini-
tiatives must extend to all areas because any 
political entity is bound to fail in the end if it 
has no clear strategy for defence and security. 
You will find in my report practical decisions 
which are already planned or are the subject of 
consultation in the Assembly, the permanent 
secretariat and the Council of Ministers of 
Western European Union. I will spare you the 
details, and would simply ask you to take 
another look at the relevant sections in my 
report. 
In connection with this report, let us also 
consider the relationship between Western 
European Union and NATO. I believe I am not 
alone in regarding the presence of the United 
States in Europe as a fact, and as a fact essential 
for the maintenance of our security. The 
Political Committee is, in any case, unanimous 
on this point and I hope that the Assembly is 
also unanimous. 
So it will be necessary to determine as clearly 
as we can what relationships will in future be 
established between Western European Union 
and the European Community on the one hand 
and between Western European Union and the 
Atlantic Alliance on the other. One of the objec-
tives which is not denied by either the facts 
or the Maastricht texts is the development 
of Western European Union as a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The Atlantic Alliance may itself have to 
change some of its habits in its relations with 
the European Community and, above all, with 
Western European Union. In the briefest terms 
I believe that clarity, complementarity and the 
willingness to exchange information are 
required in these relations. 
Let us also consider relations between 
Western European Union and the European 
Parliament. When I had the privilege of pre-
siding over this Assembly in 1987, 1988 and 
1989 I was able to form some idea of the rela-
tionships that existed or, rather, did not exist 
between the European Parliament and our 
Assembly. 
I have made even greater efforts than my 
predecessor in trying to establish a dialogue with 
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the European Parliament but without much 
success. Yet the treaty is fairly specific about the 
way work should in future be divided between 
the European Parliament and the WEU 
Assembly. To quote from the declaration of 
9th December 1991, adopted by the Nine: 
" WEU will take the following measures to 
develop a close working relationship with the 
European Union ... encouragement of closer 
co-operation between the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU and the European Par-
liament. " This opens the way for our two 
assemblies to act together in co-operation. On 
this point also I refer to the draft order attached 
to the report which instructs the Presidential 
Committee and the President to approach the 
European Parliament with a view to agreeing a 
division of work which cannot fail to benefit the 
two assemblies in the interests of the European 
Union which we all desire. 
It seems to me appropriate, therefore, to point 
out that the Political Committee was unanimous 
in calling on all the parliaments and countries of 
the European Community to ratify the Maas-
tricht Treaty in spite of all of its imperfections 
and all the question marks hanging over it. We 
arrived at this conclusion because we share 
the view of those who believe that Western 
European Union is taking on an important role 
in the construction of the European Union. We 
believe that the Council must re-double its 
efforts to define and specify the practical 
arrangements required in these circumstances. 
We stress the power of initiative now vested in 
the Council of Ministers of Western European 
Union, in the Permanent Council and in our 
Secretariat-General, and we declare that the 
Maastricht agreements are only one stage in the 
construction of European Union. 
I should also like to stress that no time-limit 
has been set for the modified Brussels Treaty 
and that the jurisdiction of the European Union 
will in future be extended to include the Brussels 
Treaty as modified by the Paris Agreements, 
and this is bound to have consequences for the 
relationship between our Assembly and the 
European Union. I said this a short time ago and 
I have no need to repeat myself. 
For all these reasons the Political Committee 
decided in the report I am now presenting to call 
on the Assembly to recommend that the Council 
give further consideration to the terms for asso-
ciation between Western European Union and 
the countries given associate status. 
The same applies to the definition of observer 
status as well as the status of associate member 
of WEU for countries associated or to be 
associated with the European Community. We 
therefore call on the Council to do everything 
possible to arrange the synchronisation of dates 
for meetings between the Presidents and 
Chairmen-in-Office of the European Corn-
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munity and the Council of Western European 
Union. 
In order not to prolong the discussion unduly, 
Mr. President, I should now like to give you my 
conclusions and say that an immense field for 
action is opening before us. Everything that 
Western European Union does now forms part 
of the logic of the integration of twelve-power 
Europe. It forms part of a relationship of trust 
and transparency and complementarity with 
NATO - at least that is our wish and let us hope 
that there will not be too many hitches. 
Let us not be satisfied with words as regards 
security. As I say, Maastricht did not err on the 
side of clarity. This is welcome or to be regretted 
according to whether one is an optimist or a 
sceptic or even a pessimist. Personally I think 
the glass is half full. The greater the number of 
points that still have to be clarified the more the 
treaty will require the political leaders to face up 
to their responsibilities. 
In making this point I think I also speak for 
my colleagues who have called attention in the 
Political Committee to the sometimes vague and 
evasive nature of the forms of words used in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Let us be optimistic, however. The Western 
European Union of the year 2000 will be dif-
ferent from that of 1992 which already differs 
in great measure from the Western European 
Union of 1984, the year it was reactivated. This 
Western European Union of the year 2000 will 
not be an end in itself. It will be an organisation 
serving the security of everyone; it will no doubt 
be more operational than it is today. It will be 
more than the simple sum of the number of 
tanks, fighter aircraft and soldiers and officers 
available to the nine, ten or twelve countries 
belonging to the union by then. I think that I can 
say with equal certainty that this Western 
European Union with an operational dimension 
will total fewer tanks, fighter aircraft and troops, 
but will, to repeat what the Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
said to us, have two kinds of role: that of the 
blue berets and that of the green berets. The blue 
berets will be available for security purposes 
under United Nations orders while the green 
berets will be on hand to deal with ecological 
disasters. 
These are two noble tasks for this Western 
European Union called on to play an active part 
in establishing the European Union we all desire. 
This Western European Union will be an 
instrument for peace, opening wider horizons 
for its citizens, allowing them to make their pur-
chases with a single currency and to travel 
around freely within one vast area open, we 
hope, to others. It will not be inward-looking. 
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I have shared this optimism with my friends or 
they have made me share it. We have achieved 
an identity of views through good will on all 
sides, thanks to the ability of Mr. Burgelin, to 
whom I pay tribute, to analyse and summarise 
and thanks to the serious approach taken to its 
work by this Political Committee, which I love, 
as our Chairman would say. 
Mr. President, I have tried imperfectly to 
outline the way in which our Political Com-
mittee now sees the identity of Western 
European Union. It may not all be perfect but I 
would say that this is because there is still much 
to be done. Let us, as the WEU Assembly, 
devote our efforts to this end. I would remind 
you that the dual political mission of control 
and political initiative is in no way called into 
question by the Maastricht Treaty. 
(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Antretter. 
Mr. ANTRETTER (Germany) (Translation). 
- I congratulate my colleague, Mr. Goerens, on 
his excellent speech, but regret that I must again 
address some critical remarks to the Council. 
The Maastricht Treaty contains a number 
of vitally -important regulations regarding the 
future role of WEU . .In such a decisive phase of 
political developments in Europe, it is more 
important than ever for the Assembly to receive 
reports in good time. But instead of this, the 
Council on this occasion transmitted its activity 
report to the Assembly only at the end of May, 
half a year after Maastricht, leaving no time for 
the report to be considered in any of the com-
mittees. I consider that the Council is out of 
order in reporting to the Assembly so late. 
For it means that we have only just heard 
about a United Nations document containing a 
declaration by WEU member states about the 
completion of the mine-clearance programme in 
the Gulf. The report also mentions a military 
planning group in Metz, but we have received 
no further details about its tasks. 
In connection with the Mediterranean 
Working Group there is mention of a " five plus 
five" group, but no explanation about that 
group. Several subjects are mentioned on which 
the WEU Institute for Security Studies has made 
reports to the Council. The Assembly has no 
knowledge of these texts. There is a lapidary 
statement to the effect that the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments continues to exist as a 
one-man operation, and no further details on 
this subject are given. 
It is hardly possible, on the basis of such 
sparse and belated information, to conduct a 
serious dialogue with the Council, and correctly 
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to assess the situation of WEU after Maastricht. 
And yet we have the task of examining the treaty 
to see whether its references to security policy 
are formulated clearly enough. 
Nevertheless, thanks to the thorough analysis 
contained in Mr. Goerens's report, we have a 
sufficient basis for discussion. Its most impor-
tant finding is that European integration in 
security and defence policy cannot be an end in 
itself, but should increase the security of citizens 
in Europe without presenting a security risk to 
others - as indeed the Rapporteur has just said 
in similar words. 
The preamble to the WEU treaty contains 
some valuable indications which are of very 
topical interest just now. There are references to 
human rights, the duty of assistance and the 
undertaking to maintain international peace in 
accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, and to resist any policy of aggression. 
On the other hand, the outline and aims of the 
security identity of European political union are 
still not clearly defined. It was certainly a wise 
decision at Maastricht to place responsibility for 
policy on security and defence in the hands of 
WEU. 
Regrettably, however, it was not made clear 
that the WEU treaty will form part of the legal 
basis of European Union. Instead of that, every-
thing has been based on the incorrect hypothesis 
that the WEU treaty expires in 1998. 
I am extremely grateful to the Rapporteur for 
his clear reference to the danger of trying to 
found political union in regard to security on the 
disappearance of WEU, without knowing on 
what basis the security of Europe will rest. 
I should like to say something else about the 
future of our Assembly. I have the impression 
that many people - including many of us - have 
not yet recognised clearly enough how poorly 
this future is assured. In this respect I can whole-
heartedly support the Rapporteur's analysis, and 
also his proposal to build up parliamentary 
control within the political union on the basis of 
a bicameral system. 
However, according to the latest information 
on the intentions of the European Parliament, 
I have doubts as to whether that body will be 
prepared to distribute the work in that way. I 
believe we shall have to pay much more 
attention to this problem and produce in good 
time a clear concept of the parliamentary 
structure of the political union, so that it would 
really be shaped and moulded by parliamen-
tarians and not by executives, councils and dip-
lomats. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Fioret. 
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Mr. FlORET (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, history has the power to set men's calcula-
.tions at nought and to bring about the triumph 
of true ideas even if incidental circumstances 
sometimes delay their coming to fruition. 
For effective European defence, the basic aim 
is still the creation of a European defence com-
munity of the kind which was planned long ago 
in the fifties but was set aside because of the fear 
that a peoples' Europe might overshadow the 
prestige of Europe of the fatherlands. 
The result of this strategic myopia was that 
Europe lost any major role in world balances 
and also the ability to safeguard peace even in 
the heart of the continent, as the present fighting 
in what was Yugoslavia shows with a clarity that 
I have no need to stress since the explicit call by 
the Serbian President, Mr. Milosevic, to the 
United States and Russia to intervene to bring 
about a cease-fire in Croatia and Bosnia. 
European statesmen who mistakenly thought 
that they could, in the Yugoslav tragedy, res-
urrect the old policy of zones of influence have 
had to think again and recognise that such pol-
icies went out with the second world war, and 
that, in any case, they provide no key for solving 
the crisis in the Balkans. 
However, if Europe has been incapable of pro-
moting an armed peace it can still sketch the 
lines of a political peace by suggesting to the 
peoples fighting each other a model based on the 
European Community within which peoples 
with different languages and traditions have 
found common ground for economic - and later 
political and military - agreement. 
In order to further this development in the cir-
cumstances now existing, WEU should therefore 
be strengthened as the appropriate forum for 
renewing the proposal for the creation by the 
necessary gradual stages of an integrated defence 
force, as the essential requirement for rescuing 
Europe from its present subordinate status. 
The Franco-German initiative of 21st May for 
the formation of an army corps may help to 
speed up progress towards an integrated Euro-
pean force, if it is included within the scope of 
the WEU treaty. 
On the other hand, the La Rochelle agreement 
would mark a material reversal of a trend if it it 
were based on the logic of traditional bilateral 
agreements between states. 
After Maastricht, therefore, WEU will have to 
take on the character of a military instrument 
operating a less uncertain, less confused and less 
hesitant European defence policy. 
Our countries and governments must realise 
that the time for delegating to others duties 
which are th~ province of Europeans as they 
involve interests vital to the future of our 
peoples is past. 
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If we do not discharge these duties, others will 
fill the political spaces which Europe, in the 
name of a historic past which belongs to us and 
which must be revived at the present difficult 
stage of world balances, has represented until now. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, Jhe debate is adjourned. 
8. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 2nd June, at 
10 a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council -
presentation of the second part of the 
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thirty-seventh annual report of the 
Council, Document 1315; Address by 
Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
2. WEU after Maastricht (Resumed debate on 
the report of the Political Committee and 
votes on the draft recommendation and 
draft order, Document 1308). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.) 
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the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the 
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Replies by Mr. Kinkel to questions put by: Mr. Hardy, Sir 
Russell Johnston, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Muller, Mr. Lopez 
Henares, Mrs. Blunck, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
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mendation and draft order, Doe. 1308). 
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S. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 10.20 a. m. with Mr. Soe/1, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Auendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be 
published with the list of representatives 
appended to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council -
presentation of the second part 
of the thirty-seventh annual report 
of the Council, Doe. 1315 
Address by Mr. Kinkel, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The first 
order of the day is the presentation of the second 
part of the thirty-seventh annual report of 
l. See page 23. 
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the Council, Document 1315; Address by 
Mr. K.inkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Minister, the Assembly of WEU will listen to 
your address with great interest since Germany 
has held the Chairmanship-in-Office of our 
organisation for almost a year, having taken 
over this responsibility at a decisive moment 
when preparations had to be made, as regards 
security and defence, for the twelve-power 
summit in Maastricht. We all know of its vital 
role in the drafting of the texts adopted in our 
field. Without the work it then did, we would 
clearly not have arrived at so firm a statement of 
the European defence identity. It is equally clear 
that Germany has made an influential contri-
bution to the definition of WEU's new role and 
to the fiist moves in initiating a European 
security policy. 
Over the long period he was at the helm of 
foreign policy in the Federal Republic, your 
predecessor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, proved himself to 
be a faithful and firm friend of WEU and its 
Assembly. It is chiefly to him that we owe the 
new relations that have developed between the 
ministerial organs of the Assembly, and your 
presence with us today encourages us to hope 
that you will be following in his footsteps and 
show the same consideration for the work of an 
Assembly, which has always believed its task, 
on an equal footing with any other European 
assembly, to be to work in its spheres of respon-
sibility for the future of the European Union 
that the Twelve launched at the Maastricht 
summit. 
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(The President continued in German.) 
Minister, in case you and many of my 
German colleagues were thinking I had for-
gotten my own language, I will add a few com-
ments in German. I would like to extend a 
heartfelt welcome to you, Minister, on behalf of 
the Assembly. I know that in the various poli-
tical posts you have held in your career and in 
the various roles you have played in the past you 
have developed an understanding of foreign 
policy that is not limited to traditional 
diplomacy but has also taken very careful 
account of the extent to which foreign policy 
issues have today become part of internal policy 
- especially European internal policy - and 
developments in the internal policies of the 
various countries of Europe have become 
relevant to foreign policy. Through the various 
roles you have so far played you have made 
excellent preparation for this intertwining of 
policies. This being the case, we are very much 
looking forward to your statement, which is 
accompanied by certain expectations in the 
Assembly. As you are at governmental level, so 
we are all under pressure, not only to find solu-
tions to long-term problems but also to answer 
highly topical questions. I refer in this context to 
the debate under urgent procedure that this 
Assembly will be conducting this afternoon on 
Yugoslavia and the conflict there. 
I would ask the Minister to address the 
Assembly from the rostrum. 
Mr. K.INKEL (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, thank you very much for your kind 
welcome. Forgive my late arrival; having been in 
office for only a few days, I have had some 
domestic upsets to deal with. Unfortunately I 
cannot be with you for long, which I greatly 
regret. I hope it will also be said of me - as you, 
Mr. President, have just said of my predecessor, 
Mr. Genscher- that I am a friend ofWEU. To 
this end, I promise you that next time I shall also 
be available to answer questions. So please bear 
with me for leaving a little early this time. I am 
currently under extreme pressure. 
The historic upheaval we are experiencing in 
Central and Eastern Europe has not only dra-
matically altered the political landscape from 
Central Europe to Vladivostok. It has also given 
the Atlantic and European post-war institutions 
a new appearance. This applies equally to 
Western European Union. 
In Maastricht, this organisation was assigned 
a clear function - that of the defence component 
of the European Political Union. This decision 
was taken in the awareness that the new Europe 
must be more than a vast free market for goods 
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and services reaching from the North Cape to 
Sicily. The new Europe must be a community of 
nations with a shared destiny. This also requires 
it to assume responsibility for its security. 
That is why the Twelve agreed in Maastricht 
to establish a joint foreign and security policy as 
well as a common defence at the appropriate 
time. That is why, together with France, we have 
formed the core of future multinational Euro-
pean forces. With the common European foreign 
and security policy we have finally drawn a line 
under an unhappy chapter of the centuries-old 
fraternal feud in Europe. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am 
glad to have the opportunity to continue the tra-
dition established by my predecessor in office 
and to report on the second half of the German 
presidency. I attach importance to carefully pur-
suing this dialogue with you in future. Only with 
your parliamentary support can we implement 
the ambitious reform programmes of this 
organisation. 
The German presidency of WEU set itself 
three goals: first, the strengthening of WEU's 
role in the process of European unification; 
second, the generation of impetus by WEU for 
disarmament and arms control; third, the 
building of bridges by WEU to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
As I see it, in all three areas considerable 
progress has been made. I believe that this will 
be confirmed by the Council of Ministers in 
Bonn on 19th June. On 4th December 1991 you 
were informed about the first half of the presi-
dency by my predecessor, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher. I should now like to report on the 
most recent developments. 
The second half of Germany's presidency was 
marked by the implementation of the Maas-
tricht decisions. The results achieved will be 
submitted to the Council of Ministers for 
decision in Bonn on 19th June. I hope you will 
appreciate that, prior to the Council meeting, I 
can only give you a brief outline of the main 
progress achieved. I can go into the details only 
afterwards at the meeting of your Assembly's 
Presidential Committee in Bonn at the end of 
June. 
The core of the implementation of Maastricht 
is, of course, WEU's relations with the European 
Union on the one hand and the alliance on the 
other. Relations with the European Union will 
be concerned above all with close co-operation 
between the Councils and the Secretariats-
General, the co-ordination of conference dates 
and venues as well as the harmonisation of 
working methods and the order and duration of 
the presidencies. 
In our relations with the alliance, we are 
striving for the closest possible degree of 
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co-ordination. In future, it should be possible to 
introduce joint WEU positions into the alliance 
consultation process. It goes without saying that, 
after the Council in Bonn, we will first of all 
discuss our proposals with the alliance and take 
decisions only in agreement with it. This 
common approach must also apply to our 
dealings with each other. Thus openness and 
transparency will remain our guiding principle. 
This will be made considerably easier by the 
relocation of the WEU Secretariat-General from 
London to Brussels envisaged for lst January 
1993. 
Regarding the enlargement of WEU, a 
solution has been found, which takes account of 
the interests of both existing members and 
newly acceding states. The definition of the 
various rights and obligations is appropriate to 
their respective status as full members, associate 
members or observers. As a rule, the future asso-
ciate members will be able to attend all meetings 
of the Council and its working groups and will 
also participate in future military planning 
under a liaison arrangement. Negotiations with 
the interested states should be completed by the 
end of the year. 
The Bonn Council of Ministers will pre-
sumably also be able to decide on the estab-
lishment of a military planning cell. Although 
this cell will not have a command furiction, 
through it WEU will acquire an important 
element of military infrastructure, which is a 
step in the direction of a European defence 
system. 
A report on the assignment of military units 
will also be submitted to the Council of 
Ministers in Bonn. It is guided by the precepts of 
Maastricht under which European Union is 
entitled to ask WEU to draw up and implement 
Union decisions and activities with defence 
implications. The WEU member states are 
called upon to designate military units from the 
entire spectrum of conventional forces for Euro-
pean military tasks. Humanitarian and peace-
keeping assignments are also a possibility. 
Account will be taken of the complementarity 
with NATO agreed in Maastricht. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I am aware that the 
decision taken at the Franco-German summit in 
La Rochelle on the creation of the European 
corps has not only raised hopes, but has also 
given rise to doubt and concern, among both our 
North American friends and a number of our 
European partners. I entirely understand our 
North American friends' concern for the 
strength and continued existence of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, about whose future indispen-
sability there is no doubt whatsoever. What are 
the issues? 
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Since the Copenhagen meeting of the NATO 
foreign ministers and the meeting of the CSCE 
Council of foreign ministers in Berlin, at the 
latest, there has been a consensus among all 
alliance members that in the years to come, 
European security must be organised on three 
complementary levels: a European level, con-
sisting of European Political Union and WEU, 
an Atlantic level, consisting of the Atlantic 
Alliance, as well as a more comprehensive pan-
European level consisting of the CSCE and the 
North Atlantic Co-operation Council. 
The Copenhagen meeting of foreign ministers, 
and the two German-American communiques of 
1Oth May and 2nd October 1991, expressly 
underlined the compatibility of Europe's own 
security identity with its alliance commitment. 
In the joint declaration of 1Oth May in 
Washington, Secretary of State Jim Baker 
affirmed that "the United States is ready to 
support arrangements the European allies decide 
are needed for the expression of a common 
European foreign, security and defence policy ". 
In Maastricht, not only was the integration of 
WEU into the process of European unification 
agreed; at the same time the European Council 
assigned to WEU the function of a bridge 
between the alliance and European Union. This 
dual function of WEU as an independent 
instrument of European security and as the 
European pillar of NATO manifests the indis-
soluble security link between the European and 
the North American democracies. 
This, in our view, forms the basis of our 
security policy. Nor will it be changed by our 
resolve to seek ever-closer co-operation with 
France and other European partners in the field 
of security and defence. Like WEU, the 
European corps is aimed at strengthening joint 
security and not at weakening it through irrecon-
cilable parallel structures. Also as regards 
alliance security interests, this corps offers more 
and not less scope for action. The German units 
envisaged for the corps will remain assigned to 
NATO. They will continue to meet NATO stan-
dards with regard to planning, availability, 
training etc. 
The corps' primary mandate is to contribute 
to the allies' joint defence. The corps will also 
perform peace-keeping and peace-making tasks, 
as well as humanitarian assignments. Through 
these additional tasks, which are new to the 
German corps units, we have assumed addi-
tional European responsibility in the fields of 
conflict settlement and crisis management - as 
constantly called for by our North American 
partners - thus strengthening security on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Of course, a number of 
questions remain as regards the European corps' 
relationship with NATO. But I am sure that the 
practical arrangements yet to be negotiated 
between NATO and the European corps will 
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demonstrate that an independent European 
defence is not an obstacle, but a basic condition 
for ensuring that the security link across the 
Atlantic remains unshakeable in future. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the bridge-building by 
WEU to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe was another focus of Germany's presi-
dency. The fact-finding missions by the presi-
dency and the Secretary-General to those coun-
tries were continued. Together with the 
Secretary-General, a representative of the 
German presidency visited the Baltic states. as 
well as Romania and Bulgaria. 
On the afternoon of 19th June, following the 
regular nine-member Council of Ministers, for 
the first time in WEU history a special Council 
will take place with eight Central and Eastern 
.European states, where the contacts initiated 
between WEU and these states are to be 
developed. WEU offers these countries a further 
forum for security dialogue. For states with def-
inite prospects of accession, this meeting also 
offers a chance of getting closer to the work of 
the Community and thus of preparing the way 
for full membership later on. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you and, in particular, 
President Pontillon, who died recently, have 
devoted great energy to building this bridge 
between WEU and the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The Berlin symposium held last 
spring was a high spot of these activities. Thank 
you for your efforts. 
The Institute for Security Studies, too, has 
made special efforts in this regard. I should like 
to mention in this context the seminar held in 
Budapest last May - the first of its kind in 
Central Europe. May I convey my warm thanks 
to the Hungarian hosts for their efficient 
organisation of the seminar. 
In the arms control sector, too, important ini-
tiatives were developed. Co-operation among 
the open skies experts within the WEU frame-
work has led to consensus on an aircraft pool for 
WEU member states. At present, various 
options on this are still being examined, 
including the possibility of co-operation with 
third countries, such as Russia. 
In his capacity as WEU Chairman-in-Office, 
my predecessor Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
appealed personally to the foreign ministers of 
the Soviet successor states to ensure the timely 
ratification of the CFE Treaty. The chances of 
this have increased following the Tashkent 
summit of the CIS states. This is also significant 
for the final phase of the CFE 1 a negotiations. 
In the nuclear sphere, overriding importance 
attaches to the development and strengthening 
of the non-proliferation regime. The nuclear 
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non-proliferation treaty is an essential ins-
trument for safeguarding peace and interna-
tional stability. We seek the treaty's unlimited 
extension beyond 1995. In this connection, we 
welcome the initialling of the agreement 
between the EC, Russia, the United States and 
Japan in Lisbon on 24th May on an interna-
tional centre for science and technology. The 
proliferation of nuclear know-how must also be 
stopped. With regard to chemical weapons, I am 
confident that we will succeed in Geneva in 
achieving, by the end of the year, a world-wide, 
comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons 
ban. 
The.disarmament process must continue to be 
linked to political developments. Political credi-
bility must pass the test of civic scrutiny in this 
area. 
The agreement to open up national inspection 
teams to participation by WEU partners within 
the framework of the CFE Treaty is a further 
element of confidence-building. A whole series 
of trial inspections has already been conducted 
successfully on this basis. With the " set of rules 
on co-operation among multinational inspection 
teams" prepared on the presidency's initiative-
which has now also been adopted within the 
NATO framework- WEU has once again imple-
mented a successful initiative in the highly 
important area of confidence building. 
We have also taken an important step towards 
our goal of an autonomous European assessment 
of foreign and security procedures at global 
level. Torrej6n near Madrid has been designated 
as the location of the satellite centre. A British 
national was appointed as its first director. 
Equal progress has been achieved in parallel 
study programmes on the possible establishment 
of a European space-based observation system. 
Extensive, detailed work has enabled a plan 
for the studies to be prepared. A further major 
event in the second half of the German presi-
dency has been the 4th European Seminar for 
Security Studies in Ebenhausen and Dresden in 
March. In addition to the role of WEU in the 
new European security architecture, arms 
control and disarmament were the main 
issues. 
Pursuant to the ministerial mandate of 18th 
November 1991, contacts between WEU and 
the Maghreb states are currently being 
examined. Thus WEU is addressing the security 
issues arising in this area, with its close 
European links. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the bru-
tality and human suffering going on in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina are horrifying. And, as 
I stated quite clearly at the Lisbon meeting on 
aid to the CIS countries, we Europeans must 
confess with complete candour that Europe has 
not yet reached the point where it can cope with 
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this new kind of challenge, although this is 
essentially a European problem which concerns 
us all. But the consequence cannot be to put an 
end to efforts to create a Europe capable of 
action. On the contrary: the only rational alter-
native is to progress even more rapidly and to 
put the European institutions in a position to 
assert the common values of the Charter of Paris 
so as to prevent a relapse into nationalism and 
violence. 
First and foremost, the procedures agreed in 
Maastricht for an EC common foreign and 
security policy must now be actively put into 
practice. An important institutional starting-
point for this is the adoption of majority deci-
sions. European integration must retain its 
momentum. Only by simultaneously reforming 
its internal structures can the Community open 
up towards the European reformist states 
through co-operation, association or full mem-
bership. 
Only through ever-increasing common ground 
can the dangers of resurgent nationalism at our 
borders be combated. Only a Community of 
internal strength and efficiency can actively con-
tribute to a just, lasting order linking North and 
South in this one world. The alliance, too, has, 
by changing its structure and its strategy, played 
an active part in shaping the new Europe. By 
establishing the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council and extending it to a total of 36 
members, NATO has obviated the emergence of 
a security vacuum in the area of the former 
Warsaw Pact. 
The Oslo meeting of NATO foreign ministers 
will clarify the question of co-operation between 
CSCE and NATO in peace-keeping operations. 
For WEU, too, new prospects for burden-
sharing with the alliance and the CSCE will arise 
in this context. To this end, however, as we have 
requested time and again, the CSCE must 
assume the tasks and responsibility of a regional 
arrangement within the meaning of the United 
Nations Charter. And WEU must create its own 
structures for this purpose. And let me add that 
we Germans must take internal steps which 
enable us to participate in peace-keeping and 
peace-making missions under the auspices of the 
United Nations. This is also my own personal, 
emphatically-stated view. 
The EC trade embargo against Serbia has now 
been followed by comprehensive sanctions by 
the United Nations Security Council, including 
the oil embargo we have been calling for again 
and again, since the middle of last year. The 
Serbian authorities and army must be made to 
realise that, if further blood is spilt, they will 
have to pay a very high price. 
On my first trips at home and abroad in my 
new position, I have frequently emphasised that 
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we must jointly ensure that things are made less 
easy for the Serbian leaders, and the army in 
particular, and that we in Europe, above all, 
must bring this terrible slaughter to an end as 
quickly as possible. I hope the sanctions will 
work. We must wait and see. Of course there 
must be supervision to prove their effectiveness. 
Let me also clearly state that ultimately the use 
of military expedients cannot and should not be 
excluded. But - let me add - I sincerely hope 
this will not be necessary. 
The presidency has called a meeting of the 
Council for Thursday to verify the implemen-
tation of the naval embargo, should this prove 
necessary. In conclusion I would like to repeat 
that military measures should not and cannot be 
excluded, but they should really be a last resort. 
I appeal for a waiting period while we see 
whether sanctions are working as we hope. 
My apologies, once again, for having relatively 
little time available for these questions, and I 
promise to be available for as long as you wish 
next time. At present I have to deal with some 
trying home affairs. Thank you again for your 
attention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you very much, Minister. 
Seven members have asked to speak. I 
propose that we begin by hearing three speakers 
in succession and that the Minister then answer 
the first three questions. We could adopt the 
same procedure for the remaining four 
speakers. 
Mr. Hardy, you have the floor. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). -Mr. Kinkel 
will have noted that the Assembly listened to 
him with marked interest. We appreciate that he 
presented a broad assessment. I hope that he will 
not think that I am seeking to tempt him to stray 
far from his brief, when I ask him to comment 
on the following point. We are now facing the 
summit in Rio, which has implications for inter-
national peace and stability. If we are to assist 
the poor areas of the world, which is essential, I 
hope that we will not seek to add to their 
burdens by unloading on to them in the next few 
years, as we have done so frequently in the past, 
the obsolete and the surplus from our military 
armouries. Does he accept that a more intel-
ligent approach to the international arms threat 
needs to be urgently developed? Although we all 
agreed with the passionate and necessary words 
that he uttered about Yugoslavia and the areas 
of difficulty and destruction in that unhappy 
part of Europe, does he accept that the evidence 
now emerging from that experience demon-
strates that there should be a great deal more 
care and control of the arms trade? 
Otherwise, where are the weapons of destruction 
coming from? 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Russell Johnston. 
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom).-
I agree entirely with Mr. Kinkel's condemnation 
of the shelling of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik, in 
the same way as Vukovar and Osijek were 
shelled before, and the wish to place the 
maximum pressure on Serbia, not excluding an 
air and naval blockade, which the Assembly dis-
cussed many months ago. May I draw his 
attention to the situation in Kosovo? There has 
been no violence but a positive policy by the 
90 % Albanian population to avoid violence, so 
they get no attention. Our western governments 
are bad at responding to people under occu-
pation, as in Kosovo, unless those people take 
violent action. We must in some way recognise 
the position of those in Kosovo and hold out 
hope for them. Otherwise, violence will break 
out there, too. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Mrs. 
Aguiar. 
Mrs. AGUIAR (Portugal) (Translation). - The 
recognition of the independence of Croatia and 
of other republics of the former Yugoslavia was 
followed by a horrendous war, to which there 
appears to be no end. The number of dead, 
injured and homeless in these countries is 
growing, as is the number of refugees to neigh-
bouring countries. 
The German Government sought and played 
a decisive part in the process of international 
recognition of the independence of Croatia. 
Will the German Government now play a 
similar role in the field of humanitarian aid, and 
granting rights of refuge and asylum? 
Will it, for instance, welcome unreservedly the 
thousands of citizens from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina who are at present taking refuge in 
Croatia, a country which is not itself in a 
position to help and accommodate them as they 
deserve? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - If the Min-
ister would now like to answer the first three 
questions. 
Mr. KINKEL (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation).- Mr. President, I was first asked 
if I did not agree that there is an urgent need for 
regulations against the international arms trade 
and whether the arms trade issue is not particu-
larly important in the context of the Yugoslav 
problem. That was the question: where are the 
weapons of destruction coming from? All I can 
say is that of course I fully share the opinion 
expressed that we must do all we can as a matter 
of urgency to bring the international arms trade 
- at least on the scale on which it is still being 
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conducted - to an end. Where the present sanc-
tions are concerned, of course, it must be 
ensured in particular that weapons do not con-
tinue to reach Yugoslavia. The routes are 
known, the supplier countries are also known. I 
do not think we need to discuss this aspect 
further. 
As regards Kosovo, I will say that everything 
possible has been included in the international 
efforts to achieve peace. We are trying to help to 
restore peace there too as far as we possibly can. 
Kosovo is definitely not excluded from interna-
tional and especially not from European peace-
making efforts. 
I now come to the third question. I do not 
know if I have understood the question. Croatia 
has been recognised so, as I see it, it does not 
need to be recognised again. 
As for the right of asylum, we have in the 
Federal Republic what I consider to be a partic-
ularly well-defined right of asylum. We are really 
doing everything we can to help the refugees. 
However, where Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
refugee problem are concerned, we are still 
insisting for the moment- and I am convinced 
this is the right approach - that visas be 
obtained. Despite this, the Conference of the 
Home Affairs Ministers of the Federal Gov-
ernment and the Under in the Federal Republic 
has considered every conceivable humanitarian 
measure very carefully. Quite a lot is happening 
in this area at the moment. I believe that we in 
the Federal Republic are acting in an exemplary 
fashion in this respect. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Germany) (Translation). -
When the Minister mentioned the 
Franco-German corps in his statement, he said 
that its task consisted not only of humanitarian 
missions but also of restoring the peace. 
Now it could easily happen- as the Minister 
himself has mentioned - that a last resort will be 
necessary in connection with the conflict in 
Yugoslavia. 
Can the Minister assume that, if Western 
European Union decided, for example, to 
impose an air and sea blockade on Serbia, it 
would really have the co-operation of all the 
members, or must it be assumed that certain 
members of Western European Union would 
not be prepared to play an active part? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Lopez Henares. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- I should first like to congratulate you, Min-
ister, on your address and the great hope it 
inspires in the organisation. As you well know, 
the modified Brussels Treaty states that the 
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purpose of this organisation is to maintain inter-
national peace and security and resist any policy 
of aggression. Article VIII lays down that, if a 
request is made for a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers, the latter will be immediately con-
vened in order to permit the high contracting 
parties to consult with regard to any situation 
which may constitute a threat to peace in 
whatever area this threat should arise. Now we 
have the experience of the former Yugoslavia: 
although, here in this Assembly, we raised 
several times the possibility of acting in 
advance, we are now being criticised on the 
other side of the Atlantic for acting too slowly in 
Europe. 
My question is this: in view of the great 
changes that you have referred to, do you think 
that the time has now come for Europe to have a 
very clear security doctrine so that we can act 
before rather than after events? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. 
Blunck. 
Mrs. BLUNCK (Germany) (Translation). -
Minister, how will it be ensured that, firstly, the 
arms procurement programmes needed for the 
Eurocorps are shown openly in the national 
defence budgets, rather than being hidden away 
in some departmental budget or other, and that, 
secondly, the procurement programmes will not 
be implemented only by the military and the 
government, without the parliamentarians or 
parliament being involved? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
May I ask the Minister a simple question? In his 
speech about the Eurocorps, he said: "The 
German units envisaged for the corps will 
remain assigned to NATO." Can he say without 
reservation that those units will come under the 
control of WEU? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Please, 
Minister, your answers. 
Mr. KINKEL (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I will try to be very clear in my 
answer to the first question: I take the view that, 
if at all possible, the deployment of German 
troops of the Bundeswehr in Yugoslavia in any 
form should be avoided on historical grounds. I 
assume that is what your question was referring 
to. 
The second question: WEU - a clear-cut 
security doctrine? Answer: yes; it is being pre-
pared and it is urgently needed. 
The third question: the Eurocorps, arms pro-
curement. So far we have only taken the political 
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decision. Where decisions on arms procurement 
are concerned - if more are needed - they will 
be taken in the future. For me there is absolutely 
no question of these decisions being taken other 
than by the proper parliamentary process, 
without bypassing parliament, let alone the 
appropriate committees, especially the Budget 
Committee. 
As for the last question, concerning WEU: yes, 
very much so. If that is what is wanted, it can be 
done. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. Next time I hope you will manage to 
take as much advantage as possible of the time 
available, as you have assured us you will do. 
The next opportunity will be on 25th June, when 
WEU's Political Committee and Presidential 
Committee will be meeting in Bonn to discuss 
the outcome of the Council's meeting on 19th 
June. 
Thank you once again for coming here. We all 
know that - precisely because you are new to 
this office - you have taken on many additional 
commitments and still have old ones to 
honour. 
(Sir Geo.ffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the 
Assembly took the Chair) 
4. WEU after Maastricht 
(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Commi"ee and 
votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doe. 1308) 
The PRESIDENT. - The next 'order of the 
day is the resumed debate on the report of the 
Political Committee on WEU after Maastricht 
and votes on the draft recommendation and 
draft order, Document 1308. 
In the debate, I now call Mr. Roman. 
Mr. ROMAN (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, it is not easy to take the floor after a 
minister. Nevertheless, I will briefly give my 
opinion on the report which Mr. Goerens has 
presented. 
Six months ago, we were in the position of 
debating alternative proposals which tended, in 
one case, to subordinate WEU to the European 
Community and, in the other, to have WEU still 
playing an active role as the European pillar of 
the alliance. Although these were frequently pre-
sented as opposing and irreconcilable proposals, 
in practice it was shown at Maastricht that fun-
damentally they were similar. I share the belief 
that what was agreed at Maastricht requires the 
most important qualitative and quantitative 
change for the Community since the signature of 
the Treaty of Rome. 
Mr. Goerens's report sets out what the 
Council will need to do to achieve the objectives 
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in view. We have a timetable and a set of actions 
taking us up to 1996 to complete the reforms 
provided for in the treaty, including the revision 
of the Brussels Treaty: to formulate a common 
defence policy with the ultimate aim of jointly 
defending ourselves. 
Mr. Goerens, I do not find paragraph J.4 so 
difficult to understand. It involves progressing 
from theory to practice, from definition to 
reality. I am in no doubt that a realistic, rea-
sonable and well-balanced consensus has been 
reached, since WEU is retaining its autonomy. 
This does not weaken NATO, but complements 
it, and, moreover, it is agreed to develop WEU's 
operational function. Some recent initiatives 
have seemed to create internal conditions, or 
rather contradictions, but we must see it as two 
ways of achieving the same aim, namely to 
provide WEU with an effective operational 
structure. There are many ways of achieving 
this, but really the important thing is to do it. 
Mr. Goerens's report is fully acceptable and I 
congratulate him on having been the first to deal 
with the intricacies of this treaty. I do believe, 
however, that we must be wary of meetings 
which require agreements to be reached in a 
very short time on too wide a range of subjects. 
Of course there will be omissions, errors and 
inaccuracies, but this does not mean that these 
cannot be corrected. 
What I would avoid are false debates. These 
we must avoid, because they will hold up 
progress towards European Union. There has 
been some talk of a loss of national sovereignty, 
but neither the character, institutions nor per-
sonality of any of our nations is in danger. There 
has also been talk of transferring sovereignty, 
when we all know that the sovereignty which is 
being transferred is not going to some third 
party, but will be shared amongst us to be 
administered by us all, so that together we can 
define our common destiny. 
Another way to oppose progress towards the 
construction of Europe is to set a maximalist 
objective: to sweep in and want to build a 
federal Europe or a European confederation 
tomorrow, or to aspire to an efficient 
~rganisation which, from the very beginning, 
mcludes all the countries of Europe. For such 
people the Maastricht Treaty is already outdated 
and outstripped, but I believe in going forward 
step by step, be the steps large or small. I do not 
believe in jumping into the void or getting 
nowhere fast. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Roman, would you 
please conclude. 
Mr. ROMAN (Spain) (Translation). - We are 
- and I am just abQut to finish, Mr. President -
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faced with revitalising WEU to enable it to fulfil 
its mission of developing and implementing 
defence policy for the European Union. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Roman. 
I call Mrs. Ozver, Observer from Turkey. 
Mrs. OZVER (Observer from Turkey). - I con-
gratulate Mr. Goerens on his excellent report. 
As was clearly indicated during the Rome 
NATO summit meeting of heads of state in 
November 1991, security challenges in the new 
Europe cannot be addressed by one institution 
alone - there must be a framework of inter-
locking and mutually reinforcing institutions. 
According to the new European security archi-
tecture, NATO, the CSCE, the European Com-
munity, WEU and the Council of Europe com-
plement each other. Agreements reached in 
Rome, as well as in Maastricht, represent the 
basis of new relationships between NATO and 
the emerging European security and defence 
identity. Declarations to that effect stress the 
need for transparency and complementary rela-
tionships between WEU and NATO. 
At Maastricht, it was decided to invite Turkey 
to join WEU as an associate member, to partic-
ipate fully in the activities of the organisation. It 
is obvious that the European security and 
defence architecture would be incomplete 
without Turkey. Turkey's orientation, location 
and the political and security interests of our 
continent necessitate a close integration between 
Europe and Turkey. We therefore consider the 
Maastricht decision on associate member status 
for Turkey as a manifestation of WEU's desire 
that Turkey be fully integrated into the 
European effort for collective security - tem-
pered only by the fact that Turkey is not yet a 
full member of the European Community. 
Turkey attaches the highest importance to the 
outcome of the negotiations to allow Turkey to 
become an associate member, and it wishes to 
participate fully in WEU's activities. The Maas-
tricht commitment to full participation for asso-
ciate members must be implemented. They 
should have the right to participate fully in all 
WEU meetings and activities and in the imple-
mentation of its decisions. The status of the par-
liamentarians of an associate member country 
should be revised and upgraded to the status 
that it deserves, commensurate with the prin-
ciple of full participation. 
I want to underline once again our determi-
nation that Turkey should not share only the 
benefits of European solidarity, but assume its 
share of obligations within that. No one should 
h~ve any doubts about that as Turkey has con-
tnbuted to NATO for four decades and will now 
contribute to WEU, taking all the necessary 
responsibilities. 
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The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mrs 
Ozver. 
The next speaker is Mr. MUller. 
Mr. MULLER (Germany) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I will begin my statement by thanking 
Mr. Goerens for his report. I do not mean this as 
one of the compliments that are normally paid 
to a rapporteur. I believe in fact that Mr. 
Goerens has given a really excellent account of 
the problem Western European Union faces and 
the role that the Assembly is playing in this 
debate. 
I would like to hark back to one of yesterday's 
speakers, Mr. Antretter, who is not a member of 
my group. In his criticism of the part played by 
the Council of Ministers he said some things 
that I can fully endorse and approve. 
In the context of this debate I said at a private 
gathering yesterday that the present differs quite 
significantly from the 19th century. At that time 
politicians, diplomats and ministers like Tal-
leyrand and Metternich negotiated treaties that 
were very clear and left no one in any doubt. 
Today we find that, in the Maastricht 
agreement, say, we have a treaty whose clauses 
are not yet ready and will have to be supplied 
later, as it were. As Mr. Goerens states very 
clearly in his report, we also find that a 
smokescreen is being put up, that doubt is in 
fact being created, where the WEU treaty is con-
cerned, as to whether it runs until 1998 or until 
2004. Paragraphs are being moved about, which 
creates further uncertainty. They leave quite a 
few things in the dark. 
That is precisely what we can do without in a 
European security and defence policy. We must 
have clarity. 
I feel one of the main problems is that parlia-
mentarians - whether at the level of national 
parliaments or of the various assemblies, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, the WEU Assembly and even the 
European Parliament - are no longer creative 
forces, as should be the general rule in a parlia-
mentary system. All they really have to do is to 
reconstruct something that has often been drawn 
up and presented in a very unclear and slapdash 
form - I must emphasise once again - by min-
isters, governments and diplomats. 
What is needed today is a genuine European 
constitutional debate, laying the foundations for 
a real political union and for a common 
European security policy, and we need to 
remove the uncertainty we find today in many 
areas of the policy on European unification. 
To conclude, let me mention something that is 
causing me considerable concern. I believe the 
policy on European unification in relation to 
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security policy will be jeopardised in the long 
term by our enlarging the European Community 
too quickly. I am convinced today that it would 
have been better in the past to have pressed 
ahead with the old core of the European Com-
munity, to have established facts, and not to 
begin by placing the emphasis on enlargement. 
I am afraid that the current phase, with a line 
of candidates waiting, as it were, in the 
European Community's anteroom to join the 
Community, will create renewed uncertainty 
rather than renewed certainty in the security 
policy sphere. 
When I think of the Scandinavian countries, 
of Austria, of Switzerland, with all their specific 
problems of neutrality and regarding other 
plans, I have many doubts about the possibility 
of a security policy in Europe in the next few 
years. There is more likely to be greater uncer-
tainty, there is more likely to be more doubt. I 
deeply regret that we are getting into such a situ-
ation. 
I can only hope that the critical remarks Mr. 
Goerens has made in his report are read and 
noted by governments and ministers, because I 
am afraid - and this is something else Mr. 
Goerens said in his report - that sometimes the 
reports adopted here are not read by the min-
isters and the Council. That is not in keeping 
with the role of our Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
-Mr. President, although I live very near Maas-
tricht and studied in Maastricht, I have never 
heard the name of this town mentioned so fre-
quently or in so many different accents as in the 
last few months. Without indulging in repe-
tition, I must say that I heartily agree with what 
Mr. Antretter has said. 
I would like to refer to something that might" 
be included in the draft order: the role of the 
national parliaments has not proceeded on set 
lines, according to Mr. Goerens's report. Nor is 
it a question of the relationship between this 
Assembly and the European Parliament. For the 
decisions that will have to be taken in the future 
and are of importance for the continued exis-
tence of this Assembly it seems to me important 
that paragraph 2 of the draft order should 
include a reference to the co-ordination of activ-
ities in the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations. The know-how and experience 
gained in the network of contacts with the 
national parliaments and the European Par-
liament must play a part. 
If the Rapporteur says he considers this to 
be a logical step, I do not need to table an 
amendment to this part. His approval will be 
enough for the draft order to be supplemented 
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along these lines. I congratulate Mr. Goerens on 
his report. 
Mr. President, in paragraph 88 of his explan-
atory memorandum, the Rapporteur, Mr. 
Goerens, says that there must be an open debate 
between the United States and Europe on the 
role to be played by Western European Union. 
The Americans' hesitation, which is also 
referred to, must be discussed. What can the 
United States and Europe expect of each other 
in the new security situation? Does the United 
States consider regional conflicts in Europe to be 
a threat to its own security and interests? Those 
are questions which have to be discussed by the 
two partners and to which answers must be 
found. 
Mr. President, the recent development of the . 
Franco-German Eurocorps is important in this 
context. We will be discussing this in greater 
depth later, but I would say at this stage that this 
development should be welcomed by WEU, 
rather than the WEU countries showing reluc-
tance to join this Eurocorps. If larger Com-
munity countries agree on defence, that is an 
advantage for the smaller countries, including 
those in WEU. But it does mean that the smaller 
countries in WEU must be involved, or they 
cannot bring any influence to bear in an attempt 
to have this Eurocorps set up in a WEU 
context. 
Mr. President, it is also very important to bear 
in mind - and I hope the WEU Council of Min-
isters will be deciding on this and on the 
Eurocorps on 19th June - who is to become a 
member of Western European Union, who will 
be associates and who will be observers. If we 
confine ourselves to the present Community 
countries, we feel Greece could become a new 
member and observer status could be granted to 
Ireland and Denmark. 
The PRESIDENT. - As always, Nick, that 
was a very good contribution. 
I call Mr. Parisi. 
Mr. PARIS! (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, as our Rapporteur 
has shown in his usual expert manner, Europe is 
now living through one of the most important 
periods since the war and possibly in its whole 
history. 
The old deep-rooted antagonisms between 
European countries are disappearing; these 
antagonisms had shaped the history of the last 
forty years in a manner which appeared to be 
beyond change, had inspired ideas and strategies 
of distrust and even fear and had therefore 
formed the basis of every fundamental 
assessment of military strategy. 
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Clearly, therefore, we have to rethink our 
strategies for the defence of Europe but not for-
getting the long-established Atlantic solidarity 
which cannot and must not be weakened and 
can and must be adapted to the new times. 
A new security order must be established in 
Europe and, as the Rapporteur has stressed, this 
first requires the conclusion of agreements with 
those countries in Eastern Europe which appear 
to have gone furthest towards establishing 
democracy and freedom on a firm basis. 
In addition, fresh thought must be given to the 
role of the existing institutions including our 
Western European Union. As was made clear in 
the treaty signed at Maastricht last December, 
WEU remains a fundamental and indispensable 
point of reference for the construction of a new 
defence order in Europe. The reason why WEU 
has come to the fore at this point in its existence 
is primarily the method of collaboration it has 
provided in a variety of contexts, making it a 
multilateral forum for formulating strategies and 
identifying means and methods of action. 
The road is certainly long and tiring and no 
immediate results can be guaranteed, particu-
larly in the present circumstances which require 
a capacity for imagination and invention and for 
looking to the future rather than trying to pre-
serve the past. 
For these reasons I think that a number of pri-
orities called for by the facts have to be 
respected. The road before us must be followed 
in a logical manner; the first step must be to 
overcome the difficulties resulting from the fact 
that three member states of the European Com-
munity are not yet members of WEU. It seems 
to me that there are encouraging prospects for 
opening negotiations for their entry. 
A second problem is that not- all the countries 
of the EC and WEU share the same ideas, at 
either government or popular level, regarding 
the maintenance of security and the use of force. 
There is a need for generally-accepted beliefs. A 
prolonged and laborious effort of negotiation 
and persuasion will be needed and over-hasty 
and partial initiatives are no substitute. 
While praise is due for the move by two 
European countries to establish a mixed army 
corps, many points have still to be clarified 
before it can be understood how this initiative 
can be reconciled with the common road which, 
through difficult and slow but unavoidable mul-
tilateral negotiations; we are all following within 
Western European Union. 
We need therefore to confirm and reiterate 
that the road to European defence policy is 
through WEU. The relationship between the 
Franco-German corps and WEU must therefore 
be clearly defined, trusting that it is a contri-
bution by France and Germany to WEU's future 
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common force. I have to say honestly, however, 
that while what Mr. Kinkel said this morning 
goes some way to meeting the concerns stressed 
by several speakers, it does not entirely dispel 
them. 
It is my belief, therefore, that it is only by pro-
ceeding along the road called for by many 
members, and which I have stressed, that we 
shall be able to move most speedily towards a 
solution to the problems of Europe's defence. 
At this time, when events in Yugoslavia are of 
such great concern, a strengthened and 
appropriately-structured WEU could, heaven 
knows, provide a powerful means of action. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Liapis, 
Observer from Greece. 
Mr. LIAPIS (Observer from Greece). - Mr. 
President, it is not constructive when an 
observer does not have the right to participate in 
the committees where the reports are being 
drawn up. In addition, it is not pleasant when 
the Rapporteur makes unflattering remarks 
about an observer's country. Although I have 
strong reservations about the Rapporteur's 
remarks about Greece, I congratulate him on his 
hard work. 
I shall make some comments on part 11 (c) of 
the report. Instead of warmly welcoming the 
accession of a member country of the EC to 
WEU - a decision made at the summit in Maas-
tricht - the Rapporteur gave the impression that 
he had a negative approach towards Greece and 
its application. Greece is a country with a great 
history of strong but painful participation in all 
the struggles for freedom in Europe. 
Why such biased behaviour? Is it appropriate 
to refer to a European country and its national 
goals by the phrase that Greece has "brought 
pressure to bear on the Twelve by threatening 
not to accede to the Maastricht Treaty ... if it was 
not admitted to the organisation"? 
Greece, dear Rapporteur, does not threaten, 
blackmail or beg. Greece asks, as do all the other 
member countries when they wish to support 
their national interests. Must I list all those 
countries that have blocked EC decisions or 
made serious bilateral compromises? Must I 
remind the Rapporteur how many times the big 
countries of the EC have postponed Europe's 
integration? Naturally, no one says that those 
countries were wrong. They were just protecting 
their people's interests. 
Greece applied for membership six years ago 
and the leaders of the Maastricht summit made 
a decision of their own free will. It is, therefore, 
unacceptable for the report to describe the 
Maastricht decision as being a result of Greece's 
threat. 
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Paragraph 42 is also unacceptable. It refers to 
Greece's foreign problems in a way that not only 
violates the truth but gives the impression that 
she is wrong - that she is serving injustice and 
aggression. 
We must be more cautious and objective in 
our remarks - not to mention, on the other 
hand, the absolute ignorance of the common 
attitude of the Twelve toward the recognition of 
the so-called "Republic of Macedonia". How 
can the Rapporteur say that Greece prevented 
"the Twelve from jointly recognising the 
Republic of Macedonia, as the other eleven 
members wanted" when the European Com-
munity unanimously adopted a common stance 
towards that republic? 
I am also afraid that the remark that the 
attitude of Greece "shows another major dif-
ference between Greece and its partners on an 
external policy matter" shows not a difference of 
approach but a lack of historical knowledge. 
Greece was the only country in the EC and 
WEU that for decades had three communist 
neighbours, but she stayed firmly there, 
throughout all those difficult years, supporting 
the interests of the West and spending enormous 
amounts of money on her armed forces and the 
security of the free world. 
Why does the Rapporteur apply two measures 
and two standards? During the cold war period, 
Greece was a good ally; now that communism 
has collapsed, Greece is not so important. 
My last remark - but not the least - is about 
the accusation that Greece wants to use her 
accession to WEU only to strengthen her inter-
national position. What is wrong with that? 
Every country in the EC, WEU, NATO or in any 
alliance on earth wants to ensure its state 
interests and improve its international position. 
It is lawful, especially when that country is sit-
uated in an inflammable region and when it has 
a history of giving rather than taking. 
Furthermore, I cannot understand the 
Rapporteur's point that Greece, by her 
accession, will change WEU's orientation when 
she is already a member of the EC and NATO 
and has not, until now, changed their orien-
tation. 
Greece has many difficult tasks to fulfil. One 
of the most important is the maintenance of 
peace in the Balkan peninsula. So anything that 
weakens Greece's position in the international 
community weakens at the same time stability 
and security. 
The PRESIDENT. - You have ten seconds 
left. 
Mr. LIAPIS (Observer from Greece). - After 
all, is not solidarity the cornerstone of our 
organisation? 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Machete. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. MACHETE (Portugal) (Translation). -
Questions of security and defence constitute the 
main core of matters coming within the compe-
tence of governments, and such questions must 
therefore remain under the control of national 
parliaments. On this specific point the demo-
cratic nature of the Assembly of WEU stands 
out as compared with the European Parliament 
because the national parliaments give it demo-
cratic legitimacy, and for this reason it must be 
taken into account. Futhermore, as the 
Rapporteur has pointed out, there is also the 
very particular circumstance that, when the final 
structure of the European Union is being 
decided, we must make sure to make it more 
democratic by giving it a bicameral structure. 
The bicameral structure and the role in the 
future development of an assembly which will 
result from the development of the Assembly of 
WEU may also prove to be important where the 
difficult question of third countries is con-
cerned. In other words, we must bear in mind 
that precisely because defence policy is of funda-
mental importance to governments and, as an 
element of national policy, must be under the 
control or supervision of national parliaments, it 
is important because, for third country govern-
ments to be able to influence such policy in their 
own national interest, they in turn must become 
members of WEU. 
In my view, the only criticism which can be 
made of the report in this respect is that this 
very important matter was dealt with in the 
context of relations between the Assembly of 
WEU and the European Parliament and not as a 
separate matter. In any event, we agree with the 
comments that have been made and believe that 
greater emphasis should be given to them. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Toskay, 
Observer from Turkey. 
Mr. TOSK.A Y (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, 
let me begin by congratulating Mr. Goerens on 
his excellent work. 
The overriding aims of Turkey's foreign 
policy are to develop relations with Western 
Europe and to participate actively in integration 
in Europe. Through its active membership of 
NATO, the OECD and the Council of Europe, 
Turkey has already proved that it respects all 
viewpoints and all democratic values, and that 
Turkish society feels it has close links with the 
European movements. 
Europe can be unified only if stable security is 
achieved. There is no doubt that Turkey will 
make a valuable contribution, as a powerful ally, 
to the future establishment of the European 
security order. Indeed, European defence 
without Turkey's contribution is bound to be 
weak. 
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The new risks and challenges that have arisen 
as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and the developments in the Gulf and 
North Africa make it clear that the institutions 
and concepts accepted for the defence and 
security of a fragmented Europe and a cold war 
need to be reconsidered. 
Conditions in the Balkans, the south of 
Russia, the Caucasus, the Gulf, the Middle East 
and the Mediterranean are making it clear how 
important Turkey has once again become where 
security in Europe is concerned: 
During the Gulf conflict and the subsequent 
developments in our area, it was obvious once 
again that Turkey has an important role to play 
in the general defence and security of the West 
and of Europe in general. In principle we believe 
Turkey has its rightful place in the European 
security structure that is now being shaped. 
At the Maastricht summit it was decided that 
Turkey should be invited to become an associate 
member .and that it might participate in all the 
activities of Western European Union. We had 
hoped this invitation would be extended as if 
Tur~ey were a full member. That would be in 
keeping with Turkey's contribution to the 
defence of Europe. On the grounds I have 
already mentioned, we would like to see this 
decision as a step towards Turkey's full mem-
bership of Western European Union. 
The Turkish parliamentarians repeatedly 
emphasise that Turkey is a trustworthy ally, 
making its contribution to peace, security and 
stability in Europe for more than forty years, 
and that it also continues to play its part in 
Western European unification, while enjoying a 
status close to full membership. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Roseta. 
Mr. ROSETA (Portugal) (Translation). - I 
would like to begin by congratulating Mr. 
Goerens on his report. Although I had some res-
ervations on the initial criticism of the treaty, 
which I felt was too extreme, I can now say that 
it is a well-balanced report and that the recom-
mendation is extraordinarily positive- it opens 
up new avenues and gives ideas on the 
important role of this organisation in the 
context of the future European Union. 
I would like to reaffirm my belief that the 
Maastricht Treaty is an important step in estab-
lishing this European Union. It cannot, in itself, 
be considered as something final or complete; it 
provides for a review in the short term, within 
four years in 1996, and I believe that this real-
istic, step-by-step approach is a characteristic of 
the building of Europe. 
That is also why it cannot be compared with 
any past union of which there have been many 
throughout history, whether in the form of a 
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confederation, federation, personal union or a 
real union. It is none of these, it is a voluntary 
and progressive structure leading to a union 
which is not closed, which has no pre-
ordained pattern and which, therefore, is not 
determinist, but is dependent on the will of the 
people and on changing circumstances. 
It is important that our Rapporteur should 
have recognised this, and I believe therefore that 
his initial criticism was rather extreme because 
he was forgetting that Rome was not built in a 
day and that this progressive and sound evo-
lution is the principal characteristic of the 
building of Europe: I am therefore very pleased 
to see this new version and the draft recommen-
dation, which is very constructive and real-
istic. 
Maastricht's recognition of WEU's role in the 
past and the certain knowledge that any devel-
opment of a European security policy must be 
through WEU deserves emphasis but to me it is 
obvious. Anything else would be unthinkable, 
even absurd. How could any other organisation 
allow the experience of decades to be forgotten, 
or that the Brussels Treaty was one of the foun-
dation stones in the building of Europe, long 
before there was any talk of the Coal and Steel 
Community, as long ago as the 1940s? How 
could the experience of half a century be for-
gotten? In my view, it would be unthinkable, 
absurd and, fortunately, it did not happen. 
In conclusion, I would like to give my full 
support to what my colleague, Mr. Machete, has 
just said. Defence policy is one of the essential 
features of sovereignty. It has to do with the very 
basis of the state and political power, and must 
therefore come under the control of national 
parliaments. The democratic nature of this 
Assembly must be stressed: it is composed of 
directly-elected members who are members of 
national parliaments and it is, in my view, the 
most appropriate starting point for the future 
bicameral structure of European Union. I do not 
imagine that a second chamber will be invented 
- whether it be called a senate or anything else -
forgetting that there already exists an embryo 
second chamber for the future European Union, 
the Assembly of Western European Union. 
I would like to refer to the question of 
co-operation and complementarity with NATO. 
I believe that the proposed wording of para-
graphs 16, 17 and 18 of the recommendation 
should be given express support and, without 
repeating the text, I would like to associate 
myself fully with it. 
Finally, I will say that both the Council and 
the Assembly of WEU are given great responsi-
bility in the Maastricht Treaty. The Council of 
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WEU has the ability to take initiatives in the 
area of security policy and external policy. I am 
certain that the Council and the Assembly will 
be capable of meeting this challenge and proving 
that we really do have democratic legitimacy 
and both the competence and the history to 
respond positively to this important step along 
the road to European Union. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Pahtas, 
Observer from Greece. 
Mr. PAHTAS (Observer from Greece) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I 
should also like to thank Mr. Goerens for his 
important and highly interesting report under 
discussion today. We do have differences as 
regards paragraphs 40 to 44, but the report is 
excellent and the Rapporteur's profound thinking 
essential for the future of our organisation in the 
light of the Maastricht decisions. 
Today Western European Union is clearly the 
only European body with responsibility for 
defence matters and its treaty and its experience 
give it a considerable advantage. WEU bears 
responsibility for defence in the event of an 
attack by a third state and for joint defence 
within the European Union. The modified 
Brussels Treaty therefore remains the corner-
stone of European defence. This is the only basis 
on which any process concerning relations 
between WEU and the European Union can be 
contemplated. Our position should be to make 
WEU an integral part or organ of the political 
union. Governments too have to agree on the 
definition of what this European defence which 
all say they want is to be. 
The real problem, as our Rapporteur has 
pointed out, is whether the governments, our 
countries and our peoples, are prepared to entrust 
the reponsibility for their foreign and defence 
policy to a joint authority, as they have decided to 
do for the management of their economy. 
If Europe is to be built then a Europe of 
defence has to be created as part of an indi-
visible whole. So the future has to be planned 
both in the defence policy sphere in order to 
define common positions, and also in the more 
strictly operational sphere. 
The formation of the Franco-German army 
corps will give the European Union its own mil-
itary capacity enabling it to have a joint defence 
policy, in the context of the European Union, 
with which to cope with urgent problems. 
The development of a community policy in 
the sphere of security and defence will become 
more effective with the imminent enlargement 
of WEU to include member countries of the 
European Community that clearly wish to 
accede. This will not be a complication for the 
future but, on the contrary, a strengthening of 
our European position. Moreover, the creation, 
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by associating a number of European countries, 
of a European security zone beyond the WEU 
zone, is also necessary and urgent. 
Our Rapporteur has referred to Greece's diffi-
culties with its neighbour, Turkey. Our relations, 
it is true, are coloured by the Cyprus problem. 
But it is not just a bilateral affair. This problem 
concerns the whole European Community and 
even the international community. Indeed, 
several resolutions have been passed on the 
subject by the United Nations, the European 
Community, the Commonwealth countries, the 
non-aligned countries and the Council of Europe 
specifically requesting Turkey to withdraw its 
invasion and occupation force and to cease 
altering the demographic structure with settlers 
brought in from Anatolia. 
This problem therefore concerns us all 
because the principle of respect for international 
law must not be followed selectively. Otherwise 
it loses its value and foundation. I think we are 
all agreed on this point. Consequently, although 
this question has to be solved, it should have no 
effect as regards the enlargement of WEU and 
the strengthening of a joint European defence 
policy. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Pahtas. 
I now call Mr. TarschyS, Observer from 
Sweden, who is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Swedish Parliament. 
Mr. TARSCHYS (Observer from Sweden). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. Let me 
first thank you cordially for inviting Swedish 
parliamentarians to address this Assembly for 
the first time. It gives me great pleasure to be the 
first Swede to do so, and I shall be followed in a 
couple of days by the Defence Minister of 
Sweden, Mr. Bjorck, with a longer statement. 
Sweden is still a non-aligned country. We are 
committed to defending our vast territory. It is 
equally clear that we want to share in the joint 
effort to create a new peace order in Europe and 
we want to participate in co-operation on 
security, as on other matters. For many years, 
Sweden's foreign policy was described as a 
policy of neutrality. We no longer find that label 
appropriate, preferring to emphasise the 
European identity of Sweden and our wish to 
take part in European co-operation. 
Maastricht, which was dealt with in Mr. 
Goerens's excellent report, is a challenge to the 
parliaments not only of member states of the 
Community but of applicants. In applying for 
membership of the Community, the future 
union, Sweden is prepared to take part in all 
aspects of European co-operation. In an 
important decision last week in Sweden, a unan-
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imous parliament, with the exception of the 
ex-communist party, declared that we wished to 
take part in all aspects of European 
co-operation. It is clear that we will work 
together with all of you in that important 
direction. 
Geography is constant but history evolves. In 
today's Europe there is no place for isolation. 
Swedes understand that, and we want to be full 
partners in the emerging European Union 
making our contribution to European stability 
and sharing in the joint efforts to create a lasting 
peace order in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Eisma. 
Mr. EISMA (Netherlands) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, although Mr. Goerens's excellent 
report concerns European Political Union and 
Western European Union, it is the relationship 
between Western European Union and NATO 
that is of primary interest. The tendency that 
now seems to be emerging is very important in 
this context: NATO may become the military 
arm of the CSCE, and WEU will then become 
the European Community's military arm. The 
European military divisions that form part of 
NATO may then also be used, whenever 
necessary, as part of WEU. This is the famous 
concept of the double-batted forces, forces that 
can be deployed in both a WEU and a NATO 
context or possibly an ad hoc coalition. This also 
applies to my own country, which is developing 
mobile air brigades that in our opinion should 
operate similarly along these lines. 
NA TO's military integration, including its 
headquarters, must be accessible to WEU. To 
some extent this is already the case. WEU's 
structure may therefore signify a kind of 
Europeanjsation ofNATO. We do not think that 
Europe, even after Maastricht, should build up 
anything new outside NATO. It must gradually 
take over NATO, and one day the European 
defence identity will be there. All at once it will 
be a fact. Nor is it inconceivable that the 
American contribution to NATO will decrease 
to such an extent that on that same day NATO 
will exist only in name. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Wielowieyski. 
Mr. WIELOWIEYSK.I (Observer from Poland) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I should like to thank Mr. Goerens for 
his remarkable report, although this does not 
mean that everyone will find it sufficiently clear 
and convincing. Indeed, the interests and 
approaches it brings up are sometimes contra-
dictory, but it is strong evidence of the very 
complex situation that Europe as a whole is in. 
Here we are debating the future of European 
structures and the sovereignty of nations and 
states. That is also happening in Poland, where 
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we are discussing the ratification of the treaty of 
association with the Communities. All the argu-
ments about safeguarding national sovereignty 
and identity are brought up, just as they are in 
the debate on the Maastricht agreements. 
But there is a fundamental difference between 
the debate in the WEU countries and that in the 
three Visegrad countries. We are sensitive to the 
problems of national sovereignty, but inte-
gration in Europe appears to us - as it does, no 
doubt, to certain medium-sized and small coun-
tries in Western Europe - to represent a guar-
antee of independence and normal development 
that is even more important. Economic 
problems are crucial, but they do not come first. 
For the countries of Central Europe, effective 
political co-operation within the economic com-
munity and security are the most important 
needs. The choice is to be or not to be. We are 
sandwiched between two major nations, the 
Germans and the Russians. For generations, our 
people have been threatened and these threats 
from two major powers and their unrestrained 
expansion and domination have cost us many 
lives. 
This explains why we are in favour of the 
European Union as a guarantee of our indepen-
dence and a framework for co-operation 
between strong and weak and why we shall make 
a great effort to adapt ourselves to the require-
ments of the Communities. We wish the Maas-
tricht policy success. 
The WEU Assembly plan to associate the 
Visegrad countries with WEU, the subject of one 
of our debates yesterday, and to create 
machinery for the active control of threats of 
aggression is good. It is one step towards a wise 
and sensible future. I am very grateful to Mr. 
Caro for his report. 
I also welcome the fact that the criticism I 
made of the report by our President, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, a year ago is now being taken 
into consideration. 
In his otherwise very well constructed report, 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg recommended more of a 
wait-and-see approach to the problems of 
security in Eastern Europe. Today I am able to 
express my profound satisfaction that, after the 
painful experience of last year, we are moving 
forward. I believe we can effectively avert the 
dangers to come. As was said in our discussion 
with Mr. K.inkel this morning, I hope that now 
the countries of Europe can avoid being caught 
by surprise and overtaken by dangerous 
events. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Giagu 
Demartini. 
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Mr. GIAGU DEMARTINI (Italy) (Trans-
lation). - The Maastricht Treaty inexorably and 
unavoidably dominates the general debate in the 
European organisations which then takes dif-
ferent directions because so many areas and 
countries are involved and affected. 
Those of us from Italy know that political 
events in our country today are conditioned by 
the results and choices of the rendezvous at the 
end of 1992 and know also that any failure can 
have the most serious consequences. Everyone 
realises that there is no more time for distrac-
tions and that, for those that keep putting things 
off, the day of reckoning will come. 
As I have just said, this applies in particular to 
the situation in Italy but it is also true elsewhere 
and for us, too, who meet in the WEU Assembly 
in which we believe in the context of what it is 
capable of representing in European Union; it 
should be extended, strengthened and used to 
the full as the essential operative element in a 
policy of defence and security and therefore of 
peace. 
I believe that the report introduced by Mr. 
Goerens is an extremely important, well 
thought-out and well-informed document with 
findings which cannot be set aside or ignored at 
any level. 
This Assembly has for years been working and 
discharging its duties in a most praiseworthy 
manner and today has again produced a precise 
analysis which looks realistically and from a dif-
ferent angle at past and present, at previous 
experience and at past achievements and which 
safeguards in particular the basic values of an 
established alliance which saved Europe - and 
not Europe alone - in difficult circumstances in 
years gone by. 
This, it must be said, stems from two 
approaches which are not very easy to define 
clearly. There is the line taken in the Anglo-
ltalian declaration of 4th October 1991 on 
security and European defence, which is very 
clear: the Atlantic Alliance is the key to 
European identity. The reform of NATO and 
the development of foreign policy and common 
security go hand in hand in political union. The 
transatlantic relationship becomes an integral 
part of the wider concept of Europe and extends 
to the CSCE as an essential element in devel-
oping the security system of Europe as a whole. 
It is the function of WEU to develop the 
European dimension of defence including the 
defence of the political union and the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; it acts at the insti-
gation of the European Council and the Atlantic 
Alliance, taking due account of the difference of 
its structures. Consultations and complementary 
decisions and the establishment of a reaction 
force are the basic rule. 
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Then there is the line taken in the Franco-
German declaration and the letter of 14th 
October 1991. The declaration calls on WEU to 
formulate and implement decisions and action 
towards union in respect of defence. The 
Council which adopted the Maastricht Treaty is 
to work out practical arrangements whereby a 
strengthened WEU becomes the defence com-
ponent of western union. Basically, progress is 
to be made through an organic link between 
European Union and WEU with the staff of the 
two organisations closely linked, the setting up 
of a chief of staffs co-ordination and planning 
group and closer military collaboration to 
include and develop that already existing with 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
The guiding principles of the report are trans-
parency and complementarity; then regular links 
with the chiefs of staff of WEU countries are 
considered to be essential for preparing the 
European armaments agency and the security 
and defence academy. 
The last proposal is for greater co-operation 
between the countries of continental Europe and 
their forces. 
The PRESIDENT. - I am sorry, Mr. Giagu 
Demartini, you really must conclude your 
speech as you have had more than your allo-
cated time. 
Therefore, with great respect, I feel that it is 
now time for Mr. Caro, whom I now call. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - While 
congratulating Mr. Goerens, I would like to 
dwell a moment on a part of the report dealing 
with co-operation between our Assembly and 
the European Parliament, an area where I feel 
there is room for improvement. We know that in 
the Council of Ministers the need for better 
relations between the Assembly of Western 
European Union and the European Parliament 
is well understood. Mr. Genscher himself said so 
at the meeting between the Presidential Council 
and the Chairmanship-in-Office at the last 
meeting in Berlin. So the political will is there. 
The question is how to do it. 
I think that the best way is for our Assembly 
to be on an equal footing with the European Par-
liament, at least as far as the committees are 
concerned. The rest is a question of letting 
things develop. The European Parliament has a 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, 
while our Assembly has a Political Committee, a 
Defence Committee and a Technological and 
Aerospace Committee, just to mention the three 
committees of a political nature. The dialogue 
needs to run between the committees, and I feel 
we should avoid having different levels of 
contact. The proposal has already been made 
that meetings between our committees and the 
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committees of the European Parliament should 
take place at the level of the European 
Parliament's sub-committee responsible for 
security problems alone. 
I for my part cannot accept this arrangement, 
but it does not matter much. What is important 
is to organise this dialogue without delay and to 
meet as often as possible for genuine working 
meetings, not just to have observers attend 
debates and report back to their respective com-
mittees. This co-operation should result in the 
definition of joint positions. 
So you can imagine my surprise to see a 
working paper of the European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security end 
w~th the following conclusions: 
"Parliamentary control over the activities of 
the WEU Council must be carrie~ out by par-
liament, the only democratically-elected body. 
This means that to all intents and purposes 
the European Parliament must replac~ the 
WEU parliamentary Assembly, which consists 
of members who, according to the statutes, 
must be members of the national parliaments 
and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. In view of this the 
European Parliament should enjoy the same 
rights of initiative and control that it has vis-
a-vis the Council and the Commission - ques-
tions, recommendations, etc. ". 
This text finishes by calling for members of 
the Council of Ministers of WEU to be heard by 
the European Parliament. These are proposals 
for the future and part, in any event, of the 
process of evolution of the political union, but 
they are diametrically opposed to the positions 
we defend here in WEU. 
Our intention is not to engage in conflict with 
members of the European Parliament, whom we 
greatly respect. They hold a key position in the 
monitoring of the treaties, and we attach consid-
erable importance to the European Par-
liament. 
But we do, of course, ask for reciprocity. 
However, what appears to be more obvious is 
that statements of this nature imply hard-
working - I might say intensive - co-operation 
and research to prevent distortions in the fore-
casts of the medium-term future of the political 
union from generating disagreements and splits 
in the European public opinion that we rep-
resent, just as much as the members of the 
European Parliament do. May I also add one 
comment - and this is less for the ears of 
members of the Western European Union 
Assembly than for those of our friends in the 
European Parliament - which appears funda-
mental to me: whatever the outcome, which I 
personally hope will be very favourable for the 
European Union and the organisation of 
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common defence - I mean the common defence 
of Europe - it is clear that for some period of 
time, no doubt as yet uncertain, the sectors of 
defence and armaments, not forgetting the 
nuclear dimension, will remain a matter of 
unshared national sovereignty. During that 
period, we shall have to go on living with the 
intergovernmental system, i.e. WEU. The prin-
ciple I want our colleagues of the European Par-
liament to uphold with us is this: we must 
discuss and work together, and I hope that this 
can happen at the level of joint responsibility. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Caro. 
The debate is now closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. GOERENS (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Let me first say how pleased I am that all or at 
least most of the speakers agree with the critical 
analysis in the report I have had the honour to 
introduce. 
I begin with yesterday's first speaker, Mr. 
Antretter, who welcomed the critical approach 
chosen by the Political Committee in tackling 
the problems created by the Maastricht agree-
ments. The next speaker voiced the same 
view. 
I will now reply briefly to the more specific 
remarks and questions. 
This morning, Mr. Roman raised a point on 
an aspect about which a question had been 
asked in the Political Committee, namely the 
difference between joint defence policy and 
joint defence itself. I took the opportunity in the 
report to point out certain passages from state-
ments by various members of the WEU Council 
to the press and otherwise, and other thoughts 
expressed before the discussions and decisions 
adopted at Maastricht by one or other of the 
parties to the treaty, and my final conclusion 
was that we have to approach all the problems 
posed by the Maastricht agreements with an 
optimistic attitude. We must start from the idea 
that Maastricht is a bet on the future. The 
reason I am so optimistic is that internation-
alism has made clear progress in the last few 
years with the growing authority of the United 
Nations and the European Communities, and 
the co-operation developing throughout Europe 
and beyond. There is no reason to imagine that 
this extremely positive attitude will not 
persist. 
Mr. MUller also welcomes the critical 
approach. He contrasts the treaties negotiated 
by Talleyrand and Metternich in the last century 
with the Maastricht Treaty. Those of the last 
century were very precise whereas the Maas-
tricht Treaty contains a fair number of ques-
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tionable and vague points. I shall not repeat 
them. The draft order and the draft recommen-
dation attempt to dot the 'i's and cross the 't's 
and to invite all those involved in the process of 
the European Union to face up to their responsi-
bilities. 
Mr. MUller also says that parliaments are 
monitoring events. I do not entirely agree with 
him. As I recalled yesterday, our Assembly has a 
dual mission. The first is one of control, which is 
spelt out in Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and confers on our Assembly of national 
representatives the right to inspect and monitor 
the work of the Council. Each year the Council 
submits an annual report which we split up into 
different parts corresponding to the work and 
mission of the permanent committees of our 
Assembly and each time we deliver a critical and 
responsible opinion on the work of the 
Council. 
The second of our Assembly's tasks is to 
provide political initiative. The list of its suc-
cesses is considerable. I shall mention only one: 
the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and 
Portugal. The Assembly had been calling unani-
mously for this enlargement since 1984 - the 
year of reactivation. Ultimately, we reached 
agreement with the Council that these two coun-
tries should join and thus fill part of the gap in 
the western defence system. 
The same will be true of the report that I have 
had the honour of presenting on behalf of the 
Political Committee. If the Assembly adopts the 
draft recommendation submitted for your 
approval, the Council will definitely follow up 
the suggestions put forward in the report. In the 
larger WEU family, the aim of the work of the 
Institute for Security Studies - whose director I 
welcome here - is similar to that of the work of 
our Assembly. We can add together our efforts 
to promote this idea of European defence, per-
forming the role laid down in the Maastricht 
agreements and their annexed declarations and 
which, according to the reply given by the 
Council, are politically linked to the treaty itself. 
Mr. Tummers pleads for closer co-operation 
between the parliaments and he calls our 
attention to the democratic deficit. We may 
indeed feel some frustration at the practice 
which has become established, but I wonder 
about the alternatives to the way of negotiating 
international treaties. I greatly fear that if we 
had not left the right of initiating negotiations to 
our various governments we would not yet be 
where we are. There is a noticeable reaction in 
most of our national parliaments where the 
majorities seek to play a more active part in the 
discussions preceding negotiations for interna-
tional treaties. 
Mr. Parisi, who analysed the situation arising 
from the end of the bipolar era, also urged us to 
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rethink the democratic role of our countries. He 
shares the Assembly's view that WEU should be 
recognised as a basic point of reference in the 
design and improvement of the western defence 
system. He rightly points out that certain diffi-
culties, mentioned in our report, have to be 
overcome, namely the status of Ireland, 
Denmark and Greece, which still differs from 
that of the Nine making up the hard core of 
what is to be one day the joint defence of the 
European Union. Naturally, he regrets the 
absence of any definition of strategy and 
common ground. It is a measure of the size of 
the task awaiting us. To the question that he 
raised about the setting up of a Franco-German 
corps I can reply positively by referring him to 
paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation, the 
terms of which will give him all the necessary 
reassurance. The Political Committee was unan-
imous about this way of approaching matters. 
As you see it recommends that the Council " set 
all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly 
in the institutional framework of WEU ". 
Not that any of this needed saying. Those who 
took the initiative for the Franco-German 
division, referring to the setting up of a joint 
army corps, presented the idea first of all to Mr. 
Lubbers, President of the European Council. I 
think if we confine ourselves to the purely 
formal aspects of this initiative, it can be seen to 
fall within the plan for the future sketched out 
up to now by our Assembly and Political Com-
mittee. 
I should also like to thank all the observers 
who took their chance to speak. The parlia-
mentary Assembly does not meet twice a year 
just to inaugurate or organise exercises in 
oratory. All speakers must be entitled to express 
their point of view; Mr. Liapis did so and laid 
claim to a right that I also claim myself. I agree 
with him on the point that he raised concerning 
the recognition of Macedonia by the European 
Community. I agree with him that, in the end, it 
was the whole of the European Community that 
rallied to the proposal that he outlined, but at 
the time my report was being written this point 
was not quite so clear. He finds unacceptable the 
criticism made in paragraph 42 of the explan-
atory memorandum and accuses me of gaps in 
my knowledge of history, reminding me that 
only a few years ago, Greece had been sur-
rounded by communist countries. I thank you 
for your superfluous reminder of a point that, 
obviously, I was well aware of. 
Mr. Liapis finally claims that our Assembly 
applies two standards and two measures to his 
country. If you have read carefully- and I would 
recommend you to do so - paragraph 42 of the 
report, you will see that we too are very critical 
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of the Council and call upon it to concede 
nothing and undertake nothing that might cast 
doubt on the meaning of Article V of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. In this connection, the 
report quotes an Agence France-Presse despatch 
from Athens dated 4th March 1992, where ref-
erence is made to a visit by Mr. van Eekelen, 
former Netherlands Minister of Defence, who 
apparently underlined at a meeting organised by 
a Greek economic review that Western 
European Union was going to adapt certain key 
rules such as that of military assistance to 
member countries in the light of its links with 
NATO and the new international situation. 
In presenting my report yesterday I said that 
ordinary mortals could no longer sort out all 
these organisations dealing with security -
NATO, the CSCE, the NACC, Western 
European Union, the Franco-German corps now 
being set up - not at least in the definition of 
principles; ordinary people and even the average 
parliamentarian are no longer clear. I challenge 
you to take a poll in your parliament and ask 
your parliamentary colleagues about the specific 
nature of each of the organisations I have just 
mentioned. If WEU has a mission that is com-
plementary to the Atlantic Alliance, it is pre-
cisely because of Article V. This Article V used 
to be full of common sense. May I recall, Mr. 
President, that it was an additional legal guar-
antee to show that France, which had a par-
ticular status within NATO, was firmly 
anchored in the western defence system. What 
was true of the past is true today. If there is one 
point on which one can argue for WEU's origi-
nality and its complementarity with NATO, it is 
precisely Article V, which, if not everyone, then 
certainly the majority feel should not be diluted 
in any way. For the WEU Assembly this is sacro-
sanct since otherwise Western European Union 
will lose all credibility. 
I hope that the enlargement of WEU to 
include Greece can take place within the time-
scale set in the Maastricht Treaty, namely before 
the end of the year, and that Greece can join 
WEU, accepting the union as it now is. You 
know that there are problems in your region and 
that Greece, as part of that region, cannot 
remain indifferent to them. One has only to read 
what has appeared in the press. We must not 
forget Turkey either which has vigorously 
expressed its desire to join the European Com-
munity and WEU. It is not for the WEU 
Assembly, as the parliamentary Assembly of 
WEU, to postpone Turkey's possible accession 
to this Assembly indefinitely. We are all aware 
of Turkey's important role within the NATO 
system and that, so far, that country has always 
been a faithful member; one cannot erase the 
past and leave these evident truths unsaid. I feel 
the Turkish observer who spoke showed a spirit 
of compromise by welcoming the association 
status proposed for Turkey. He is right to ask for 
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a precise definition of that status. I hope that, 
these few remarks hav:ing been made, we can in 
the future perhaps tackle this problem with 
greater calm. 
Mr. Machete spoke about the two-chamber 
system also referred to in our reports. If I 
mention this system it is in particular to fill the 
democratic deficit, an attitude or way of seeing 
things shared by most of our colleagues. 
Mr. Toskay stresses the developing nature of 
the European Community to include WEU in 
which case, naturally, Western European Union 
has a major role to play. Needless to say, this is 
not a final stage, not the close of negotiations 
but the start of a movement that will take con-
crete shape in the coming weeks, months and 
years. 
Mr. Roseta welcomed the final version of my 
report, finding the first too critical. I should like 
to tell him that perhaps more stress was put on 
the need for our national parliaments to realise 
how many queries there were when it came to 
analysing the Maastricht Treaty. He does not 
agree with the two-chamber system. He suggests 
we should not complicate matters further 
because we already have a European Parliament 
and a second chamber exists in embryo. I 
entirely share this view of things, but I would 
point out that an embryo is intended to develop, 
or otherwise be stillborn. I should not like to see 
our Assembly condemned to that fate. Its 
powers and responsibilities must be developed. 
Need we recall that we are the only international 
European assembly empowered by treaty to 
discuss defence and security matters. I fully 
share the views expressed by Jean-Marie Caro, 
namely, that to escape from this sterile quarrel, 
this institutional imperialism, we have to have a 
division of responsibilities and a dialogue 
between the two assemblies, as called for by the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Mr. Pahtas agrees on many points and his 
tone was more conciliatory, if I may say so. He 
referred to relations between Greece and 
Turkey, and the Cypriot problem that we were 
unable to deal with. Obviously, the whole of the 
international community is concerned but pri-
marily Turkey and Greece. 
Mr. Tarschys said some significant things 
including the fact that his country was now 
interested in participating in all aspects of 
European co-operation. This is part of the reply 
to the question I put in my report when I said 
that enlargement to include many neutral coun-
tries could create problems. If all the neutral 
countries took a similar attitude to that of Mr. 
Tarschys, I think it would be a great help in pre-
venting any one country being isolated in the 
process of European construction. 
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Mr. Eisma finally shares our analysis by 
insisting on the need to clarify relations within 
the Atlantic Alliance. This would be in the 
framework of the transatlantic dialogue on the 
role played by the United States in Europe and 
on the way that country perceives regional con-
flicts in Europe, and whether it feels its security 
to be directly or indirectly threatened by these 
conflicts. He is quite right to raise these 
problems and I hope there is no suggestion in 
the analysis that I have been able to make in this 
report, that I agree with those who forecast or 
assert that a conflict between WEU and NATO, 
and consequently between Europe and the 
United States, is already programmed. I hope 
that the pessimists are wrong and that events 
will show that this way of seeing and 
approaching problems is wrong. 
Mr. Wielowieyski - I am sorry I cannot pro-
nounce his name - representing Poland wel-
comes Mr. Caro's report, agrees with the general 
view and backs the rapprochement which is 
sought by our Assembly between the three 
Visegrad countries and WEU. 
Mr. Giagu Demartini also stressed the volume 
of work in front of us. There was a great simi-
larity in the views expressed by the various 
speakers. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think 
that the Political Committee was very wisely 
inspired by the strength which finally led to una-
nimity. Mr. Stoffelen is always saying, I like this 
committee. I think that he is quite right. He is 
not the only one to like this Political Committee 
where he does such good work. From the clash 
of ideas, light emerges. May the same light also 
guide all the members of the Council forward in 
the process of forming the European Union. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Stoffelen, 
Chairman of the Political Committee. 
. Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - I will be 
brief. I wish to make three comments and give 
one compliment, and I shall start with the com-
pliment. It is the usual one, but it is still a 
pleasant duty to compliment Mr. Goerens on his 
excellent and, as always, thorough work. 
We had extremely animated discussions in the 
committee, where we had to face two facts at the 
same time. First, we have reason to be pleased 
with the Maastricht Treaty and the nine-power 
declaration. There will be European political 
union. The treaty permits member states to take 
a decisive step in that direction, to come to a 
foreign and security policy and, as Mr. Goerens 
said, we invite every national parliament to 
ratify the treaty as it is. It is not Europe a la 
carte; one must accept the treaty as it is. 
Secondly, we can put critical questions and 
ask the Council of Ministers to clarify, elaborate 
and implement. We can have worthwhile discus-
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sions with the European Parliament, and here I 
come to the remarks by my colleague, Mr. 
Tummers. Of course, there should not be a 
battle between our Assembly and the European 
Parliament. That discussion can be based on the 
facts of Maastricht. With European Union 
comes security and a defence identity. Whether 
one likes it or not, that is the reality. If we have 
discussions with the European Parliament it is, 
of course, relevant to inform, to have contact 
with and to work in co-ordination with all rel-
evant committees of this Assembly, including, of 
course, the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations. 
There is a desperate need, which I sensed in 
every contribution, for the Council of Ministers 
to elaborate on a joint foreign and security 
policy. In almost every debate there has been an 
'emphasis on the urgent need to develop the ways 
and means of pre:venting conflict, to develop 
crisis management and to bring about a peaceful 
settlement of disputes. 
There is an urgent need for further clarifi-
cation of relations with the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe and with 
NATO, and to find out how we can make 
Europe safer. We are not playing military 
strategy but thinking about the subject on which 
our friend, Mr. Antretter, spoke. We all have the 
same feelings - this is a subject for another 
debate - of fury and shame at the fact that 
apparently we - not just the Assembly but the 
Council of Ministers - have not been able to 
prevent the murder of people in Europe almost 
every minute. There is an urgent need for all of 
us to be prepared to prevent that murder and to 
make Europe safer. 
The Political Committee will go along with 
attempts to promote the development of a joint 
foreign and security policy. I ask colleagues to 
do the same as the members of the committee 
and to adopt the draft recommendation, if pos-
sible unanimously. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Pieter. 
The Political Committee has presented in 
Document 1308 a draft recommendation and a 
draft order to which no amendments have been 
tabled. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1308. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
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more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
We shall now vote on the draft order in Doc-
ument 1308. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The draft order is·adopted 2• 
My compliments to Mr. Goerens and Mr. 
Stoffelen. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of ,he next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following 
orders of the day: 
1. WEU: the operational organisation (Pre-
sentation of and debate on the report of the 
Defence Committee and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Document 1307, 
addendum and amendments). 
2. Application of United Nations Resolution 
757 (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Defence Committee and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Document 
1319 and amendment). 
3. Arms export policy (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Technological 
and Aerospace Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 1305). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orderS of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.) 
l. See page 24. 
2. See page 26. 
FOURTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 2nd June 1992 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. WEU: the operational organisation (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1307, addendum and 
amendments). 
Speakers: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman and Rapporteur), 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Lopez 
Henares, Mr. Caro, Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman and 
Rapporteur), Mr. Moya, Mr. Caro, Sir Dudley Smith, 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Dudley Smith, Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Moya, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Stoffelen; 
(explanation of vote): Mr. Steiner, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 
Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. 
Caro. 
4. Application of United Nations Resolution 757 (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the Defence Com-
mittee, Doe. 1319 and amendment). 
Speakers: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (Rapporteur), Sir Russell 
Johnston, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Caro, Mr. 
De Decker, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Muller, Mr. Haekkerup 
(Observer from Denmark), Mr. Roseta, Mr. Soysal 
(Observer from Turkey), Mr. Martino, Mr. Parisi, Mr. 
Scovacricchi, Mr. Eisma, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Savio, Mr. De 
Hoop Scheffer (Rapporteur), Sir Dudley Smith 
(Chairman), Sir Russell Johnston, Sir Dudley Smith. 
5. Arms export policy (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 1305). 
Speakers: Mr. Aarts (Rapporteur), Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe, 
Mr. Pocas Santos, Mr. Aarts (Rapporteur), Mr. Lopez 
Henares (Chairman). 
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accord-
ance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. WEU: the operational organisation 
(Presentation of and deiHlte on the report of the Defence 
Committee and 11ote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1307, addendum and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Defence Committee 
I. See page 29. 
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on WEU: the operational organisation and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Document 1307, 
addendum and amendments. 
I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and 
Rapporteur, to present his report. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). -
There is a great temptation for anyone profes-
sionally involved in politics to use an oppor-
tunity to address the Assembly to talk about 
WEU in its new, invigorated form, to tear up the 
official script and the remarks that one should 
make and instead to really push the new views. 
That is especially so for me because there are 
various reasons why I may or may not remain a 
member of the Assembly for much longer, 
although I was most grateful to the Defence 
Committee for re-electing me for a fourth and 
final term this morning. I note that one of my 
British colleagues is smiling cynically because he 
has seen it all before. 
On such occasions as this, of course, we start 
off invigoratingly, but then we get deeper and 
deeper into the mire and dig tank traps for our-
selves. There is no more unedifying a spectacle 
than an elderly politician trying to extricate 
himself from those tank traps towards the end of 
his speech. Therefore, today I will not be 
throwing caution to the wind or trying to be any-
thing other than possibly marginally dull. I shall 
cite the facts as I see them about the paper 
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that the Defence Committee has prepared, and 
which it proudly feels is apposite to the present 
moment. It certainly calls for detailed attention 
by those who are present this afternoon. At the 
end of the day I shall be safeish in my remarks, 
but I hope that I shall spark off a few ideas in the 
minds of those who are present. 
Mr. President, I am glad to be here under your 
presidency. We all wish you the very best of 
good fortune in the year ahead. All the r~m­
mendations in the report are very straight-
forward and are a reflection on the present 
position. The report also contains a series of par-
liamentary suggestions, designed to create a 
more efficient and cost-effective organisation 
for all of us. Ultimately, whatever our political 
divisions, we are here because we believe in 
Western European Union and believe that it 
should be worthwhile and effective. 
As a result of the Maastricht agreement, our 
governments feel that they have subscribed to a 
new phase in European defence arrangements, 
which is very much the case. I have been for-
tunate to be a member of the organisation for 
thirteen or fourteen years. When I joined it, it 
was extremely moribund and no one took much 
notice of it - indeed, very few people had heard 
of it. I can speak only for my own country as I 
only ever listen to the news in English, but it is 
extraordinary how often WEU is mentioned 
today. It is beginning to be noticed not merely 
by politicians, but by outside opinion-formers 
and others. Therefore, it is right that there 
should be a new phase in European defence 
arrangements, and it is important for us to con-
sider them. 
Our Defence Committee has taken full 
advantage of the current climate to ensure that 
all the former neutral countries had the oppor-
tunity to express their views. I am sure that you, 
Mr. President, would wish to join me in 
expressing our pleasure at welcoming here 
observers from Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
some of whom I had the good fortune to talk to 
this morning. It is also a pleasure to see many 
Central and Eastern European nations present at 
this session of the Assembly. Several of us have 
had the chance to talk to their representatives, 
whose attendance we appreciate. 
The operational organisation of WEU is vir-
tually agreed by all our governments. We must 
be pragmatic in our arrangements and tailor 
them so that they are cost-effective, which is 
what is happening now. The next item on our 
agenda is an emergency debate on the position 
in Yugoslavia and it is worth recalling ~hat any 
operational arrangements should be devised pn-
marily to preserve European security and to 
bring about lasting peace on the territory ~f the 
former and very much troubled Yugoslavta. 
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I am presenting this report on WEU, the oper-
ational organisation on behalf of the Defence 
Committee, and it is appropriate to underline a 
number of issues that we debated in committee. 
We admired the move of the Dutch Defence 
Minister, Mr. Ter Beek, to establish defence as a 
shared European responsibility. The Dutch 
white paper on defence published last year 
emphasised that element when it asserted " that 
the Netherlands will always act solely in con-
junction with other countries, that is, in some 
form of international alliance. The participation 
of the Netherlands will therefore always be of a 
complementary kind: an addition to the military 
units of other countries ". We welcome that, but 
we must be realistic as few other countries are 
likely to follow that lead, certainly in the imme-
diate future. We must make practical arrange-
ments as soon as possible to be able to face crises 
as they develop. That is what we are t!Ying to. do 
in WEU. We have already heard this question 
several times during the Assembly: why did we -
all the countries, particularly the nine nations of 
WEU- not heed the warnings on Yugoslavia 
and act before the bloody warfare broke out ? 
Our committee was struck by a general all-
party consensus on defence principles in many 
of our countries during the past six months, 
which is a refreshing and interesting devel-
opment. However, it is obvious that, on some 
specific items, it is still possible for us to remain 
poles apart in our approach to defence matters. 
It is important and only fair to describe the dif-
ferent nuances, which is what our report tries to 
do. It also tries to be fair. 
Consultation with other parliamentary organ-
isations is absolutely essential, particularly with 
national parliaments. That is also the case with 
the European Parliament and the new CSCE 
Assembly. 
Since the early 1970s the Defence Committee 
has had regular meetings with the North 
Atlantic Assembly's Defence and Security Com-
mittee. I am pleased to report that the rela-
tionship is flourishing and in good fettle. It gives 
substance to both the Rome and Maastricht dec-
larations. At Mr. Sinesio's request, before you, 
Mr. President, assumed office, I represented Mr. 
Sinesio, the Acting President, at a recent 
meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly. 
I did my duty and attended nearly all the ses-
sions to which I was entitled to go. Virtually 
every speech that was made by the members of 
that assembly and by many of the observers 
referred to WEU and its future role, which was 
extraordinarily significant. I am glad there is at 
least one NAA observer here today, a politician 
from Denmark. 
Whether we like it or not - we do not boast 
about it, but it has occurred through a series of 
circumstances - we occupy the centre stage of 
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European defence at present. We should ensure 
that we capitalise on that, not for our own 
aggrandisement but for the better health and 
success of the correct defence for Europe and all 
the people whom we, as politicians, represent. 
We are pleased to see so many other represen-
tatives from various countries here today as that 
bodes well for the future. Likewise, we are happy 
to welcome a number of observers from NATO 
headquarters and command, who are always so 
welcoming and helpful when we visit them on 
our fact-finding missions. Anyone who has been 
there will subscribe to that view. That gives sub-
stance to the link that has been forged between 
WEU and NATO. 
I am particularly keen to bring colleagues as 
up to date as possible on recent developments 
affecting the setting up of WEU's operational 
organisation. · 
It is available now through the main report 
that the Defence Committee has drawn up and 
the addenda that have been circulated today. A 
series of important meetings and announce-
ments will have a far-reaching effect on the oper-
ational arrangements now being implemented. 
For example, on 14th May the new British Sec-
retary of State for Defence, Mr. Malcolm 
Rifkind, speaking at the Centre for Defence 
Studies in London, gave particular and positive 
British support for WEU's operational vocation 
by announcing a scheme whereby national units 
. might be earmarked for WEU. 
At their meeting under German chairmanship 
in Bonn on 20th May, WEU chiefs of defence 
staff reached broad consensus both on their own 
role and on the terms of reference and staffing 
for the WEU planning cell to be established in 
Belgium this autumn. Sometimes what we say 
precedes what actually happens and what is 
announced. Only this morning my attention was 
drawn to an article in the most recent issue of 
Defense News - that well-known trade publi-
. cation in the United States - under a Paris 
byline, which reads: "Top European military 
officials met discreetly in Germany last week to 
discuss defence co-operation initiatives that 
could overshadow the establishment of a 
Franco-German army corps, according to 
European officials... The establishment of a 
joint planning staff, and closer military 
co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport, 
training and strategic surveillance were dis-
cussed by the chiefs of the defence staffs of the 
nine members of Western European Union 
(WEU) when they met in Bonn, Germany, on 
20th May." 
Although it was said by a French defence 
spokesman that it was not an opportunity to 
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discuss the conclusions that had been reached 
the publication says that: ' 
" One recommendation calls for WEU to 
establish a joint planning staff, comprising 
about forty officers from all nine countries, 
headed by a three-star general. 
Based in Brussels, Belgium, the staff should 
begin working in October and be fully opera-
tional next spring, according to a WEU 
official. It will be answerable to the WEU 
Council, the organisation's ruling body, and 
'will be responsible for developing plans for 
operations in which WEU forces might be 
involved', according to a WEU report released 
on 21st May." 
That is the report that we are discussing and 
voting on this afternoon. Magnanimously, the 
article continued: 
" Drafted by Sir Dudley Smith, President of 
the WEU Assembly's Defence Committee, the 
report adds that the staff should establish the 
relevant requirements in command, control, 
communications and intelligence, and that 
an appropriate protected communications 
system is necessary to link the planning cell to 
other WEU units. " 
In other words, it is wrong to say that we have 
revealed information being discussed privately 
at that planning meeting. We accept the implied 
congratulations. However, we maintain that we 
have not leaked secret information or published 
anything that we are ashamed of or on which we 
could be challenged as to it being a secret doc-
ument. Many of the items have appeared in 
various newspapers and are an intelligent 
putting together and amplification. But it shows 
that Defense News in America and people else-
where are beginning to pay attention to what we 
are trying to achieve. I throw in, perhaps for the 
interest of Defense News, the fact that I under-
stand that an Italian officer, General Marcello 
Cantabiano, is likely to be appointed director, 
with a French general as his deputy, of the 
organisation that I have mentioned. I am giving 
away no secrets although that information is not 
widely known. 
The chiefs have discussed the creation of a 
military advisers group for the Council. That is 
to be commended. 
Adding to the points that we make in the 
addendum, on 21st May we saw the first formal 
meeting between the permanent representatives 
of WEU and NATO, thus giving substance to 
the declarations made in Rome and Maastricht 
and beginning the process of transparency and 
complementarity called for by the report's draft 
recommendations. We have already heard 
during this Assembly about the Franco-German 
summit held in La Rochelle on 21st and 22nd 
May. 
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That resulted in a major declaration from 
President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, in 
which they formally announced the creation of a 
European corps and invited other members of 
WEU to participate. The two leaders stressed 
the European corps' rOle at the service of both 
WEU and NATO. From what the Defence Com-
mittee has learnt about the likely status and 
composition of the corps, your Rapporteur 
believes that we should congratulate both 
French and German Ministries of Defence on 
the practical steps being taken to implement the 
over-arching political decision. France, in par-
ticular, has not received due credit for the signif-
icant progress made in moving towards a pos-
sible reinsertion into NATO operational 
arrangements. 
On 25th and 26th May other significant 
meetings were held: Eurogroup ministers in 
Brussels seeking a link with WEU, NATO 
defence ministers in Brussels to consider putting 
NATO at the disposal of the CSCE, and EC 
foreign ministers in Lisbon to consider measures 
designed to help end the conflict in the states of 
the former Yugoslavia: 
The Eurogroup members of the Defence 
Planning Committee were particularly enthusi-
astic about bringing Eurogroup under the aegis 
of WEU and found a particularly felicitous 
formula to ensure that " Eurogroup members 
who are not members of WEU (have) the possi-
bility to participate fully in its activities, and to 
retain the same rights and responsibilities as 
they currently enjoy for any functions trans-
ferred to WEU from other European security 
organisations ". 
The Defence Planning Committee agreed on 
the principle of making NATO's resources and 
organisation available for peace-keeping on 
behalf of the CSCE. However, this idea would 
require agreement by all sixteen allies and the 
test will come this Thursday when the complete 
NATO Council meets in Oslo to examine such 
considerations as well as to redefine NATO's 
command structures. 
The European Community's meeting in 
Lisbon on 26th May decided to seek specific 
United Nations sanctions against Serbia over 
the continuing fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Obviously such sanctions are to be economic 
and political to begin with, but the use of mil-
itary force has not been ruled out. 
Speaking on the BBC Newsnight programme 
on 22nd May, the WEU Secretary-General, Mr. 
van Eekelen, called for the necessary military 
planning to enforce such an embargo in general 
and in particular to keep open Sarajevo airport 
to allow humanitarian relief to reach its desti-
nation. I concur with such sentiments - I believe 
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that most WEU members do, too - and believe 
that, with a comparatively minimal engagement 
of sea and air forces, it should be possible to 
bring the various belligerents to their senses and 
at the same time demonstrate Europe's resolve 
for action. It will be for the Assembly to decide 
the course of action it believes WEU should now 
be pursuing - even before the permanent opera-
tional organisation is in place. Are we pragmatic 
enough to tackle the problem? 
In conclusion, on a personal note, it would be 
remiss of me as the Rapporteur not to 
acknowledge the considerable help and specific 
briefing furnished by the German, British and 
French Ministries of Defence for the prepa-
ration of our document. Bonn, which has held 
the Chairmanship of the WEU Council recently, 
has been more than punctilious in its courteous 
treatment of WEU's parliamentary Assembly in 
general and our Defence Committee in par-
ticular. It deserves particular congratulations 
from us all for carefully guiding ideas on WEU's 
operational organisation from conception to the 
present near-realisation. I hope that the official 
representatives from Germany who are present 
today will take note of that. It is all too easy to 
make such comments, but we truly feel that and 
should like those comments conveyed back to 
the sources who have been of great help to us. 
It would ·be churlish of me as the Rapporteur 
of the Defence Committee, of which I am lucky 
to be Chairman, not to acknowledge the 
enormous help and research on the preparation 
of the document as well as the incisive approach 
to the problem of Mr. Colin Cameron, the clerk 
of the committee. One should not always 
pay tribute to officials who work for the 
organisation, but where they merit it, it is wrong 
not to do so. Mr. Cameron is peripatetic and 
indefatigable. He works hard and with great 
good sense. I thank him very much. 
We all seek a cohesive, credible, defence 
strategy for WEU. By and large, we are moving 
towards that. Therefore, I commend to the 
Assembly the Defence Committee's report and I 
hope that we will vote unanimously in favour of 
it to show the solidarity that we are anxious to 
express. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, the first 
speaker on the list. 
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation). - Mr. President, I have a 
few comments to make on the report by Sir 
Dudley Smith, Chairman of my committee. 
There has been a great deal of discussion in 
Europe on European security in recent years. 
Certainly since Maastricht we have constantly 
been faced with it. There is still a good deal of 
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confusion about the form that European security 
and European co-operation should now take. 
The confusion about NATO's view of its new 
task forms part of this, and the various 
European countries have their own ideas on the 
matter. But what we do not manage to do is to 
express the importance of European security. In 
my opinion we are still focusing too heavily on 
security in Western and Southern Europe. When 
we speak of Europe, we have assumed for the 
last forty years that it consists of Western and 
Southern Europe. But since the cold war came to 
an end and the wall fell, we have had to think in 
terms of a different Europe, a Europe in which a 
greater role must be allotted to its own security. 
By this I do not mean that the links with the 
United States should be completely severed. But 
if Europe wants to be independent, the links 
with the United States will certainly have to be 
loosened to some extent. France will have to 
emerge from its present isolated position, and a 
united Germany will have to spend less time 
" limping on two legs ". 
In the economic and monetary union that 
Europe will eventually become it seems impos-
sible that a security or defence policy will also be 
established. In my opinion Western European 
Union will have to play a more distinct role in 
this context, in defining what we mean by 
European security and defence. I would also 
remind you of the speech that the Netherlands 
Defence Minister made on 31st May, in which 
he at least outlined the future of Dutch defence. 
In his report Sir Dudley Smith says that the 
Minister did so primarily for economic reasons, 
which is only partly true, because there was also 
undoubtedly some vision behind it. The Min-
ister adopts a very clear position against a form 
of defence that is exclusively in the national 
interest in a future Europe. 
As regards the economic aspect, I do not think 
it is certain that, even if our own and other 
European armed forces are reduced in size, there 
will be any money left over for what will then be 
called defence. I believe a great deal will have to 
be spent on verification. A great deal of money 
will have to be invested in the Prevention 
Centre in Vienna. Money will also have to be 
spent, to my mind, on the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Vienna. If these things are 
counted as part of joint European security, the 
money will have been well spent, and we may 
save on the total defence budget in the long 
term. 
Finally, I have an appeal to make to my fellow 
parliamentarians. The magic word Maastricht 
has again played an important role in the 
debates we have had here in the last few days. 
By and large we are acting as if everything has 
already been settled. But all the governments did 
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at Maastricht was conclude a treaty. The details 
have yet to be worked out in each ofthe national 
parliaments, because not one country has yet 
ratified it, and I would point out that an 
important referendum on it is being held in 
Denmark today. We hope, of course, that the 
result will be in Europe's favour. While the 
details are being worked out, we parliamen-
tarians must keep a close eye on the govern-
ments in international bodies and also in our 
national parliaments. Then we should put 
forward proposals about what they are dis-
cussing among themselves otherwise and in 
general. 
Europe is growing, but it is also becoming 
more complex for parliamentarians. The 
European Parliament still does not have enough 
democratic power to control the governments. It 
is for us to continue keeping a check on govern-
ments and other bodies, such as the military, 
which is a very important factor within the 
general framework. It is necessary for all this to 
exist, but it is above all necessary for there to be 
continuing parliamentary control. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stein er. 
Mr. STEINER (Germany) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, this report on 
Western European Union as the operational 
organisation for security and defence policy 
measures must be seen in the context of the 
reports which Mr. Caro and Mr. Goerens have 
presented and which we have already approved. 
We have already considered Sir Dudley 
Smith's report in some considerable depth at 
two meetings of the Defence Committee, where, 
I will tell you frankly, we also voiced a number 
of criticisms. Despite in-depth discussions, and 
constructive proposals as well, we did not unfor-
tunately succeed in presenting a draft recom-
mendation on which there was unanimous 
agreement. I very much regret this, especially as· 
I feel it is important at this particular stage to 
send the Council clear signals on this subject, on 
which, above all, a consensus can be achieved. 
The Maastricht decisions enable the Council 
to take initiatives on aspects of a common 
foreign and security policy. We should now have 
been presenting our political arguments to the 
Council of Western European Union as it elabo-
rates the Maastricht decisions. 
If we are to be taken seriously at the present 
time, with security policy changing radically, we 
must proceed with particular care and also take 
particular account of the sensitivities of the new 
Central and Eastern European countries. We 
must not approach these tasks arrogantly, but 
must ensure that our involvement is well 
organised, finely-tuned and non-violent. Only 
then can security be guaranteed in and for the 
whole of Europe. 
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I believe the overriding task for all European 
political organisations in the years to come will 
be to contribute substantially to ensuring that 
the reformist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the republics of the former Soviet 
Union become part of a pan-European structure. 
Helping these countries to develop democratic 
structures with as little friction as possible, but 
as quickly as possible too, will make a more 
effective contribution to peace than intervention 
forces, however perfectly organised and 
equipped. Even in democracies, of course, there 
will always be conflicts of interest, but demo-
cratic societies allow conflicts of interest to be 
resolved by non-violent means. Although demo-
cratic forms of government are no guarantee 
of peace, they represent the essential conditions 
for the achievement of security through 
co-operation and organisation. 
I feel that if our joint work here in the 
Assembly is based on this consensus, the aim 
must be to maintain or, if we think fit, to 
develop or expand provisions against risks 
during this difficult transitional phase. But we 
must proceed gradually. As members of this 
Assembly, we must begin with a political risk 
description. We must specify the risks to which 
we might be exposed now or in the near future. 
The second step would then be to describe the 
instruments we parliamentarians consider 
appropriate to enable Western European Union 
to perform the tasks assigned to it at times of 
crisis or even conflict. 
I do not believe the report before us and 
the recommendations it contains adequately 
provide for the system that I consider necessary. 
I do not mean these criticisms personally: It 
must be possible for friends to criticise each 
other from time to time. 
Following on from what I have said, it would 
have been easier if we had designated the pos-
sible military mandates, whether of a humani-
tarian nature or as a last resort in the event of 
conflict, from the viewpoint of a future 
European Union. Preparations, that is the 
planning of the fulfilment of mandates, should 
then be left to those who have been specifically 
trained for it. Our task is to define clear political 
precepts. But decisions on the deployment of 
military forces must continue to be subject to 
the agreement of the appropriate political 
bodies, with respect for national constitutional 
limits and for the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Lopez Henares. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, first I would like to offer my 
sincere congratulations to Sir Dudley Smith for 
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the magnificent report he has presented to this 
Assembly; it is brief, but full of detail. We have 
become accustomed not only to the high quality 
of Sir Dudley Smith's reports but also to his bril-
liant presentation of them. I would like to con-
gratulate him most heartily because it is, in 
addition, a most timely report, Mr. President, 
since we are meeting in this Assembly for the 
first time since the approval of the Maastricht 
Treaty on 7th February. This treaty provides 
for the institutional transformation of our 
organisation, considering it to be the appro-
priate organ for the defence policy of the 
European Union. We have clearly been enthusi-
astic about this, happily, in the Assembly, and 
the various reports which are to be presented 
here, including of course Sir Dudley's, are influ-
enced by their evident timeliness. 
All organisations, Mr. President, must be effi-
cient if they are to remain in existence, and this 
is even more true of defence organisations; a 
defence organisation which was not efficient 
would be a contradiction in terms. I must say 
that I am in complete agreement with my hon-
ourable predecessor, and in view of the division 
of opinion, may I say that I fully agree with the 
entire report and the draft recommendation. I 
would simply take this opportunity to make a 
brief comment, Mr. President, as we have with 
us the Secretary-General of the organisation and 
distinguished members of the Council, and ask 
that these recommendations be put into effect 
with some urgency. 
Some of these recommendations are purely 
political, others are military in nature, such as 
the " military planning cell " and the meeting of 
the chiefs of defence staff leading to the possible 
constitution of a military committee. Mr. Pres-
ident, we believe that if our organisation is to be 
efficient and well' organised, it is absolutely 
essential that it should have the necessary 
effective tools as soon as possible. Although this 
may seem obvious, I do feel it needs to be said, 
not because we wish the organisation to have an 
aggressive character, which indeed it does not 
have, but because it is an organisation for peace, 
and above· all an instrument of dissuasion. Ref-
erence was made to this this morning, and the 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs also 
referred to it as an element of dissuasion saying 
that the organisation would be more effective 
with such instruments. 
Let us not forget - and I am about to finish, 
Mr. President - that our. organisatjon has two 
main objectives, which at times we are liable to 
forget. First, it is a defence alliance, but also -
and this is contained in the revised Brussels 
Treaty - it is an instrument for the construction 
of European unity. Well, although these days 
there seem to be varying opinions regarding the 
degree of political or economic unity, 
nevetheless, in my view, Mr. President, the 
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greatest victory for Europe is achieving peace 
throughout the whole of a continent which has 
been distinguished by the very opposite. That is 
the great victory, and let us make no mistake 
about it; the instruments for consolidating this 
peace and making the WEU organisation more 
efficient will need to be increasingly powerful, 
progressive and effective. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -I call Mr. 
Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - May I 
begin by congratulating my colleague and friend, 
Sir Dudley Smith, for the excellent report he has 
given us on behalf of the Defence Committee 
and for his extremely important contribution to 
the Assembly's debates this session. This report 
covers all the issues of concern to us. 
I hope the draft recommendation will be 
adopted by the largest possible majority. Out of 
a number of extremely important paragraphs 
there is one on which I wish to comment 
because I consider it to be particularly 
important at the present time. It deals with the 
planning and preparations for the construction 
of political union and of the organisation of 
European defence, in accordance with the deci-
sions taken at Maastricht last February. I refer 
to paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation. 
This paragraph encourages the United Kingdom 
and France to co-operate in nuclear affairs, and 
makes proposals for doing so which I consider to 
be extremely clear. 
In reality the first part of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht lays down a programme and procedure for 
organising the Union and for establishing 
European security and the institutions needed in 
support. These institutions will be launched as 
of 1996 by the next intergovernmental con-
ference for which we are all now preparing and 
which, under the terms of the treaty, should 
result in the organisation of a common defence. 
Apart from currency, which is dealt with in the 
other very large new part of the Maastricht 
Treaty - a single currency which I hope one day 
to see - there is the other side, the defence com-
ponent. Currency and defence are the two vital 
features of national sovereignty. 
As regards currency, three phases are planned, 
and in the third our powers would be pooled in, 
I hope, an irreversible manner. 
As regards defence, the other essential feature 
of sovereignty, how can the member states of the 
Twelve, beginning with the Nine of WEU, 
organise the sharing of power? Should their 
model be that used for economic and monetary 
union and the common currency? Probably not. 
There is no institutional model for the political 
organisation of Europe. We have to make up 
this model bit by bit, incorporating our history, 
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traditions and customs. I would even add our 
inertia. For these things exist. 
But under this national sovereignty heading, 
when it comes to defence, apart from the fact 
that this is an area in which no country is at 
present willing to delegate in any way an 
authority outside its own complete control - if 
only on account of defence objectives linked to 
foreign policy - there is also the nuclear 
element. 
The Maastricht Treaty says nothing about 
nuclear weapons, and this could possibly be a 
mistake but we believe that the authors and 
those taking part in the next intergovernmental 
conference will prove that this is not so. I know 
that everyone is fully aware of this. 
But it is essentially up to two member states of 
Western European Union, Great Britain and 
France - each having nuclear weapons, one allo-
cating them to NATO and the other using them 
with NATO, the choice in either case simply 
being a problem of national will - to make WEU 
the necessary framework to take on this respon-
sibility in a spirit of European co-operation for 
the common defence and in accordance with the 
principles laid down in The Hague platform 
which constitute for the moment our book of 
rules. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur and Chairman of the 
Defence Committee. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). -We 
have had a short but useful debate. I am grateful 
for the general support expressed by Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman. I know that she has some 
reservations, which she expressed frequently in 
committee. However, it is always helpful to have 
intelligent dissension. I note what she said about 
the Dutch defence vision. We interpreted that in 
the way that we did, but I note her remarks 
about the real intention behind it. 
Mr. Steiner said that the matter had been 
extensively debated in committee, and how right 
he was. He was fairly critical in committee, and 
was so again today. Being a democratic 
organisation, there is room for those who do not 
agree to say so. I am full square· with Mr. Steiner 
about political decisions over intervention. If I 
understood the interpretation correctly, he was 
saying that before any sort of intervention the 
organisations and governments concerned must 
be in harmony about it. If there is dissension, 
the enterprise will not succeed. 
I am grateful to Mr. Lopez Henares for his 
congratulations on the report. As he said, it is 
timely. One of the advantages of this Assembly 
is that from time to time - perhaps more by luck 
than by judgment - we produce a report that is 
germane to the present position, and fortunately 
that is so this afternoon. 
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Sir Dudley Smith (continued) 
I thank Mr. Caro for his remarks. An 
amendment has been tabled to paragraph (vii) of 
the recommendations and we shall deal with 
that in a few moments. I agree with many of Mr. 
Caro's comments, which could form the basis of 
a future report. The matter needs to be 
develo~ed and brought out by WEU. I hope that 
that will happen under the aegis of one of 
WED's committees, even if it is not the Defence 
Committee. 
I hope that we can now proceed to the amend-
ments and then vote on the report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Four 
amendments have been tabled to this report. 
They will be considered in the following order: 
Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Moya, Amend-
ment 1 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, 
Amendment 2 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Moya. 
Mr. Moya has tabled Amendment 3, on behalf 
of the Socialist Group, which reads as follows: 
3. In the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation, leave out paragraph (vii). 
I call Mr. Moya to speak to Amendment 3. 
. Mr. ~OY A (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
Ident, If you have no objections, I could submit 
the two amendments together because they are 
quite clearly related; indeed, the content of the 
two amendments I have signed is very similar 
and I could submit them both at the same time 
so as not to prolong the debate unnecessarily. 
These two amendments are deletions· one 
of them calls for the deletion of paragraph (vii) 
of the preamble and the other is for the deletion 
of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation 
proper. Both of these amendments have the 
same intention and content. 
In these amendments, in both paragraphs of 
the draft recommendation, explicit reference is 
made to a subject which I feel - indeed which 
the Socialist Group feels - is not needed in the 
report because it could - in fact it did -
int~oduce an el~ment of conflict concerning 
which there might be some difference of 
opinion, even between the parties involved 
themselves. Moreover, it adds nothing of impor-
tance to the report as a whole, so it could have 
been left out without affecting the substance of 
the report. What I am talking about is deleting 
the reference to the role of nuclear forces of indi-
vidual states within WEU, namely the refer-
ences to the nuclear strength of Britain and 
France. We believe that this is a very specific 
point ~hich could be debated separately; 
mdeed, It has been dealt with in other reports in 
great.er depth, where necessary - more compre-
hensively - and we believe that this specific ref-
erence to the nuclear policies and the nuclear 
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role of the nuclear forces of England and France 
is unnecessary in the report as a whole. This is 
why we are asking for it to be deleted. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Caro. 
. Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
Ident, as my last speech was on this subject I 
shall simply add some supplementary rema;ks 
and shall refrain from entering into a sub-
stantiye debate with our colleagues who are 
speakmg on behalf of the Socialist Group 
knowing that The Hague platform was approved 
by all WEU parliamentary representatives and 
by all WEU governments, whether left or 
right. 
Our colleague asserts that this paragraph 
should not be where it is in the draft recommen-
dation of the Defence Committee. In all 
mode~ty, I should like to state exactly the 
opposite. 
Remember, ladies and gentlemen, that in 
1996 we have to prepare the political stage. Our 
governments have all signed, and I believe that 
m os~ of our parliaments will ratify, the treaty. 
But If governments are to be able to begin this 
second fundamental phase in 1996, we have to 
prepare the way for it at the parliamentary and 
democratic level. Leaving this task solely to gov-
ern~ental experts would be incompatible with 
our Idea of democratic control which involves 
two requirements - to monitor the actions of the 
ex~cutive and to retain the initiative in prepa-
ration. 
We have practically two years before the pre-
paratory files for the 1996 conference are to be 
ready .and subm~tted at the level of the experts of 
our nme countnes, and therefore the Twelve. 
I beg you to bear in mind, ladies and gen-
t~e~en, that this is the very image of this 
sittm~'s debat~s that we are giving here, in June 
1992 m the middle of the Yugoslav crisis. In the 
immense task of building Europe we must make 
it plain to public opinion in Europe and beyond 
that what we are doing is preparatory work. For-
tunately_ ~e are ~?t operating·under the pressure 
of a poht~cal cnsis. Let us, I beg you, seize this 
opportumty to work in advance and decide that 
these few lines in the report of the Defence 
Committee are fully in harmony with the 
responsibilities of our Assembly. I fully share 
your opinion that the subject really needs 
another debate, but at least in this way we are 
starting on it within a general context. 
. I would therefore be most grateful, in the 
mterests of the whole Assembly and in the hope 
that we can reach unanimity, if you would 
kindly withdraw your amendment so that we do 
n?t have to vote against it, which is neither your 
aim nor ours. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
opinion of the committee? 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom).- I am 
sorry to advise the Assembly that the com-
mittee, which had good results on most of the 
amendments, both those originally tabled and 
those proposed during the debates on the 
subject, was split down the middle on this one. 
There was no consensus on an opinion to give to 
the Assembly. In those circumstances, it is 
impossible for me to give advice. 
In deference to my friend Mr. Moya, it is fair 
to say that, strictly speaking, the matter is not 
absolutely relevant to the report, which could 
well be accepted without it. But I share many of 
Mr. Caro's reservations, which is why I said 
earlier that the subject could probably be better 
dealt with in a stand-up debate on the subject of 
the French and British initiatives on nuclear 
defences. I hope that that can take place. In the 
circumstances, we must leave it to the Assembly 
to vote. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I will now 
put Amendment 3 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has tabled Amend-
ment 1 which reads as follows: 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) and 
insert: 
" deciding the parameters for closer military 
co-operation in the fields of logistics, 
transport and training and considering an 
eventual mandate for action. " 
I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move her 
amendment. 
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation). - Mr. President, as I said 
just now in my short statement, I feel that par-
liamentarians have a responsibility of their own 
and should always be very critical of their gov-
ernments. While he was arguing against 
Mr. Moya's amendment just now, Mr. Caro said 
that governments had approved The Hague 
platform. Right across the board, he said. But, 
Mr. President, in a parliamentary democracy 
that is not the whole story. Parliamentarians 
have their own views in a parliamentary 
democracy, and fortunately they are able to 
oppose their own governments. 
As regards my amendment, sub-paragraphs (a) 
to (d) of paragraph 1 in the draft recommen-
dation refer to a WEU military planning cell, a 
committee of WEU chiefs of defence staff and a 
WEU military committee. I would not rec-
ommend this to the Council of Ministers. I feel 
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the Council of Ministers must take this decision 
and that we must then monitor it. Whatever 
happens, I do not. want to recommend too many 
military committees, cells or whatever they are 
called. As a parliamentarian I would therefore 
like to see this paragraph changed as proposed in 
Amendment 1. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Sir Dudley Smith. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - I 
agree with some of Mrs. Baarv~ld-Schlaman~s 
objections, but I do not agree with her on this 
matter. I am sorry to disappoint her, but I rec-
ommend that we should reject the amendment, 
which goes to the heart of some of our recom-
mendations. 
I took some time trying to explain, perhaps 
inadequately, what happened in relation to the 
planning side in 1 (a). That is now a reality. The 
Council is keeping up with us and vice versa. 
The amendment gets rid of (a), (b) and (c) at the 
same time. In the past, as a committee we have 
always unanimously supported the proposals 
contained in those sections. We believe that they 
constitute a progressive and sensible way 
forward. It would have a greatly negative effect 
were we to dismiss those proposals and sub-
stitute Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's amendment. 
There is nothing sinister about this. There is 
no great ideological principle at stake here, as 
there may have been on the previous vote. In 
those circumstances, I strongly recommend to 
the Assembly that we reject the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I will now 
put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 1 is negatived. 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has tabled Amend-
ment 2 which reads as follows: 
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after " production " add " and 
reduction ". 
I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move her 
amendment. 
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation). - Mr. President, I. ~o not 
think this amendment needs much explammg. If 
we all sit down to discuss matters and 
co-ordinate them, I feel it is logical for the words 
" and reduction " to be inserted after " pro-
duction". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
What is the opinion of the committee? 
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Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - The 
theme behind the amendment is adequately 
covered in the report by Mr. de Puig that we will 
discuss later. Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman knows 
that I am nothing if not conciliatory. If she 
would like this amendment, we have no real 
objection to it. By and large, the committee 
would go along with it and we would accept the 
word " reduction ", too. In those circumstances I 
willingly accept the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I will now 
put Amendment 2 to the· vote. 
(A vote was then take~ by show of hands) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf 
of the Socialist Group reads as follows: 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 7. 
I call Mr. Moya to move· the amendment. 
. Mr. MOY A (Spain) (Translation). - The same 
arguments apply. I would repeat that the 
amendment to delete paragraph 7 is intended to 
promote specific debate on ,a subj~ct which is 
controversial and which needs to be discussed in 
greater depth, without prejudging the outcome 
of this debate. I therefore think that, if this 
Assembly is to make a statement about doctrine 
and thinking on nuclear matters, there have 
been reports on this in the past and there are at 
this very moment reports dealing with the 
subject in depth. If we are to make specific ref-
erence to the role of the nuclear strength of indi-
vidual countries such as Great Britain and 
France within WEU, this needs to be dealt with 
in detail and therefore should not be buried 
within this report. I therefore repeat my request 
for deletion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
In a way Mr. Moya has just demolished his own 
argument. In the original report we are being 
asked to agree the continuation of The Hague 
platform. I remind Mr. Moya that the last two 
countries to join WEU were Spain and Portugal 
and that one of the conditions of joining was 
that they accept The Hague platform. It was 
accepted by the socialist Government of Spain 
and ratified by the Spanish Parliament, yet now 
Mr. Moya attempts to go back on a precondition 
of entering WEU. 
I understand Mr. Moya's point about wanting 
a full debate on the matter, but the way to 
proceed is to table a motion for a recommen-
dation, and for the subject to be referred to a 
committee for a full debate, rather than in 
this hole-in-the-corner way which would omit a 
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point of established policy of this Assembly. I 
urge the Assembly to reject this amendment, as 
it rejected the earlier one. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -What is the 
opinion of the committee? 
Sir Dudley SMITH (Uoited Kingdom). - The 
committee was divided on this issue. I subscribe 
to the argument that there is a need for a much 
wider, more substantial debate on the subject. 
That is the be~t way to deal with the matter. 
There is no harm done by mentioning this on 
the report. My personal feelings are that it is 
good that this has been mentioned. It would be 
wrong of me, as the Chairman, not to say that 
the committee was strongly divided and that the 
vote was almost a dead heat. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I will now 
put Amendment 4 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 4 is negatived . 
We shall now vote on the amended draft 
recommendation. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives present in the chamber 
request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands).- What has 
just happened is contrary to the good experience 
of the past years of a willingness to form a con-
sensus. Many essential amendments have been 
rejected, and not because they run contrary to 
The Hague platform. It includes a minimum 
nuclear deterrent for NATO, not the nuclear 
arms of two countries. We know that we are 
divided on this. I would have respected the 
opinion of adults. I would have expected adults 
to respect our opinion. For that reason I want to 
see where personal responsibility lies and I have 
to ask for a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Is your 
request supported by four other representa-
tives? ... 
I see that that is the case. 
The vote will therefore be taken by roll-call. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of 
Mr. Meyer zu Bentrup. 
I call Mr. Steiner. 
Mr. STEINER (Germany) (Translation). -
Mr. President, is it possible under our Rules of 
Procedure to make a personal statement before 
the vote is taken? 
\ 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We are 
already in the process of voting. I would ask you 
to make your personal statement after the 
vote. 
(The President continued in French) 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows 1: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Noes ................................ 23 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted 2• 
I call Mr. Steiner for an explanation of 
vote. 
Mr. STEINER (Germany) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would 
have liked to speak before the vote was taken, 
especially as I am sorry to say that I cannot 
approve this report, which came from my com-
mittee, the Defence Committee. This morning it 
still looked as if we had found a minimum of 
consensus. We considered the report once again 
this morning and took a vote in which a signif-
icant majority agreed that paragraph 7 of the 
draft recommendation should be deleted. I 
believe that was the minimum consensus that 
might have helped to ensure a larger majority in 
favour of the report today. I very much regret 
the failure of the Rapporteur, who is also the 
Chairman of the committee, to provide this 
information in this form before the vote was 
taken. I am very concerned about this. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Perhaps I might explain my vote. Mr. Stoffelen 
said that he would have liked more consensus. I 
remind him that, of the two amendments put 
down by individuals, one was carried; both of 
the two tabled by political groups were rejected. 
If Mr. Stoffelen wants amendments to be carried 
with a consensus, he will not achieve that if a 
political group puts down an amendment that at 
once makes everyone else think: " What do the 
socialists want to do? " Had the amendment 
been put down in Mr. Moya's name alone, it 
might - I do not say that it would - have carried 
1. See page 30. 
2. See page 31. 
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more sympathy. It certainly might have got 
more votes. To do otherwise continually makes 
the rest of us automatically think that, if an 
amendment is in the name of a political group, 
we had better oppose it. I would never want to 
see our federated group table an amendment in 
our name. In my judgment, that is not the 
business of this Assembly. That is why I voted as 
I did. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - This 
Assembly is trying to act more and more like a 
parliament. It is the same with parliamentary 
groups. It would be childish and completely 
unrealistic to think that in any parliament - I do 
not speak about the House of Commons - a pro-
posal would be accepted if it were tabled by an 
individual, a secret person who did not belong 
to any party, but it would be rejected if it were 
tabled by only half a group. Is that the way to 
treat each other in a parliament? In a parliament 
parliamentary groups should respect one ~~~ther. 
I know perfectly well that Sir Geoffrey belongs 
to a party, to a group - there is no problem with 
that. There is no need to love each other, but at 
least we should respect each other. What hap-
pened in this case was that one essential element 
was not tolerable to almost a majority. I have 
seen the Assembly growing and the members 
trying to meet each other's views, as happened 
in the Defence Committee. It would have been 
possible for the whole proposal to be adopted by 
almost everyone. 
I very much deplore the fact that I had no 
option other than to call for an organised vote, 
as in any normal parliament. We are not inan-
imate individuals; we belong to a party. Sir 
Geoffrey is proud to belong to his party, I guess. 
I am proud to belong to the Socjalist Party - not 
just to the party in my country but to the whole 
group. 
We should try to learn that, if we want to have 
an assembly, we should act as parliamentarians, 
not just individuals. For all those reasons, I had 
to vote against the draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Hoop Scheffer. 
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands).-
One reason why I voted in favour of this report 
is that the Chairman and Rapporteur of the 
Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith, acted 
justifiably in separating the two responsibilities. 
I would not have taken the floor had not my col-
league, Mr. Steiner, made his explanation. Sir 
Dudley has leaned over backwards and given a 
fair impression and evaluation of what hap-
pened this morning in the Defence Committee, 
at which I was present. That was one reason for 
my vote in favour. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. 
Blunck. 
Mrs. BLUNCK (Germany) (Translation). -
I voted against because as a parliamentarian 
I have looked at the content of this motion. As a 
parliamentarian I claim that as my foremost 
right. I am shocked that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg is 
not concerned with what a motion says, but with 
who has tabled it. As a parliamentarian I reject 
that. I examine every motion for its content. 
That is why I voted against. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mrs. 
Blunck, let us try to calm things down a little. I 
would appreciate it if explanations of vote were 
not used as an opportunity for criticising other 
members. 
I call Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - My vote 
is quite clear in that I saw nothing revolutionary 
in this paragraph in relation to the attitude of 
th~ Assembly up till now. If there is anything 
new, it is the fact that it appears in this recom-
mendation. 
The second thing is that the Chairman and 
Rapporteur repeatedly said on behalf of his 
committee that we would have a debate. If I am 
not mistaken, he even said that a separate report 
should be written on this subject before long. 
That is something that everybody would like. 
May I recall that during our discussions at The 
Hague, Secretary-General, you were, at the time, 
in government. The whole of the Assembly was 
very pleased with The Hague platform. I do not 
see why this paragraph poses any problem of 
substance. As Mr. Stoffelen said, the only 
problem is the fact that some of our colleagues 
do not wish to see this wording included in the 
document. 
I therefore ask you to minimise the discord 
caused by all these explanations of vote. Basi-
cally, I am well aware that in the debate for 
which we are preparing we shall in the end 
arrive at the consensus that is absolutely nec-
essary when the time comes to implement Maas-
tricht and when we have to succeed. Please let us 
not inject any venom into this debate. I am sorry 
about this, Mr. Stoffelen, because you are 
Chairman of the Socialist Group. I had made 
this request in all modesty of the Socialist 
Group, asking it to withdraw its amendment in 
exchange for the Chairman's promise that a 
debate would be held. I am sorry it did not 
attract your attention more than it did. 
I have regrets of my own, but no bitterness, 
and I am sure I can rely on you for your con-
tinued co-operation. 
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4. Application of United Nations Resolution 757 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defenee 
Committee and 11ote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1319 and amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Defence Committee 
on the application of United Nations Resolution 
757 and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Document 1319 and amendment. 
I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur of 
the committee. 
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands).-
Where do we stand and what should be done 
urgently to end the terrible suffering to which so 
niany thousands of men, women and children 
are exposed in what we used to call Yugoslavia? 
What is the high price, to quote Bundes-
aussenminister Kinkel's speech this morning, 
that Serbia and the militias dependent upon it 
must pay to stop the massacre? How can we 
prevent Kosovo and possibly Macedonia giving 
this already bloody war its much feared interna-
tional dimension? 
Albeit with the benefit of hindsight, I think 
that there is not much reason to be proud of 
ourselves - and I mean as Europeans - in the 
way that we view the present state of affairs in a 
conflict that is so close to our doorsteps and 
which could have the most serious international 
repercussions, apart from the tragic human 
dimension. 
It cannot be denied that the Assembly showed 
a little more foresight and readiness last 
December about the way further bloodshed and 
suffering might - and I stress that word - have 
been prevented, by at least discussing a possible 
WEU naval and air operation against the indis-
criminate bombing and shelling of cities such as 
the now disappeared Vukovar and the city of 
Dubrovnik. L'histoire se repete is the sad con-
clusion for Dubrovnik, where the shelling is not 
only a war crime but cultural barbarism. 
The regrettable lack of foresight and prepa-
ration in trying to solve what is in the first place 
a European problem cannot, of course, be the 
framework for our further action in WEU. That 
is why the Defence Committee this morning 
unanimously supported and adopted the draft 
recommendations tabled yesterday by Mr. Caro 
and many others from the different political 
groups. It is on behalf of the Defence Committee 
that I have the honour briefly to introduce the 
recommendations this afternoon. 
I return to the question " What should be 
done? " First, in the opinion of the Defence 
Committee it is of the utmost importance that 
the Permanent Council, at its meeting scheduled 
for later this week, instructs the ad hoc planning 
group to reconvene at the shortest possible 
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Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued) 
notice to work out arrangements for a possible 
WEU naval and aerial participation in securing 
the all-out embargo against Serbia and Monte-
negro on the basis of Resolution 757, if a 
Security Council resolution asks for such action. 
With due respect to Bundesaussenminister 
Kinkel, in preparing those sorts of measures we 
cannot wait until 15th June, when the Secretary-
General of the United Nations presents a report 
to the Security Council on the implementation 
of Resolution 757. From experience gained 
during the Gulf crisis and war, we have learned 
that early political decision-making and 
planning are vital for any successful operations 
of this sort. We now have the legitimacy, based 
on Resolution 757, to show that WEU can also 
play a role in making United Nations measures 
effective in the European theatre. Such a reso-
lution creates political obligations. Let us not 
shirk our responsibilities; let us not invite the 
United States Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, to 
tell us again that we do not do what we should 
do- a comment, by the way, that the United 
States could address to itself. 
It is up to us as politicians and to the 
Assembly to tell our electorate and to convince 
our public opinion that Security Council resolu-
tions such as 757 are not adopted for free. Let us 
call on our ministers and governments to act not 
only in the way that I indicated earlier, but to 
prevent the further spreading of this violent war 
virus into Kosovo and other areas where people 
wish only to be left alone and to live in peace. 
Let our ministers also give Mr. Milosevic that 
message. 
The Defence Committee this morning 
adopted one important amendment to Doc-
ument 131 7, the draft recommendation. Col-
leagues will have read it as it has been dis-
tributed. It rightly calls for further measures if 
Resolution 757 should not have the desired 
effect. In my opinion, that implies that 
European ministers, be it in their WEU or their 
EC capacity, should not only closely follow the 
implementation of Resolution 757, but should 
show readiness to participate in measures 
enforcing the embargo by naval and aerial mil-
itary means if the Security Council so decides. 
In other words, political action to make such 
follow-on resolutions possible should not be 
excluded, but stimulated. 
Mr. Feldmann has tabled a second 
amendment on war criminals and the way that 
they should be brought to trial, which has also 
been distributed. I gladly accept that 
amendment, but I hasten to add that it has not 
been debated in the Defence Committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
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I propose that the Assembly allow the first 
speaker of each political group to speak for ten 
minutes. 
I call Sir Russell Johnston. 
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom).-
We are late in the day. There are so many dead, 
so many grieving mothers, fathers and lovers. 
The most obscene characteristic of the conflict 
has been the way in which the Serbian armies 
have stood back from defenceless cities and 
pounded them to pieces, killing indiscriminately 
and using aircraft for like purposes. For some, it 
has almost been worse to remain alive. 
I remember just before Christmas, after our 
last plenary session, going to Cisak which is 
about sixty kilometres south of Zagreb and on 
the border - perhaps I should say front, as one 
could hear the crackle of gunfire. I visited a hos-
pital there, and its distinctive feature was to 
house large numbers of young men with no 
hands, arms, legs or feet. A leg looks funny 
without a foot at the end. The hospital housed 
not only young men. I was taken to a bed in 
which lay a man of my own age who was a 
farmer. He told me that he was crossing his yard 
when what he was later told was a rocket, struck. 
He awoke in hospital and was told that there 
was no trace of his wife, three sons and two 
grandchildren. The doctor drew back the bed-
clothes and I saw that the farmer's body stopped 
just below his trunk. " What will I do? " he 
asked. I had no answer, not even the beginnings 
of one. 
I also had no answers for the group of refugees 
from Sarajevo - by every account the most tol-
erant and open city in what was Yugoslavia -
when they came to the House of Commons in 
the United Kingdom earlier last month. What 
could I say to the emancipated, rather beautiful 
Muslim lady who was married to a Serb and 
who happened to be a television presenter? She 
said: " I do not know where my husband is. I 
know our house is flat to the ground. I do not 
know whether my parents are alive. " She then 
added: "Ours was a very friendly city." 
Here in the Assembly of WEU we talk of force 
dispersals, weapon types and command struc-
tures, and debate resolutions that are decent, 
carefully contrived, suitably amended and con-
sensual. The reason why the West, the European 
Community and, within its ambit, WEU, did 
not act, was not through lack of resources or the 
absence of structures - though it suffers from 
such problems - but because of a fundamental 
lack of will. It did not have the will to identify 
the aggressor and take action against him. Such 
awfulness could have been prevented. 
It is true that, perhaps, we could not have pre-
vented the bandit warfare, but the mindless, 
mad destruction of peaceful cities could have 
been prevented. On 3rd December last, on the 
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Tuesday of our plenary session, a letter of mine 
was published in The Times in London. I wrote 
it not just for myself, but on behalf of many 
other people in other parties. The last part 
stated: " If I were in a decision-making position 
I would say to the Serbs ... ' we want a cease-fire 
by midday tomorrow and if it does not happen, 
aircraft will attack your positions round Osijek 
and take out any heavy tanks and artillery they 
see because only you have them '. If we did that 
the war would stop before any action was taken: 
if we do not Osijek too will be destroyed " - this 
was after Vukovar - "and there will be more 
pictures of horror and death". Now we are six 
months on, and the position has not changed 
much, has it? 
I shall give a second quotation- from a letter 
that I, received from the British Foreign Sec-
retary, Douglas Hurd, on 15th May, in response 
to a letter from me on 22nd April urging an 
aerial blockade in the terms used by Mr. De 
Hoop Scheffer. I am not picking on Douglas 
Hurd - what he wrote certainly reflected the 
position of the European Community and 
WEU. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Dumas, would not have disagreed, particularly 
in the light of the recent views of the French on 
sanctions. I do not believe that Mr. K.inkel 
would disagree, although at that time that post 
was filled by Mr. Genscher. That letter was a 
classic one, expressing the futility of indecision 
in which Europe has writhed. 
The letter began, " I share your concern ". 
When ministers say that, one begins to worry. It 
continued: " The central point is that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has been recognised as an 
independent state: it is therefore not acceptable 
that the Yugoslav army or Serb or Croatian 
irregulars should intervene, provoking civil war. 
In the end, however, the answer is in the hands 
of the peoples of Bosnia itself and of Bosnia's 
neighbours. The fighting cannot actually be 
stopped from outside and I do not think that an 
aerial blockade of Serbia would be right. There 
is no legal basis for such action and it could be 
construed as a simple act of war " - no comment 
on what was happening there. " What we have to 
do is to make it clear that only by peaceful nego-
tiation can a lasting peaceful settlement be 
reached so that Bosnia's intermingled national 
communities can live in peace. That is why we 
shall persist in our efforts; we cannot let Bosnia 
be dismembered but I do not expect the fighting 
to end until the factions lose their appetite for 
war. We are backing the efforts of the European 
Community and the Yugoslav peace conference 
under Lord Carrington to bring about a 
cease-fire and the beginnings of a peaceful 
solution. " The letter has a classic ending: " The 
consistent deterioration of the security situation 
makes progress in these talks increasingly 
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uncertain and casts doubt on the viability of any 
agreement reached in them. Yours ever, 
Douglas." 
Notice that he did not even mention the possi-
bility of sanctions. The letter epitomises the 
emptiness and lack of forethought of the 
European position, which shames us now and 
will shame us even more in the archival judg-
ments of tomorrow's historians. Mr. De Hoop 
Scheffer spoke about that this week. 
This recommendation, initiated by the Liberal 
Group, is good but the message that should ring 
forth from the Assembly to our governments 
should be even more decisive and determined. 
We should tell them that we support wholly the 
remarks of our Secretary-General, Mr. van 
Eekelen, who said that we should tell Mr. 
Milosevic that we are prepared to use aircraft 
and a naval blockade to stop his murderous 
actions and that we will, through the United 
Nations, find a way to do so - and quickly, 
because Sarajevo and Dubrovnik are, even as we 
debate this issue, being shelled once more. 
As I said to Mr. K.inkel this morning, we must 
also not confine our message to the endorsement 
of sanctions. We must look ahead to the con-
ference that will finally come about to settle the 
Yugoslav crisis in a more democratic and secure 
way than in 1919. That must mean the recog-
nition of Macedonia, as our Rapporteur said. I 
say to Greek observer colleagues that to block 
that simply on the name cannot be sustained. It 
must also mean enabling Kosovo - 90% Alba-
nian and only 8% Serb - to determine its own 
future, I suggest by a plebiscite such as France 
agreed to in the Saar in 1935. 
As I saw in Pristina a week ago last Sunday, 
the suppression of human rights there is inde-
fensible. Nor can we expect Dr. Ragova, the 
Albanian democratic leader, to hold his people 
on the path of peaceful protest unless he is given 
a firm assurance of support. After all, they will 
suffer most from sanctions. 
I have been harsh - justly so - but our 
admission of ineffectuality can spawn the begin-
ning of a new approach. The countries of 
Western European Union and the European 
Community as a whole, in addressing the 
Yugoslav tragedy, have been inexcusably hes-
itant and slow. However, I believe that a pro-
found change is· under way. The recommen-
dation moves that still further forward and I 
recommend it to the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when two 
years ago my friend, Mr. Martinez, and I went to 
Yugoslavia for the Council of Europe in con-
nection with Yugoslavia's possible entry to the 
" ' 
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Council, I would never have believed that so 
soon after I would be speaking to support a rec-
ommendation aimed at saving that unfortunate 
country which used to be Yugoslavia from final 
disaster. 
Why, I wonder, is the war in Yugoslavia con-
tinuing to escalate so dramatically in spite of the 
repeated efforts of the European Community 
which, as you will remember, sent observers 
hoping to separate the two sides during the 
fighting in Croatia? It is still going on while 
some 14 000 United Nations troops are having 
to withdraw to Belgrade without being able to 
stop the fighting or even to interpose themselves 
between the opposing sides. The truth is that 
Yugoslavia and the warring parties including 
not only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia but 
other countries as well, have so many arms and 
munitions that they can go on fighting not for a 
few days or months but for years. 
It is impossible for us to intervene in the war 
whether as Europeans or at international level 
because I do not believe that either the Amer-
icans or a United Nations force of 100 000 or 
500 000 men could secure peace by force or by 
keeping the belligerents apart. It is sufficient to · 
recall that during the second world war some-
thing like a million German and Italian troops 
were held in check by Yugoslav fighters; given 
the difficult and unusual geography of the 
country and the fighting spirit of the Yugoslavs 
there is no way of imposing peace by force. 
My next query is how is it possible for this 
fighting to continue so actively and on such a 
scale if no supplies are coming in. I believe that 
the United Nations were right to impose an 
embargo which at least tends to . prevent new 
armaments and munitions from getting into the 
country. For such an embargo to be effective 
there must be surveillance. We have the recent 
experience of other embargoes in the Gulf and 
in areas close to us. Europe and WEU must 
provide the means to ensure the effective appli-
cation of Resolution 757. 
I therefore believe that we should make it pos-
sible for the embargo imposed by the United 
Nations to become really effective by preventing 
supplies reaching the conflict which I believe 
will go on for a long time yet with more fighting 
and destruction in the country. 
The surveillance proposed by the Secretary-
General and likely to be discussed at the next 
meeting of the Council of Ministers would be a 
step in the right direction. But will it be suffi-
cient? We shall see; in the meantime it is a first 
move. The proposal is for naval surveillance 
which should prevent unknown or even known 
countries from continuing to keep the war going 
by supplying arms and munitions. Let nobody 
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tell me that this has not happened while the 
fighting has been going on. The fact is that after 
two years of fighting, national reserves of arms 
and munitions ought to have been exhausted but 
this has precisely not been the case. I would say 
instead that after a pause, just when it seemed 
the fighting was dying down, it has flared up 
more violently with greater determination and 
an increased capacity for destruction. 
Will surveillance of the Adriatic, as has now 
been suggested, be enough? Naval surveillance 
will certainly prevent vessels flying dubious flags 
from continuing to feed in arms and munitions 
for the war and the suggested surveillance from 
the air will, I think, help prevent deliveries by 
air if they become impossible by sea. 
Will surveillance of the Adriatic be enough? I 
am not convinced that it will. Who can say that 
the fighting will not be kept going from else-
where, for example across the Aegean or - why 
not - from the Black Sea via the Danube? 
Indeed, I can state quite categorically that we 
have worrying news of arms and munitions 
arriving from the Black Sea via the Danube 
where the riparian countries like Romania 
cannot check illegal cargoes because of a treaty 
which exempts Soviet or ex-Soviet vessels until 
1999 from customs checks in the countries 
through which they pass along the Danube. I 
would not want us to be applying controls while 
at the same time the embargo is broken and the 
war is allowed to continue by the use of other 
routes. 
All countries must maintain the closest soli-
darity; it must be possible to guarantee the effec-
tiveness of the embargo. More than any other 
country, Italy is seriously concerned at the 
gravity and ferocity of the fighting. We are 
already paying a high price as we share a border 
and the Adriatic coastline with the former Yugo-
slavia. We have already taken in thousands of 
refugees and will most probably take in many 
more. Italian soldiers have lost their lives during 
the previous European Community mission 
when they were the victims of a violent attack. 
We have also paid in economic terms; the 
Adriatic coast where many Europeans tradi-
tionally take their holidays will probably not see 
too many this summer. But this is of little 
account as compared with what is happening on 
the other shore of the Adriatic. 
We are prepared to accept our responsibilities 
provided there is real determination to put an 
end to the fighting. 
Mr. President, I believe I can support this rec-
ommendation for myself and also, I think, in the 
name of the Italian Delegation which, more than 
any other, wishes to put an end to these tragic 
events. 
I hope that the decisions to be approved will 
be taken up speedily and in earnest, with the 
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greatest determination and above all with the 
realisation by the whole of Europe that the 
fighting in Yugoslavia affects not just the 
Yugoslav countries and republics but every 
country in Europe and Europe's security as a 
whole. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
-·Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on 15th 
October 1991 the Political Committee and the 
Defence Committee of our Assembly had a joint 
meeting to discuss the problem of Yugoslavia. 
One of the issues considered was how to bring 
about a cease-fire and how to impose an arms 
embargo. I pointed out that, if both these mea-
sures were successful, the aggressor was likely to 
look around for other ways and means of 
aggression and destruction. I therefore pointed 
out that we must be aware that not only would 
buildings, monuments and towns be damaged in 
the fighting, but that the cultural heritage itself, 
in the widest sense, would be used as a weapon 
and a target in the new fighting. ' 
At that time the Chairman of the WEU 
Council responded positively to my recommen-
dation that WEU should join with the Council 
of Europe in appointing to the peace-keeping 
force that was then to be formed, specialists in 
the recording of accidental damage and wilful 
damage, the deliberate destruction of the cul-
tural heritage. Unfortunately, it was at this time 
that co-operation between the Committee of 
Ministers and Yugoslavia, governed by various 
treaties and conventions, broke down, and 
Yugoslavia was allowed to evade commitments 
it had entered into. 
The treaty on which WEU is based certainly 
gives us the right to talk about the fate ofthe cul-
tural heritage in this context. To do this does not 
in any way mean that the fate of human beings is 
being subordinated to that of the cultural her-
itage. The modified Brussels Treaty says that the 
High Contracting Parties want to strengthen the 
economic, social and cultural ties by which they 
are united so as to preserve personal freedom, 
political liberty and the dignity and worth of the 
human person. Article VIII of the treaty also 
falls within the scope of these aims. 
Mr. President, as I have said, the Red Cross 
comes before concern for monuments. But we 
must realise that during the cold war we were 
not conscious enough of what might burst out of 
these latent areas of conflict in our part of the 
world after the cold war. What is happening in 
this area of conflict is not- as Mr. Caro seems to 
feel it is - comparable with what took place in 
the history of Alsace. We must not misjudge 
ethnic characteristics. Misjudging ethnic charac-
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teristics is not commensurate with the respect 
for human values alluded to in our treaty. I say 
unequivocally that taking a hostile view of 
ethnic qualities is not in the spirit of the treaties 
on European unification and is a threat to our 
continent. We must not just point this out: we 
must rediscover ways and means of applying 
peaceful solutions. That is our dilemma. 
So far there have been expressions of regret 
about the damage that has been done to the cul-
tural heritage, but it has not been made suffi-
ciently clear that the destruction of the cultural 
heritage is an attempt to destroy an identity. 
That is the closest thing to the dignity and worth 
of the human person, as referred to in the treaty. 
The recommendation we are now discussing 
follows on from United Nations Resolution 757. 
If we feel so close a link with the United 
Nations, we cannot ignore the close relationship 
with UNESCO, and UNESCO's attitude. 
UNESCO is hesitant and indecisive. Although 
Yugoslavia is a member of this. United Nations 
organisation for education and culture, 
UNESCO is letting things slide, even though 
Dubrovnik and Split are on the list of places of 
major historical value, not part of the local or 
natiopal, but of the world heritage. 
Mr. President, referring to what I said at the 
beginning of my statement, I would remind you 
that the Chairman of Western European 
Union's Council has recommended and 
accepted CO-operation with the Council of 
Europe in this regard. I will therefore conclude 
by referring to Council of Europe Document 
6612 of 5th May 1992, which is Written 
Question 343, signed by the French parliamen-
tarian Jacques Baumel and myself. I hope that 
the early implementation of the recommen-
dation we are discussing today will be accom-
panied by what I have said in my statement. Let 
us then devise some better, more astute and 
more inventive activities to cope with this kind 
of problem, which· can be expected to arise in 
other latent areas of conflict. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I fully agree with the draft before us. I 
countersigned it, though I believe that the only 
way in which WEU can find a means of action is 
by reference to Article VIII of the treaty. I shall 
say no more-on this point; we have both dealt 
with it already. Apart from that, we cannot say 
there is any political will that is operational. We 
recently approved a report on WEU as an opera-
tional organisation. This is bound to depend on 
political will which - to be expressed - has to be 
based on the treaty. 
I was happy to see such a wide consensus 
on these benches agreeing with the Secretary-
General's remarks on this subject when the 
session began, but I am sorry that it is not in evi-
,, 
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dence today. Of course we had to work our way 
through a great many hesitations and much 
seeking and finding; regrettably, of course, we 
had to see this accumulation of human suffering 
to open the eyes of the political decision-makers 
in our countries whereas the public needed only 
a few moments to realise the dreadfulness of the 
calamity taking place a few hundred kilometres 
from their homes. I am in no way proud of it but 
I would like to remind you that on 6th August 
1991, I told the President of our Assembly of a 
proposal for an emergency meeting of the gov-
erning bodies of our Assembly, and also for a 
meeting at ministerial level on the basis of a 
memorandum which is on the files of our 
Assembly, though it has not been published. In 
it there is a suggestion - I quote from paragraph 
11: "WEU is in a position to form immediately 
a joint military intervention force to be inter-
posed between the belligerents." 
The idea was to form the force, display it and 
hope it would not have to be used. That is the 
very basis of the policy of military deterrence, 
the doctrine of non-war that we have applied 
everywhere for decades. The reply we received 
was that the WEU Council of Ministers had 
decided to continue to monitor the development 
of the situation in that country, hoping that the 
cease-fire announced would be sustained; this 
was August 1991. The President of the Assembly 
informed me that he hoped that in the end 
reason would prevail and that, bearing in mind 
the problems of the holiday season, he thought it 
would be difficult to bring the members of the 
Presidential Committee together and that we 
should have to wait until the ordinary meetings 
scheduled for September. 
Knowing as I do the difficulties I might run 
into and involve my colleagues in, in view of our 
slender resources, especially since I was 
informed in a letter from the Clerk of the 
Assembly that it would be difficult for the Pres-
ident, without being rash, to come away from 
these discussions with any conclusions much 
more specific than those already voiced by the 
Council, I gave way. Rash ... what a word! 
Despite the awfulness of events in Yugoslavia, if 
we, elected representatives of the people, 
demand action, if we counsel firmness, we are 
told: be careful. If we let you speak, we might 
hear proposals that could be rash. But who is to 
be the judge of rashness save those that come 
after us? What does it matter if I have to fight in 
order to convince. The fact remains that in 1991 
we might perhaps have been able to take another 
road. I know the difficulties in the procedures of 
our assemblies and those of our governments 
seeking to define a common will, bearing in 
mind a past that did not give them similar possi-
bilities. A new pattern of intervention, as it 
were, had to be invented. 
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In December 1991 I was unable to attend the 
part-session of the Assembly. I was in Yugo-
slavia on a humanitarian mission to various 
places including Dubrovnik, Bukovar and 
Osijek. I and other colleagues came under bom-
bardment by Serbian guns. We saw an ultra-
modern hospital full of sick people destroyed 
before our eyes. We witnessed the house-by-
house destruction of a village situated one 
hundred metres from the line of fire. Even the 
animals were killed in the farmyards. The sight 
reminded me of another I had seen when still a 
young man and which remains graven in my 
memory, that of Oradour-sur-Glane. It showed 
us how monstrous was the hatred and desire to 
kill in their most atrocious expression. 
I was there as a Frenchman, not a European 
delegate. At Dubrovnik, in company with my 
colleagues, I had a talk at one headquarters of 
the federal forces on the Dalmatian coast. As 
you probably know, the town was not bom-
barded from the land or the hills where batteries 
of artillery were posted but from the sea where a 
whole lot of low-grade, dirty and rusty patrol 
vessels, manned with non-uniformed gangs 
bombarded with rockets a Dubrovnik that had 
been declared a protected zone. When we talked 
- in a safe area naturally - with the federal army 
commanders they told us, privately of course, as 
I have reported to the press, that if there were a 
deterrent force, a show of military force some-
where in the Adriatic, Belgrade would give the 
cease-fire order the same day. They even gave us 
an example: imagine the Clemenceau barring 
the entrance to the Adriatic and a squadron of 
Mirages based on Bari opposite, watching for 
the smallest shot at Dubrovnik to carry out 
reprisals on one of those patrolling vessels. 
I did what I could with my colleagues at the 
French level but we were automatically impli-
cated in European business for which we needed 
the common European will. And today I hear all 
our friends, including the Secretary-General, 
referring to this European zone in which our 
Article VIII might justify an immediate reaction 
in the eyes of the world to protect civil societies, 
perhaps not, as was rightly said yesterday, to 
fire, should it be possible to set up a protected 
area as you yourself, Mr. President, said. But as 
you well know, a show of armed force ready for 
action is even more of a deterrent than 
destruction or wounding and possible death of a 
fighting man, because it reaches the minds of 
those who have political power. 
August 1991 to May 1992, what a difference -
in the new diplomatic problems, texts to be 
voted upon in the Security Council, conversa-
tions and changes of mind and in the rebirth of a 
European civic spirit. Were not some people 
saying: " I do not want to have young conscripts 
in my constituency stopping bullets to save 
Dubrovnik. " That was even being said publicly 
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in one or another of our assemblies. What a 
change of heart between what I hear said now 
and what we heard yesterday. 
But this time reality compels us to recognise 
that, independently of the right of ancient 
republics of the former Yugoslav Federation to 
exist, an operation aimed at domination is being 
mounted by a nation that we French once loved, 
but who under the power of the force introduced 
by the former communist regime led by 
Milosevic, has formed armies of invasion and 
conquest and whose first step was to refuse first 
autonomy and then independence to republics 
now recognised by the international community. 
It is because the Belgrade government did not 
want Slovenia to become independent that it 
began the bombardment. At the time, you may 
remember, it was by air raid. 
Today, ladies and gentlemen, let us simply 
acknowledge one thing: the step we are now 
taking, standing upright and having the courage 
to ask what we do ask may not be enough. But, 
as representatives of our people, elected by 
direct universal suffrage, and conscious of our 
responsibilities, we must put pressure on our 
governments. That is how a member of par-
liament is justified in carrying out the task 
entrusted to him. As long as we have this task, 
we must be able to carry it out, but this time we 
must not give an inch! 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
De Decker. 
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I thank the 
Assembly of WEU for having placed this emer-
gency debate on the agenda on the proposal of 
the Liberal Group. It provides an opportunity to 
discuss the text of a recommendation tabled by 
the main groups, much to my satisfaction. 
I shall not repeat at length what has already 
been said about the dreadful events now taking 
place in the former Yugoslavia. Sir Russell 
Johnston and Jean-Marie Caro have just given 
us accounts far more telling than anything I 
could say. 
I would simply draw your attention to the fact 
that a major step has been taken in the process 
of international law towards a possible set-
tlement of the Yugoslav crisis by the United 
Nations Security Council's decision to apply a 
total economic, trade and oil embargo on the 
former Yugoslavia and to suspend all air links 
with this territory. 
When the decision was taken we heard Mr. 
Milosevic declare that the United Nations mea-
sures were ridiculous. If the Serbian President 
believes that United Nations decisions are ridic-
ulous, it is our duty today to consider the use of 
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force to ensure the decisions of the Security 
Council and the European Community are 
applied. 
As our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, 
has said, it is unacceptable that states on our 
doorstep should try to control territories by 
force with the aim of redrawing frontiers unilat-
erally and expelling minorities. 
I believe that in such a situation Europe has a 
duty to intervene in order to make sure first and 
foremost that human rights are respected, that 
international law is obeyed, in this case the deci-
sions of the European Community and of the 
Security Council of the United Nations and that 
the cultural heritage of mankind embodied in 
the cities of Dubrovnik and Split is protected. 
Ladies and gentlemen, that is the message we 
must convey to the only authorities able to take 
the practical decision to bring military force into 
action: the members of the WEU Council of 
Ministers. 
The embargo must be backed up by air and 
sea support, in which connection we would 
stress the heavy responsibility falling upon all 
member countries and would-be member coun-
tries of WEU for the implementation of the 
sanctions. 
Here I turn especially to our Greek friends. 
They know how much I am basically in favour 
of Greece and later Denmark and Ireland 
becoming full members of WEU as suggested at 
Maastricht. But it is bound to depend upon how 
conscientiously the Greek Government in par-
ticular applies the sanctions or ensures they are 
applied in spite of the difficulties it faces in this 
matter - difficulties that we fully appreciate -
because of its geographical situation. 
If the embargo fails to induce the warring 
parties to observe a cease-fire and begin to settle 
their differences politically, then other, military, 
intervention will be necessary to enforce respect 
for international law, human rights and the pre-
servation of the human heritage. 
This could consist mainly of aerial and naval 
action designed to discourage resorting to force. 
It would, of course, imply complete control of 
Yugoslav airspace, the protection of Dubrovnik 
and of all historic sites forming part of the 
human heritage, and the creation of safe areas 
for populations threatened by aggression on 
either side, responsibility in this respect being 
sometimes shared. 
I shall conclude by saying that we have a duty 
to ensure that our governments and the Council 
of Ministers of WEU clearly understand what 
we want. So far they have been far too con-
cerned about the political and diplomatic diffi-
culties and the military risk involved. It is my 
belief that Europe cannot possibly retain its 
• t 
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credibility, nor WEU its own as the military arm 
of European political union, if we do not have 
the political will to secure respect for interna-
tional law and human rights. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Rodrigue.s. 
Mr. RODRIGUES (Portugal) (Translation). -
Mr. President, our colleague, Mr. De Decker, 
said yesterday that it was pointless for WEU to 
discuss security in Europe at this session unless 
the agenda included an item on a subject which 
affects every one of us; I am referring to the 
bloody drama which is being enacted in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
Events there are an affront to the logic and 
rationality of life; they could have come from 
the pages of a Greek tragedy, and yet the crimes 
of the Serbian Government and army are very 
real. The slaughter - for that is what it is - has 
been going on for months while we stand by and 
watch, helpless. We have been unable to stop it. 
Yesterday, in this Assembly, it was said that we 
must stop talking and act. But what action 
should we take? 
We have not yet found a satisfactory answer 
to this question. We have not yet reached 
agreement in Europe on what can be done, apart 
from what needs to be done; however, I believe 
it is a matter of some importance and urgency 
that we determine what should not be done - the 
borderline which must not be crossed. 
I do not think that Europe should respond to 
Serbian barbarism in a like manner. War is bar-
baric, whatever form it takes; and war is now 
being incautiously urged as a final solution. 
It is true, as our President Hartmut Soell said 
yesterday, that throughout this tragedy we have 
failed to react appropriately to the massacre of 
thousands of innocent people, to the exodus of 
entire· populations and to the systematic 
destruction of the economic bases of the new 
states which are growing up in the area which 
was once Yugoslavia. I support the proposal to 
create protection zones for the civilian popu-
lation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of 
Croatia. That would be a good start. If such 
zones were firmly maintained, free from vio-
lence and fratricidal madness, perhaps the nec-
essary conditions would be created for them to 
play a very important role, hastening the end of 
this tragedy; to this end, they would be assisted, 
of course, by strict observation of the embargo 
contained in United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 757. 
I also believe, however, that we should reject 
at once the idea of resorting to air and naval 
bombardment. This would simply aggravate the 
situation, increasing the extent of the tragedy 
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with the most terrible unforeseeable political 
and social repercussions. I think that we should 
all heed the wisdom expressed here today by the 
German Minister Klaus Kinkel, when lie said 
that the legacy and memory of the war were still 
very present in this region and it was necessary 
to avoid German troops intervening in the ter-
ritory which was once Yugoslavia under any cir-
cumstances. We must banish war from this 
planet, the home of all mankind. Civilised 
nations cannot resort to war to resolve conflicts, 
however noble the aim. 
Finally, I believe that if we aspire to resolving 
the problems of European security, we must 
leave in European hands those matters which 
are the sole responsibility of Europe. It would be 
a serious mistake to involve the United States or 
NATO forces themselves in the Yugoslav confla-
gration, even under the mandate of the CSCE. 
We shall not achieve our long-sought European 
security identity if, at such a harrowing moment 
in our history, we call in the United States, 
whether directly or indirectly, and they once 
again assume a responsibility in Europe which 
should be borne by Europeans. We must not, 
because of our own inadequacy, ask the United 
States to take on a role which United States con-
gressmen have repeatedly stated to be outside 
their competence. This will do nothing towards 
improving our relations with our American 
friends. 
We all bear guilt for the Yugoslav tragedy. We 
need only recall that most of the weapons which 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia are using 
to kill one another were manufactured in the 
Europe of the Twelve. 
We have been unable to avoid the tragedy. We 
have lost the battle to prevent the crime. But it 
would be unforgivable if we heaped new mis-
takes on old ones, committing one crime in the 
hope of preventing another one. The challenge 
of the Yugoslav tragedy affects each one of us 
and touches the whole of humankind. Never-
theless, I believe that WEU should reject the 
idea of military intervention of any kind and 
should stand firm in the correct application of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
757. 
(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Germany) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, when the 
Berlin Congress sat at the end of the last 
century, the then German Reich Chancellor Bis-
marck, who was occasionally used as an honest 
broker, said at one of the conferences that the 
turmoil in the Balkans was not worth the bones 
of a single Pomeranian musketeer. At that time 
he assumed that it was for the empires which 
then existed - the imperial and royal Austrian 
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monarchy, the Ottoman empire - to ensure 
order in the Balkans, whose ethnic minorities he 
regarded · as sheep-stealers, incapable of gov-
erning themselves. 
This nineteenth century view can no longer be 
applied to the present. Human rights in the 
Balkans, the right of the peoples there to self-
determination, must be honoured. 
For many months now we have been wit-
nessing a conflict in the territory of what was 
once Yugoslavia, a conflict that grows worse 
from day to day and shows that WEU's role of 
onlooker, and especially the West's policy of 
appeasement, are again contributing to the out-
break of wars, creating situations that are more 
critical than was originally thought possible. 
If we recall last December's part-session, when 
the Greek Prime Minister and the Czech 
Foreign Minister spoke here, both showing con-
siderable sympathy for Serbia, drawing certain 
parallels with a period during the second world 
war and blaming fascist Croatia, we now realise 
that all they were doing was advancing ideo-
logical arguments in support of certain interests 
which could not be squared with reality. 
We are now witnessing the biggest conflict 
since the second world war. We are witnessing 
the greatest expulsion of people since the second 
world war in Europe, and we are witnessing a 
so-called civil war, which has long been out of 
control and may lead to a more widespread war. 
The Hague Land Warfare Convention and the 
Geneva Conventions are not worth the paper 
they were written on. They are not being 
observed in this area. We are now seeing and 
will continue to see in the next few months 
neighbouring countries being implicated. 
Hungary and Romania, even Turkey and 
Albania could be affected. In the last few days, 
in fact, Turkey and Albania have signed a 
mutual assistance pact. 
In this situation Europe - WEU - again 
stands there like a paper tiger. I am sadly 
reminded of the policy of appeasement before 
the outbreak of the second world war. In 
Goebbels's memoirs you can read how worried 
Hitler was, when he ordered German troops into 
the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland, that 
France might mobilise and send a few troops to 
the border. He let Goebbels know that he would 
then have immediately withdrawn the order. If 
France had mobilised at that time, the dictator 
might have been put in his place. I believe what 
the generals of the Yugoslav federal army said, 
as Mr. Caro has pointed out: if military units 
had been deployed - whether from the air or 
from the sea - with a view to preventing the 
shelling of Dubrovnik simply by being there, we 
might not have been prepared to take this step. 
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History constantly repeats itself: the same mis-
takes are made time and again. Pacifists 
throughout the world, whose arguments are 
based on emotion rather than understanding in 
these matters, help to ensure that not hundreds 
and thousands but tens and hundreds of thou-
sands of people die. 
If we had taken a strong stand in Yugoslavia's 
case over a year ago, if we had made it clear that 
we are not prepared to accept whatever comes, 
then thousands, even tens of thousands, of 
human lives could probably have been saved. 
That needs to be made absolutely clear. 
You cannot tell people in Europe that you are 
prepared to become involved when oil in the 
Middle East is at stake, but not when it is merely 
a question of old people, children, babies, 
patients in hospitals. Then we look on, and keep 
quiet. Europe's young people, too, can no longer 
understand these double standards. 
In conclusion let me say this: it is not just a 
question, as Mr. Tummers said, of cultural 
assets, it is not just a question of people, it is not 
just a question of the Geneva Convention and 
The Hague Land Warfare Convention. The 
point is that if Europe wants to retain security 
and not abandon it - as William Pfaff wrote in 
an article in yesterday's Herald Tribune -
Europe must act. It must create zones, with-
drawal and protection zones for the civilian pop-
ulation. It must be prepared to ensure that the 
sanctions are observed at sea and in the air. 
If Europe is not prepared to make this com-
mitment, if certain countries, certain political 
groups - as Mr. Karsten Voigt has already said 
in Bonn - want to evade such action, they will 
once again assume an enormous burden of guilt. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Haekkerup, 
Observer from Denmark. 
Mr. HAEKKERUP (Observer from Denmark). 
- First, as I come from a country that is not a 
member state and am only an observer, I should 
like to thank you for giving me this opportunity 
to address the Assembly of WEU. As you may 
know, we in Denmark have been very occupied 
with what has been happening is Yugoslavia. 
There are almost one thousand young Danish 
boys in the United Nations forces in that 
country, helping in the efforts to re-establish 
peace. 
I should also like to call attention to a striking 
paradox. Parliamentary observers from not just 
Denmark, but Croatia, are invited to this 
Assembly. It seems paradoxical that, when we 
discuss Yugoslavia, the Croatian observers are 
not allowed to express their view. To all of us, 
especially those from countries which have sta-
tioned forces in Croatia, it seems essential that 
the Assembly should try to find a way of 
allowing Croatian observers to address it on this 
major subject. 
! j 
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Secondly, I shall comment on the political 
activities in the former Yugoslavia. Two years 
ago, I was speaking to the North Atlantic 
Assembly, and saying: "Yugoslavia is next on 
the list - it is the test case. Let us see how we and 
Europe handle it. " When I consider our actions 
over the past two years, they seem negative - an 
example of lack of political will on Europe's 
part. It is not a matter of qualified majority 
voting or a military arm, but about whether we 
in Europe and Western European Union have 
the political will to form a consensus and go 
forward. What we should have done, and should 
continue to do in future, is to reach a common 
conclusion, draw a line in the sand and say: " If 
you cross this line, Serbia, it will lead to the fol-
lowing consequences. " If we do not do that, the 
problems will continue. 
The problems of Yugoslavia do not involve 
western weapons or weapons export. The 
weapons used in Yugoslavia are Soviet ones, 
and are used against a population that has 
expressed its own free will during democratic 
elections. However, we in Western Europe are 
still leaning back and watching what is hap-
pening without taking firm action. 
So far, the problems have involved Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the recom-
mendation does not even touch on what is to 
come. Next, the problems will arise in Mace-
donia and Kosovo. What is the European Com-
munity's policy towards those countries? My 
view is simple: if people by their own free will in 
democratic elections want sovereignty; we 
should support that and, although we did not do 
so before, we should draw a line in the sand and 
say that if the Serbs do not respect those basic 
principles there will be certain consequences. It 
is not just a question of sanctions. We must go 
further than that. Sanctions are essential but are 
still a long-term perspective that will take one, 
three or five months to work. Nevertheless, we 
shall see what happens in the next few months. 
There will be more bloodshed in former Yugo-
slavia while we still lean back and do nothing, 
rather than tell the Serbs that their actions will 
have certain consequences. 
Lastly, may I call the attention of the 
Assembly to the fact that 2nd June is a special 
date in Denmark because we are having a refe-
rendum on the Maastricht Treaty. I have been 
out campaigning actively for a yes vote and I am 
confident that tomorrow I shall be able to tell 
the Assembly that there was a clear yes from 
Denmark. However, we must wait for the result. 
I am hoping for such a result tonight. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Roseta. 
Mr. ROSET A (Portugal) (Translation). - I 
would like to begin by saying that, as I think is 
135 
FOURTH SITTING 
obvious, I fully support the resolution, of which 
I was one of the signatories. First, because I 
approve unreservedly United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 757, which happily, if 
belatedly, was passed a few days ago; and sec-
ondly, because the bombardment of towns in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which has 
caused such terrible suffering for the people of 
those countries, must stop immediately. Ten 
thousand people have been killed, there are 
countless wounded and hundreds of thousands 
of refugees - the biggest exodus for fifty years in 
the continent of Europe, since the second world 
war, that is. 
Even the Red Cross, which has been respected 
in other wars and even in other continents, has 
not been able to operate effectively. 
In Dubrovnik and other cities there has been 
widespread destruction of the medieval heritage; 
an attempt is being made to destroy the eco-
nomic structure of the new states; tourism, 
which was once an important source of income, 
especially in Croatia, has all but dried up. 
The Portuguese President of the European 
Community has been trying to confront this sit-
uation within his area of competence and has, in 
fact, after strenuous efforts, achieved several 
cease-fires. In January he also contributed to the 
recognition of the independence of Croatia and 
Slovenia and, later, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfor-
tunately, the cease-fires are systematically vio-
lated by the militias in general, and by Serbia in 
particular. 
To me this shows that, in future, we must pay 
particular attention to conflict prevention, 
starting with those areas which demonstrate an 
aggressive nationalism which has been held in 
check by a well-known dictatorship and which is 
now in the process of expansion. 
We must also, by means of agreements, per-
suade certain over-armed countries to reduce 
their stock of weapons. The army of the former 
Yugoslovia was out of all proportion and vastly 
over-equipped. 
Moving on to what can be done in this situ-
ation, including to what extent we should 
intervene, a matter which our colleague Mr. De 
Decker also touched upon, I must say that I do 
not believe that peace can be imposed by force, 
for the reasons so eloquently expressed by our 
colleague Mr. Stegagnini, who is familiar with 
the local situation and who said that we could be 
opening a Pandora's box. We would have no 
way of knowing where this would lead us. Let us 
not forget the situation on the ground - the exis-
tence of a fanatical, over equipped army, plus 
the fact that there is no continuous front line to 
enable an engagement to take place. No such 
line exists, there is merely a series of enclaves 
and towns split into areas dominated by 
opposing forces. Much needs to be done to 
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assure the protection of human rights and the 
rights of minorities, but I do not believe armed 
intervention is necessary. 
First it must be stated, urbi et orbi, that 
human beings are not the property of the state 
and that the state must acknowledge responsi-
bility for its actions before the international 
community. Simply being a citizen of a par-
ticular country does not mean that a person 
belongs to the authorities of that country, and 
from this we can draw our first conclusion - that 
these conflicts must be prevented or avoided 
and that countries - not just the Serbian author-
ities - must be made to understand on a political 
level that in this day and age, in the twenty-first 
century, conflicts are not resolved by massacre 
and that this situation is intolerable. 
Secondly, any country likely to find itself in a 
similar position must be made aware that very 
severe sanctions will be imposed upon it, as are 
now being applied in this case. There has been 
talk of a trade and air embargo and an embargo 
on oil supplies to Serbia and Montenegro, and I 
would like to say that these sanctions ought to be 
extended and continued until supplies run out, 
with the sole exception of foodstuffs and medi-
cines. 
Thirdly, I think it should be made quite clear 
that the international community, following on 
from what I was saying earlier, will demand both 
financial and political reparations. 
Fourthly, and fmally, I will mention the need 
for a strict air and naval blockade with a United 
Nations mandate and an effort to create pro-
tection zones for the civilian population. At 
some time in the future we must call for a con-
ference on security and co-operation in the Med-
iterranean, along the lines of the CSCE model, 
to prevent such conflicts so that, by all these 
means, we can avoid massacres such as this 
which bring nothing but dishonour to the 
human race. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Soysal, 
Observer from Turkey. 
Mr. SOYSAL (Observer from Turkey) (Trans-
lation).- I congratulate the members signing the 
motion for debate under urgent procedure, and 
those who signed the motion for a recommen-
dation; both relate to subjects that the Assembly 
has a right to debate. 
What, after all, are we discussing in this 
Assembly? We are discussing the need to 
establish security arrangements, and this means 
forming an army and hence a group of young 
people prepared to risk their lives for shared 
interests and values. 
Yesterday the Secretary-General of WEU said 
something very interesting; he asked why the 
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fleets of member states of the union were not 
already in the Adriatic with the object of 
enforcing sanctions. 
There could be different replies to that 
question. The cynics would say that in Kuwait's 
case there was a specific interest: oil. In today's 
case this does not apply. But are there not values 
we all share that need to be defended by force, 
such as human rights and the right of the people 
living in Bosnia-Herzegovina to live like human 
beings? Does not that call for military inter-
vention or the use of force to impose sanctions? 
The more so as Europe's responsibility applies 
to the universality of human rights. If human 
and community rights are universal they must 
be protected without discrimination on grounds 
of religion, be it Christian or Islamic. 
Europe also bears a special responsibility 
because of the differing intervals at which it has 
recognised the different states born of the 
former Yugoslavia. This is one of the reasons for 
what is going on now in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and may happen tomorrow in Macedonia, as 
our Observer from Denmark has just pointed 
out. I do not wish to enlarge upon what caused 
the states of the Union to apply this differential 
timing, or the factors that were taken into 
account; but whatever their nature, WEU should 
now reflect on how valid they are compared 
with the danger represented by the risk of civil 
war or Serbian invasion to which certain new 
states are exposed by this staggered timing 
which, in the view of the Serbs, implies differing 
degrees of legitimacy which may encourage 
them to commit the deeds that we condemn. 
We, as members of parliament in a country 
waiting for a decision and whose membership of 
the Community or of WEU may be postponed 
indefinitely, as one speaker said this morning, 
with no regard for our status, have two reasons 
why we cannot remain indifferent to what is 
happening in the Balkan countries. 
The first is historical: who are the Bosnians? 
They are Serbs who have adopted Islam as their 
religion. They were not forced to do so since 
other Serbs chose to remain Christians under 
the Ottoman Empire. But it is because we were 
present in this region of Europe. So we bear 
some historical responsibility for the fate of 
these people who converted. 
The second reason, Mr. President, stems from 
the presence of at least three million people of 
Bosnian origin, now Turkish citizens and living 
in Turkey. We, as members of parliament, 
cannot remain indifferent to the problems of 
these people. 
That prompts me, Mr. President, to point out 
that we, the Turks of the empire, were a source 
of concern to Western Europe throughout the 
nineteenth century over what was happening to 
the countries of the Balkan peoples. I am not 
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talking from the viewpoint of historical revenge 
but as a member of parliament convinced that 
decisive action should be taken against the 
present violations. We Turks, whatever status 
you eventually give us, are ready to take part in 
any action designed to achieve this. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, with some dif-
ficulty I recall certain figures I found over twelve 
months ago in the report on military balances 
produced annually by the Institute for Strategic 
Studies. They were in the report for 1990 which 
gave some information that I feel is signif-
icant. 
Despite belonging to the group of non-aligned 
countries, Yugoslavia was, at the end of the 
eighties, spending something like $1 576 mil-
lion or 3.8% of gross domestic product to equip 
an army of 188 000 men. 
These dry and apparently sterile figures are 
the explanation for the epoch-making suffering 
which today's historic events have unfortunately 
brought home to all of us in vivid terms. 
With the breakdown of the illiberal and 
undemocratic ideology holding the country 
together, ethnic and religious divisions between 
new and old cultures have erupted with ex-
plosive force and blood has been shed. Mem-
ories of events of the mid-century come back to 
us and we remember Chetniks, Druze, U stachi, 
and the awful tragedy which at the time seemed 
to have no end. 
Today's tragedy also seems to be without end 
and inhuman in the countless pictures which the 
television news and the real-time media bring 
into our homes. But by some kind of acceptance 
or through being inured to events, this tragedy 
no longer hits us with the distressed amazement 
which would have caused firm decisions to be 
taken by politicians and governments in the 
democracies. 
Our words are becoming mere babble and 
noises in our throats. We seem to be stumbling 
on and on through a world in ruins strewn with 
thousands of dead men and women, children 
and old people which a kind of barbarity we 
would never have believed possible is dumping 
on the road towards a Europe of peace that rec-
ognises the basic human rights to life, freedom 
and security. 
Here I am expressing our deep sense of frus-
tration which stems from what often appears to 
be the futility of our work. This evening our 
Assembly will adopt an urgent recommendation; 
once again the reference to Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, which calls on the 
high contracting parties to take immediate 
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action under terms drafted by just and free men 
at the end of the second world war, and the rec-
ommendation in question may seem to be pro-
viding a way of salving our consciences. 
But that is not so, Mr. President. When we 
approve this draft recommendation every one of 
us in the depth of his being will in fact have 
made a promise and sworn a real and respon-
sible oath; each one of us will have sworn never 
to cease working by every possible means for 
peace in freedom and security for all people of 
good will. 
(Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pari si. 
Mr. PARISI (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. Pres-
ident ladies and gentlemen, the events now 
taking place close to our borders and Serbia's 
aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovin~ are 
matters on which it is not easy to speak m rea-
sonable terms, horrified as we are by the atroc-
ities and massacres perpetrated without regard 
for the civilian population and without even the 
most elementary considerations of humanity 
which would at least spare women and 
children. 
It is, however, our moral and civil duty not 
only to express our sense of shock and to 
condemn what is happening categorically and 
explicitly but also to study the most effective 
ways of ending these atrocities and the mad 
plans for domination they are designed to serve. 
Every resource of international law must be 
used to force the attacking army to withdraw 
immediately. When I say every resource I 
exclude none. I mean that if political and eco-
nomic sanctions prove ineffective, international 
law authorises the international community or 
certain states under United Nations mandate to 
use armed force as the ultimate solution in 
accordance with what Mr. Kinkel said this 
morning. 
In fact, I see in the events which have been 
going on for some time in the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia, signs of the same mad 
craving for power which led Saddam Hussein, as 
other speakers have said, to attack an unarmed 
Kuwait and systematically massacre the Kurds. 
Just as when faced by this mad folly, the inter-nation~ community saw why it should and how 
it could take united action to impose respect for 
international law and to alleviate the sufferings 
of the oppressed peoples, it now has the legal 
and moral duty not merely to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds in order to help the ref-
ugees and the wounded - as indeed Italy is 
already doing on a large scale - but also to resort 
to discussion by armed force if there appears to 
be no other way. 
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I therefore approve Mr. Caro's initiative and 
Resolution 757 a.dopted on 30th May. The draft 
recommendation comes at the right moment 
and I give it my full support. 
I must, however, stress that this Yugoslav 
problem - and how belittling it is to refer to the 
sufferings of human beings as a problem - is 
essentially a matter for Europe, firstly, as several 
speakers have said, because the territories of the 
now non-existent Yugoslav republic are Euro-
pean territories, secondly because the problem 
has its roots in the history of Europe as a whole 
and lastly because there will be no way of 
building a peaceful and prosperous future for 
Europe as a whole if even just one of its nations 
clings to the mad belief that its own growth can 
be achieved at the expense of the others. 
For these reasons, it is my firm belief that 
WEU will finally do everything in its power to 
help put an end to this pointless and horrifying 
massacre. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Scovacricchi. 
Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the debate 
may appear complicated and many faceted but 
it seems to me that the essential points of ref-
erence are very simple. 
May I, as someone living in the Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia region, which is the only one of our prov-
inces sharing boundaries with Slovenia and 
Croatia where the fighting has been and still is 
taking place, be allowed to give my personal 
experience of this problem which, as you know, 
affects most acutely the lives of people physi-
cally closest to the sounds of the shooting. 
Let me say, then, that it is already late for 
Europe - which is always pointed to as having a 
leading role to play in the areas within its 
purview - to take the action suggested in the 
document now before us; furthermore, in my 
view this is simply a motion for a recommen-
dation casually tacked onto a United Nations 
resolution. In fact there was no need to refer 
to that resolution: the old continent, directly 
affected as it is by the crisis in the crumbling 
Yugoslav federation, would still retain its full 
responsibility. 
I do not need to repeat that this crisis is a 
factor of instability and anxiety, psychologically 
as well as otherwise, for the whole of Europe and 
the world as a whole - given the new approach 
to foreign policy already tested in Iraq - and it 
seems to me that Mr. Parisi had that aspect in 
mind. 
We must get away from the old patterns of 
strategic doctrine. No solution can be found by 
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using force, i.e. going to war with the former 
Yugoslavia and its large and battle-hardened 
army. I fought in Bosnia with the Italian second 
army until the victory of the dictator Anton 
Pavelic and even thereafter. In that war which 
was under cover but sometimes explicit and 
open as well, I learnt the tricks of a way of 
fighting in which numbers were irrelevant. 
Nothing, it seems to me, has changed; guerrilla 
action plus armoured strikes are virtually impos-
sible to monitor, e.g. by newcomers to the scene 
with their blue berets and uniforms fresh from 
the steam-press. 
So before it is too late I think we should give 
the fullest possible support to the embargo, par-
ticularly that on arms, and to all the measures 
which have been mentioned here. That we must 
do in order that we are not forced by today's 
indecision, which has already gone on for too 
long, to take military action with the gravest 
economic and social consequences and causing 
bloodshed that will add to the number of Euro-
peans who have already lost their lives as the 
price of solidarity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call. Mr. 
Eisma. 
Mr. EISMA (Netherlands) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, we can but say that the European 
Community has adopted a passive attitude 
towards Serbia-Montenegro, particularly in 
recent months. It has followed the course of rec-
ognising the part-republics and of Lord 
Carrington's peace conference for too long. 
These measures did not have the strength to call 
a halt to Serbian aggression. It has taken far too 
long for the Twelve of the Community to decide 
to impose sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro. And 
once the decision was taken, far more stringent 
measures - bans on sport, trade, oil and air 
transport- were decided in the United Nations 
context under the influence of the United States. 
What the Community's Council of Ministers 
intended to reaffirm tomorrow will have to be 
adjusted again at its meeting. Instead of being 
the front-runner, the Community, potentially 
the leading actor in the- European- Yugoslav 
conflict, has become a follower. This is regret-
table, now that work is being done on a common 
foreign and security policy in the Community 
context. 
Mr. President, the most important part of this 
draft recommendation is the sentence: " Further 
measures should be considered if Resolution 
757 does not have the desired effect." Western 
European Union could intervene militarily only 
if so instructed by the United Nations Security 
Council. This premise is not to be found in the 
recommendation, but it is stated by the 
Rapporteur, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, in his 
explanatory memorandum. It would help if he 
stressed the need for a United Nations Security 
Council resolution in his reply. 
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Mr. Eisma (continued) 
Even before any measures were taken at this 
level, the WEU Council of Ministers, which is 
due to meet shortly, could also take other initia-
tives. I feel it could also suggest to the CSCE 
countries that they meet as soon as possible at 
foreign minister level, to see if a general political 
arrangement might be made in that context and 
at that level. The WEU Council of Ministers 
could also call on the CSCE to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in The Hague to set up a 
special tribunal to consider crimes against 
humanity. 
Mr. President, to conclude, I would like to say 
something about the sanctions the United 
Nations has now imposed. It is not for nothing 
that we have Greece among us as an observer. I 
call on the Greek observers in this Assembly to 
ensure that the sanctions are enforced. The ban 
on air traffic must not be evaded because the 
bureaucracy, in this case the Greek bureaucracy, 
has not yet coped with it. Let this be a message 
to our colleagues here, for them to transmit to 
the foreign minister and the other members of 
the Greek government. 
Mr. President, it will be clear that, subject to 
these comments, I strongly endorse the draft rec-
ommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Mrs. 
Blunck. 
Mrs. BLUNCK (Germany) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I would like to support the rec-
ommendation. I would not have asked to speak 
if a quite crucial sentence and, therefore, the 
substance of this recommendation had not 
changed since last night. I mean the sentence: 
" Further measures should be considered. " 
This means war. This means more destruc-
tion, more deaths and endless suffering for 
many innocent people. 
Have we then really learnt nothing at all from 
all the dreadful wars in the past, from the first 
world war, the second world war, the wars in 
Korea and Vietnam, the Gulf war? We have all 
assumed a terrible burden of guilt. Surely we 
here do not want suddenly to distort the truth 
and label those who are opposed to the use of 
force, the pacifists, as perpetrators or as crim-
inals? It is high time we made provisions, we 
must act, before something happens. 
First we produce weapons, then we sell them 
to trouble spots. With the proceeds we bring up 
our sons. Then the violence escalates in the 
trouble spots and we send our sons there to kill 
and possibly to be killed. This is cynical. 
None of those here who support brutal vio-
lence tell us how we are to avoid escalation and, 
if possible, emerge from this escalation. Just 
think of Vietnam and what happened there. 
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Mr. MULLER (Germany) (Translation). -
Sarajevo! 
Mrs. BLUNCK (Germany) (Translation). - I 
have the feeling that at the moment we are 
setting ourselves up as judges without really 
knowing the facts. I ask myself, and I ask you: 
do you believe the Serbs? Do you believe the 
Croats? Do you really know what is happening 
there? Can you really know who is the guilty 
party there? Do you really want us to send our 
sons there? Do you want to take violence there? 
I do not. 
I therefore call most urgently for separate 
votes. I would like to support the recommen-
dation, apart from the sentence I have quoted. I 
cannot support that sentence. I am not in favour 
of more suffering. I am not in favour of more 
destruction. I am not in favour of more deaths. I 
would at last like to see provision being made. 
The violence should at last be brought to an end. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Savio. 
Mr. SA VIO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, we have already 
witnessed two exoduses in this span of the 
century: one from 1947 to 1950 before this 
important Western European organisation 
existed, and the second now and close to our 
frontiers as a result of what is happening in 
Yugoslavia. The first time it was people of 
Italian origin leaving their country. Europe had 
only just emerged from the second world war 
and looked on virtually unconcerned at what 
was happening in Istria to make Italians emi-
grate. 
The end of the Berlin wall had a different 
effect, stirring up ethnic feelings in neighbouring 
Yugoslavia and finally, with reason failing to 
bring about the outcome sought by the demo-
cracies, triggering off the conflicts that are now 
terrifying and stupefying us because of their 
gravity and ferocity, the way they are being 
fought and finally the recurrence of a situation 
bringing today the inflow of refugees or to-
morrow - though heaven forbid - involvement 
in situations which may get out of control. This 
problem concerns us Italians and in particular 
us V enetians; I am a Deputy for that part of the 
country and can vouch for the facts. 
That is why we approve the whole of the 
motion now before us in the form proposed, 
with its reference to Article VIII and its call on 
the Council to meet as a matter of urgency and 
set up the machinery needed to put that part of 
United Nations Resolution 757 into effect that 
imposes an embargo designed to halt the action 
which Mr. Milosevic is determinedly pursuing, 
regardless of appeals for a solution to be formed 
respecting the peoples, their wishes and their 
determination to be independent. I am referring 
in particular to Bosnia. 
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The embargo will certainly create difficulties 
for us Italians. Indeed, it will have a particularly 
decisive effect in the Adriatic because Italy's 
coastline faces that of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, 
Italy is one of the leading countries ~s regards 
trade with Yugoslavia. 
All this will mean hardship in Italy because 
many Italian firms are involved, and here I refer 
in particular to the finished and semi-finished 
goods they import from Yugoslavia. 
We nevertheless believe tj:lis sacrifice to be 
necessary because the stakes are very high and 
Italy wishes to make as great a contribution as 
,other countries at this time to peace and demo-
cratic self-determination for the peoples of 
Europe. Our contribution will go further still 
and take on board what the United Nations 
decided in its resolution. It is our hope that the 
experts who will be called upon to decide on 
immediate action to make the embargo an 
effective deterrent will find some means of mon-
itoring the system in detail so as to distinguish 
those countries that have helped Yugoslavia up 
to now from those that unfortunately have been 
lookers-on. 
I am sure that, as soon as a government has 
been formed, the Italian Parliament will debate 
the motion signed by no fewer than three 
hundred and sixty-seven deputies drawing 
attention to what is happening in Yugoslavia 
and outlining to the Italian Government, so that 
it will raise the matter in WEU, the kinds of 
action which we today consider appropriate and 
important in order to discourage anyone now 
claiming, in superficial and arrogant propaganda 
for Mr. Milosevic, that if we intervene in any 
other way they will meet fire with fire. 
This means that under the embargo every 
form of action must be taken to prevent the 
arrival of fresh supplies, with the exception, of 
course, of food and all medical supplies that can 
be used to treat the wounded. The purpose of 
such action must be to bring about the end of 
the fighting. 
We hope that this can be done: we see it as a 
first significant act for WEU to take and one 
which has our full support. 
In conclusion, I repeat that Russia should be 
told that for a very short but appropriate period 
it should be possible, as Mr. Stegagnini said, to 
nullify agreements allowing arms to pass up the 
Danube without any check of the vessels in 
transit. These agreements would in fact make 
the embargo on the Adriatic pointless. I should 
like to put this recommendation to you, Mr. 
President, so that the possibility of immediate 
measures to that end can be looked into, pos-
sibly including a resolution which we could draft 
and then vote on here and now. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer~ the Rap-
porteur. 
Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Netherlands) 
(Translation) - Mr. President, as it is getting 
late, I can be very brief. Your speech yesterday 
morning, the statement by the Secretary-
General, Mr. van Eekelen, and the statements by 
almost all members this afternoon - I will revert 
to the one exception in a moment - show that, 
where the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is con-
cerned, this Assembly wants more than has Seen 
done so far. This has been indicated by all the 
members in more or less the same words. 
To those who have reacted critically to the 
draft recommendation I would say: what is the 
objective? The objective is to restore the legal 
order. That was the aim in the Gulf war, Mrs. 
Blunck, that is the aim in Yugoslavia. The aim is 
to restore the legal order, to restore law and 
order. That is why the United Nations Security 
Council, the highest body representing this legal 
order, has adopted a resolution that imposes 
strict sanctions. That is why the amendment 
unanimously adopted by the Defence Com-
mittee this morning calls for further measures if 
the Security Council's resolution does not have 
the desired effect. Further action must then be 
taken by the United Nations, as was the case in 
the Gulf war, to restore law and order. 
And while we are talking about facts, let me 
refer you to the statements by Sir Russell 
Johnston and Mr. Jean-Marie Caro. They were . 
extremely eloquent in their description of the 
facts in Yugoslavia. There are people without 
arms and legs, many people have died unneces-
sarily. Those are the facts, and it is our duty as 
politicians gathered here together to ensure that 
law and order are restored - that is what this res-
olution is about - so that the unnecessary 
bloodshed may stop. That is the aim of this 
debate, and, as I intimated earlier, that is why 
this morning the Defence Committee unani-
mously approved the sentence that has been 
added to the recommendation. 
We have our commitments to other organi-
sations and bodies when it comes, for example, 
to the cultural barbarism I have referred to. Let 
us simply let UNESCO know what we have said. 
here this afternoon and of the recommendation 
we have adopted. Then we cannot say later - we 
would have to say this to ourselves as well- that 
we knew about it, but we did not do enough. 
There have been numerous statements about 
this. We cannot allow this to happen again. Our 
ministers cannot allow this to happen again. 
That is the aim ofthis debate, and of this recom-
mendation, which I sincerely hope can count on 
very wide support in this Assembly as well, fol-
lowing the meeting of the committee. Then we 
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can move ahead. This is not, after all, the end of 
the road - unfortunately, I have to say - but 
probably the beginning of the road, in the 
interests of law and order throughout the 
world. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Dudley Smith, Chairman of the committee. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). -
Because of the lateness of the hour, I shall be 
brief. 
As the Rapporteur has just said, the com-
mittee supported the recommendation unani-
mously. It is a difficult and complicated matter 
and it is so easy to get it wrong, as we are all 
aware. Practically everything that needs to be 
said about the unhappy and disastrous Yugoslav 
situation has been said. May I corrupt an old 
English - or perhaps universal - phrase and say 
that the only way that evil can triumph is for 
men of good will to stand aside and do 
nothing. 
In my view and that of the Defence Com-
mittee that I represent, Europe needs its peace-
keeping credibility. The motion before us, so 
ably conducted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, points 
the way and I hope that action will be taken 
upon it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - To the 
draft recommendation in Document 1319, one 
amendment has been tabled by Mr. Feldmann. 
It reads as follows: 
1. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add a new paragraph: 
" Take immediate initiatives to ensure that 
war criminals will be judged following the 
guidelines of the proposal of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council ofEurope 
of May 1992. " 
I call Sir Russell J ohnston to move the 
amendment. 
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
I put forward this amendment on behalf of Mr. 
Feldmann, who has had to return to Bonn. It 
refers to a proposal for an international court to 
judge war crimes. The proposal was put before 
the Council of Europe earlier this year, and Mrs. 
Haller of Switzerland was the Rapporteur. That, 
in turn, called in support the precedent of a 
unanimous vote of the Santiago conference of 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union in October last 
year on a resolution dealing with genocide. In 
essence, the argument was for the establishment 
of an international criminal court and the report 
urged that member states of the Council of 
Europe should" act through the United Nations 
to secure the convening of an international con-
ference to prepare a convention on the setting 
up of such a court ". 
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The amendment is designed to make it clear 
to persons acting in a fashion that could be 
determined as a war crime that a means of 
bringing them to justice is to be established. 
There is no doubt that that war, apart from the 
general horror produced by mass shelling - I do 
not understand how Mrs. Blunck can watch 
Yugoslavia being reduced to rubble and say, we 
are not sure who is to blame - has also produced 
many individual instances of what can only be 
called barbarism. 
I mentioned in my speech earlier that I have 
heard from refugees from Sarajevo. I did not say 
that they also showed us a video of fifteen men 
lying manacled on the ground, obviously having 
been beaten before being shot. Those respon-
sible for such atrocities should be brought to 
justice and this amendment is designed to 
express the intention that that will happen. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Sir Dudley Smith. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - I do 
not rise to speak against the amendment but 
simply to explain the situation. Mr. Feldmann 
introduced the amendment not in written form 
but colloquially, towards the end of the meeting 
before we began the main sitting. He appre-
ciated the fact that there was not time to discuss 
it and we had only a few cursory words about it. 
I talked to the Rapporteur, who is not against it 
but who cannot see too much sense in it. Lis-
tening to Sir Russell Johnston, who always 
speaks sensibly and convincingly about those 
matters, I am a little worried about the practical-
ities and whether it would work. We have no 
fundamental objection but it would be impos-
sible for me to say what the committee's view 
would be. We shall need to debate it. Therefore, 
to be fair, I must leave it to the Assembly to 
decide. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the amended draft rec-
ommendation. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The amended draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
1. See page 33. 
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5. Arms export policy 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 
and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1305) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Technological and 
Aerospace Committee on arms export policy 
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc-
ument 1305. 
I call Mr. Aarts, Rapporteur of the com-
mittee. 
Mr. AARTS (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, the arms export policy is a 
complex and sensitive political issue at both 
national and international level. A great deal of 
thought should be given to this policy, more 
than it is receiving in this chamber at the 
moment. Thought should be given to the arms 
export policy because it has to do with national 
security and defence, with the economy and 
employment, with technology and industrial 
policy, with international competition and 
co-operation within the alliance. 
On the other hand, ethical and moral values 
are also involved, because weapons are, after all, 
designed to put people out of action and to cause 
devastation. We have been hearing almost all 
day today what effects weapons can have. We 
need only look at the television pictures from 
Bosnia to make further explanation superfluous. 
What is more, the constant advances in tech-
nology, improvements and refinements are 
making weapons increasingly efficient. 
A review of the arms export policy is therefore 
urgently needed. It is impossible to think of 
most Western European countries without arms 
production. It forms an important part of the 
industrial apparatus, with branches stretching 
throughout society, to universities and research 
centres. In addition, military inventions have 
often gone hand in hand with civilian applica-
tions. 
For several decades the East-West conflict was 
the cause of a major arms race, both conven-
tional and nuclear. Defence budgets grew each 
year and, with them, military production. A 
recent study by SIPRI in Stockholm says that in 
1985 arms factories in European NATO coun-
tries employed one and a half million people. 
The cold war fortunately resulted, according to 
this study, in three hundred thousand jobs being 
lost between 1985 and 1990. 
There has been another major factor in the 
spread of the feeling among many people that 
things could not go on as they were and that 
there must be an end to the unchecked sale of 
weapons. This was the coalition's confrontation 
during the Gulf war with an unrivalled war 
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machine, a very considerable proportion of 
which originated from our countries, by which I 
mean the countries we represent here. I refer you 
to the tables in my report on arms sales, to Iraq, 
for example. 
After the Gulf war the alarm was sounded 
from many sides. Ideas were put forward. But 
there is bound to be a fear that, if we fail to 
reach international agreement quickly, this 
restraint will be forgotten again and trade, even 
with regional trouble spots, will again become 
attractive. We politicians know that there is con-
siderable demand for weapons. A great deal of 
money can be made from them. Although 
employment in the arms industry has declined 
sharply in recent years, production in the coun-
tries concerned is extensive enough to far out-
strip domestic demand. 
What is more, defence budgets will be reduced 
in every country in the future. There will 
therefore be, as indeed there already is, a ten-
dency to look for new markets. They will be 
found all too easily in third world countries. So 
the paradoxical situation we see emerging is that 
western countries are offering aid with one hand 
and selling arms with the other. This refers less 
to conventional weapons than to chemical, bio-
logical and nuclear weapons and to techno-
logical know-how. 
In my report I have tried to paint as accurate a 
picture as possible of the complexity of the 
problems relating to the international context in 
which the arms trade takes place and of the 
existing multinational control systems. I have 
briefly reviewed each member country's policy 
and given some specific figures, uncompro-
mising though they may be. I conclude my 
report by making a number of suggestions for 
the improvement of the existing regimes. 
An effective policy geared to reducing and 
monitoring arms exports will always have to be 
an internationally co-ordinated policy. The cri-
teria will have to be harmonised. Control mech-
anisms will have to be developed. Whatever 
the issue, this can be done at world level, 
through, say, the United Nations, under specific 
treaties or conventions, under the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty or through existing regional 
associations, such as the European Com-
munity. 
The report lists the most important treaties 
and draft treaties in this sphere. They will have 
to undergo further development and improve-
ment. 
First, provisions concerning the export of 
nuclear technology will have to be added to the 
NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty 
must be given a sound financial basis. It should 
also be placed under the authority of the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations. 
I' 
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Second, the future of Cocom is under dis-
cussion now that the relationship between East 
and West has changed and democracy is devel-
oping in the countries of the East. One idea 
might be that Cocom should be transformed 
from an East-West into a North-South embargo 
organisation. Or should Cocom be replaced by a 
European export regime? 
Third, the chemical weapons convention is 
still not ready, even though this is precisely the 
kind of weaponry that must and can be banned. 
Fortunately, there is now the Australia Group, 
which has set itself the goal of preventing the 
export of certain chemicals and has developed 
for this purpose an export warning list featuring 
fifty chemicals. All the countries we represent 
belong to this group. The proposal is that this 
list should be transformed into a worldwide 
export ban list under United Nations super-
vision. 
Fourth, the MTCR- the Missile Technology 
Control Regime - which was established in 
1987, is not a treaty yet, but an informal 
agreement prohibiting the export of conven-
tional and nuclear ballistic missiles and related 
technology. The importance of this regime, 
though not widely known, as I have found, 
should not be underestimated in view of the 
weapons we are talking about in this case. But 
the number of participants is small. There are 
still no means of ensuring enforcement. 
Fifth, the United Nations can and must play 
an extremely important part in the control and 
monitoring of arms exports. Above all else it 
should achieve this by using its power to impose 
mandatory arms embargoes. It has done so in 
the case of South Africa, Iraq, Somalia, Libya 
and Yugoslavia. The inspection and enforce-
ment of these embargoes has not always been as 
good as it might be. Quite the contrary. But we 
did find that it was better in Iraq's case than in 
others. 
In 1991 the General Assembly of the United 
Nations took a very important step towards a 
worldwide surveillance system for conventional 
armaments transfers by establishing a regi_ster of 
international conventional arms transfers. This 
was intended to make the international arms 
trade transparent. We will have to wait and see 
how well the members of the United Nations 
keep to the agreed rules. Judgment cannot yet be 
passed because the first registration date is 30th 
April 1993 for the calendar year 1992. I realise 
this registration is only a first step towards the 
worldwide control and monitoring of the arms 
trade, but it is nevertheless an essential step. 
To conclude, I would like to discuss two 
points, the relevance of Maastricht to the 
control of arms exports and the position of the 
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national parliaments. In December 1991 the 
European Council decided to include matters 
concerning nuclear non-proliferation, tech-
nology transfers to third world countries and the 
control of arms exports in the category of issues 
for which common actions must be prepared 
and on which decisions will be taken by a qual-
ified majority. This is a major step forward, but 
it will only mean anything if Article 223 of the 
Treaty of Rome is repealed or amended at the 
same time. This article makes such matters as 
arms transactions a national responsibility. At 
the Maastricht conference no mention was made 
of an amendment to this article. This is not only 
inconsistent but also extremely dangerous 
against the background of the single European 
market that will soon come into being, because 
the member state with the most liberal export 
regime could become Europe's arms export 
centre, unless the national arms export regimes 
are harmonised under and against the back-
ground of a common foreign policy. We 
therefore feel political action is urgently 
needed. 
I would also like to say something about the 
position of the national parliaments. It will 
come as no surprise that while I was studying 
arms export regimes in the member states, I was 
forced to reach the general conclusion that the 
parliaments still have little influence or 
authority over arms exports. There is no denying 
that progress has been made. In various coun-
tries far more information is supplied to the par-
liaments, and discussions with the ministers 
responsible have become more common. In 
special cases parliamentary debates are followed 
by decision making, but this only happens 
in cases where there is a national political 
motive. 
The question is, then, how the national parlia-
ments can be given a greater opportunity to 
exercise control. It is difficult to lay down 
general rules on this, because each country has 
its own parliamentary rules and traditions. The 
aim in each country should be to enable par-
liament to check whether the government's 
licensing policy complies with the criteria that 
have been agreed with parliament. I am not 
therefore generally advocating direct decision-
making powers for parliaments in the matter of 
arms export licences, but the opportunity for cri-
teria to be established in consultation with the 
government and for the policy to be compared 
with these. 
Mr. President, I realise that any report on this 
subject is very quickly out of date. Develop-
ments in the world occur very quickly, in both 
the positive and the negative sense. The world 
situation can change completely in six months. 
It will therefore be necessary for a follow-up 
report to be written in the not too distant future, 
partly because all the regimes I have discussed 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Aarts (continued) 
and the many conventions and treaties under 
consideration are making progress. We will have 
to assess this progress. 
Mr. President, it will be worth considering 
this subject again in a while. A halt must be 
called to excessive trade in weapons of all kinds. 
I am particularly happy that Germany's Foreign 
Minister emphasised this once again this 
morning and that he said much human misery 
stems from excessive arms production and sales. 
This must be stopped, partly because the vast 
sums of money concerned can be spent on far 
worthier causes, but also, above all, because of 
the evil that is done. Controlling and reducing 
arms exports is a form of political civilisation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe. 
Mr. GONZALEZ-LAXE (Spain) (Trans-
lation). - We are faced with a truly transcen-
dental question concerning the operational area 
of WEU's activities and the various national 
policies in a global context. 
Arms export policy can therefore be dealt with 
from differing points of view, so what is 
required is the harmonisation of joint action by 
all countries. If we analyse this, we can say that 
in some countries there is a division between 
policies designed to liberalise exports on the 
international market where this is of importance 
for the economic development of industrialised 
countries, because private firms sell arms, com-
pared with the situation where industry is com-
pletely under government control. 
Second, there are many ways of controlling 
the export of arms; there are cases where the 
export licence is granted by just one ministry, or 
by interministerial committees or by special 
agencies; all of these require different frame-
works to deal with the different political circum-
stances of each country. 
Third, the difficulty of finding uniform solu-
tions for the transfer of not only nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons, but also conven-
tional weaponry, calls for a wide variety of 
policies and, consequently, different courses of 
action on the part of governments. This, 
together with dual-use products, constitutes an 
additional area of concern to be taken into con-
sideration in the formulation of such a common 
policy. 
This is the situation we are faced with, under-
lining the lack of a harmonised common 
European arms export policy, which obviously 
constitutes a high degree of potential risk for 
international security. It is therefore necessary 
to establish two basic elements to correct the sit-
uation since in recent years world exports of 
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arms have fallen by around 30%, although, in 
actual fact, they have been concentrated in certain 
countries - a matter of considerable international 
concern given the continued existence of situa-
tions of conflict throughout the world. 
These two basic elements can be summed up as 
follows: the first concerns the need to define a 
common arms export policy and the second, the 
definition of an effective export control regime. 
These two initial rules governing the new interna-
tional conduct constitute a step forward in that we 
can be reasonably satisfied with the new agree-
ments signed between different countries which 
will finally put an end to the clandestine sale of 
the weapons of war, the first step in the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a lasting peace. 
Mr. Aarts's report presents an excellent 
summary of the global situation as regards arms 
export policies, but it also underlines certain dif-
ficulties being encountered at present in con-
trolling, verifying and co-ordinating interna-
tional action. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency is responsible for verification alone and 
cannot impose sanctions; one of Cocom's objec-
tives is to control the proliferation of products 
derived from nuclear energy but consists of 
merely an official co-ordination agreement; the 
Australia Group is self-regulating in respect of 
chemical weapons; the missile technological 
control system is not an international treaty. 
These, along with other bodies, reveal the com-
plete lack of an overall control and verification 
of arms export policy. Consequently, it became 
an international aim to find a system of moni-
toring such transfers and achieving greater trans-
parency, so that the responsibility of govern-
ments can be documented. So much so that, as 
Mr. Aarts said, the United Nations General 
Assembly created a universal register of conven-
tional arms transfers in January of this year. All 
information in connection with these matters 
must be supplied to the register and this could 
obviously help to assemble the criteria for 
harmonisation of national requirements 
regarding both the combination of external pol-
icies, such as defence, on the one hand, and the 
combination of financial, economic and com-
mercial policies with defence and external 
policy, on the other hand. 
The Maastricht summit has taken a step 
forward in this complex matter and one of its 
objectives is the control of arms exports, 
requiring the ministers for foreign affairs to 
make a start on preparatory work to settle this 
controversial matter. For instance, the transfer 
of armaments will remain under national 
control in accordance with Article 223 of the 
Rome Treaty. However, it is reasonable to hold 
that despite the requirement of free movement 
of goods throughout the Community, arms 
export policy should not be based solely on com-
mercial considerations, but on a common policy 
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Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe (continued) 
harmonising the interests of all member states in 
the area of security and national defence. And 
while this is being formulated, it will be the 
remit of WEU, as the body responsible for 
defence policy after the Maastricht summit, to 
work on the determination and adoption of final 
decisions for the control and verification of the 
arms export policy. 
Mr. Aarts's report suggests the possibility of 
creating a European arms agency which would 
have responsibility for such control, and in this 
way we could fulfil the basic requirement for 
transparency and verification of the arms trade 
to foster global security. The drafting of interna-
tional rules and directives by the United 
Nations would also result in an improvement in 
the monitoring of such arms exports. It is along 
these lines that we should continue to work, and 
for this reason I support Mr. Aarts's report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Po9as Santos. 
Mr. PO<;AS SANTOS (Portugal) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, 
the arms trade, like the drugs trade, is one of the 
most reprehensible activities because of the 
harm it causes to humanity. We know, however, 
how difficult it is to turn words into actions in 
controlling this phenomenon. The enormously 
high financial stakes involved often mean that 
political decisions taken by international institu-
tions and national governments are rendered 
ineffective. 
It is true that some progress has been made in 
this area since the end of the cold war and the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union as a super-
power. However, a number of very black clouds 
have cast a shadow on the world panorama, 
which we would all like to see more peaceful. 
Unfortunately regional conflicts, civil wars, 
inter-ethnic struggles and the violent disinte-
gration of some multinational states seem to be 
not only continuing, but on the increase in 
recent times. This gives rise to a growing 
concern that the exports of arms should be con-
trolled. It would be extremely useful if, when 
arms are sold- the prohibition of arms, sadly, 
being merely a utopian dream - their final desti-
nation and end use could be known. 
There is, however, one area where interna-
tional co-operation is essential, namely arms 
trade for military purposes. There is absolutely 
no prospect of reducing this scourge if our 
efforts do not result in joint action, at least by 
the main exporting countries. Without this, we 
would have a situation where those countries 
which observe international law and morality 
would be at a serious disadvantage, because 
other countries might be standing by to take 
their place as arms sellers. 
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This would give rise to a very unfair situation; 
the defence industries and the economies of the 
countries which respected international law 
would be needlessly sacrificed without any sub-
sequent benefits for world peace. A concerted 
effort by governments to achieve disarmament 
is, then, a condition sine qua non if we are to 
succeed in this area. 
It is in this context that Western European 
Union, at a time when it wishes to be seen as 
dynamic and revitalised, can play an important 
role, providing a forum for reflection, debate 
and to some extent, decision on these matters, at 
least as far as Europe is concerned. This was one 
of the points made' in the declaration of the 
Council at Maastricht, from which more specific 
results at the next meeting in Lisbon are hoped 
for. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the draft 
recommendation we are discussing could 
perhaps be described as rather restrained, but it 
is a first step towards solving this problem 
within our Assembly and it provides a strong 
incentive for the WEU Council to reflect on this 
very important matter. Approval of this recom-
mendation would constitute explicit recognition 
that Europe cannot and must not be deflected 
from maintaining peace and security in the 
various parts of the globe, whether internal 
peace - violated in such a shocking way in 
Yugoslavia, or in parts of the world which, 
though more distant, cannot be simply forgotten. 
In spite of the damage to the arms industries 
of each of our countries which any decision 
might have, we believe that, in the long term, we 
will all benefit from a reduction in current levels 
of arms production and consumption. 
We do not expect great results in the short 
term. Nevertheless, we believe that it is 
important not to stand idly by when so many 
men, women and children are suffering the pain 
of war, terrorism, crime and organised banditry. 
In cases such as these, no weapons should be 
considered as being in safe hands. 
What I have said does not mean a lack of hope 
in the future, but is simply recognition of the 
fact that, unfortunately, the various instruments 
of international control have not worked as 
intended, frequently through a lack of political 
will to put them into practice. Nevertheless, 
without being over-optimistic, it is possible to 
make greater progress than has so far been 
made. Everything to do with the machines of 
war is complex, but that is no excuse for 
inaction. 
Ladies and gentlemen, in presenting this 
report Mr. Aarts, to whom we must say a word 
of appreciation for the work he has so excel-
lently performed, urges us to show a new and 
increased interest in questions concerning 
restrictions on the export of arms. 
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I very sincerely recommend that we approve 
and explore further the suggestions which have 
been put to us, certain that this is the only way 
which can promote real integration of policies in 
this area, first at European level and later on at a 
global level. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. AARTS (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, my sincere thanks to the two 
members who have spoken at this late hour, and 
shown that they have studied the report thor-
oughly, for the support they have given to the 
report and recommendations. I assume the list 
of speakers was not longer because of the quality 
of the report, which did not leave any room for 
criticism by members. As not many questions 
were asked, I will be brief, if only because of the 
time. 
Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe pointed out that in many 
countries arms manufacture is controlled by 
various people, sometimes by the government, 
sometimes by private companies, sometimes by 
a mixture of the two. In some countries there are 
also certain regimes in which licences, exemp-
tions and all kinds of other export arrangements 
are important. This means that the same arms 
export regime can never be imposed on 
everyone from above and that every country 
remains responsible for ensuring the en-
forcement of international laws and treaties, 
taking account of its own legislation and its own 
situation. This simply increases the responsi-
bility of national governments and national par-
liaments. 
Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe also referred to one of the 
most serious problems facing us where arms 
exports are concerned: the black market. This is 
a separate problem, if only because there are no 
satisfactory statistics on the subject. It is dif-
ficult enough to obtain statistics on the normal 
arms trade, even if all the information is in the 
hands of governments. It is absolutely impos-
sible to say even roughly what amounts are 
involved in the illegal arms trade. We know that 
large numbers of weapons are coming on to the 
black market from the East, where weapons are 
in abundant supply at the moment. I have tried 
to obtain some information on the black market 
from SIPRI, but that was completely impossible. 
They did not dare to quote any halfway serious 
figures. They even said there are probably far 
more weapons on the black market at the 
moment than we can imagine. This means that 
the arms trade is probably comparable to the 
drugs trade: a very dangerous business, with a 
lot of money doing the rounds and a lot of 
money to be earned, because the trade is carried 
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on in an atmosphere of secrecy. It would be a 
good thing for this aspect in particular to be 
taken into account in the monitoring of national 
imports and exports of weapons. 
Mr. President, Mr. P~s Santos said this was 
a difficult problem. I will conclude with this. If 
you study this difficult problem, you constantly 
have to suppress a feeling that you have quite 
often in politics, but certainly in this case, a 
feeling of despondency. You have to suppress 
the feeling of wanting to give up because nothing 
can be done. Clearly, human weakness in this 
respect is so pronounced that we always find 
ways of excusing ourselves for production being 
so high or for the issue of licences for exports to 
countries or regional trouble spots to which 
arms should not be supplied. As politicians, we 
all play a part in this in our own countries. But 
we must not become despondent. After all, if we 
politicians become despondent, who will take 
charge? I feel we must realise that any step we 
take is an important step in a growing awareness 
of the responsibility of politics for an arms trade 
that has become extremely extensive - so 
extensive that there are many countries where 
weapons are available in abundance, while 
people are going hungry and having to do 
without housing and medicines. We politicians 
must tackle this imbalance between the billions 
of dollars spent on weapons and the billions of 
dollars needed for the development of the third 
world and Eastern Europe. It can only be done 
in small stages, but it has to be done none-
theless. 
Thank you for the support you have given me. 
I assume that the recommendation will be 
adopted as it stands. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- I have to inform the Assembly that the draft 
recommendation was approved unanimously by 
the committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the draft recommendation in Doc-
ument 1305. 
Under Rule 35 ofthe Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
l. See page 34. 
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6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd June 1992, 
at 10.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union for the 
financial year 1992 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Doc-
ument 1303). 
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2. New Euro-American relations (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Political Committee and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Document 1310 and 
amendment). 
Are there are objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
{The sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.) 
FIFTH SITIING 
Wednesday, 3rd June 1992 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
Western European Union for the financial year 1992 (Pre-
sentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Doe. 1303). 
Speakers: Lord Mackie of Benshie (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Rathbone (Chairman). 
4. New Euro-American relations (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1310 and amendment). 
Speakers: Mr. Soell (Rapporteur), Mr. Antretter, Mr. 
Rodrigues, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Fabra, Mr. 
Machete, Mr. Nuiiez, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Caro, 
Mr. Roseta, Mrs. Terborg, Mr. Lamminen (Observer from 
Finland), Mr. Soell (Rapporteur), Lord Mackie of Benshie 
(point of order), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman), Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Mr. Caro, Mr. Soell, Mr. Stoffelen. 
S. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 10.40 a. m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. AnendliiiCe register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accord-
ance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
I extend a warm welcome to Mr. Haekkerup 
and Mr. Sonderby as parliamentary observers. 
The Presidential Committee met this morning 
and discussed the situation created by the 
rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish 
people. While respecting their decision, the com-
mittee recalled the recommendation approved 
by the Assembly yesterday with Mr. Goerens's 
report and qualified the situation thus created as 
regrettable. It found that the referendum had no 
direct implications for WEU but thought that 
the new situation would have some indirect 
implications for our organisation. 
l. See page 37. 
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It therefore decided to monitor closely gov-
ernment decision-making in response to this sit-
uation so that the necessary measures could be 
taken when the time came. 
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union 
for the ./inliiiCial year 1992 
(Pruatlltion of tM rqort of tM Comminee on Budgetlll'y 
Affllin tuUI Administration tuUI POle 
on tM drtl/t m:olfllllelldation, Doe. 1303) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The first 
order of the day is the presentation of the report 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration on the opinion on the budgets of 
the ministerial organs of Western European 
Union for the financial year 1992 and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 1303. 
I call Lord Mackie of Benshie, Rapporteur. 
Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE (United King-
dom).- It is my pleasure to present this report on 
the instructions of the Assembly, whose rules 
state: " The Assembly shall express its views ... on 
the annual budget of Western European Union as 
soon as it has been communicated. " Unlike most 
parliaments, we do not have to approve the 
budget, we merely have to express an opinion on 
it, and that we can do. Colleagues will obviously 
have read the report. I pay great tribute to Mr. 
Cannizzaro, who has done a great deal of work 
and produced a document that covers all the 
points - even to the extent of showing how, by 
domestic savings, one section has been able to 
buy a new motor car. That is the sort of budg-
eting in which most families indulge. 
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Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued) 
The whole art of budgeting, whether in busi-
ness or elsewhere, relies on a set of criteria and a 
set of historical figures from which we can 
forecast the budget for the next year. That is 
enormously difficult in a time of great changes, as 
is the case now. The budget survey actually 
covers only two bodies - the Secretariat-General 
and one other - which have been established for 
a long time. That makes it possible to cover those 
bodies. The two new bodies have not yet pre-
sented their budgets, so we cannot criticise 
them. 
I do not want to take too long on this matter. 
On the question of the Secretary-General's 
budget, it is important that there is some flexi-
bility during a time of change and when a move 
to Brussels is taking place. We were glad to note 
that an increase had been allowed for, but that 
part of it had been frozen. I am not sure what 
that means, but I suspect that it is that that body 
has to apply again if it wants that portion of the 
increase. That is a sensible device if it is used 
properly. Indeed, the Council might consider 
it for the Assembly's budget. Last year, the 
Assembly had great trouble financing the 
accession of Portugal and Spain. If it had had a 
reasonable forecast and a frozen budget,· it could 
have applied for those funds as soon as it needed 
to spend money. Instead, we were put to great 
trouble and it required great skill by the officials 
to keep within the budget. 
The freezing measure that has been devised 
could be usefully employed in future. There is no 
question but that, with the move to Brussels and 
all the changes taking place, it is impossible to 
forecast exactly what sensible increases are 
needed. That issue has been well covered in the 
report. The total increase is 1.62%. It is mis-
leading in that some non-recurring expenditure 
that occurred last year is not accounted for, so 
the increase is actually greater - but it is good, 
tight budgeting. Budgeting must be related to the 
political position and the changes taking place. 
The pensions budget - with any necessary 
increases and decreases - should be absolutely 
automatic and should have nothing to do with 
the general running of affairs. It should not be 
related to the organisation's general expenditure. 
Supplementary budgets will, of course, be 
needed. As we say in the report, the budgets are 
tightly calculated and everything has been 
properly taken into account. 
Paragraph 29 of the report states: " The Sec-
retary of the committee, during a talk in London 
with the administrative staff of the Secretariat-
General, held in a co-operative, cordial atmo-
sphere, was able to obtain all the information he 
requested with a view to drafting the present 
report. " We shall always meet in a cordial atmo-
sphere as it makes it much easier to get along. 
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A chat over dinner will probably achieve a great 
deal more than passing acrimonious minutes 
between the organisations. 
Another question is whether the civil service in 
European organisations should be seconded or 
join the permanent European civil service. I 
agree with Mr. Keith Speed to a large extent, but 
as Britain has been an island state for a long time 
and its citizens find it difficult to relate to 
Europe, it might be useful for people to move to 
and fro between the services. 
The figures are all contained in the report and I 
thank you for listening. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Nobody has 
asked to speak in the debate. 
The Rapporteur does not wish to speak again. 
I call Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the com-
mittee. 
Mr. RATHBONE (United Kingdom).- I have 
nothing substantial to add to what the Rappor-
teur has said in his excellent report and intro-
ductory speech, except to say that we have had 
our past budgetary difficulties. Present diffi-
culties include insufficient staff to maintain the 
Assembly's ability to do the job with which we 
have charged ourselves and with which we are 
charged in representing our national parliaments 
here in WEU. If anybody doubts that, please 
walk along the first floor of this building and see 
the extremely cramped quarters in which our 
Assembly staff have had to work this week. They 
will have to continue to work in those condi-
tions to do the job that we ask them to do on our 
behalf. I pay tribute to them for the work that 
they do, even under those difficult conditions. 
We have initiated better budget-setting proce-
dures in our relationship with the ministerial 
committee. I look forward to working with you, 
Mr. President, having established earlier this 
year our budget for 1993, which will be a year of 
change for our Assembly in all the tasks that we 
shall take upon ourselves in this post-Maastricht 
era. 
Looking at 1992, I hope that I can reassure 
colleagues that we shall be able to do the 
minimum job necessary, although not all of the 
jobs that we should like to do. I hope, never-
theless, that we shall be able to do those in the 
future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the draft recommendation in Doc-
ument 1303. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
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There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
(Mr. Fourre, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
4. New Euro-American relations 
(Presentation of tUUl de/Jate 
on tile report of tile Politiclll Committee 
tUUl rote on tile drqft recommendation, 
Doe. 1310 41Ul amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Political Committee 
on new Euro-American relations and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 1310 and 
amendment. 
I call Mr. Soell, Rapporteur. 
Mr. SOELL (Germany) (Translation). - The 
report before us deals chiefly with opinions, 
ideas and plans in the United States after the 
end of the cold war. Its starting point is an 
enlarged conception of security that contains 
political, economic, financial and military ele-
ments. All of us who travelled to the United 
States for the Political Committee in February 
of this year realised that, in a presidential 
election year, it was bound to be difficult to 
obtain definite answers to each of our questions. 
We have therefore elected to present a broad 
picture of the various aspects and subjects as 
well as of the opinions that we encountered. 
My main objective in the first part, as should 
be obvious, was to recall our shared values and 
our common history as regards the stabilisation 
of democracy. I have mentioned this here again 
because, as one learns in politics, even obvious 
facts need constant repetition. 
Next we have tried to bring out the fact that 
the prevailing tone of the declaration made by 
the American President about the treaties after 
the Maastricht summit was very positive. It is 
true that in the last part of this declaration he 
indicated certain differences, especially in con-
nection with the Uruguay round. But reading 
between the lines, one senses that the United 
States has some difficulties with an economi-
cally and politically strongly integrated Europe, 
because of course such a Europe might engender 
competition between us, and this would undoubt-
edly call for fresh thinking by the Americans. 
We gained the strong impression during our 
discussions in the United States that there are 
1. See page 38. 
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still considerable differences of opinion on this 
subject in the various parts of the adminis-
tration. And of course this applies to Congress as 
well to a considerable extent. For this reason the 
next few paragraphs deal intensively with 
certain drafts and plans within the Pentagon, 
even though we are aware that criticism of plans 
of this kind surfaced very quickly, both in 
American public opinion and in Congress, in 
fact resulting in modifications to those plans; 
nevertheless, such opinions exist. Since then a 
new version has appeared, particularly of the 
parts of these Pentagon papers published in the 
form of a first draft, so this section of the report 
must naturally be viewed in a new light. 
The following paragraphs deal very inten-
sively with the Uruguay round and the GATT 
negotiations. Since this subject was very strongly 
emphasised by the American Vice-President and 
some senatorS at the security conference in 
Munich last February, we must discuss the 
subject very thoroughly, in the light of the fact 
that the economic and financial questions 
referred to earlier are achieving greater promi-
nence both in American public opinion and in 
Congress. 
Not very much is said about the relationship 
of Europeans and of the United States with the 
third world. Against a background of the con-
ference that has now begun in Rio, we have 
touched mainly upon ecological problems. We 
are aware that in this particular area problems 
will be increasing on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Despite certain agreements on principles, there 
is still a considerable gap as regards the exact 
data for certain measures in the area of climatic 
protection, the protection of species and, in par-
ticular, divergent opinions on the financing of 
the funds dedicated to the protection of the rain 
forest and many other things in third and fourth 
world countries. 
We also have to consider a subject that is 
claiming increasing attention in discussions in 
the United States as well, namely quite specific 
practices and attitudes in international trade, 
which undoubtedly play a part in connection 
with GATT, but also in bilateral relations both 
between the United States and Japan and also 
between Europe and Japan. I believe that there 
are several common interests that have not so 
far been recognised as such. Certainly one can 
see attempts to deal with this subject mainly in 
bilateral terms in American-Japanese relations, 
but I believe that there are considerable 
common interests in this field, especially as 
regards the opening of particular markets. I am 
not thinking so much of the opening of markets 
for visible trade, where there are relatively few 
obstacles, but rather the internal make-up of the 
Japanese economy, which makes it difficult for 
both Europeans and Americans to enter the 
finance and insurance markets and to create 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Soe/1 (continued) 
markets for certain products. In wide sectors of 
the economy there are quasi-cartels. This, too, 
opens up possibilities of co-operation between 
the United States and the European Community 
in the context of an enlarged concept of 
security. 
Another section of the report is mainly 
devoted to the subject of" NATO and ~uropean 
Security ". The Rome declaration provides the 
occasion for a further discussion of the role of 
the North Atlantic Co-operation Council. We 
know that there is no formal guarantee of 
security for the countries of Eastern Europe. 
That matter was also discussed in connection 
with Mr. Caro's report. But this debate on both 
sides of the Atlantic must be carried on in the 
awareness that military conflicts there are bound 
to affect the western countries. This of course is 
especially true of the very topical case of the 
former Yugoslavia. 
For this reason the recommendations, which 
we have phrased very modestly, contain a call to 
define much more accurately the new threats we 
are now facing after direct threats have dimin-
ished, even though of course they have not com-
pletely disappeared. This applies to the wide 
area of the structure, training and mission of 
future armed forces, but also of the planned 
rapid action formations. Here we truly need a 
definition of the threats and a common 
assessment of the way in which we should react 
to them, but we also need an accurately defined 
distribution of tasks. 
Proposals currently exist, particularly in the 
United States, for developing global protection 
against limited nuclear strikes. At present too 
little is known about the content of the indi-
vidual plans. 
There are additional reasons for us Europeans 
to hesitate ·before becoming involved in these 
plans. According to information in my pos-
session, in the last few days a new American pro-
posal has been put out, the details of which I 
must confess I had not previously known. At any 
rate I think that these American plans, also on 
offer to Europeans, call for intensive discus-
sions. 
We have also tried to pay attention to 
Canada's problems and Canada's share in 
European defence and joint security. The wish 
for Canada to continue to be very visibly com-
mitted to the security of Europe is expressed 
very clearly in our report. However, our cer-
tainty that Canada maintains this attitude is 
fading. All the same we have expressed our hope 
that notwithstanding the almost complete with-
drawal of Canadian troops which is planned for 
the next two years, Canada will continue to 
show interest in joint transatlantic security in its 
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public opinion, its government and parliament, 
and that an intensive dialogue with Canada will 
be continued. 
In closing permit me to add the following, 
after a long debate in the Political Committee: 
there have been several versions of this report. 
During this debate it has become very clear to 
me that different generations grasp and evaluate 
many facts and issues differently. There has 
been a very lively debate about several of the 
Rapporteur's assessments. And the Rapporteur 
himself has learnt much during this debate, 
since quite clearly there are different views, and 
there is a constant need to re-emphasise things 
that are really self-evident. 
May I make an earnest request: at a time when 
new attitudes are called for, an intensive dis-
cussion is needed both about threat appraisal 
and the distribution of tasks. The tasks do not 
have to be redistributed completely afresh, but 
there must be a discussion about future threats, 
and a redistribution, and this discussion should 
as far as possible be carried on without prejudice 
and suspicion. 
It is perhaps only a pious hope to say that the 
discussion should be carried on without prej-
udice and suspicion, but this appeal is directed 
to all of us, and of course to our friends and 
partners in America as well. Precisely because 
the direct threat has disappeared, there is an 
undoubted tendency, both here and elsewhere, 
to get into substitute action and find substitute 
opponents. 
To make this debate fruitful for transatlantic 
relations we should keep the discussion free as 
far as possible from such prejudice, suspicion 
and substitute actions. I cherish the same hope 
for today's debate. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Antretter. 
Mr. ANTRETTER (Germany) (Translation). 
- I hope you will not interpret the brevity of my 
speech as a measure of the importance I attrib-
ute to Mr. Soell's report. I believe that this 
report and Mr. Goerens's report are the two 
most important documents of the present 
session. I believe this one to be an important 
document because it makes clear that fresh light 
has to be shed on some major points in the area 
of security and defence and in Atlantic 
co-operation. I also believe it to be an important 
, document because it clarifies the interests of our 
friends across the Atlantic by reporting on 
American political attitudes. Much has accord-
ingly become more understandable. 
Against this background, I wish to refer to 
only one aspect in detail - the Franco-German 
corps. My first reaction when I think about the 
agitation over this Franco-German corps is to 
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remind myself that some five years ago there 
was a similar flurry when plans for the creation 
of the Franco-German brigade and the for-
mation of a Franco-German security council 
became public. 
At this time - if I may quote myself- I issued 
from this place a warning against annoying 
Qthers by creating something on which no clear 
agreements yet existed and no clear information 
could be provided. 
A similar situation has now arisen, since the 
President of France and the German Federal 
Chancellor announced at La Rochelle the for-
mation of a Eurocorps. 
To do this without at the same time pub-
lishing the agreements inevitably opened the 
doors to all sorts of interpretations and rumours, · 
and this at a time when there are in any event 
differing ideas about a redefinition of task distri-
bution between NATO and WEU. I am sure that 
many doubts and misunderstandings can be 
cleared away; but one thing should be avoided: 
the creation of new permanent command struc-
tures for a unit in which perhaps several coun-
tries may soon be participating, and which is 
under the command neither of NATO nor of 
WEU. 
For then there would in future be three 
different security structures. It is therefore 
desirable for both the states involved to bring 
the. project into WEU. 
There is already too much mistrust within the 
overall alliance with regard to the intentions and 
ulterior motives of individual partners, and in 
fact this is particularly noticeable on the 
American side. It is in nobody's interest for this 
mistrust to be intensified, and we may therefore 
be thankful that the communique issued at the 
Elysee Palace on 22nd May 1992 expressly 
states that the corps will help to strengthen the 
Atlantic Alliance. I believe, however, that a 
somewhat clearer gesture on the part of France, 
explaining this sentence and making it more spe-
cific, would have been helpful and desirable. 
With the aid of some documents from gov-
ernment offices in America, of which one at 
least is described by the Rapporteur as being 
very significant, the report establishes that con-
siderations are being raised in the United States 
with regard to relations between the United 
States and Europe which can only irritate and 
are bound to give rise to much concern in view 
of the demand in one of these documents that, 
" to avoid a competitive relationship from 
developing", the United States must seek to 
prevent the emergence of European-only 
security arrangements which would undermine 
NATO. 
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But this is contrary to repeated advice to 
Europeans by the United States and, indeed, 
makes it downright ridiculous. For example, 
President John F. Kennedy wanted WEU to be 
regarded as the European pillar of NATO. Only 
very recently the United States and Europe 
agreed in Rome that Europe should develop a 
European security identity within NATO. I 
think it would be a good thing if today's debate 
helped to create clarity on these points. This is 
what makes many, if not all, Europeans regard 
NATO and the allianee purely as an instrument 
of American' policy, through which the other 
partners to the treaty are dominated. 
Such a view may be understandable, espe-
cially in the light of a number of American docu-
ments cited in the report, but it should not 
become the mainspring of our political activity. 
For thinking in hegemonies is not confined 
solely to NATO, but is repeatedly met within 
Europe itself, as for instance in warnings that 
Europe will in future be dominated by the 
Germans. · 
The alliance and European Union must rely 
primarily on mutual trust and on the common 
values that we wish to develop and defend. Our 
main concern should be to work at this rather 
than invoking the dangers of hegemony. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would 
remind speakers that the time allowed for each 
speech is five minutes. 
I call Mr. Rodrigues. 
Mr. RODRIGUES (Portugal) (Translation). -
Mr. President, colleagues, the report we are dis-
cussing has aroused a fascinating debate in the 
Political Committee. That is only to be expected. 
Euro-American relations are at the very centre 
of the problems of European co-operation and 
security. And yet the subject is seldom dealt 
with openly or in any depth because dealing 
with delicate matters almost always gives rise to 
misunderstandings. 
Hartmut Soell has taken up the challenge. 
In his report, and in the recommendations, I 
recognise work of the highest quality, of which 
we should be proud. It enhances the image of 
WEU. It has the breadth and significance of a 
paper which encompasses the political, eco-
nomic and historical aspects of the new Euro-
American relations. By setting these into the his-
torical context the report also becomes a work 
reflecting on the path of man as he enters the 
twenty-first century. 
Rather than avoiding the difficulties of a 
thorny problem, Mr. Soell has faced up to them. 
The first of the many merits of the report is 
perhaps the courage shown in rejecting the pious 
and hypocritical untruths which continue to sur-
round the Euro-American dialogue, giving a 
mythical vision of the United States and its pol-
icies. 
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For two hundred years the people of the 
United States have made a significant contri-
bution to the progress of mankind, and the 
· respect which this contribution inspires brings 
with it the need to speak clearly when the global 
strategy of the government of the Great 
Republic sometimes clashes with the democratic 
North American tradition. 
In his report, our colleague, Mr. Soell, faces us 
with a number of disturbing contradictions. 
On the other hand, President Bush, first after 
the Rome summit and again after Maastricht, 
issued a statement firmly supporting European 
Union. He urged WEU to assume even greater 
responsibility for defending our continent. And 
yet, in contradiction of these and other similar 
calls, it transpires that those responsible for 
defining the external policy of the United States 
insist on a highly self-centred, unilateral 
strategy. 
One manifestation of this tendency is the now 
famous Pentagon document - to which Mr. 
Soell refers - which was revealed in March by 
the Washington Post and the New York 
Times. 
In justification of the effort to prevent other 
powers, notably Japan and Europe, taking a fun-
damental role in world security, the Pentagon 
says - and I quote - " that they need not aspire 
to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive 
posture to protect their legitimate interests". 
And why is this? The Defence Department 
intends that the United States- I quote - " must 
sufficiently account for the interests of the 
advanced industrial nations to discourage them 
from challenging our leadership or seeking to 
overturn the established political and economic 
order ". Documents such as this - and there are 
many - reveal a determined devotion to the 
dangerous myth of the redeeming nation, the 
myth of the founding fathers, taken up again 
recently by Presidents Reagan and Bush, 
whereby the United States alone can carry out 
the divine plan for the salvation of mankind. 
Mr. Soell's report is not - could not be - anti-
American. It is a report which dispassionately 
throws light on reality. In this it reminds us that 
the United States, in the grip of a long recession, 
is not in a position to support financially the 
ambitious strategy of world hegemony to which 
a large sector of the administration aspires. It is 
sufficient to remember that the intervention in 
the Gulf in 1991 was paid for primarily by its 
allies. This year the budgetary deficit alone is 
expected to exceed $400 000 million. 
Mr. Soell also reminds us, in a timely 
comment, of the existence of Asia. For instance, 
the Japanese economy alone amounts to twice 
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that of Germany, the giant of Europe. Japanese 
dynamism is such that, if the present rate of 
growth continues, the production of goods and 
services in Japan will, by the end of the century, 
have to aid the United States economy, despite 
the fact that the population of Japan is half that 
of America. To my. mind, the most important 
pages of Mr. Soell's· report are those which 
analyse and reflect on mankind in the world 
today. 
The security of Europe is inseparable from the 
security of the planet as a whole, in other words, 
from the destiny of mankind. Therefore our 
partnership with the United States can be har-
monious only if it is a partnership between 
equals. So far, unfortunately, this has not been 
the case. 
Allow me to quote a fine passage from the 
conclusion to the report to justify this frankness: 
" Possible tensions in the long-standing Atlantic 
relationship can be averted only if the causes, 
possible consequences and related issues are 
discussed in an atmosphere of openness and 
without mutual recriminations. " That is what 
Mr. Soell has said. 
I repeat: WEU has every reason to be proud of 
the report produced by its President which we 
are studying today. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I should like to comment on two points in the 
report. First, I should like to compliment 
Mr. Soell on an extremely good report in the 
version which we have now, together with the 
recommendations. It gives us a solid basis 
for re-examining our relationship with North 
America. 
I should like to look briefly at two angles. I 
deeply regret the apparent decision in Canada to 
withdraw from what I call the first rank of 
nations and to retreat into what we saw before 
the last war in America - virtual isolation from 
the world. I do not believe that this is the 
genuine wish of the Canadian people, but I am 
not sure that we have been able to let the Cana-
dians know how much we as Europeans really 
value their participation in the North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
I am afraid that, all too often, we have talked 
about America instead of North America. I have 
always taken great care to talk about America 
and Canada. We desperately need to keep the 
Canadians involved because of what has hap-
pened in two world wars. I appeal to Canadians 
to think again. Perhaps, if they can solve their 
constitutional problems, as now looks to be a 
possibility, we can readdress ourselves to the 
linkage. 
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On the United States, I think that we are yet 
again in the cycle in which the Americans ask: 
" Why should we involve our manpower and our 
money in Europe? " There is no longer the 
menace of communism· or. of the Warsaw Pact. 
All now looks simple. New democracies have 
been established. Of course, the Americans 
rightly chide us as Europeans for allowing tens 
of thousands of people to be murdered in Yugo-
slavia by a state that manifests such savagery. 
Let no one say that there is any civilisation left 
in the Government of Serbia, because it is 
behaving in a brutal, savage way - in a way 
which, frankly, has not been seen in even soine 
of the worst excesses of Mrican dictatorships. 
And yet the Americans say to us: " Why have 
you done nothing?" We heard yesterday all the 
reasons, none of which I accept. It was possible 
six months ago, to have stopped 90% of the 
deaths if any one of our countries had been pre-
pared to do it. It is too late today. 
What we now have to do is to work out, as 
Europeans, what we believe we require for the 
defence of Europe, for the defence of the new 
democracies against, who knows what? Iraq has, 
perhaps, no longer a nuclear weapon capability, 
but has North Korea? How many other coun-
tries have such a capability? That is why we 
cannot give up nuclear deterrence. I accept that 
Russia is no longer the enemy, but other coun-
tries could be. 
We must work out what we require for Europe 
and what we are prepared to pay for that. It is 
rather like WEU budgets, when we gaily go 
ahead and want to spend more than we have in 
the budget. We must work out our budget and 
what we can afford to pay and then say to the 
Americans, as our partners:" We need to get as 
part of our security, which is your security, these 
items. " If we do it that way we can get the 
message over to the new American Congress on 
how that can operate. If we continue to believe 
that America will automatically give us support 
we will be making a great mistake. No one can 
predict who is likely to win the next American 
presidential election. We all have our own views 
but it would be dangerous for Europeans to state 
them. I say to the Americans that we should 
work out what we need and sit down and talk it 
through. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -I call Mr. 
Fa bra. 
Mr. F ABRA (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, owing to the important .changes which 
have taken place in the world and especially in 
Europe, it is now more than ever necessary to 
create a new architecture for world security as 
demonstrated by the need to strengthen the 
European pillar, because we cannot, nor would 
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we wish to, continue without our allies on the 
other side of the Atlantic. 
What I had intended to say at this juncture 
has been rendered unnecessary by the presen-
tation and approval in committee Qf the 
amendment tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and 
Mr. Ward and touched upon by Mr. Caro. Con-
sequently, if we ensure that the Franco-German 
corps is placed under the authority of WEU and 
that all of this contributes to strengthening the 
military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, then I 
have nothing more to say, except to vote in 
favour of it. 
·Mr. President, clearly these recommendations 
should have an objective, but some of these par-
agraphs in the explanatory memorandum do not 
appear to me to be best suited to accompany the 
draft recommendation if it is to be received in 
the United States and Canada as we would wish 
it to be. I am not referring to the twenty-four 
paragraphs which have been deleted altogether, 
nor to those others which have been substan-
tially altered. There are still a number of para-
graphs which are pure speculation or value judg-
ments and are quite divorced from reality, or 
which pass judgment on deeds or ideas of two 
hundred years ago. In doing this, we are merely 
passing judgment on ourselves. In criticising the 
idiosyncracies of the North Americans are we 
not also criticising ourselves? Is the American 
way of conducting oneself anything more than 
the combination of French pride, British effi-
ciency, German industry, Dutch, Belgian or 
Luxembourg astuteness, the Italian sense of 
community, Portuguese spirituality or the 
Spanish ability to improvise? Mr. President, the 
truth is that I would not like our friends and 
relations across the Atlantic to believe that that 
is what we think of them. 
Mr. President, I recognise the effort Mr. Soell 
has made in agreeing to changes in a text which 
is his, and his alone. Perhaps I am the one who 
is mistaken, and the majority of those present 
share the view, past and present, of our allies as 
they are reflected in the explanatory memo-
randum; if this is so, they should understand 
that the only possible and plausible way out for 
the United States and Canada is a return to the 
Monroe doctrine. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Machete. 
Mr. MACHETE (Portugal) (Translation). -
Mr. President, in my view the report which Mr. 
Soell has presented on the new Euro-American 
relations is a good summary and contains many 
interesting suggestions concerning future devel-
opments. It sets out clearly the complex nature 
of the present situation and the doubts and hesi-
tations which both Americans and Europeans 
are experiencing faced with the upheavals taking 
place in Europe. 
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Moreover, it is - and this should be stressed -
not only a report on questions of security, but 
also on the more important aspects of Euro-
American relations. One of its most significant 
attributes, already pointed out by my Portu-
guese colleague who spoke before me, is that it is 
a balanced report which, while drawing 
attention to American idealism - which gave us 
the declaration on human rights, Jefferson's dec-
laration of independence and the entire history 
of the United States justifying its struggle for 
freedom - does not on the other hand neglect 
the fact that the United States is now the only 
superpower in the world, from which it has 
acquired a certain philosophy of power which 
also permeates its international relations and its 
international policies. 
This latter point has particularly clear reper-
cussions especially for the Uruguay round in the 
renewal of GATT. 
Let us hope that the recent reform of the 
common agricultural policy will in this case 
point to a new way out of a particularly difficult 
situation. This is also true in relation to NATO, 
and the difficulties which this organisation has 
encountered in coming to terms with the new 
situation in which we are living, and in under-
standing clearly the negative reactions to the 
Franco-German military corps. 
This leads us to recognise that we have to 
make an increased effort in order to continue to 
enjoy American interest and support in matters 
concerning the defence of Europe, which is vital, 
and which is symbolised in particular by the 
presence of troops. This is fundamental for the 
pursuit of European security policy - and we 
must not forget that, for our part, it is our right 
and our duty to achieve more self-reliance in 
defence matters. 
I believe that the creation of a high-level, 
mixed group, as is proposed at the end of Mr. 
Soell's report, is a first step towards this, but 
naturally it is a very small step, because within 
NATO we had an arrangement able to deal with 
any problem which will be dealt with by that 
group. 
It is essential to point out that we must 
compel- if you will forgive the expression - our 
American friends to take an increasing interest 
in Europe, and also that Europeans are capable 
of assuming responsibility for defence policy 
and overcoming the difficulties of building 
European unity - demonstrated yesterday with 
the negative result of the Danish referendum. 
These two efforts must go hand in hand, and 
it is essential, given what is at stake, that we do 
not relax our efforts to achieve speedy and tan-
gible results. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Nufiez. 
Mr. NUNEZ (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. 
Soell's report raises the question of the urgent 
need for a calm and thorough dialogue between 
the two sides of the Atlantic Alliance on the con-
struction of a common European policy. In my 
view, such a debate should be given a wider 
framework, in the context of the need for new 
political, diplomatic and economic relations 
between the American and European allies. Just 
now when all relationships, both human and 
international, are so closely interconnected, no 
single country or organisation can claim to 
possess the solution to the world's problems. No 
one can resolve all of the problems alone. For 
this reason Euro-American relations must be 
considered on the basis of postulates which are 
free from the prejudices that have existed 
between the European and American allies as a 
consequence of over forty years of cold war. 
Our American allies should understand that 
we in Europe are in a period of institutional 
change and that the desire of Europeans to 
create a European defence and security policy is 
only one more consequence of the European 
desire to build the European Union. Our 
American allies should understand, therefore, 
that this is compatible with the existence of 
NATO and military forces which are under the 
flag of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; 
and of course the Maastricht summit left no 
doubt about WEU's dual vocation, namely to 
constitute the EUropean defence and security 
identity and, at the same time, to serve as the 
European pillar of NATO. Our American allies 
must understand this dual vocation because 
relations between Europe and North America 
must be based on two fundamental principles: 
the respect of each party for the identity of the 
other, without which the common fruits we all 
desire will not be forthcoming, and, at the same 
time, the need for mutual complementarity. But 
we must start with the respect for each other's 
identity. And I believe I can say that I am, to a 
large extent, in agreement with what my col-
league Mr. Fabra has said. We must avoid mis-
trust, but we must also have clear ideas and 
proceed on the basis that each has its own 
identity. 
Europe has its own identity which is different 
from the American identity. This does not mean 
that there are no common roots, and there must 
be complementarity, but starting from the sep-
arate identity of each of the parties on either 
side of the Atlantic. It is unfortunate that in this 
particular instance there is no understanding or 
awareness on the part of the Americans of this 
new European reality. 
When our colleague Mr. Lopez Henares pre-
sented his report, we drew attention to this lack 
of awareness and understanding and the need to 
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remedy it in connection with the necessary par-
liamentary relations between Europe and Latin 
America. We are living in the age of information 
when not to be known is almost not to exist. We 
in Europe must be aware that many Americans 
do not know in which part of the world Europe 
is situated and there are some American con-
gressmen who are not aware of the existence of 
WEU; it is from this basis that we must start to 
strengthen our collaboration and our ties. 
In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope that after 
the elections in the United States there will be a 
clarification and strengthening of our links, and 
I am certain that given the intellect, the sense of 
balance and enthusiasm of our new President, 
Mr. Soell, whom I congratulate personally and 
publicly on his appointment, collaboration 
between Europe and America will also bear 
important fruit, based on respect for each 
other's identity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord 
Mackie of Benshie. 
Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE (United King-
dom). - I congratulate Mr. Soell on the 
enormous amount of work that he has done. I 
read the report with tremendous awe, and am 
glad that we have a new President who is pre-
pared to put in the hard work to provide such a 
wide survey .. 
I shall concentrate on the si:mple matter of 
defence and our approach to the"United States. I 
went to the United States with the Political 
Committee and found it absolutely fascinating. 
Apart from the representatives from the 
National Heritage Foundation, an organisation 
with right-wing leanings, we met some other 
admirable people. Those in Washington under-
stood the world, Europe and the problems. 
However, I also gained the impression that I 
was considered a barbarian from the far north of 
Hadrian's wall who had arrived in Rome, where 
I was seen rather as a creature from outer space 
might be seen, a supplicant in that great imperial 
capital. Perhaps that is true, but the snag about 
going to the United States is that all the parlia-
mentarians are so busy doing their work one can 
never meet them, and sees them only occa-
sionally. The same is true of our parliaments. 
We should get a bunch of congressmen over to 
Paris. It was not long ago that every American 
hoped to die in Paris. It is extraordinarily remiss 
of the French to have let the relationship slip so 
far that there is now some hostility between the 
two. The French have not displayed their usual 
cunning in using their cultural heritage in inter-
national relations. 
Over here, we have a good chance of getting 
everyone to listen and understand our problems 
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in Europe. We should work towards that, rather 
than visiting the United States as a body- just 
one of the hundreds of organisations that go 
there to put their case. 
It is vital that we get our own act together. If 
I were an American looking at the result in 
Denmark, narrow though it is, I would say that 
those people do not know where they are going. 
If I were an American looking at the formation 
of the Franco-German corps, I would ask what 
sort of arrangement invites other people to join. 
Surely any arrangement should be by mutual 
decision. 
If Europe got its act together and spoke with 
one voice, the Americans would listen. But as 
long as we do not know where we are going, they 
will have great doubts about what they should 
do. We have heard many examples - Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg has already mentioned our 
shame about doing nothing to resolve the Yugo-
slavian crisis. Let us get our act together in 
Europe so that we have some influence. We can 
then preserve NATO as a real force for world 
peace in a world that is still dangerous. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - The 
report by our colleague and President, Mr. 
Hartmut Soell, presents a number of thoughts 
and a draft recommendation which, even if 
some of us might not altogether agree with what 
it says about the way to talk to our American 
friends, provide an overall statement with which 
I am in agreement. 
We are presently discussing the first and 
second versions of Mr. Soell's report. A few days 
ago I was in Washington with a delegation from 
the French National Assembly and, after our 
talks with members of Congress, my overall 
impression was that mutual understanding with 
them depends upon the use of direct, frank and 
fair language, to speak in diplomatic terms. I 
must also say that just then the French position 
was front page news. The use of hollow lan-
guage, saying we are still friends, references to 
La Fayette and French cuisine to ensure a 
friendly reception are cliches no longer serving 
any point except as a reminder that when it 
comes to human rights the Americans and the 
French are in the forefront of the battle. 
It is true, as Mr. Soell reminds us, that with 
the Americans, moral duty governs all major 
decisions on the international scene, whatever 
they be, and that we Europeans, out of a kind of 
modesty or even shyness, tend to consider these 
references to the great values as being so obvious 
that they are better left out. That could be a psy-
chological problem due to the differences in lan-
guage and attitude on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. 
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To my mind, contact with the United States is 
essential for European development in condi-
tions of coherence, complementarity and mutual 
understanding. Therefore, though approving 
the draft recommendation and the amendment 
tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward, I 
and my colleagues, on behalf of the federated 
group which I have the honour to chair, intend 
to propose to the other members of the political 
groups of the WEU Assembly that we suggest to 
the Presidential Committee that it put on its 
agenda the idea of setting up an official body for 
liaison between the WEU Assembly and the par-
liaments of the United States and Canada. This 
permanent institution, which would not need to 
be eternally meeting, would have the political 
advantage of being in existence. By utilising the 
qualifications of the members of such a body, 
whatever the method used, meeting together, 
corresponding or using modern techniques such 
as tele-conferencing, we could demonstrate to 
the public that WEU realises that the objective it 
has in view, via the Maastricht Treaty and other 
means, can only be achieved through close 
co-operation with the United States and that 
WEU is concerned to dispel misunderstandings 
and seek whenever possible a common political 
will. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Roseta. 
Mr. ROSETA (Portugal) (Translation).- May 
I congratulate our President, Mr. Soell, most 
warmly on his excellent report on the most 
important aspects of Euro-American relations. 
My colleague and friend Mr. Machete has 
already dealt with some of its main points and, 
as I am in complete agreement with what he has 
said, I shall refrain from repeating it. 
I would simply point out that the report con-
tains an excellent historical expose incorpo-
rating both political and economic aspects, as 
my compatriot Mr. Rodriques said, and presents 
an accurate picture of the complexity of the 
world today. I would also like to congratulate 
Mr. Soell on being so open-minded throughout 
the lively and interesting debate which took 
place in the Political Committee, enabling some 
aspects which I and various other colleagues felt 
to be rather too critical to be re-examined. 
This final version of the report is, I think, well 
balanced, even though it still contains some crit-
icisms. The alliance does not exclude criticism; I 
believe that it even calls for it. A true alliance, 
obviously, would call for each of the allies to be 
critical of the other. 
There is much to be said for moderation in all 
things. Whatever thoughts the Pentagon may 
have had - and I consider that too much 
attention may have been paid to them, even 
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though obviously they needed to be criticised -
the American administration and representa-
tives, and in particular the Senate, will under-
stand that Europe has both the right and the 
duty to be free to build its own identity, now 
and in the future, especially in the field of 
defence, security and global foreign policy, 
without detriment to national identities. 
I think that our American friends are realists 
- they know who today has the resources to 
sustain policies and even operations, such as the 
intervention in the Gulf to which reference has 
already been made- and as realists they under-
stand that Pentagon documents designed pri-
marily to obtain funds for a particular 
department are not going to dominate the 
foreign and security policy of the United States, 
particularly as regards relations with Europe in 
the coming decades. 
I would like to stress that I agree with the rec-
ommendation to define the respective roles of 
NATO and WEU as regards security and peace 
in Europe in this new world situation. 
For the Portuguese people, relations between 
the partners on either side of the Atlantic are 
still very important. We all know that, without 
detracting in any way from our interest in 
security in Europe in general and our concerns 
regarding the Mediterranean, the defence of the 
Atlantic is just as important. Consequently, we 
would be less than honest if we did not at this 
point stress the importance we attach to transat-
lantic links, not only with the United States but 
with Canada and other countries, in particular 
Brazil. 
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my 
congratulations to the Rapporteur and say that, 
together with other colleagues, I expressly 
support the amendment tabled by Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg and Mr. Ward, which I think is rel-
evant and timely and will, therefore, have my 
vote. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. 
Terborg. 
Mrs. TERBORG (Germany) (Translation). -
When I read the report of our President and 
Rapporteur, Mr. Soell, about new relations 
between Europe and America- thoroughly, with 
all its points and conclusions - I had to admit 
that he had managed to draw a very full portrait 
of the conduct of transatlantic relations. It was 
not only his grasp of history that brought me to 
this recognition. I was fascinated by the long list 
of actual and alleged irritations in relations 
between Western Europe and the United States, 
between the United States and Asia, between 
Europe, the United States and the CIS. 
The report told me about the efforts of the 
alliance partners to define their attitude to all 
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parts of the world, including the ecological 
dimensions, in such a way as to gain much 
influence but assume as little responsibility as 
possible. I found my suspicion confirmed that in 
the search for constantly new compromise for-
mulas the cracks between interests were being 
plastered over. Therefore I struggled through the 
two hundred and eighty six numbered para-
graphs of the report, instead of reading only the 
recommendation at its head. 
This led me to the conclusion that the search 
for new security and defence architectures - or 
even identities - is a comparatively incon-
spicuous aspect compared with the great task of 
developing new architectures of trust and 
co-operation that will help to avoid economic 
wars - a danger that is far from over - which 
will allow our earth to survive - and Rio will 
show how clumsily and selfishly we approach 
that problem - and will create real solidarity, 
both with Eastern Europe and with third world 
countries. As yet I have detected no convincing 
steps in this direction. 
After studying the report I asked myself: what 
can WEU really contribute? How creative can 
and should it be in preventing a failure in the 
areas mentioned above from finally involving us 
in helping to settle the contradictions of this 
world in a plethora of local, regional and other 
conflicts by means of a modernised military 
architecture? 
At that point I decided that I should have to 
ask you this question, and I knew beforehand 
that I should be thwarted by the preconception 
that here was somebody trying to introduce pac-
ifist thinking. Why so? Surely because we all 
lack a predictive architecture that is humane, 
mutually supportive and to some extent nec-
essary even for the survival of humanity. May I 
remind you of yesterday evening? After we had 
painstakingly worked through the crisis in Yugo-
slavia, the last proposal was to threaten military 
intervention. As long as that is the last resort of 
civilised humanity, it is a pathetic alternative 
and one of which our Assembly has no reason to 
be proud. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Lamminen, Observer from Finland. 
Mr. LAMMINEN (Observer from Finland).-
Mr. President, fellow parliamentarians, on 
behalf of the Finnish Parliament I wish to 
express our appreciation for your invitation to 
attend this meeting as observers. As you know, 
Finland applied for membership of the Euro-
pean Community in March this year and that, of 
course, means that it is important for us to 
follow developments in WEU. 
I should like to use this opportunity to say a 
few words about current attitudes in Finland 
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towards European Union. The Maastricht 
Treaty establishes a common foreign and 
security policy for the European Union and pro-
vides for the development of a defence 
dimension and for a role for WEU. In seeking 
European Community membership, Finland 
approves the acquis communautaire, the 
content of the Maastricht Treaty and the finalite 
politique of European Union. Finland accepts 
all the obligations of the treaty and is prepared 
to participate constructively in its implemen-
tation, as agreed in Maastricht. 
Finland has always pursued a policy aimed at 
stability and security in northern Europe. For 
the time being the core of the policy of neutrality 
in the Europe of today may be characterised 
as military non-alignment and independent 
defence. We intend to maintain an effective and 
credible national defence capability commen-
surate with our security environment. 
At present membership of WEU is not a con-
dition of membership of the European Com-
munity. Finland's future decisions in that 
respect will depend on how WEU develops in 
the next few years and on the role that WEU will 
assume in carrying out the foreign and security 
policy of the European Community. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The debate 
is closed. 
I call Mr. Soell, the Rapporteur. 
Mr. SOELL (Germany) (Translation). 
Mr. President, I am pleased that Mr. Antretter 
has welcomed this report. I underline what he 
said about the Franco-German corps, and in 
particular what he said about the information 
policy that accompanied the resolutions relating 
to this Franco-German corps. 
I believe that in our new situation, in which 
there are many irritations, it is essential to a 
common policy that we should not add to the 
number of these irritations. The problems we 
already have will give us enough to do. 
Mr. Rodrigues said that in the past the part-
nership between Europe and the United States 
based on equal rights has not been properly 
recognised in some quarters. In this connection 
we must of course remember that the often con-
fusing multiplicity both of public opinion in 
individual states and of the pronouncements of 
European bodies are not always fully compre-
hensible to American public opinion and 
American politicians. I believe that this point 
was emphasised by many speakers as a necessary 
piece of self-criticism. 
I particularly support Sir Geoffrey's appeal to 
the Canadian Government to reconsider once 
more its decision to withdraw practically all its 
troops from Europe. We made a similar point in 
referring to this matter in the report and recom-
mendation. 
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In connection with attitudes on both sides of 
the Atlantic I should like to say something more 
about the conflict in Yugoslavia. You know that 
even in connection with the Gulf conflict, 
European public opinion was claiming that a 
double standard was being established in inter-
national relations. 
Even as I refer to this opinion, I do not think 
it is a fair one, because in fact Europeans are pri-
marily responsible for taking the necessary steps 
in their own area; that is increasingly the theme 
of European domestic policy. If there had been 
relatively early and sufficient awareness of the 
conflict before the first shot had been fired and 
the first blood shed, we should of course be in a 
considerably better position. 
Now I should like to deal with Mr. Fabra's 
criticism of the report. He thought that much of 
its content might well cause the United States to 
fall back upon the attitudes of the Monroe doc-
trine. I do not share this scepticism - indeed I 
believe that plain speaking by both sides, 
together with the necessary self-criticism, is 
more likely to lead to a joint definition of future 
policy. 
Mr. Machete expressed certain fears that there 
is a kind of power philosophy marking the 
attitude of the United States, for instance in the 
GATT negotiations. We all know that the 
United States faces considerable economic 
problems. However, we should not rejoice at 
these misfortunes but simply show awareness of 
them, just as we expect the Americans to take 
account of such things as the big structural 
problems of European agriculture. 
At all events Mr. Machete emphasised the 
need for the proposal which forms part of the 
draft recommendation, namely to set up a high-
level working group to make threat assessments 
and define the distribution of tasks. 
We do not wish to pursue these contacts 
exclusively as Western European Union and the 
European Union. We know of course that this 
discussion is also being conducted in the 
framework of NATO. However, it is conducted 
only between individual nations and their gov-
ernments within NATO. We want to venture 
upon a new step, namely that this European 
Union which is coming into being should, as it 
were, define the problems in the sphere of 
foreign and security policy jointly with the 
United States and Canada. 
Former Foreign Minister Genscher has pro-
posed a transatlantic treaty. Perhaps we should 
include this idea in the proposal made by Mr. 
Caro for the creation of a permanent liaison 
body between the American Congress and the 
parliamentary Assembly of Western European 
Union, because there are still many problems in 
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this area and in particular our work is not yet 
sufficiently widely known. 
Mr. Caro has already given some interesting 
information in discussions in the Political Com-
mittee - and as a member of my national par-
liament I have had the same experience - about 
the fact that in the American Congress people 
are more likely to be given a hearing as members 
of a delegation from a national parliament than 
as members of the parliamentary Assembly of 
Western European Union. This is another 
reason for my previous observation. 
Lord Mackie made a brief reference to our 
discussion in the National Heritage Foundation. 
That of course was not fully in the mainstream 
of the rest of our discussions. In the State 
Department itself we were given very full and 
pertinent answers which in fact differed from 
what we were told in the National Heritage 
Foundation. 
I think we should bear in mind that a certain 
section of public opinion, which is still reflected 
in the Pentagon's thinking, persists in the old 
view that the Americans want to negotiate with 
the individual European nations and their gov-
ernments in the first instance. They expect the 
Germans to influence others in the field of eco-
nomic and agricultural policy, and they expect 
the British to act in harmony with the American 
attitude in the area of security policy. And there 
is an old love affair with the French. 
We are not yet in a position to provide evi-
dence for a new transatlantic love affair between 
Europe and the United States, because the 
history of these relationships is still relatively 
short. But there is real need for a great effort, 
Lord Mackie, to make it clear to the American 
public and American politicians that it will cost 
a great deal to promote a common European 
foreign and security policy, and that we cannot 
continue with the multidimensionality of the old 
ways. I believe that that was the burden of 
nearly all the contributions to the debate, and 
of course it presupposes much greater unity 
between us Europeans. 
May I in closing refer to another point. Mrs. 
Terborg raised an issue that must affect us all 
very much, against the background of the 
current crisis in Yugoslavia. Our predictive 
architecture is still underdeveloped. That I 
admit. However much our perception of this or 
that conflict may differ, we naturally want all 
conflicts to be perceived as early as possible, 
before military activity breaks out. Further-
more, we must be aware that there are also 
massive cultural and economic differences, and 
that many historical conflicts still existed even 
among the Twelve, because national diplo-
macies naturally often drew upon their own 
fund of experience. It is still true that the road 
back to Sarajevo is comparatively shorter than 
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the road towards overcoming Y alta, as we have 
found during the past year. 
As a historian I can well understand people 
having recourse to their national fund of expe-
rience. However, if we wish to structure policy 
for the future, if we want to perceive crises and 
conflicts in good time, we must try to define our 
common interests as soon as possible. That 
applies to Europeans among themselves, and it 
also applies to American-European relations. 
That will enable us to make a better job of cre-
ating the predictive architecture, the lack of 
which you have rightly deplored. 
I thank you for your suggestions in the debate 
and ask you to vote for the draft recommen-
dation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Lord 
Mackie of Benshie, on a point of order I 
presume. 
Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE (United King-
dom).- Perhaps I was not heard correctly. I said 
that," apart from" the National Heritage Foun-
dation we had highly intelligent conversations of 
a hopeful nature. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the Political Committee. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). -As many 
colleagues said, the Political Committee had a 
very successful visit to the United States and 
Canada. It was fascinating not so much because 
we had extremely lengthy contacts with Amer-
ican colleagues, but because the discussions were 
so fruitful. 
I wish to make two more remarks. First, I 
compliment the Rapporteur. He knows better 
than anyone how difficult it can be to write a 
report - and the report is the property of the 
Rapporteur - and produce a document that 
makes the committee happy. As last, he pre-
sented a text that not only had his signature on it 
but caused a pleasant feeling in the committee. 
Secondly, it is easy to speak critically of the 
mistrust and lack of understanding in the 
United States. When we were there we made it 
clear that there will be political union - and I 
reiterate that today, despite the results of the ref-
erendum - and that there will be a security and 
defence identity and a common European 
security and defence policy. We said that that 
was the reality, whether people liked it or not. It 
will happen, and sooner than many people 
think. 
We must also realise that we cause many, 
many problems. People have said that matters 
are difficult to explain, and that was shown in 
the reaction of Mrs. Terborg. I am not speaking 
in a personal way; I am reflecting the feelings of 
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the committee. If I see people suffering, dying 
and asking for help, I cannot simply tell them 
that it is the fault of the arms exporters, 
although to some extent it is. It is also due to the 
miserable lack of courage of European govern-
ments. There is a cry for help. 
Almost everyone here is willing to build up a 
security identity to help people and to keep or 
restore peace. Our discussions with the United 
States must continue; just one visit is not 
enough. I agree with the proposal that has been 
put forward, but we must develop ways and 
means to have constant discussions with our 
friends in the United States and Canada. 
The Rapporteur and the committee deserve 
the Assembly's approval of the recommen-
dation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - On this 
text I have been informed of one amendment, 
Amendment 1 tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
and Mr. Ward. 
Amendment 1 reads as follows: 
1. At the end of paragraph (v) ofthe preamble to 
the draft recommendation, add: 
" insisting in this connection that, in 
accordance with the Maastricht Agreement, 
the Franco-German Eurocorps must be placed 
under WEU authority and that its arrange-
ments must strengthen the alliance military 
structure; " 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to speak to the 
amendment. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
There is really only one issue, and it is the one 
set out in my amendment. On 22nd May the La 
Rochelle meeting produced no details, although 
they had been promised for a long time, about 
the Eurocorps. We need to know what will be 
the real relationship of the corps both to WEU 
and NATO. 
It is interesting to note· that the Belgian Gov-
ernment has highlighted two issues that give 
substance to my amendment. First, it says that 
the -Eurocorps must be placed under WEU 
authority; and, secondly, that it must involve no 
weakening of the alliance structure. The infor-
mation so far available appears to show that 
those conditions may not be fulfilled, although 
yesterday Mr. Kinkel was more positive. I was 
also delighted to have Mr. Antretter's support 
for my proposal. 
France has already clearly stated that the 
political authority of the corps will be the partic-
ipants, not WEU. Availability to WEU is only 
one option, at the discretion of participating 
partners. In that case, its command will be 
uncertain. Meanwhile, France and Germany 
continue to speak as though the Eurocorps will 
' 1 
' 
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eventually expand into a European army that 
will become a third structure under the 
European Union, outside NATO and WEU. 
Again, that was what Mr. Antretter said earlier. 
That is directly contrary to the agreement in 
Maastricht that WEU would be the vehicle for 
non-NA TO European defence. 
The corps could have serious implications for 
the NATO integrated military structure because 
German units will have the corps and not their 
NATO formations as their primary assignments. 
Under the decision-making arrangements, in 
effect, France will decide whether the German 
elements are deployed as part of the corps or in 
their present NATO role. 
The availability of the corps units to NATO 
will be complicated by additional agreements 
and political decisions, in addition to NATO's 
well-tried procedures. The primary task of the 
corps - the defence of NATO territories -
unnecessarily duplicates what all of the allies 
have agreed, and most recently at Rome, as the 
responsibility of the alliance. 
As I said, in practice it may be different, but 
we have not had any details. That is why it is 
essential that we are all aware of our policy as an 
Assembly, which is to have WEU as the bridge 
between the EC and NATO. We must ensure 
that we remain true to that and to what was 
agreed at Maastricht. We need to agree the 
amendment - which, as I am sure the Chairman 
will say, is approved of and supported by the 
Political Committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
body wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I am going to use a procedure, well known 
in our parliaments, in which one can always find 
a touch of humour; as a French member of par-
liament, I am going to speak against the amend-
ment in order to say that I am in favour of it. 
What I want as a Frenchman and a European 
is that this army corps should strengthen not 
only the military structures of NATO, as Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg has said, but also - obvi-
ously - Western European Union, which we 
want to see performing the role of defence organ 
of the European Union. 
Clearly, although this is currently a bilateral 
treaty, the option is European. When the con-
struction of Europe first began, the Germans 
and French launched the European Coal and 
Steel Community which started the building 
process. Today the French and the Germans are 
offering Europe this first possibility of having 
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a European military structure by joining their 
forces. 
In my view, this is a European option, and it 
is in this spirit that I support Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg's amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Caro 
has just made use of a rule which he knows very 
well because he has been President of this 
Assembly under somewhat unusual circum-
stances. I am sure he will allow me to ask if 
anyone else wishes to speak against the 
amendment. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
Nobody wishes to speak. 
What is the opinion of the committee? ... 
Mr. SOELL (Germany) (Translation). - Since 
in the draft recommendation of Mr. Goerens's 
report - I refer to paragraph 14 of the recom-
mendation proper, a proposal made jointly by 
myself and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg - we said 
something similar to what is now being restated 
in detail, I have no objection to the recommen-
dation being amplified as proposed. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stoffelen, Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). The com-
mittee decided by an extremely large majority to 
express a favourable opinion. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the amended -draft rec-
ommendation. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. We shall therefore vote by show 
of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted unanimously 1• 
I especially thank the Rapporteur, President 
of our Assembly, and the Chairman of the com-
mittee. 
l. See page 39. 
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5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following 
orders of the day: 
1. Address by Mr. Riihe, Minister of Defence 
of Germany. 
2. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence 
of France. 
3. The development of a European space-
based observation system (Presentation of 
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and debate on the report of the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Document 
1304 and amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.) 
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7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- In accord-
ance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now 
inform the Assembly that I have received the 
nomination of Mr. Martinez for one of the two 
vacant posts of Vice-President of the 
Assembly. 
l. See page 43. 
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If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that 
the election of this Vice-President be by accla-
mation. 
Are there any objections? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare Mr. Martinez elected Vice-
President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by Mr. Riihe, 
Minister of Defence of Germany 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Riihe, 
Minister of Defence of Germany. 
(The President continued in German) 
Minister, allow me to welcome you to this 
Assembly in our own language. Since Western 
European Union was reactivated, it has become 
the fine custom for the defence ministers, too, to 
address this Assembly. It would in fact have 
been appropriate if this had been done before 
1984. 
As you know, this Assembly has great expecta-
tions as regards the details that will be added to 
what the governments of the nine member states 
decided in Maastricht. But let me begin by 
making a comment concerning you personally. 
As a parliamentarian, you have gained wide-
ranging international experience, especially in 
European-American relations. This is a time of 
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radical change and reorientation. In the few 
weeks you have been in office you have laid 
down the first markers at national level for the 
fulfilment of the requirements of this reorien-
tation. 
The challenges at international level are even 
greater. I have just referred to the declaration of 
the Nine in the context of the Maastricht Treaty. 
At this part-session we have adopted two recom-
mendations, one concerning the Eurocorps. It 
shows that we expect the Eurocorps to be firmly 
planted in the institution that is Western 
European Union and generally to strengthen the 
political and military cohesion of the alliance. 
As regards the sanctions designed to bring the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia to an end, the 
Assembly decided yesterday after a debate under 
the urgent procedure to recommend the Council 
of Ministers to take the necessary measures as 
soon as possible to give effective support to 
these sanctions. 
I put forward these briefly summarised expec-
tations with you in mind. May I now ask you to 
address the Assembly. 
Mr. RUHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, after the visit of my colleague, Mr. 
Kinkel, at the beginning of the week you are now 
seeing a second new face from Germany. I must 
say I am happy to be here. I am looking forward 
to working with you, and what I would like to do 
today is discuss new aspects of European 
defence policy with you. This debate is taking 
place not only at the end of the German presi-
dency, but at a time that is generally important 
for WEU's development, shortly after the Franco-
German summit at La Rochelle and NATO's 
spring meeting and shortly before the meeting of 
the WEU Council of Ministers on 19th June. 
Addressing the Assembly of Western Euro-
pean Union on the subject of European security 
and defence policy, I am well aware that I am 
carrying coals to Newcastle. Therefore, I shall 
confine myself to a few significant points. 
The failure of socialism and the fact that the 
division of Europe and Germany has been 
overcome have wrought a fundamental change 
in the political geography of Europe. The one-
dimensional threat of the East-West conflict is a 
thing of the past. But its place has been taken by 
new and less definite dangers and risks. Today, 
conflicts are bursting out in Europe which had 
been kept under the concrete lid of communism 
but have never been settled: border disputes that 
remain to be solved, ethnic conflicts, social and 
economic problems. 
And finally, it is not only security in Europe 
which is at stake but also security for Europe. 
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The task of safeguarding peace in freedom for all 
Europeans requires not least a broad range of 
precautions against developments fraught with 
crisis and conflict in other regions of the world, 
precautions for which we have to use all political 
and economic instruments available to us. 
Years of continuous transformation are lying 
ahead. This transformation must be structured 
and controlled by us. Having won the cold war, 
we are now facing the challenge to win the 
peace. In this era, there is no clear-cut archi-
tecture of security in Europe. The landscape of 
security policy has become fluid and will not 
crystallise into new, solid structures for years to 
come. 
In this situation it is an advantage that there 
are NATO, CSCE, the emerging Political Union 
of Europe, and WEU, institutions that provide 
us with a set of instruments to use in safe-
guarding our security interests. 
Many questions concerning the mutual rela-
tions of these institutions are as yet unanswered. 
But if there is a collective political resolve 
guiding our actions, then we shall answer these 
institutional questions. Conversely, however, 
the following is true as well: institutional 
arrangements, let alone military structures, 
cannot take the place of political consensus. 
Let me add just a few sentences about the 
institutions of security which we have. NATO, 
in its capacity as a security and defence alliance, 
continues to provide the basis of our security. 
Being the only functioning alliance, it is the 
guarantor for peace and stability in Europe. In 
forty years, the Atlantic Alliance and the 
presence of American forces have come to be an 
integral part of what I would call the European 
security culture. The United States is and will 
continue to be an Atlantic power, present on 
both sides of the Atlantic. This fact is not only 
indispensable for maintaining the security 
balance in Europe; it is also preserving the 
political weight of the United States in 
Europe. 
To enable the alliance to accomplish its 
mission, it must not be overstressed, for 
instance by far-reaching security guarantees for 
the CIS states giving rise to conflicts within the 
alliance that would be beyond control. All the 
same, NATO will extend its political role to 
include that of a security system for Europe as a 
whole. The establishment of the North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council has provided a forum for 
dialogue and co-operation with the eastern 
partners. This puts into practice what the NATO 
foreign ministers formulated as follows at the 
Copenhagen meeting in June last year: Our 
security is indivisible from that of all other 
European states. 
Moreover, I consider it conceivable that 
NATO may make available to CSCE, on a case-
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to-case basis, its resources for peace-keeping 
measures. But one thing must be understood 
clearly: NATO's main mission will continue to 
be the protection of the alliance, the preser-
vation of the security and integrity of its 
member countries. Only when NATO accom-
plishes this mission will it be able to act as an 
anchor of stability for Europe as a whole. 
Not least the conflicts raging in the former 
Yugoslavia have made clear that there are situa-
tions of crisis for European security in which 
NATO is neither in a position nor willing to 
intervene. This sober analysis forces the Euro-
peans to shoulder more responsibility for their 
security. And Europe must not be incapable of 
taking action when it is a matter of preserving 
peace and freedom. The Europeans must 
therefore provide the instruments required to 
enable them to safeguard their own best security 
interests. This is why the decision of Maastricht 
to strengthen, with the assistance of WEU, the 
common European identity in the domain of 
security and defence is of strategic importance. 
The mission devolving on WEU in this 
context is to co-operate in the development of a 
common defence identity in its capacity as an 
integral part of the European Political Union. 
WEU is to be in a position to develop and 
implement decisions of defence policy. The 
German presidency has been active in all these 
domains. Special importance attached to the 
Bonn meetings of the chiefs of defence staff held 
on 27th January and 20th May. At those 
meetings, the chiefs of defence staff talked about 
how to concretise the operational role of WEU 
and prepared the necessary political decisions. 
In the future they will - so it was decided - meet 
regularly before ordinary meetings of the minis-
terial Council, and additionally whenever 
required. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the Eurocorps, whose 
establishment was agreed upon at the Franco-
German summit in La Rochelle on 22nd May, is 
an important addition to the European security 
scene. The activation cell will start to work in 
July, and by 1995 the corps is to be operational. 
In the perspective of the European Union, the 
corps is then to be able to accomplish three mis-
sions, doing so within the scope of national con-
stitutional provisions and in compliance with 
the United Nations Charter: missions in the 
framework of collective defence of the allies in 
accordance with Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty or with the Brussels Treaty; missions 
aimed at maintaining or restoring peace, and 
missions for the purposes of humanitarian aid. 
The decision on its commitment will rest with 
the respective governments. 
WEU, as the link between NATO and the 
emergent European Political Union, is the pol-
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itical roof of the Eurocorps. I am confident that 
very soon other countries will participate in the 
Eurocorps which began as a Franco-German ini-
tiative, whose perspective is however that of a 
really European corps. 
The process of building European security 
structures, however, must be pursued together 
with, not against NATO. But the United States, 
too, has a vital interest in a stronger European 
partner who will assume more responsibility for 
its security. What is decisive is for the Euro-
peans to take these steps in consensus especially 
with the United States, and to beware of com-
municating the wrong signals. The shaping of 
European security structures must be guided by 
the principles of transparency and complemen-
tarity. The United States and Canada are and 
continue to be indispensable partners in stability 
and guarantors of a lasting, peaceful devel-
opment in Europe. 
In this regard I feel it is essential that the 
German forces foreseen for the Eurocorps will 
not be withdrawn from their NATO assignment. 
They will be faced with an additional mission, 
but will remain fully available to NATO. In the 
press release on the meeting of the Franco-
German Security and Defence Council at La 
Rochelle, too, we have once more made clear 
that the national contributions to the Eurocorps 
do not prejudice any existing commitments to 
other organisations. 
Moreover, the missions of the Eurocorps 
provide for a significant contribution to joint 
operations at NATO level in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Against this 
background, the relationship between the 
French units in the corps and the alliance 
assumes a new quality. Like other national and 
multinational forces, the European corps may be 
employed in the WEU framework as well as in 
the framework of NATO in the function of a 
special European contribution. Under this 
regime, France will make available the troops it 
contributes to the corps either to NATO's reac-
tion forces or to its main defence forces, as the 
situation may require. This is a step forward. 
Germany has only been able to agree to the 
Eurocorps' mission subject to what its current 
constitutional situation permits it to accept. As 
regards this, we Germans are facing the question 
to what extent our security policy is capable of 
assuming a European dimension. The united 
and sovereign Germany must not be permitted 
to play a special role and isolate itself in the 
domain of foreign policy. Being a normal state, 
Germany must be in a position to exercise all of 
its rights and fulfil all of its obligations in safe-
guarding and restoring peace and international 
security. 
In Cambodia there are now almost 150 men 
of the medical corps of the Federal Armed 
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Forces who provide medical support to the 
22 000 military and civilian personnel of the 
UNTAC mission of the United Nations. The 
challenge facing UNT AC in Cambodia is not 
confined to the task of guaranteeing the cease-
fire. Until the time when free elections will be 
held, UNT AC will practically govern the 
country, must prepare these elections, and not 
least repatriate nearly 400 000 refugees. 
I am fully convinced that the success or failure 
of this operation will signal the future political 
weight of the United Nations Organisation in the 
world. Therefore, it is of great psychological 
importance that Germany has committed itself to 
that operation. This is a big step for Germany, 
though for others, looking at it from outside, and 
comparing numbers, it may be a small one. From 
the German standpoint it is a big step towards 
assuming greater responsibility under the United 
Nations. We are, however, well aware that we 
cannot stop at such humanitarian missions. The 
next step to be taken by us Germans must be par-
ticipation in blue-helmet actions. Today, more 
than 40 000 blue helmets are operating 
worldwide, and it would be bad for Germany's 
international reputation if we disappointed the 
expectations of our friends and partners. In the 
Bundestag, such missions are already accepted in 
principle. I shall therefore make an effort to 
establish - in discussions with the political 
parties represented in the Bundestag - the condi-
tions requisite for employment of German serv-
icemen in the framework of blue-helmet actions 
of the United Nations, and I shall try to do so 
before the end of this year. 
On the other hand, however, it is not possible 
to get rid of and transform overnight forty years 
of experience and accumulated instincts in 
foreign policy. Nor of course can they be 
ordered away from the top down. United 
Germany's assumption of greater international 
responsibility must be an organic process, which 
takes time. This applies in particular to the par-
ticipation of German soldiers in combat opera-
tions, a situation that is also understood by our 
allies. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the CSCE provides the 
framework for building a peaceful order from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. It provides the 
framework for comprehensive co-operation in 
politics, economy, environmental protection, 
society and culture. In the Charter of Paris, all 
European countries entered for the first time 
into a binding commitment to the principles of 
democracy, human rights and market economy, 
and decided upon a working programme for the 
establishment of an enduring and just European 
order of peace. 
We want to open up to CSCE further options. 
CSCE should in particular be strengthened by 
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developing into a regional arrangement in 
accordance with Chapter VIII of the United 
Nations Charter. 
It is one of the primary interests of all Euro-
peans in the domain of security policy to have 
the Vienna Treaty implemented as soon as pos-
sible. After discussions with our allies, I have 
decided that in the middle of the current year we 
shall start unilaterally to destroy about 10 000 
weapon systems that come under that treaty. By 
doing so, we set a signal to encourage early rati-
fication of the treaty by the CIS states; for, in a 
European security system, the contribution of 
disarmament and arms control towards equi-
librium and stability and towards mutual confi-
dence is indispensable. 
Let me also mention here expressly the contri-
bution made by Western European Union to 
disarmament and arms control in Europe. The 
Open Skies Group of experts has . arrived at 
initial results, and another matter which WEU 
has urgently advocated is the coming into effect 
of the CFE Treaty before the CSCE summit to 
be held on 9th and lOth July- a goal which we 
support with all our might. 
In the network of European institutions of 
security, it would be wrong to narrow the 
spectrum down in an era of change. We need 
flexibility and a variety of options. The 
European and transatlantic institutions of 
security cannot be substituted for one another. 
But they can complement each other provided 
they are supported by the foundation of a 
common political objective. 
For this political process we need your 
support, too. The Assembly of Western 
European Union in its capacity as a parlia-
mentary body must and - I am convinced - will 
have a say in, and make available its unique 
experience to, this process. 
I do not want to come to an end without 
recalling Robert Pontillon, who fulfilled his 
duties as President of the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU with exemplary dedication. 
At the same time I congratulate the newly-
elected President, Professor Soell, whom I know 
and have learned to value from our work 
together irt the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
German Bundestag, and wish him much success 
in his work. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
for your statement, Minister. I assume that you 
will be answering member's questions. So that 
we. know where we stand, I have noted the 
names of eight members wanting to put ques-
tions to you: Baroness Hooper, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Fioret, Mr. 
Stegagnini, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Caro and 
Mr. van der Linden. 
I call Baroness Hooper. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
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thank the Minister for his fascinating contri-
bution. May I ask him what he considers to be 
the prospects for Germany continuing to 
support the development and production of the 
European fighter aircraft? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - As I cannot answer every 
question in the speaker's own language- I could 
do so in English - and as I want to treat 
everyone the same, I will answer in German. 
When I left Bonn, I thought, or at least hoped, 
that I would not be asked this question for about 
half an hour. I can understand, of course, that it 
is the very first question. 
We find ourselves at a very difficult stage in 
our decision-making, because this project was 
essentially designed in the mid-1980s and, to my 
mind, is now quite disproportionate to the 
changed security situation. As everyone knows, 
Germany is also in a very difficult financial situ-
ation, not least because of the process of unifi-
cation. Many of our foreign colleagues are con-
stantly warning us not to impose too much of a 
burden on the international capital market and 
to reduce our public spending. 
When this aircraft was designed the real 
growth rate in our defence budget was between 
3% and 4%. Now we have a very sharp drop in 
the defence budget, which is creating a situation 
that may lead to serious displacement effects. 
My initial analysis is therefore a military one: if 
I want to prevent the agreements laboriously 
negotiated by the Federal Chancellor and Mr. 
Gorbachev, allowing the German armed forces a 
strength of 370 000 men, from being under-
mined financially by the displacement effect of a 
given system, I have to take a responsible 
decision at this juncture. At 230 000 men, 
Germany's land forces are already very 
numerous, and this will continue to be so in the 
future. I have to ensure that the army can be 
kept up to date across the board, and whatever 
happens, I must avoid a displacement effect. 
A number of other aspects, such as aspects of 
industrial policy, will rightly be addressed. All I 
can say is that when looking through my budget 
I have not discovered a title for them so unfortu-
nately I cannot take account of them in my 
budget. Instead, I have to try to keep the 
German armed forces as a whole up to date on a 
shrinking defence budget. 
I also have to ask myself what threats we may 
face after the year 2005 up to 2030 or 2040. In 
this case I have to try - after 2005 at least - to 
relate an airborne component, a fighter aircraft 
- we need a successor to the Phantom - to a pos-
sible threat in the form of missiles. I also have to 
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relate it to the need to create European air 
transport capacities for a more mobile army for 
deployment outside Germany but in the NATO 
area, and in the long term generally for a more 
mobile army to perform the tasks expected of us 
in the international arena. In other words, all 
these military considerations must be related 
one to the other. 
These are just a few of them. The British 
Prime Minister, John Major, will be coming to 
Bonn on Friday, and we will then have an 
opportunity to discuss the matter. It will be a 
difficult decision, but the Defence Minister has 
expressed his views. It is a decision that has to 
be taken by the whole of the German Gov-
ernment and ultimately in the German Bun-
destag. I believe this will be done in the very 
near future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Will the Minister clarify without reservation, if 
he can, the German Government's position on 
the Eurocorps? Are we correct in assuming that 
it will be both under the control of WEU and 
within the alliance? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - As I quite deliberately said in 
my statement, which is also available in writing, 
this corps will be under WEU's political control. 
I agree with my British colleague, Malcolm 
Rifkind, that this should not be the only 
instrument, that others too are conceivable: an 
Anglo-Dutch amphibious formation, possibly 
even a multinational division, which should 
similarly be kept in readiness under the heading 
of forces answerable to WEU. 
As regards the relationship between the 
Eurocorps and the alliance and the sequence 
that has been agreed for them, I have said that 
the first task of the Eurocorps is to take action 
under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. If 
there is a NATO situation, in other words a case 
in which a comprehensive defence is needed -
this is something else we can achieve - the 
deployment of the whole corps will have pri-
ority. The terms in this respect will have to be 
negotiated by the Eurocorps and SHAPE. Our 
idea is that this agreement can ensure that, if the 
Eurocorps is deployed in a NATO case, it would 
be placed under the operational control of 
SACEUR in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, not under NATO's full 
command, because that would mean complete 
integration into NATO, but under SACEUR's 
operational control. 
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It is quite clear that, if this is the agreement 
reached, it will be NATO that profits in a NATO 
case, because the French units have so far been 
held back in a kind of reserve position for use as 
a last resort. So I believe that what we have 
decided will strengthen the European com-
ponent if NATO is unwilling or unable to react, 
but that, if there is a NATO case, it will also 
strengthen NATO. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister. 
I call Mr. Borderas. 
Mr. BORDERAS (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. 
Volker Rtihe, Baroness Hooper has asked the 
very question I was about to put to you; conse-
quently my question will be much more brief 
because it has, in part, been answered and I 
heard your reply very clearly. 
Nevertheless, I must say that in political 
defence circles in my country and in the Min-
istry of Defence itself, there is concern about the 
state of opinion as regards the EF A, the 
European fighter aircraft. To date my country 
has invested over 70 000 million pesetas, around 
$ 700 million, because Spain is contributing 
some 13% to this project. 
Minister, you have assessed the repercussions 
which this project has, in our countries, on 
investments by the state and by private firms 
and on the future of European air defence itself, 
and I should like to know what you think in 
view of the fact that currently Spanish opinion 
appears to favour prolonging the production 
period so as to be able to spread the cost over a 
larger number of annual budgets so that we can 
continue with this programme. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - This is not domestic policy: this 
is European policy, so I have some sympathy for 
the questions. 
Costs have been incurred everywhere, 
including Germany. We have given an assurance 
that the development of the aircraft will be com-
pleted in any case, but it was agreed from the 
outset that each country would be free to decide 
whether or not to join in production. So the situ-
ation we are now facing is by no means new. 
Where Germany is concerned, the gov-
ernment set up a working group in 1991 to 
prepare the way for a decision on whether or not 
to go into production and also to examine other 
options. If you look at the facts, you will find 
that there is nothing at all surprising about the 
present German debate. In fact, everyone has 
known for several years that development would 
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not automatically lead to production. In line 
with the agreement we are now making up our 
minds whether or not to go into production. 
This is a difficult decision. Nor will it have 
escaped you that Germany too is having diffi-
culty in taking it. It also, of course, has major 
implications for certain regions. That is why it 
will ultimately be a decision that has to be taken 
by the whole government. It goes without saying 
that concern with the alliance and Europe also 
plays a major part in the deliberations. But 
everything I have said is also very important in a 
quite specific situation. 
If I might be permitted a personal comment, I 
believe that, if the reaction in 1990, when there 
were signs of very significant changes in Europe, 
as I have just said, had been to stop work on an 
aircraft of this type and to say we will go for suf-
ficiency, for an adequate rather than an ideal 
solution, if we had reacted to the new political 
situation in the world, there would have been 
greater acceptance today and the necessary 
funds would have been available. And if I may 
be permitted to say so, I would add that the 
financial situation in Germany is particularly 
difficult, but I sometimes have the impression 
we are at the moment the only poor country in 
Europe. There may be one or two people behind 
us who should be asking themselves whether 
they are really in a position to finance all the air-
craft they once talked about. In Spain's case it 
was supposed to be one hundred, but I believe 
they have already reduced that to eighty-seven. 
Italy wanted one hundred and twenty. I feel that 
if you take a closer look you will find that it is 
not only in Germany that there are financial 
problems. But we face a quite specific situation 
because we are transferring resources to the 
value of one hundred and forty billion from 
West to East each year, so our position is partic-
ularly strained. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister. 
I call Mr. Fioret. 
Mr. FlORET (Italy) (Translation).- Minister, 
the creation of an integrated force presupposes 
the adoption of standard armaments with 
obvious consequences for the training of troops 
and the equipment of armouries and for the 
industries which support the integrated armed 
forces. 
France and Germany argue - as you repeated 
this morning - that the army corps created by 
the agreement of 22nd May is an armed nucleus 
designed to speed up the integration of Europe's 
defence forces. 
Do you think it possible, Minister, that the 
chiefs of staff from WEU countries not involved 
in the La Rochelle agreement can accept an 
already established situation in which they have 
not been involved in the operational choices? 
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Does it not seem to you that the Franco-German 
initiative, which basically offers the other WEU 
countries the choice of take it or leave it, is a 
move in the opposite direction as compared 
with what you said in your speech, which to me 
is reassuring in form but unconvincing in sub-
stance about the function of the Franco-German 
army corps? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - After the President of the 
French Republic and the Federal German Chan-
cellor set the ball rolling last October, it was 
clear that this matter would be open from the 
outset. This has also meant that a number of 
countries may be about to take a favourable 
decision. But seen through both German and 
French eyes it was always clear that it should be 
a genuine Eurocorps, and I, too, am very 
hopeful. 
But I am sure we are all familiar with situa-
tions in domestic politics, and in foreign politics 
too, where somebody has to set the ball rolling 
-- and it is not possible for everyone to be involved 
straight away. This, for example, has been a 
Franco-German initiative. But I am really very 
confident that the name Eurocorps will be jus-
tified in the not too distant future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister. 
I call Mr. Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Minister, please forgive me but I would like to 
come back to the question of the European 
fighter aircraft for which the German Gov-
ernment is getting ready to announce cancel-
lation of the programme. Our Spanish colleague 
raised the matter first and I am now speaking as 
an Italian and also as the person who, for three 
years in this Assembly, was responsible for one 
of the biggest examples of military-industrial 
co-operation within WEU; four countries are 
involved in that programme which is considered 
to be vital for Europe's aerospace industry and 
also a first priority from the military stand-
point. 
Yesterday we heard the United Kingdom Sec-
retary of State for Defence, Mr. Rifkind, 
announce that the programme will have to go 
ahead anyway even at the cost of serious eco-
nomic sacrifices; the economic situation in my 
country is certainly worse than that of 
Germany. 
It seems to me that the problem is not only 
economic but also political and technological 
and to do with European co-ordination. Fur-
thermore, in my opinion, there are other reasons 
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- at which you hinted in your speech a short 
time ago - and I would not like it that in 
response to the unfair accusations levelled in 
some measure against your country by the 
Americans, Germany should do any favours, to 
General Dynamics, for example, because by the 
end of the century the German Phantoms are 
bound to have to be withdrawn. So we have the 
device of buying American aircraft in order to 
refute the unfair accusation of being anti-
American or anti-Atlantic which has recently 
been heard following the summit at La 
Rochelle. 
I would not wish to seem to be fantasising or 
harking back politically but this decision coming 
after La Rochelle certainly leaves us in doubt. 
Minister, the European fighter aircraft pro-
gramme is essential not only for the credibility 
of European co-operation in the matter of aero-
nautics and technology; but it has been asked 
what future Deutsche Aerospace will have if this 
programme is cancelled, and this also applies to 
Italy's Alenia and to British Aerospace; what 
international credibility shall we have for the 
industries which are of fundamental impor-
tance, particularly if they are co-operating 
because while individually they have the 
required technological and intellectual 
resources, they are not individually strong 
enough to carry through such a complex major 
programme. The withdrawal of Germany is 
therefore a matter of great concern to us, both 
for the political reasons which I hope are untrue 
and for the economic reasons which are serious 
for Germany and also for the other countries of 
Europe, including the United Kingdom which 
we know is facing very serious difficulties, and 
without mentioning Italy which has terrible dif-
ficulties. 
And so when the British Prime Minister, John 
Major, visits Chancellor Kohl, I would ask you 
to argue on behalf of our Assembly and of all of 
us here working for genuine co-operation in 
WEU in the field of military technology, that the 
programme should not be abandoned and that 
other means should be found of going ahead 
with the project which, while there may have 
been changes as regards military strategy and 
international politics, there have been no 
changes as regards technology and the enormous 
possibilities for co-operation in such an 
important and vital sector as that of European 
aerospace. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I realise, 
Minister, it is not exactly easy to respond to a 
comment like this; it is more than a question. 
Mr. RUHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - I have also had to have 
intensive discussions with the representatives of 
the aerospace industry, of course. 
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Let me begin by saying that the Federal Gov-
ernment has not taken a decision: we are still in 
the process of discussing this issue. The Defence 
Minister has considered the environment in 
which a decision has to be taken. The Eurocorps 
really has nothing to do with this. 
The European fighter aircraft has been the 
subject of a critical debate in Germany for 
several years. Certainly since 1990 it has been 
quite clear that no decision has been reached on 
this aircraft. At that time none of us yet knew 
anything about President Mitterrand's and 
Chancellor Kohl's initiative. 
I would ask you to believe me when I say that 
this discussion is not a cover for any ulterior 
motives in the foreign policy sphere. It all has to 
do with what I said about reunification, the 
change in the security situation, the particular 
financial situation facing Germany and the need 
to keep 370 000 men up to date and to prevent a 
displacement effect. 
I emphasise the importance of European 
co-operation on armaments. The problem is 
simply that this project dates back to 1984 and 
meets the tactical requirements of 1984. That is 
why difficulties have arisen. I have told you 
what I personally think might have been done to 
put things right. 
What is more, if it should be decided not to go 
into production, American aircraft are by no 
means the only alternative, although I would 
have no objection to them: I referred to the 
Atlantic Alliance and its importance just now. 
There would also be European aircraft to choose 
from. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. 
The next question will be put by Mr. Lopez 
Henares. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- Minister, today the members of this Assembly 
have been disappointed to hear the result of the 
referendum in Denmark, with the greatest 
respect, of course, to the Danish people whose 
decision it was. This negative result for those of 
us who are so enthusiastically monitoring the 
construction· of Europe and the debates taking 
place in Europe as a result of the Maastricht 
agreement suggests that, in future, we may have 
to expect progress in matters both political and 
social to be rethought and possibly implemented 
with greater caution or less haste. At the same 
time, however, the so-called European defence 
identity to which you tellingly referred in your 
address and which we so frequently discuss, is 
one area where we cannot, nor must we, have 
any doubts. We should not delay in this matter, 
but should speed up work on the mechanisms 
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for this defence identity to the greatest possible 
extent, while maintaining the perfect trans-
parency you so aptly referred to and without 
arousing the slightest mistrust on the part of our 
great ally on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Minister, as a Minister of Defence with acute 
political awareness - with which I am familiar, 
having last met you at a seminar in Madrid 
before you became Minister of Defence, when 
your considerable knowledge of the subject was 
already obvious - do you not believe that the 
WEU Council and the European ministers 
responsible for these executive bodies must 
greatly speed up the establishment of arrange-
ments for a European defence identity; that this 
is one way of demonstrating our political will, 
and that in spite of the caution we have to show 
in this area, there can be no doubt that to 
strengthen the union for defence and security 
would constitute a great achievement? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. RUHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - Firstly, as regards Denmark, we 
all have the same concerns. But we undertook to 
proceed consistently with the implementation of 
the decisions taken at Maastricht. 
Where the European security identity is con-
cerned, I agree that we must work more quickly. 
We will be setting the planning cell up in 
Brussels this year. I see that as a very important 
step. 
But the example of Yugoslavia, which has 
been discussed here, shows that there are new 
kinds of crises which we are not in a position to 
deter. Much of what is now being discussed is 
far too late. We must prepare ourselves for crises 
of this kind. 
On the other hand, I must recall what I said in 
my introductory statement: the finest structures 
and organisations are of no use if we cannot 
agree on the political analysis. I would remind 
you in all modesty that a year ago the European 
nations - and they were not alone in this - dif-
fered very widely in their opinions on the situ-
ation in Yugoslavia and on whether there was 
any chance of preserving the central government 
or whether it would not be wiser to bring 
pressure to bear with the aim of finding a 
co-operative, confederative solution. The 
analyses of the situation differed very widely. 
Not even the best planning cells and other ideas 
are then of any use. The two things have to go 
together. If we are honest and self-critical, we 
have to admit that that was how it was in 
Yugoslavia's case. 
But I also have to say - I hope I may be quite 
frank here in the Assembly - that some of those 
who are now saying that particularly tough 
action should be taken expressed precisely the 
' 
' 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Riihe (continued) 
opposite view of the situation at that time. I at 
least have been reading Mr. Milosevic's speeches 
since 1987. I believe quite a lot was foreseeable 
even at that time. If pressure for a confederative 
solution had been exerted, there might have 
been a chance - I cannot say for certain. 
If we analyse the present situation as Euro-
peans, we should be self-critical. This also 
applies to my own country. As a parliamentarian 
I had a heated discussion with my own Foreign 
Minister - at that time; the situation is quite dif-
ferent today. 
We should be self-critical and admit that in 
the analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia we 
did not reach political agreement on the future 
of the central government. So we failed to exert 
political pressure as we should have, which 
might have saved us various problems. 
So I entirely agree with what you have said. 
We must speed up the development of the 
European defence identity, but we must also 
improve our common political analysis. Other-
wise military instruments, however good, will be 
of no use. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. 
The next spealer is Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Thank 
you, Minister, for your very frank reply. I should 
like to speak about Yugoslavia. You are no 
doubt aware that yesterday the Assembly 
approved a very important recommendation, 
which incidentally supports the view expressed 
by our Secretary-General calling for the appli-
cation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty so that the Security Council resolutions 
are implemented. 
My question follows from this insistent 
demand, so far unanswered, for a European 
intervention force in the framework of WEU in 
particular. Unless I am mistaken, some six 
weeks ago Mr. Genscher asked Mr. Cyrus Vance 
about possible intervention by WEU armed 
forces in Yugoslavia in support of the Security 
Council's action if this were necessary. If this 
information is correct the request has unfortu-
nately come to nothing. Nevertheless as things 
stand at the moment the problem is urgent, par-
ticularly as regards preventive action. 
If this did happen and urgent action became 
necessary, could German forces take part imme-
diately without Germany being obliged to 
amend its constitution first? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - As in my previous answers, I 
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will express myself very clearly: I would never 
deploy German units in Yugoslavia, even if the 
legal provisions to do so existed in Germany. 
There is a variety of reasons for this. 
What you have said is not, to my knowledge, 
correct. Mr. Genscher did not make that offer. 
To my knowledge, Mr. Vance asked Mr. 
Genscher whether, given a United Nations 
decision to despatch a peace-keeping mission to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be possible for 
WEU also to be involved. But that is not what 
happened subsequently. 
We have always pressed for sanctions to be 
imposed. The embargo that has been announced 
must now be enforced. The necessary action 
must be taken to this end. I believe it has come 
rather late in the day. None the less, I hope it 
will have an appropriate political impact. 
Nor, seeing that German units will not be par-
ticipating, do I consider it right in my capacity 
as Germany's Defence Minister to speculate on 
a military response. If the constitutional require-
ments exist in Germany in the future, we will 
consider very carefully whether it would be pro-
ductive or counter-productive for German 
troops to be deployed in a given region. I believe 
that anyone who takes another look at history 
will appreciate that - even if the constitutional 
requirements were satisfied - it would be 
counter-productive to deploy German troops 
there. I am totally convinced of that. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
question will be put by Mr. van der Linden. 
Mr. van der LINDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I was very taken by 
what Mr. Riihe had to say about the implica-
tions of the result of the referendum in 
Denmark. I am happy with his expression of 
political will. But I am afraid it is not as easy as 
that and that we will not be able to make do with 
an expression of political will. The consequences 
we face will be more far-reaching than now 
seems likely. 
Mr. President, the press release on the Franco-
German discussions of 22nd May says: " France 
and Germany invite as many member states of 
WEU as possible to participate in the European 
corps. " I want to ask the Minister what this par-
ticipation entails. Does this complete decision-
making power also extend to determining the 
course to be taken by the Eurocorps in the 
future? What interest might member states have 
in participating in the activities of the 
Eurocorps? In this context the press release 
states: "It may also be given peace-keeping or 
peace-restoring missions ... " Minister Riihe has 
said that this means deployment within the 
United Nations framework- blue helmets. Does 
this not mean that Germany's credibility is 
coming under some pressure in this respect? 
After all, the Minister has said that Europe must 
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assume responsibility for itself. But in this 
respect Germany would be placing more confi-
dence in , the United Nations than in its 
European partners. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - Anyone who participates in the 
Eurocorps will have completely equal rights and 
will be involved in all the structures. 
When I was referring to the agreement by the 
defence ministers just now, I made it clear that 
Germany has reservations on constitutional 
grounds. This means that, if the corps already 
existed, Germany could not participate in 
certain missions. 
The corps will become operational in October 
1995 if everything goes according to plan. I 
canpot yet give you a guarantee that we will 
have created all the constitutional provisions by 
that time. It is a question of taking action to 
restore peace not only for the United Nations 
but, of course, on behalf of European bodies. I 
cannot give you a guarantee. Germany might 
not be able to participate in every mission. 
On the other hand, it is clear from this - and I 
say this to the members of the opposition in 
Germany, who are very welcome - that we 
would eventually lose our credibility as a 
European nation if we failed to meet the consti-
tutional requirements for the deployment of 
German armed forces on behalf of such 
European bodies as WEU and European 
Political Union. 
There is not yet a majority of the members of 
the Bundestag in favour of the necessary 
amendment, but we are working on this. With 
the help of our pro-European colleagues, we may 
succeed in gaining the support of a majority in 
the Bundestag by October 1995. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister. 
The last question will be put by the Observer 
from Greece, Mr. Pahtas. 
Mr. PAHTAS (Observer from Greece) (Trans-
lation). - In your speech, Minister, you referred 
to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
to Article 5 of the Treaty ofWashington. WED's 
mission complementing that of the Atlantic 
Alliance stems precisely from Article V, which 
the great majority of people believe must not be 
weakened in any way, as otherwise the European 
Union will lose all credibility in the matter of 
common security. 
Minister, what is your view about the problem 
of maintaining Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty having regard to the different 
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statutory positions which would result from the 
creation of a geographical area for co-operation 
in security and defence outside the WEU area? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. ROHE (Minister of Defence of Germany) 
(Translation). - The WEU Brussels Treaty is 
stronger on the automatic nature of the com-
mitment to assist other member states. As I have 
said before, the Eurocorps's first task will be 
deployment to ensure the joint defence of the 
allies in accordance with Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty or with the Brussels Treaty. 
But ifl understand you correctly, you want to 
know about other countries joining Western 
European Union. That is, of course, a subject 
that has to be discussed. There is some differen-
tiation, including associate membership, and 
there is talk of a third status in addition to 
normal membership. I feel we must pay 
attention to this as developments continue and 
that the final word has not yet been spoken. 
That is why my answer is rather vague. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister. If I might say a word about the last 
point, we cannot, of course, expect you to be 
fully informed on the state of all the discussions, 
like the one concerning Greece's desire to 
become a member of Western European Union. 
None the less, I would like to thank you very 
much for your very full answers. You will have 
noted that we have a very critical and very lively 
debating atmosphere here. I hope this will not 
deter you from participating but in fact 
encourage you to join in the future work of our 
Assembly and its committees. The first oppor-
tunity for this will be in Bonn on 25th June, 
when the Presidential Committee and the 
Political Committee will be considering the 
decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 
19th June. 
Many thanks to you, and I wish you a pleasant 
return journey to Germany. 
(The President continued in French) 
I am informed that Mr. Joxe, Minister of 
Defence of France, will be arriving very shortly. 
This being so, I propose to adjourn the sitting 
for a few minutes. 
(The sitting was suspended at 4.10 p. m. and 
resumed at 4.15 p.m.) 
The sitting is resumed. 
5. Address by Mr. Joxe, 
Minister of Defence of France 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Joxe, Min-
ister of Defence of France. !· 
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Minister, our Assembly always listens to you 
most attentively because we remember the 
important address you gave us just a year ago. 
On that occasion you announced the generous 
proposals which have very largely opened the 
way for a space policy for Europe geared to the 
requirements of a defence adapted to the chal-
lenges of the most advanced technology. This 
was the origin of the decisions taken later by the 
Council of WEU and we are very pleased to note 
that since the beginning of this year they have 
moved forward to practical implementation. 
We are particularly grateful to you for coming 
back today. We are well aware that the future of 
a policy for the defence and security of Europe is 
still beset by many problems. The decisions 
taken by the nine members of WEU at Maas-
tricht show the direction in which our govern-
ments are seeking a solution but there is still 
room for widely-varying interpretations. 
It would of course be a mistake to expect any 
government to tell us what decisions the Nine or 
the Twelve will take. But France's vital role in 
the formulation of a European security policy, 
its determination to find solutions for the 
problems created for us by a completely new sit-
uation and its anxiety to co-operate closely with 
its partners, and Germany in particular, give the 
greatest weight to your remarks. 
May I add that the part you are playing per-
sonally in studying the new security conditions 
and the requirements of a defence geared to 
present circumstances give you great authority 
to speak on these questions. We are all expecting 
a great deal from the ministerial meeting of 
WEU to be held on 19th June and we are sure 
that you will play a major part in formulating 
the decisions it will adopt on operational ques-
tions. 
For all these reasons, we shall be listening to 
your remarks and your replies to our questions 
with great interest and close attention. 
Mr. JOXE (Minister of Defence of France) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I was very happy to accept the invitation 
from your Assembly of which I was a member 
myself some years ago and where I am pleased 
to meet again, if only very briefly, people and 
colleagues I have known elsewhere. Today, the 
list includes my colleague, Mr. Rtihe. Now that 
WEU has a bigger role to play as a result of the 
decisions taken at Maastricht in particular, par-
ticipation by the elected representatives of the 
member countries in discussions about the con-
struction of a European defence system is more 
than ever essential and desirable. 
I shall shortly be meeting again some of you 
who are invited to attend the exercise with the 
pretty name Farfadet which will be taking place 
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in the south of France in a few days' time with 
the involvement of French, Italian, Spanish and 
British forces. 
Europe's identity in the field of security and 
defence is steadily gathering strength and I 
thought I might usefully review progress here. 
Following the important texts which marked 
the reactivation of WEU during the eighties, 
first in Rome and then at The Hague, the 
organisation has, since 1990, developed as never 
before both in military co-operation and in its 
institutions and policies. 
The political framework has now been set up 
with the treaty on European Union signed at 
Maastricht. As you know Article J.4 states that 
Western European Union" which is an integral 
part of the development of the Union " shall 
" elaborate and implement decisions and actions 
of the Union which have defence implications". 
The member countries' declaration annexed to 
the treaty enlarges on the tasks assigned to 
WEU, the strengthening of its operational role 
and its relations with the European Union and 
the Atlantic Alliance. Here we have a new sce-
nario. 
Almost at the same time, military co-oper-
ation is benefiting from the impetus given 
during the Gulf war by the decisions taken in 
1990 on logistic co-operation and the 
co-ordination of naval forces in particular as I 
myself witnessed on the spot in the Gulf. The 
ministerial meeting of 19th June which you have 
just mentioned, Mr. President, will provide an 
opportunity to review what has already been 
done to strengthen WEU's operational capa-
bility in accordance with the Maastricht guide-
lines and decisions. 
Here are a few examples of the progress 
achieved: the planning cell to be staffed by 
officers from the nine member countries will be 
set up in Brussels next October. This unit, which 
is clearly essential for WEU to have credibility, 
will provide the organisation with genuine mil-
itary expertise. The chiefs of staff of the WEU 
countries will be meeting regularly from now on, 
providing for consultation between the highest 
European military authorities; at their recent 
meeting in Bonn on 19th May they made 
excellent preparation for the forthcoming minis-
terial session. The WEU satellite centre pro-
posed by France and encouraged in your report 
will be set up at Torrej6n in Spain this autumn 
to provide us with a joint observation 
capacity. 
All these are moves in the right direction. I am 
glad that some of them have been suggested by 
France and I take the opportunity to pay tribute 
to the vigour displayed throughout this year by 
the German presidency which will shortly come 
to an end but has seen major progress. 
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At the meeting on 19th June we shall also be 
discussing the question of the assignment of mil-
itary units to WEU in accordance with para-
graph 5 of the Maastricht declaration. The 
decision and therefore the proposal made by 
France and Germany at La Rochelle on 22nd 
May last to set up a European army corps fits in 
with this. Furthermore I note that the proposals 
announced by my British colleague, Mr. 
Rifkind, concerning his country's participation 
in strengthening the operational role of WEU 
can be seen as part of the same pattern. 
The proposed European army corps will 
benefit from the experience of the Franco-
German brigade, a unit where young Frenchmen 
and young Germans live side by side and will 
move even closer to each other in the future. 
The European army corps differs fundamen-
tally from this Franco-German experiment 
which has already been going on for some years 
and has not even been carried right through yet. 
The European army corps corresponds to a 
global concept which associates not only France 
and Germany but is open from the outset and by 
its nature to the other member states ofWEU. It 
is based on the establishment of a multinational 
general staff for operational planning with the 
principle of multinationality applied at general 
staff level. Each participating state will make 
such contribution as it deems appropriate to the 
army corps. 
So the intention behind the European army 
corps is not that it should be "a European 
army " as suggested by some commentators, 
mostly in opposition to the plan. It is in fact one 
of the units capable of acting within the 
framework of WEU. I repeat that it does not 
therefore exclude other proposals for the 
assignment to WEU of other European units 
whether or not linked with NATO. 
Furthermore a number of countries have 
announced that they intend to assign to WEU 
sqme of their units now assigned to NATO. This 
isl positive sign of support for the European 
o~ganisation. I welcome this and we shall clearly 
be talking about it in a fortnight's time in Bonn. 
It is our hope that the countries which have 
expressed interest in the proposed European 
army corps should join with France and 
Germany as soon as possible. We shall have to 
work out together how the corps is to be 
assigned to WEU, of which it is of course a 
natural extension. 
I should like to touch briefly on the very close 
links which the Eurocorps will have to maintain 
with NATO. 
The corps' first mission is to be available for 
commitment for the common defence of the 
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allies in case of aggression, on the basis of 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington and 
Article V of the Brussels Treaty. In such circum-
stances the Eurocorps would intervene, in 
current NATO parlance either as the " main 
defence " or for " rapid reaction missions " on 
the flanks of the alliance, for example. I think 
that the extent to which France and Germany 
have taken account of the alliance's interests 
and operational requirements could not be 
clearer. 
It will be necessary - and the general staffs 
concerned are already looking at the question -
to define exactly the conditions and practical 
arrangements for commitment of the corps and 
its placing under NATO command. To this end, 
an agreement will have to be discussed, studied, 
drafted and signed by the authorities responsible 
for the corps and the competent NATO author-
ities. 
As you will see, the corps will therefore be 
called on to intervene at both European and 
Atlantic level. It is a logical consequence of the 
proposal for a European Union and as such is 
linked with WEU ; in addition it is a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the 
alliance. 
Contrary to what has been written and said in 
certain quarters, there is no question in our 
mind of a new structure competing with WEU 
or NATO. 
The next point is that co-operation under 
WEU auspices must also progress in the matter 
of armaments. We must now organise this sector 
better in order to meet the objectives set at 
Maastricht. 
What is the present situation? 
First, there is the informal group, the IEPG, in 
which we met in Oslo. Through this group, 
which includes many European countries but 
has no legal status, permanent links have been 
established between the armaments directors of 
the various European countries and experience 
which must be turned to account has been 
acquired. 
Second, we have the role of Western European 
Union as the organ for the formulation and 
implementation of the future common defence 
policy and, as one of the objectives set by the 
Maastricht agreement, the creation at the appro-
priate time of a European armaments agency. 
This idea, originating from a Franco-German 
proposal, is now a benchmark for the debate. I 
think that its content should be specified in 
detail. It is an important subject for discussion 
and thought by the WEU authorities which will 
have to deal with armaments questions. 
One way of turning the IEPG's experience to 
account and at the same time exploiting the new 
prospects opened for WEU, might naturally be 
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to bring the two bodies together. This was pro-
posed on 6th March at the Oslo meeting of 
IEPG defence ministers I mentioned earlier and 
the idea is now being studied. It is a question we 
shall be looking at on 19th June. 
Mter this brief look at progress with the con-
struction of Europe I should like to turn to the 
matters which are now preoccupying the author-
ities responsible for the defence and security of 
the European continent. The tragic example of 
Yugoslavia is daily evidence of the perils to 
which Europe is exposed. 
Against this background how could we fail to 
hear the anguished cries of our Central and 
Eastern European friends? How can we be deaf 
to the anxieties of those in Prague, Budapest, 
Warsaw and the Baltic states who fear the conse-
quences of the chronic instability and break-up 
of states in the Balkans and along the borders of 
the former Soviet empire? 
I have recently met and am still meeting 
defence ministers from these Central European 
countries. I can tell you that they are delighted 
by our invitation to attend the meeting to be 
held on 19th June. That day the ministers from 
the WEU countries will for the first time be 
meeting their opposite numbers from the Baltic 
states, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bul-
garia and Romania. I recall that France pro-
posed such a meeting twelve months ago. I 
believe that the countries of Western Europe 
must establish bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions and links with these new democracies as 
they are essential first for better understanding, 
and then for greater co-operation in the security 
and defence of Europe. 
At the beginning of April your Assembly 
organised a symposium in Berlin and invited me 
to attend. I accepted the invitation but at the 
last moment I was, to my regret, unable to go for 
reasons which you understand. I have looked at 
the declarations made there by the representa-
tives of the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak and 
Polish Governments. We must listen to their call 
for European solidarity. This is true for every-
one but in particular for the three countries I have 
just named which are now linked to the Euro-
pean Community by an association agreement. 
I believe that we shall be able, in Bonn, in a 
fortnight's time, to agree on the development at 
all levels, including ministerial level, of regular 
permanent relations with the countries invited. 
The states which will be joining the European 
Union and already have associate status should, 
I think, be given special treatment. I know you 
have discussed this question yourselves. I shall 
do my best to work to that end. 
Finally, there is one area where specific 
co-operation could be developed in WEU and I 
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say be developed because it exists already; I am 
referring to peace-keeping operations. French 
units are already deployed in Krajina side by 
side with Czechoslovak troops while Belgian 
units are operating with Polish troops in another 
sector. Why not encourage practical measures 
for training, instruction, planning and logistics 
geared specifically to this sort of operation, 
which we have every reason to believe will con-
tinue on an increasing scale. They are significant 
and might even be symbolic of the conversion of 
these armies from the Eastern European coun-
tries to new tasks. 
Of course our Europe of today presents a very 
contrasting picture of fears and hopes and of 
successes and failures. I believe, however, that 
even more than today the European Union will 
tomorrow be a pole of attraction for the whole 
continent. It is for us to give it its full dimension 
in the matter of security and defence and to 
provide it with the means to match its responsi-
bilities, and for that to be achieved the debate 
and the discussion must spill over from the 
circle of ministries or general staffs and be 
carried into the parliaments and in particular 
into an Assembly like yours where all the parlia-
ments of these European countries have been 
represented for many years and have gained 
experience, of which you are the very rare pos-
sessors, of international debates on defence and 
security questions. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister, for your address. I am sure you will be 
prepared to answer questions from the members 
of the Assembly. Four have put their names 
down. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Mr. Joxe, you referred to the British Secretary of 
State's comments on the British-Dutch proposal, 
which you said was one of the ideas being con-
sidered by WEU. You then mentioned the 
Eurocorps. Is it not true that, whereas the 
British-Dutch proposal starts by firmly declaring 
that the Eurocorps is to be totally within WEU, 
you have just said that how the Eurocorps fits 
into WEU has still to be worked out? Is that not 
why the confusion which we hoped would be 
dispelled after the La Rochelle meeting has still 
not been completely cleared up? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. JOXE (Minister of Defence of France) 
(Translation). - I am not sure that I can put my 
finger exactly on who helps to create confusion 
on the subject at one point, or who helps to 
dispel it at another. I hope that I have not added 
to the confusion but neither am I sure that I can 
dispel it. What is certain is that one of the 
problems arising is the assignment of units 
which have already been assigned in some cases 
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as part of an earlier project; I am thinking of the 
Anglo-Dutch unit. 
I recall very well that my British colleague 
said: " Basically we know all about the European 
army corps, we have had one for a long 
time". 
That is true. I have also talked to my Nether-
lands colleague about it. It is true that the exis-
tence of this Anglo-Dutch unit is a fine 
European achievement. Its composition is 
European. It can also be said that its purpose is 
European because the conditions for using it 
were linked to the defence of Europe. 
Why does the proposal for a European army 
corps create confusion or seem to do so? 
I think this is because it has been represented 
in some quarters as a hostile move; I am 
thinking in particular of what the United States 
Defence Secretary said, describing it as an oper-
ation · that could undermine the Atlantic 
Alliance. The least that can be said is that this 
was not only a negative but also a somewhat 
aggressive description. 
Now that the proposed European army corps 
is open to all European countries wishing to 
join, those countries clearly have a problem 
about the forces they could assign to it. Here I 
can only speak for my own government - a 
number of European countries which can accept 
the European army corps in principle are not 
clear about the conditions under which they 
could assign units to it, because the greater part 
or even the whole of their forces are already 
assigned to the Atlantic Alliance. 
In my view, what my United Kingdom col-
league said concerning the Anglo-Dutch unit 
does not lead to any confusion. It shows that in 
Great Britain as elsewhere there has been 
movement on European defence and security 
policy. I believe that the discussions due to con-
tinue will, as has already appeared likely for 
some days, produce a formula showing that dual 
assignment is possible. 
I suppose - I was going to say I am afraid -
that changes in the situation on the ground over 
the coming weeks and months in certain parts of 
Europe are going to focus thoughts more sharply 
on this question. 
I will take one example. Many European 
troops are now in Yugoslavia but so are others. 
There are troops from other continents 
including America. I am thinking of the Cana-
dians. Nevertheless, the European forces and 
not only those from France are clearly, so to 
speak, the backbone and above all the guarantee 
of this very tardy peaceful intervention in Yugo-
slavia. 
176 
SIXTH SITTING 
What is the only occasion when this question 
was discussed, though without any decision 
being reached because unfortunately this was 
ruled out from the outset? It was exactly one 
year ago, i.e. last June, when the WEU ministers 
met. 
Admittedly, the discussion was not very pro-
ductive and revealed wide differences. It pro-
duced a decision which in truth was not a 
decision, namely to study various possibilities: a 
first was minimal, a second went a little further, 
but in the end, a few months later, neither was 
adopted. To name only a few countries, situa-
tions or positions varied over the whole range 
from the United Kingdom, which stated its out-
right opposition, to Germany, which explained 
that it was legally difficult or impossible for it to 
participate, via France, whose attitude was pos-
itive and a number of other European countries 
which were willing to participate. This is the 
only place where the question was discussed in 
advance, that is before tension burst into crisis 
and a mixture of civil and international warfare. 
It was in a European forum: WEU. 
Looking forward twelve months I would not 
like to make any bets but it can be predicted that 
minds will be focused more sharply by the 
pressure of events and that it will then be 
realised that discussions must start between the 
countries of Europe even if the decision is, as it 
quite rightly should be, taken in the United 
Nations. Furthermore, many of the plans for 
intervention under the United Nations banner 
are the result of operational studies spanning 
several months in WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). - I 
should like to begin by thanking you, Minister, 
for the contribution you have made to our 
Assembly in the project for the satellite centre. 
You took part in our symposium in Rome and 
your political contribution as regards solidarity 
and commitment in your country was consid-
erable. 
I should like to touch on two points which still 
leave us with doubts concerning the Franco-
German army corps. You said that it would be 
possible for agreement to be worked out between 
the multinational European army corps and 
NATO, giving the impression that the army 
corps will have international legal status so that 
WEU, though it stands over the army corps, will 
not conclude such agreements as it rightfully 
should. In practice, as you said, the possibility 
that the commander of the army corps may con-
clude those agreements indicates that it is not 
the international organisation responsible for 
and standing above the military units which will 
have authority to conclude international agree-
ments. This is the source of some confusion. 
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You also said that the army corps will be 
made up of divisions and that its general staff 
will be integrated and therefore international, 
with the possibility therefore of including 
officers from other countries having units in the 
army corps. 
If this is correct and valid for a unit at army 
corps level how do you think command can be 
exercised at divisional level? As a rule, 
command at that level is not integrated but 
national. It is planned that some divisions of the 
army corps shall be multinational because it is 
unthinkable that a small country could assign a 
whole division to the army corps; the likelihood 
is that it will be able to assign only a few bat-
talions for units at battalion level. So, you antic-
ipate for these divisions something that has 
never happened before, the formation with some 
difficulty of an integrated general staff which 
leaves one wondering what will happen in the 
matter of telecommunications, command and 
control, operational techniques and so on. 
The problem you were trying to simplify has 
been complicated by your speech. I believe that 
integration should be at army corps level and 
that units should be national at divisional level. 
Or if divisional level is not possible, brigade 
level should be planned; but below army corps 
level it seems to me that it would be very dif-
ficult if not impossible to set up integrated 
general staffs. 
I would therefore ask you for further infor-
mation on two points: firstly, the formation on 
the general staffs which are essential for partici-
pation in an international army corps, and sec-
ondly, what powers the commander of the army 
corps general staff would have in the matter of 
international relations in agreements with other 
countries or international organisations such as 
NATO and the CSCE. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. JOXE (Minister of Defence of France) 
(Translation). - What is this political authority? 
It is the authority represented by WEU. 
However, if nobody wants it this will not 
happen. Why talk about it so much? We two will 
continue to talk about it. We shall have fewer 
problems. 
Is it useless? I have some limited military 
experience from thirty years back. I do not want 
any repetition. It was during the war in Algeria. 
At the time military service in France lasted 
thirty months. I have a more recent experience 
dating back twelve or fifteen months. So far I 
have known only multinational operations. 
I arrived at the defence ministry when the 
Gulf war was at its height and there were French 
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regiments in a French division with American 
and British elements alongside integrated into a 
group under Franco-American command with 
the whole force under American command. The 
question was resolved. 
After the end of the war I visited several 
French naval units in the Gulf which were 
taking part in mine-sweeping as part of a com-
pletely integrated system. This was at WEU 
level. There were also Italian vessels. 
I could give you a whole list of the operations 
I have had to prepare, on which I have had to 
take decisions personally or to propose decisions 
for the President of the Republic to take. At 
Kinshasa we took part in a peace-keeping oper-
ation with the Belgians. They did not fire but 
they were fired on and there was even one death. 
This was a Franco-Belgian operation. In Kur-
distan there were Americans, British and French 
in co-operation with the Turks from whom per-
mission had to be sought to use their bases - and 
there were also Dutch troops. In Yugoslavia, 
about which I spoke a moment ago, there are to 
date troops from at least twelve or fourteen 
countries. 
Over the past twelve months my only expe-
rience has been of operations to which several 
countries contribute though the proportions 
differ widely in some cases. 
With the Americans playing the leading part 
in some cases and Europeans in others these 
problems are always with us and will continue to 
be so. In what form? I do not know what the 
exact figure is for the Anglo-Dutch unit but I do 
not think that it amounts to a division. The 
Franco-German brigade is an integrated unit at 
brigade level with each regiment retaining its 
autonomy. The proposal for a European army 
corps makes express provision for a multina-
tional general staff and national units. Theoreti-
cally, the unit is to be a division but how ~ould 
one say no to a country unable to assign a 
division to the corps through lack of resources, 
the political will or the legal capacity to do so 
because of its existing commitments? Is it going 
to have to accept that it cannot participate with 
less than a division? Of course not. To refer to 
one country in particular, I know that Belgium 
has expressed interest in the Eurocorps and has 
spoken of the possibility of participating though 
it has also raised the problem of co-ordination 
with NATO. In any case it will not participate at 
division level. I think that a more pragmatic 
approach is necessary with a multinational 
general staff, an intern'!-tional ~olitical .autho~ty 
and national or sometimes mixed umts. I sm-
cerely hope, however, things do not come to an 
extension, not to say generalisation, or sys-
tematic adoption of a practice that we are 
beginning to see over a very wide field. We often 
find ourselves in a situation of improvisation, a 
word I would prefer not to use as it is dispar-
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aging in French in relation to administrative or 
military questions, though not in musicology 
where it may carry undertones of greatness. 
From the information which I receive daily I 
can tell you that the French units currently 
deployed in Yugoslavia have to improvise every 
day because a number of the conditions set for 
the deployment of elements by other countries 
have not yet been carried out. They are con-
stantly adapting and, with the planned 
co-operation of the defence minister, the Czech-
oslovak units near the French are continuously 
improvising forms of organisation to deal with 
all the difficulties you have mentioned as 
regards transmission, logistics, equipment and 
fuel. Yes, that is the way things are going more 
and more. I do not see why we should not try to 
be more systematic. Naturally, if by chance 
when a perfectly adapted structure is worked out 
it all proves to be useless and there is no one to 
use it, a possible conclusion would be to say that 
it is precisely because we invented and designed 
it and set it up that it has proved unnecessary. 
Just imagine not that we had deployed but that 
we had marshalled and announced a European 
force of 15 000 men capable of intervening very 
quickly in Yugoslavia last June or even July. 
History cannot be rewritten but there is a good 
chance that events would not have unrolled in 
August, September, October, December and 
even still today in the way they began. That is all 
I can say. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). -Excellent ! 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Pahtas, Observer from Greece, wishes to ask a 
question. 
Mr. PAHTAS (Observer from Greece) (Trans-
lation). - We are all agreed here that Europe 
must provide itself with all the instruments and 
means of action necessary to create a permanent 
institution for the conflict prevention, crisis 
management and above all the peaceful set-
tlement of disputes as in Yugoslavia. 
Minister, I ask my question in the context of 
the historical bonds of friendship between the 
French and Greek peoples and the peoples of 
Yugoslavia. You know how greatly concerned 
we are about the crises and the conflicts causing 
the former Yugoslavia to be tom apart by 
several civil wars or just plain war. Your col-
league, the German Defence Minister, spoke of 
too critical an attitude and of a policy designed 
in principle to promote self-determination for 
all who want or claim it. 
Do you believe that a more flexible confeder-
ation for those remaining in Yugoslavia is still 
likely? Are there to be still more civil wars? Do 
you believe that the embargo will be final and 
effective or simply a step towards a change in 
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the situation? We hope not but that is my 
question, Minister. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. JOXE (Minister of Defence of France) 
(Translation). - An embargo is an instrument 
essentially of economic but also of political 
pressure. It expresses severe disapproval and is a 
condemnation. Its pressure is firm and peaceful 
and its purpose is to express severe disapproval. 
It is not merely symbolic; it has a practical 
effect. Will it be effective? It certainly proved to 
be so immediately afterwards because the 
authorities hit by the embargo seemed to 
acknowledge this in their declarations. Unques-
tionably what is happening at present in some 
parts of Yugoslavia is totally unacceptable in 
terms of all our ideas about civilisation gen-
erally, not just human rights and the concept of 
humanitarian behaviour. Consequently the 
democracies must clearly make use of every 
form of democratic action to put an end to it. 
Formal condemnation is a political act. An 
embargo added as a penalty to this verbal 
political condemnation, which is in some 
measure ethical, is another political act. It must 
be hoped that it will first slow down the violence 
at least and ultimately bring it to an end. It is 
only afterwards that other political moves may 
be thought of at international level. Can action 
be taken to separate the combatants? The 
United Nations' Secretary-General has said this 
several times - it is a question we have been 
facing for months - interposition between the 
combatants is possible only if there is at least a 
cease-fire and if the parties accept. Beyond this 
stage which we all want, is it possible to imagine 
that another type of political relationship can be 
established between the countries concerned? 
Let us hope so. 
Will this result in a confederation? Who can 
say? We have not yet reached the point at which 
we can think about the kind of institution which 
might put an end to the tensions between the 
different communities. We are at the very first 
stage, i.e. that of the need to start with at least 
political action to call a halt to a truly barbarous 
situation. 
Naturally, when we who believe that under-
standing and co-operation between the countries 
of Europe should develop into a political 
structure see on the one hand progress towards 
the political organisation of Western Europe and 
on the other the simultaneous break-up and 
sometimes division and sub-division of the 
Eastern European countries, we can only hope 
that they will ultimately find a form of political 
co-operation within which the rules of 
democracy can operate. This is called respect for 
minorities and for law and begins with the 
framing of legislation in conditions of demo-
J 
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cracy. There are minorities in many countries. 
In Switzerland, for example, one of the countries 
seeking to join the European Community, 
widely differing ethnic, linguistic and religious 
groups have lived together for centuries in the 
Helvetic Confederation. So there is no reason 
why widely differing ethnic groups cannot be 
united in a single country. 
One of the Swiss cantons is so divided 
between Catholics and protestants that an 
internal system has been created there. The 
memory of wars of religion has produced highly 
specific legal machinery, little known elsewhere 
and dating back to Europe of long ago. 
What is now happening in some parts of what 
used to be Yugoslavia calls to mind what we 
were taught about the wars of religion, the thirty 
years war, truces declared but then broken 
cease-fires which last a week, declarations mad~ 
to gain time, deceive the enemy and regroup and 
political manreuvres allowing reinforcements 
food, munitions and reserves to be brought up: 
We all know that the sufferings of war one day 
end in a political solution. Let us hope that the 
events now shattering Yugoslavia do not last 
thirty years. It is our countries which by inter-
vening, exerting pressure when that becomes 
possible and separating the adversaries can help 
in reaching a point, as we hope, when the 
political problems will be settled internally. 
Unfortunately we have clearly not yet reached 
that stage. 
Mr. President, after taking one more question 
I may perhaps be allowed to return to another 
Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. van 
der Linden and Mr. Martinez would like to ask 
you a further question. I ask them to be brief. 
I call Mr. van der Linden. 
Mr. van der LINDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I would like to ask the 
Minister the following question. If Belgium were 
to join the Eurocorps, could it play a full part in 
the Eurocorps' decision-making process? Would 
sue~ particip~tion entail a restriction concerning 
dectston-making on the Eurocorps question? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Martinez. 
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain) (Translation). -
Minister, you will appreciate that, given the 
hitc~es in r~tification of the Maastricht Treaty 
and m parttcular the result of the Danish refe-
rendum, the Assembly is perplexed, pessimistic 
and even somewhat discouraged by the news. 
For some of us the bell for Maastricht has 
started to toll. I would like to hear what you 
think. Does it mean a halt to the reactivation of 
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WEU as a platform for defining and imple-
menting a common security and defence policy 
or on the contrary should we persevere and forge 
ahea~ so that the reactivation of WEU can help 
reacttvate the treaty or the spirit of Maas-
tricht? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. JOXE (Minister of Defence of France) 
(Translation). - My answer to Mr. van der 
Linden is that any country participating even on 
a limited scale in the project for a Eurocorps 
would naturally participate fully in any deci-
sions regarding its use and before that in all 
~ecisions. concerning its organisation and entry 
mto servtce. 
Why do I say naturally? Because otherwise the 
project would not make sense. The reason you 
ask the question is perhaps that right from the 
start this project has been misunderstood, badly 
presented and possibly even badly received. Part 
of the reason I expect - and this may sound like 
a tale but it is a fact - is that the project for the 
Eurocorps was referred to in a postscript to the 
Maastricht declaration and caught the eye of the 
press. The result was that minutes afterwards 
the first and possibly only item of news put out 
was the idea of setting up a Franco-German 
army corps. This message reached Mr. Hurd-
whom I know well as a friend because he was 
Home Secretary in the United Kingdom when I 
had t.he equivalent post in France- attending a 
meetmg of Commonwealth countries in Zim-
babwe. After reading it he said, looking 
somewhat unhappy, I do not think this is very 
good news and I do not think it is what we really 
need. After that another press report went off to 
Paris, Bonn, Washington and so on, saying that 
the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had 
reacted very negatively to the Franco-German 
proposal. 
This is how the whole thing moved into the 
realms of bitter argument. Many people who 
have never read the Maastricht declaration have 
criticised the idea. Even now, many people who 
have not yet had occasion to look at the project 
for a Eurocorps criticise it. 
That is why I say that " naturally ", any 
country taking part in setting up the European 
army corps would take a full part in doing so. 
You may perhaps be thinking of asking what 
will happen or if there will be proportional 
voting. No way! This kind of action requires 
total political agreement. Again, what type of 
mission is envisaged in the joint text worked out 
by France and Germany and proposed to the 
other WEU countries? There are three types, 
namely defence of the alliance, humanitarian 
action and peace-keeping duties. All this presup-
poses joint discussion at European level even if 
some countries do not take part. 
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The fact that you ask the question is both 
serious and revealing. It shows the need for 
further explanation. At the meeting on 19th June 
it will therefore be necessary to arrange for the 
formal and, why not, complete content of the 
Eurocorps document to be circulated and com-
mented on. 
Mr. Martinez asked what the consequences of 
the no-vote by the people of Denmark will be. I 
am in no position to measure exactly the inter-
national or national political and legal conse-
quences of this decision in every country, even 
including France. Clearly it was not unfore-
seeable. The possibility was anticipated. I firmly 
believe that, however important and far-
reaching this event and its implications may be, 
it will be seen as no m9re than a passing phase in 
the years to come. Many West European coun-
tries wish to join the European Union or hope to 
belong to it. In a few year's time, therefore, all 
this will be looked upon as a mere incident. I do 
not say hiccup because I would not speak slight-
ingly about the Danish people's choice. 
I was a student when the Treaty of Rome was 
signed. I remember it well. There were six 
founder countries and the European Free Trade 
Association had been set up. At the time the top 
professors, in Paris at least, did not give the 
common market much of a chance. I spent many 
hours at lectures by very distinguished people, 
some of whom are today members of the 
Academie des sciences morales et politiques in 
Paris. So they have been more successful in their 
careers than in their ability to see into the future 
twenty-five years ago. 
I also remember very -well the London agree-
ments, of 1954 I believe. Before that there had 
been the Paris agreements which I had also 
heard about. 
The problems of European defence have 
changed so much. Just think that WEU origi-
nated from a situation that was totally different 
from the situation today. There is an 
organisation which includes a parliamentary 
body where these problems have been discussed 
for decades and this must continue. You men-
tioned a satellite centre. Clearly this is a very 
important idea which is gaining ground and will, 
I believe, be implemented because its purpose is 
to prevent crises. 
Briefly, to answer your question, I believe, not 
more than ever but as always, that reflection and 
debate and also action have to go on in this 
context. That in fact is what we shall be doing in 
a fortnight's time. We shall then realise that 
further progress has been made. 
Mr. President, I should like to leave, with 
your permission. If you do not grant it, I shall be 
very embarrassed. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Minister, for your replies. Speaking for our 
Assembly, I hope that you will continue to 
discuss the current problems of European 
security with us. 
The sitting is suspended. 
{The sitting was suspended at 5.15 p.m. and 
resumed at 5.20 p.m.) 
The sitting is resumed. 
6. The development of a European space-based 
observation system 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Teclrnologiclll and Aerospaee Comminee 
and 11ote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1304 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Technological and 
Aerospace Committee on the development of a 
European space-based observation system and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Document 
1304 and amendments. 
I call Mr. V alleix, Rapporteur of the com-
mittee. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, may I first say that it is unkind to ask 
the Rapporteur of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee to speak after two addresses 
by ministers, which have taken up most of the 
afternoon and, as we have seen, have held the 
general interest. I am all the more grateful to 
those of you who have remained. 
What are the original features of this debate -
I shall be very pleased if there is one - or at least 
of this presentation? 
To make matters clear, I must first say that 
Mrs. Blunck, the eo-Rapporteur, has had to 
return to Bonn this afternoon. We were talking 
together only this morning. I make the point not 
only out of elementary politeness but also so 
that it is clearly understood that we are in com-
plete agreement in this report. Moreover, we 
both had a special opportunity to expand on 
these views together with the committee secre-
tary, Mr. Burchard, during a visit to Friedrichs-
hafen in Germany, where we were able to confer 
with the Dornier company. I shall be coming 
back to this point. 
Mrs. Blunck asked me to give you her apol-
ogies. If she could have been present she would 
also have spoken. 
What is the question at issue? Since you have 
the elements available, I shall omit the more 
technical aspects which some may find complex 
and which have been dealt with in serious and 
detailed studies, to dwell on some more political 
matters. 
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As regards the development of a European 
space-based observation system, I should like 
first to emphasise what is involved, and then the 
original features of this undertaking, the tasks it 
is destined to fulfil and be applied to, and finally 
certain aspects of co-operation and co-ordin-
ation in what needs to be done. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what is 
the matter at issue? It is an old issue, very dear 
to WEU. I should like to emphasise, so that the 
press may also be aware of it, that everything 
concerning space - first aeronautics and then, 
very speedily, the space segment itself - has 
been of great interest to WEU, which has 
advanced a long way in these matters. This was 
true as regards Ariane and Arianespace, but is 
also true of everything concerning the space 
segment. For many years we have been dealing 
very specifically with these subjects. 
At this Assembly in 1987 I presented a report 
on the future of space in Europe up to the year 
2000. We have a passage from it here, con-
cerning verification satellites. In 1988 Mr. 
Fourre - whom I thank for being here today -
presented a report on verification - a future 
European satellite agency. Mr. Malfatti and Mr. 
Lenzer have also dealt with these subjects under 
various headings such as " The scientific and 
technical aspects of arms control verification by 
satellite " and " Observation satellites - a means 
of verifying disarmament ", using information 
drawn from the symposium organised by our 
colleague Mr. Lenzer. 
Thus there is a continuous thread of work 
leading to the interesting aspect of this par-
ticular report namely, that now some ofthe rela-
tively theoretical approaches have to be put into 
practice. 
The WEU satellite centre was set up some 
months ago at Torrej6n, near Madrid, in 
premises formerly used by NATO, and the 
question of setting up a group to study the feasi-
bility of establishing a medium-and long-term 
space-based observation system is also being 
considered. 
Two decisions, one made in June 1991 and 
the other in November 1991, are thus now being 
implemented. The Torrej6n centre is being 
fitted out under its Director, Mr. Blaydes, and 
feasibility studies are being carried out by a 
group of industrialists appointed for this 
purpose. Dornier, which is responsible for the 
operation, reached its decision as recently as last 
May, so we are fully up to date and the work is 
going ahead. 
As regards the original aspect of the system, 
may I stress its concreteness. I apologise for bor-
rowing the term from Mr. Senghor, but we are 
indeed at this stage. We are no longer just 
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making proposals. WEU has already committed 
funds to a space study centre for interpreting 
satellite data and training WEU personnel, and 
the pilot study team, led by Mr. Blaydes on 
behalf of the centre and by an Italian, Mr. 
Gagliardi, as regards the team itself. 
This then is the instrument we submit to you 
for adoption. Decisions have been taken and 
they correspond precisely with our wishes but 
now the measures for their implementation are 
there to be followed, and possibly controlled in 
the performance of our future parliamentary 
mission. I welcome the presence of the Secretary-
General on this occasion. On this issue the 
Assembly may sometimes have appeared rela-
tively impatient and disruptive in the eyes of the 
Council of Ministers. The Assembly is grateful 
to the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-
General for having taken both operational and 
practical steps. Only a few months have passed 
since this decision of principle and today the 
instrument is already in place. 
As regards the original nature of this initi-
ative, we must refer to the historical fact that did 
so much to speed up this matter, namely 
the Gulf war. As Europeans, however well-
intentioned, however much committed to this 
system, we perceived how few effective means of 
observation were available to us, resulting in 
dependence on our great American allies. 
Within the family everything ran relatively well, 
but it sharpened our awareness of a need for 
greater independence so as to provide a truly 
European force with independent sources of 
intelligence which are essential to action in the 
field. 
Again, as regards the originality of this initi-
ative, may I stress a point which is not always 
brought out and which we parliamentarians 
believe to be of prime importance - I am 
speaking in the name of the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU - namely, the need for links 
with public opinion. This is a difficult area that 
involves finance. At present, nine million ecus 
have been invested in the centre and pilot study 
team. This is a three-year programme, which 
presupposes funds to cover future develop-
ments. This is important to remember at a time 
when it is fashionable to consider that peace 
reigns in spite of the dramas we have been 
talking about, the nearest theatre being Yugo-
slavia. It is all very well to talk about peace divi-
dends, but these dividends must be earned every 
day and consequently we have to have the 
proper means, including finance. Hence we must 
ensure both as regards government action via 
the Council of Ministers, and also at our own 
level as a parliamentary Assembly, that we find 
links with public opinion to support the present 
effort and ensure proper future development. 
The actual tasks are in the process of being 
defined, because they have been put together 
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step by step, pragmatically. Referring to the 
work of Mr. Fourre, Mr. Malfatti and Mr. 
Lenzer, it is clear that the first issue is surveil-
lance, verification of disarmament agreements. 
For this surveillance, there is nothing more 
suitable than satellites. 
Out of sheer necessity, and I am referring to 
the Gulf war, we quickly recognised that there 
was a kind of continuity between verification 
and surveillance at a time of crisis. These are 
developments which are easily observed. 
I call the Secretary-General to witness by 
quoting his statements to the House of 
Commons in January 1992, where he explained 
that the first three years, 1992 to 1994, covered 
on-going programmes. They were to be used for 
training analysts in the interpretation of satellite 
imagery and for demonstrating the technology, 
using the means currently available. This would 
be done by using data gathered from the SPOT, 
Landsat and ERS satellites which, of course, 
would be enriched by the potential of Helios 
which was under development by France, Italy 
and Spain. Mr. van Eekelen nevertheless 
pointed out that these observation facilities 
should not prevent WEU, at the appropriate 
time, from having more independent facilities. 
As regards the objectives of the pilot study 
team, the Secretary-General's statement fol-
lowed the same lines. 
Missions could be developed and should not 
stop there. We can come back to this when the 
Rio conference opens. Environment is not 
within the purview of WEU, but we have 
unbroken technological continuity in this area. 
Our structure will in the future contribute to 
protecting the environment by a better analysis 
of soils by satellite. Thus we have defined the 
missions that we can accept at the present time, 
but taking a constant pragmatic development 
into account. 
Moreover, this enables me to bring up another 
point that you will find in the draft recommen-
dations, the open skies agreements between 
members of the former Warsaw Pact and the 
NATO alliance. In this area also agreements 
have been concluded. 
Finally, Maastricht is also involved. Without 
prejudging future repercussions, since this 
question is also highly topical - which shows, as 
I said at the beginning, how closely our subject is 
related to the real problems of the present -
Maastricht, through its reference to the defence 
of Europe, is looking towards both crisis surveil-
lance and also what is called strategic surveil-
lance. 
Ladies and gentlemen, these are the points 
that I wished to make, to clarify the objec-
tives. 
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My fourth point concerns the co-operation 
which will be essential to make this action as 
effective as possible. This is mentioned in the 
report. Obviously, it is a question of working in 
close co-operation with the European Space 
Agency, which is in reserve. In order to be 
effective, this initiative needed to be set up, 
without necessarily establishing all possible con-
nections from the beginning. But now that the 
project is under way, it is important to create 
closer co-operation by asking each possible 
partner with similar objectives to provide the 
best he can. This applies to the European Space 
Agency, the IEPG, and probably other structures 
as well. 
In this connection, in a parallel direction and 
anticipating the future - you will find a ref-
erence to this in paragraph 63 of the report - I 
should like to mention the work of Eurosat, par-
ticularly on the European Space Agency's verifi-
cation satellite project. I do not think I am 
wrong to emphasise that the interest of Mr. 
Fourre in this subject, if not unique, is certainly 
of prime importance, since he was virtually its 
inventor. We may be in a specific area here, but 
who is to enable us to forecast future develop-
ments today, in other words why not have such 
an agency? Is there to be talk of verification, sur-
veillance satellites? This may perhaps be antici-
pating the definition of the term, but the idea 
has been launched and will certainly spawn 
others and we shall need to examine it in detail. 
Similarly, I do not think that I am misrepre-
senting current thinking in our various organi-
sations, both at the Assembly and the Council of 
Ministers when I say - and I think this is some-
thing that the Secretary-General has referred to 
- why should WEU not launch a satellite itself 
one day? On the basis of the definition of the 
missions that are very specific to our responsi-
bilities, we could in fact hope to do this in order 
to fulfil the missions thus defined. 
These then are the actual data of this rather 
unique and totally multinational advance in mat-
ters of defence technology and which, as you will 
have noted, having regard to its degree of techno-
logy, makes it very difficult to determine where 
the line between civilian and military is crossed. 
The difference may be a matter of intent. 
As you are aware, in world agreements space 
must normally be a civil matter; hence we speak 
of verification, surveillance, observation, but 
never aggression. But civilian equipment can 
supply military information from the moment 
when such a use can be derived from it, so we 
have to be careful, but our role is to control this 
action. We are ready to take this on. I would add 
that, equally, military undertakings may have 
ecological or environmental applications in the 
future. In our dialogue with public opinion this 
is a line that we should attempt to convey, or at 
all events share, to create a better understanding 
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of the human aim of our defence activity, which 
is not only the security of the men and women of 
this planet, but also possibly their better quality 
of life. 
In concluding the presentation of this report, I 
think our committee was unanimous on the final 
vote. Interesting amendments put forward by 
Mr. Fourre will shortly be examined; I regret 
that he has not been able to take part in all our 
work. We agree on the final objective, but the 
committee has not been able to meet since he 
submitted them. We shall have an opportunity 
to come back to this point when they are 
debated. 
I thank you for your attention and hope that 
you will approve the draft recommendation 
which proves how long our Assembly, working 
with the Council of Ministers along parallel and 
highly productive lines, has been actively 
engaged on a course which is now taking on a 
very concrete and European dimension. I almost 
said a universal dimension. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Borderas. 
Mr. BORDERAS (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall make 
my initial remarks in French so that they can be 
produced in full in the official report. I should 
like to congratulate Mr. Lopez Henares on his 
election to the chairmanship of the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee which has 
produced this report. It is a great satisfaction for 
the Spanish Delegation to have one of its mem-
bers appointed Chairman of such a committee. 
I will now continue in Spanish. 
(The speaker continued in Spanish) 
I will now comment on the conclusions of 
your report, Mr. Valleix, where it says in para-
graph 87: "a European space-based observation 
system, WEU has launched a project which, by 
its nature and magnitude, exceeds anything the 
organisation has done since its creation. " 
Mr. President, what the Rapporteur means in 
his resume is in the text of the report itself: this 
project for a WEU satellite centre is to be imple-
mented at the Torrej6n de Ardoz air base, about 
twenty kilometres to the northeast of Madrid; it 
has a budget for the first three years totalling 
38.25 million ecus, giving a budget of around 
$55 million; eighty-five firms from the various 
WEU member countries are to take part in it; its 
director is Mr. Barry Blaydes, whom I had the 
pleasure of meeting in Berlin in April and again 
here two days ago and who is now here with us; 
work has started on the infrastructure and actual 
construction is expected to be completed 
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towards the end of August this year. The most 
recent news I have from Mr. Blaydes and my 
own government is that it could be inaugurated 
this autumn, possibly in October. The initial 
work on the infrastructure will cost nine million 
ecus; the first twenty of the total of fifty tech-
nical personnel who will make up the staff have 
been contracted and the organisation chart for 
their activities will be divided into five sections: 
operational, information, staffing, finance and 
scientific and technical development. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would 
like to record my interest, the interest of my del-
egation, of my government, of my country, in 
supporting this project and would like to 
acknowledge the interest taken by Mr. Fourre, 
Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Lenzer, both in this 
Assembly and in the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in January this year, in the initiatives in 
this matter. 
Some of you may be wondering what will be 
done at this centre. Well, as Mr. Valleix has 
explained, it will first carry out verification of 
the disarmament agreements using European 
resources, in particular after the Open Skies 
Treaty dated 24th March of this year. Second, it 
will be involved in crisis monitoring and, partic-
ularly for my country, Spain, it will be moni-
toring problems in the Mediterranean, which are 
of great concern to all but especially to the coun-
tries of southern Europe; at this very moment 
there is in this area the whole problem of the 
Yugoslav conflict. Third, there is the monitoring 
and identification of environmental phenomena 
which are increasingly worrying, increasingly 
threatening and imminent and therefore a 
matter of great public concern. 
Ladies and gentlemen, for Spain in particular 
the implementation of the WEU space pro-
gramme constitutes an attractive technological 
challenge and will ensure the development of 
some very advantageous industrial activities 
through our collaboration. In this respect, our 
country already has experience of the Helios 
programme involved in the ground component 
of that programme. 
To sum up, Mr. President, we fully support 
this report and its Rapporteur, Mr. Valleix; this 
problem may be of concern to everyone, but for 
the Spanish people it certainly constitutes a 
responsibility and a great challenge. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - I 
should first like to thank and congratulate our 
Rapporteurs, in particular Mr. Valleix, who has 
just given us a particularly brilliant report, as he 
usually does, on a question with which I am 
especially familar. I should also like to thank the 
former Chairman of the committee, Mr. 
Stegagnini, who is with us here and who, with 
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others, of course- as Jean Valleix mentioned-
has been one of the promoters of this project 
which Mr. Lopez Henares is to take in hand. I 
should like to assure him also of my full support 
in our common aim, to promote the European 
agency for verification by satellite, which I have 
called by this name since 1982. I think one 
should also remember the perseverarice of those 
parliamentarians who had ideas and finally 
managed to see them brought to fruition. 
I should like to take this opportunity to recall 
why and where this idea arose. It has to be com-
pared with France's initiative in 1978 at the 
United Nations when it sought to create an 
international satellite verification agency. This 
ISV A did not come into being for a simple 
reason: space observation at the time was essen-
tially under the military control of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and at that time 
these two countries used their veto to prevent 
the international agency being set up. 
Thereafter, a number of study groups tried to 
think up more regional responses. I launched 
this idea in 1982, when I was a member of the 
Council of Europe and serving for the first time 
on the Technical Committee. Of course, it ended 
up again, naturally enough, in this organisation 
because it was primarily a matter which is a 
WEU responsibility, namely defence. Here in 
the Technological and Aerospace Committee we 
began putting this idea forward in 1984 and it 
finally reached the stage referred to a moment 
ago by Mr. V alleix. It was a matter of great satis-
faction for us parliamentarians to see in 1988 a 
Council of Ministers approving unanimously 
one of our recommendations aimed at pro-
moting concrete measures to mobilise Europe 
behind a strategy of disarmament and in par-
ticular of crisis verification. 
Obviously, this concrete advance referred to 
by Mr. V alleix prompts us today to want a 
progress report. This was even included in Rec-
ommendation 465 to which I referred a moment 
ago. In it we asked the Council of Ministers to 
give us a phased programme. It is true that it 
took a parliamentary initiative for us to be spe-
cifically informed of what had been done. I 
thank the committee for having taken this initi-
ative and I regret that it was not the Council of 
Ministers itself that took it. 
So far, then, the balance is positive, but this is 
only one stage. It is a first phase and does not go 
far enough, although it is of considerable impor-
tance. We now have to plan further stages and 
they will require more finance. The techno-
logical and economic requirements we already 
have in our ability to mobilise Europe's space 
capabilities. 
The number of companies already specialised 
in all areas is large and we can therefore con-
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ceive of a specialised European space segment. 
One day in the future why should we not have a 
WEU European satellite verification agency? 
This perhaps would mean that the Helios exper-
iment would have to be the very basis of the 
concept. Nothing is impossible. Hence, Mr. 
President, Mr. Rapporteur, we have to consider 
this as a first stage towards a global concept. 
Personally, since 1982 I have always called it 
European satellite verification agency. Make no 
mistake, I am not personally attached to the 
name, and I could well think up another. Never-
theless, as regards the impact on public opinion 
to which our Rapporteur referred a short time 
ago, we need to insist for the subject and the 
concept to be properly recognised. I agree that 
the word verification may be less suitable for the 
environment than for disarmament. It will 
depend on the missions one day assigned to this 
agency. That is not the fundamental problem. 
The basic problem relates to the technological 
and economic capacity that we develop in con-
junction not only with the European agency, but 
also with national agencies and even the IEPG. 
Henceforward, we must strive to mobilise all 
our partners. Without a firm political will and 
all our confidence, we shall not succeed in this 
ambitious but hugely promising project. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
shall be brief. I should first like to thank Mr. 
Borderas for the additional details that he has 
supplied and his enthusiasm for the setting up of 
the Torrej6n centre and the initiative that we are 
discussing. I also extend these thanks to my 
Spanish friends because we will then have a base 
where some serious work can be done and high-
grade personnel trained, both things that will 
help equip WEU in the way it needs to perform 
its missions. 
I gladly allow Mr. Fourre his right to take an 
initiative. I have no wish to engage in a battle of 
author's rights, but I do feel somewhat irked at 
the late arrival of his amendments which puts us 
in a rather complex position because, as Mr. 
Stegagnini can testify, a great deal of work was 
done in committee on this subject right up to 
last week. 
Since I have mentioned Mr. Stegagnini, let me 
take this opportunity to pay him a tribute since 
he will shortly be leaving the Assembly. I thank 
him for his work in the committee which -he 
shepherded to the Bordeaux area where we were 
able to discover some enjoyable products of the 
earth and some highly technological advances in 
space. I also welcome his successor, Mr. Lopez 
Henares, who will, as I well know, take up the 
reins with equal enthusiasm. 
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As for Mr. Fourre's amendments which we 
will look at in a few moments, I can already say 
that as regards the final objective we are in full 
agreement. I found the documents that he 
passed on to me extremely interesting. I know 
that you will continue to be active not only in 
the Council of Europe as regards the civil side, 
but also in this Assembly as regards our specific 
mission, and that you will go on affording us 
your support and innovative ideas. 
I shall say no more because I expect the 
Chairman of the committee wants to present his 
conclusions before taking the amendments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- I have to tell you that we convened the com-
mittee this morning to consider any amend-
ments. None came in and therefore I cannot 
offer the committee's opinion to the Assembly. 
I can therefore only give my personal opinion 
of Mr. Fourre's amendments which show his long-
term and undeniable knowledge of this ques-
tion and also the interest and enthusiasm that 
Mr. Fourre has always shown for these impor-
tant subjects. I must also congratulate him on the 
courage that he has always shown in this area. 
Amendments 1 and 4 cannot be accepted 
because, as I say, they have not been considered 
by the committee. They relate to a future 
European satellite verification agency. The word 
verification troubles me because the satellites 
are primarily for observation, intelligence and 
surveillance. Verification is something done by 
employees, civil servants and office staff. The 
idea is good but, as I should like to stress, it 
needs to be considered by the committee and 
this has not been done. 
Amendment 2 would appear to be acceptable 
because it is in line with the attitude of the com-
mittee and the wording is satisfactory. 
As for Amendment 3, Mr. Fourre is well 
aware that it applies to a part of the text arrived 
at after long discussion, a compromise having 
been reached by the committee with the help of 
several of its members. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee has tabled 
the draft recommendation in Document 1304. 
I have four amendments to this text from Mr. 
Fourre and they will be examined in the fol-
lowing order: Amendment 1, Amendment 2, 
Amendment 3 and Amendment 4. 
Amendment 1 reads as follows: 
1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, after " WEU Satellite Centre " 
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add " a first step towards the future creation of a 
European agency for verification by satellite ". 
I call Mr. Fourre to move his amendment. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - May I 
tell Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Valleix that I 
would have liked to present these amendments 
and debate them in committee, but unfortu-
nately I am no longer on this committee though 
having been a member for nearly ten years. 
As regards a European agency for verification 
by satellite, I agree that neither its title nor 
content have been discussed in the committee. I 
should nevertheless like to remind you that in 
1988 when we adopted our two recommenda-
tions the principle and concept of such an 
agency were accepted. Moreover, my report was 
entitled: " A future European satellite agency ". 
It is true that the term verification can be open 
to various interpretations, but if one looks at the 
content of the missions referred to in Mr. 
Valleix's report, namely disarmament verifi-
cation, crisis monitoring and the environment -
which we have now integrated - we see that this 
notion can be very broad. 
I would like to stress this point because the 
reference to an agency is also not new and 
because I think it is useful to remind the Council 
of Ministers that while this satellite centre is a 
good initiative it is not sufficient. It is the first 
step towards a European satellite verification 
agency, it being understood that we could opt 
for another title in the future, but the concept 
itself has already been unanimously agreed. I 
would hope that the committee will have further 
occasion to work on this project and will then be 
able to find a more suitable name. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the opinion of the committee? 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). - You 
can see the dilemma I am in because, under the 
rules, Mr. Stegagnini cannot speak after Mr. 
Fourre who has spoken to his amendment and 
because this text has not been considered by the 
committee. So there was no way for us to make 
any possible changes to include this idea. 
The actual purpose of the amendment does 
not contradict the general trend of the recom-
mendation, but to incorporate it, apart from the 
use of the word verification, would seem to 
imply that the first step is the one we are dealing 
with now and that a second step would be the 
setting up of the agency. 
I think that it may be an agency, but it could 
perhaps be something else. Let us not guess at 
the post-1994 programme in advance which, as I 
said a moment ago, is referred to in the infor-
mation provided by the Council of Ministers. 
Between now and then, we shall ourselves have 
to study the project and, by then at the latest, 
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step in again to define new objectives. Otherwise 
we would be failing our duty. 
Similarly, we do not know whether we shall 
then propose to our Assembly and the Council 
of Ministers the production of a satellite related 
to the definition of the specific missions that we 
would have agreed with the services, or whether 
we shall be headed straight for a European sat-
ellite agency, which is indeed one of the fore-
seeable outcomes of our activity. It is difficult to 
look ahead today, because it might mean con-
fining ourselves to this one path which, though it 
may appear natural, may not be the only one 
possible. 
Finally, I have pointed out that it was very 
desirable to plan for close co-operation with 
existing organisations so that there is no rivalry 
and above all no counter-moves. I am thinking, 
fot example, of the European Space Agency, 
whose nature is not specifically the subject dealt 
with by our colleague Mr. Fourre. This would at 
the very outset lead to risks of difficulty and 
rivalry, whereas we are at present seeking closer 
relations rather than inviting the risk of misun-
derstandings between us. 
Mr. President, these are the reasons of both 
substance and form why at present, with my 
regrets to Mr. Fourre, I cannot see any possi-
bility of inserting his proposed amendment in 
the text that we have tabled. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- As I have already said, I agree with the 
Rapporteur. But I shall take this opportunity to 
say to Mr. Fourre that the history of this 
question is not yet over. 
I can assure you, Mr. Fourre, that we shall 
continue to look hard at any way there is to 
increase the chances of obtaining this European 
agency. But to my mind there seems no way to 
accept your amendment if the committee has 
not considered it. 
I repeat, Mr. President, that in both my view 
and that of the Rapporteur, we can accept only 
Amendment 2. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I shall now 
put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment I is negatived. 
We shall now move to Amendment 2 tabled 
by Mr. Fourre, which reads as follows: 
2. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, after " experience " add, " on 
the one hand ", and, at the end of the paragraph, 
add " and, on the other, of national agencies ". 
I call Mr. Fourre to move his amendment. 
186 
SIXTH SITTING 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - I shall 
be brief because my amendment has been 
accepted by the committee. It is obvious that we 
agreed the whole concept of a European agency 
for verification by satellite - excuse me but I still 
persist in thinking that this is what we should 
call it - in 1988. That, no doubt, is what our col-
league Mr. Stegagnini wanted to say. And now 
we are going back on our decision. I find this 
very serious. I shall come back to the matter 
when we take Amendment 4. 
The purpose of Amendment 2 was simply to 
point out that the European Space Agency 
should rightly be associated with our work but 
that we also have national agencies that could be 
put to work on this project. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the opinion of the committee? 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
- Agreed, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
put Amendment 2 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
We now move to Amendment 3, tabled by 
Mr. Fourre, which reads as follows: 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out " wider organisations with a 
European, Atlantic or universal vocation" and 
insert "any other organisation". 
I call Mr. Fourre to move his amendment. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - The 
Chairman of the committee has explained why 
he personally was against this amendment. I was 
not present, with good reason, at the discussion 
in the committee to which he referred. I agree 
that the proposed wording did seem rather con-
fused to me. Indeed, the notion of universality 
naturally already includes the two previous 
ones. Rather than making distinctions between 
the different " vocations ", I thought that we 
could simply say " to any other organisation ", a 
wording that sums up the idea. But if there has 
been discussion and consensus on this wording, 
I am prepared to withdraw my amendment if it 
poses a problem. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). - I 
should like to take over Amendment 3, with-
drawn by Mr. Fourre and to recommend it for 
approval. 
I think that the points raised in the amend-
ments tabled by Mr. Fourre are correct and 
apposite. Since Maastricht, WEU is not an 
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autonomous organisation as it was in the past, 
particularly as regards relations with the 
European Community which, through the Com-
missioner for Research, is given powers to 
intervene in the field of scientific and technical 
research, including powers in respect of funds. 
This means that these amendments could create 
a two~sided, direct relationship permitting an 
increase in the. limited funds available to us for 
our ambitious projects. 
In addition, I am pleased that reference is 
made to Atlantic organisations because the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group, IEPG, is 
an organisation under NATO but will shortly 
pass under WEU control, although this has not 
happened yet. 
As regards the other world organisations, who 
can say that an international space agency could 
not devise forms of co-operation with our project, 
with the prospect also of a European agency? That 
is why I have supported these amendments. 
As I have the floor, Mr. President, I should 
like to thank Mr. Valleix, Mr. Lopez Henares, 
Mr. Fourre, Mr. Lenzer and all my friends who 
have helped me with this work over the last 
three years, and have contributed decisively to 
the pursuit of these objectives. I hope I have not 
forgotten any colleagues who have worked with 
me but I would like to record in particular my 
sorrow at the recent death of Mr. Malfatti. With 
their unflagging ability and determination, they 
have worked unremittingly to further, on behalf 
of the whole Assembly, this most ambitious 
project of such importance for the future of 
Europe and for the effective contribution of a 
WEU presence to its achievement. In this 
respect, WEU must play a privileged role as part 
of the alliance and as the centre of the Commu-
nity's security and defence policy. 
I should like to thank members for the kind 
things they have said about me. This is certainly 
the last session I shall be attending and it is with 
emotion, Mr. President, that I offer you and all 
my colleagues my warmest thanks and affec-
tionate regard. The seven years I have spent in 
this Assembly have been of the greatest impor-
tance; we have shared moments of great 
emotion and tension; for me they provide a 
wealth of memories which I will carry away to 
my future both inside and outside politics. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Mr. Stegagnini. I too wish you well in the future. 
What is the opinion of the committee? ... 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - The 
committee's opinion, Mr. President, has already 
been given by the Chairman, Mr. Lopez Henares. 
I should simply like to say that I appreciate 
Mr. Fourre's willingness to be co-operative and 
withdraw the amendment for reasons internal to 
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the committee as Mr. Stegagnini will confirm. 
He complicates my task with an emotion that all 
of us of course will share. In France we say: I am 
in a Cornelian situation and our English col-
leagues would probably use the word Shake-
spearean. We all have our own word for it. In 
short, ladies and gentlemen, we all are headed in 
the same direction. 
Mr. Fourre wanted to simplify the expression 
by making it more general. I do not think that I 
am misinterpreting him. He thought that three 
or four words were simpler than just one. 
Mr. Stegagnini, it happens that our committee 
that you presided over found itself with the 
beginnings of a list which was embarrassing 
because it was restrictive. However, we are all 
pulling in the same direction, namely that WEU 
should make the best use of its information in 
the interests of all and possibly in the interests of 
the whole planet; we were talking about this a 
short time ago. 
But secondly, and you were right to make the 
point, there should be a fair return on this effort 
and investment and therefore expenditure, pos-
sibly by trading the information. This is your 
approach and, although not necessarily the over-
riding approach, it may have its positive side. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to give due 
weight to the discussion in committee. The 
Rapporteur has to regard himself as the official 
recorder of these debates, which is what I am 
trying to be. This in no way affects my 
friendship for Mr. Fourre nor my admiration 
and loyal friendship for Mr. Stegagnini, but, in 
brief, I am against the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I shall now 
put Amendment 3 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
Mr. Fourre has tabled Amendment 4, which 
reads: 
4. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add the following paragraph: 
"Reaffirm its will to set up in successive 
stages, of which the Satellite Centre is the first 
step, a European agency for verification by 
satellite. " 
I call Mr. Fourre to move Amendment 4. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
Chairman, I am of Breton origin and the 
Bretons are reputedly stubborn. I therefore con-
tinue to think that we are making a mistake by 
not introducing the idea into this recommen-
dation that for us this is only one stage. There is 
nothing in our present recommendation which 
makes it clear to the Council of Ministers and 
the public that we are concerned with a first 
stage. This concerns me deeply. It also concerns 
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me because the work of the WEU Assembly has 
to be planned ahead. 
I, like Mr. Valleix, recalled a moment ago the 
history of the satellite centre and space obser-
vation that we are recommending. I repeat; in 
1988 in two reports jointly presented by the 
Defence Committee and the Technological and 
Aerospace Committee we decided to " define 
the conditions for setting up a European satellite 
agency in WEU " - and most importantly - " on 
the basis of the guidelines in the present 
report ". We voted this unanimously. 
What did the report say? It set out the three 
stages that I have just mentioned for creating 
such an agency. The first of the three was the 
setting up of a satellite centre. I should like it to 
be pointed out to the Council of Ministers that 
we are at the first stage and that we hav.e a col-
lective ambition to go further, even if, and here I 
agree with you entirely, we have to redefine the 
missions of this European verification agency. 
Of course we have to draw on the experience of 
the present, developments in technology, and 
the mobilisation of the social partners. But we 
should say so. 
At the moment, there is nothing that tells the 
public that we are indeed going to pursue this 
plan which was voiced in 1988 but had been 
there a considerable time before. 
Without going further into the definition of 
the agency's missions, I would like it simply to 
be pointed out that this is the first stage towards 
a European satellite verification agency. 
My apologies for defending this case so 
intensely but I believe in it very strongly. I hope 
that the Chairman and Rapporteur understand 
the purpose of this amendment and approve it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does any-
one wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the opinion of the committee? 
I call the Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (Spain) (Translation). 
-I agree that you are persistent, Mr. Fourre. It is 
a pity that you have not been convinced by what 
we have said. We still prefer to keep the original 
text. I ask for your understanding of the position 
of the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the com-
mittee out of respect for both the committee and 
the plenary Assembly. 
Rule 31 states that: " Amendments tabled in 
writing and signed by their author shall be dis-
tributed without delay." In a spirit of concili-
ation we allowed you to table your amendments 
at the last moment. 
I should like to take this opportunity, Mr. 
President, to make a suggestion to the Clerk of 
the Assembly. In the future, it would be a good 
idea to have a register of amendments, as in all 
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other assemblies, to record their date and time 
handed in. It is difficult to study an amendment, 
submitted late in the morning, for an afternoon 
debate. I do not doubt that you handed in your 
amendment early enough, but, in the future, 
complicated amendments could be submitted 
and the Assembly could find itself in an 
awkward situation. 
It is for this reason and as a matter of prin-
ciple that I repeat that while I am not against the 
earlier recommendations, I cannot accept this 
amendment without hearing what the com-
mittee has to say. The Assembly will decide. But 
I personally, like the Rapporteur, am against the 
amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Normally, 
the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure is 
the province of the President and of the 
Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure. All amendments have to be submitted 
within the prescribed time-limit. 
I now put Amendment 4 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
Amendment 4 is negatived. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation, as amended. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The amended draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
7. Date, time alld orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Thursday, 4th June, at 10 
a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Address by Mr. Bjorck, Minister of 
Defence of Sweden. 
2. Arms control: CSCE and WEU (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Defence Committee and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Document 1306). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
{The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.) 
l. See page 44. 
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8. Adjournment of the session. 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- In accord-
ance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting 
have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Examination of credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would 
like to propose, under Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, that the Assembly now ratify the 
change in the credentials of the Netherlands 
Delegation to the effect that Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman becomes a representative in place of 
Mr. Jurgens who becomes a substitute. 
The necessary official documents have been 
received from the Netherlands Parliament. The · 
1. See page 47. 
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credentials, under Rule 6 (2), are subject to sub-
sequent ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The credentials are therefore ratified, subject 
to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
4. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We must 
now proceed to the election of a Vice-President 
of the Assembly. I have received the nomination 
of Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman for the last 
remaining post of Vice-President. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that 
the election of this Vice-President be by accla-
mation. 
Is there any objection? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
elected Vice-President of the Assembly. 
The order of precedence of the Vice-
Presidents according to age is as follows: Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Martinez, Mr. 
Machete, Mr. Fourre and Mrs. Err. 
5. Changes in the membership of committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accord-
ance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, I 
ask the Assembly to agree to the changes in the 
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membership of committees proposed by the 
Spanish Delegation which have been published 
in Notice No. 7. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The changes are agreed to. 
6. Address by Mr. Bjorck, 
Minister of Defence of Swedm 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Anders 
Bjorck, Minister of Defence of Sweden. 
This, Minister, is the first time in all 
its history that the WEU Assembly will be 
addressed by a Swedish minister. It is not a 
matter of chance but the logical outcome of the 
changes affecting Europe over the last three 
years. Concerned as it was to preserve its policy 
of neutrality at the time when the East-West 
confrontation dominated European affairs, 
Sweden like some other countries feels, because 
of the new situation in Europe, it must take a 
more active part in the new organisation of 
peace throughout Europe. Having decided to 
apply to join the European Community it felt 
the wholly natural wish to set out to us its views 
on security matters through the mouth of its 
Defence Minister, once the Twelve in Maas-
tricht confirmed WEU to be an integral part 
of this process of European Union to which 
Sweden has decided to associate itself. You may 
be sure that none of the significance of your 
gesture in visiting us here today is lost upon us. 
But this does not mean that you yourself or 
your country are strangers. For decades, we have 
been meeting together in the Council of Europe 
where, up to the end of last year, you held 
the office of President of its Parliamentary 
Assembly with an authority and skill which we 
all admire. For most of us, therefore, you are an 
old friend we are pleased to see again and we are 
going to listen to you from both these stand-
points. They prompt us to pay keen attention to 
what you are about to say on the way in which 
your country, without betraying its history, 
envisages integration in a European system no 
longer limited to economic community and on 
what it expects from its new partners. For our 
part, we have always given close attention to the 
problems of the north of Europe and, as you 
know, we have opened relations with the Baltic 
republics. But no one is better prepared than 
you to explain to us the security problems which 
now arise in the Baltic area. 
I am therefore delighted to have you with us, 
Minister, in what is for you a new context with 
new responsibilities. The questions that will, 
with your permission, follow your address will 
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enable us to renew a dialogue which now, in our 
eyes, takes on a fresh importance. 
I call the Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- First, I thank you, Mr. President, for your 
warm words of welcome and I thank you, ladies 
and gentlemen, for inviting me to give this 
address to the parliamentary Assembly ofWEU. 
It is the first time that a Swedish minister has 
appeared before the Assembly and is a clear sign 
of the sweeping changes that have occurred 
all over Europe, including Sweden. The rapid 
changes which have taken place in European 
security policy have made it possible for Sweden 
to participate fully in the building up of a new 
European co-operation. 
In the new Europe, there is a striking contrast 
between the stability of the West and the 
unsettled situation to the East. WEU, NATO, 
the Council of Europe and the European Com-
munity have demonstrated considerable 
capacity for adaptation in the face of changing 
prerequisites. Today, I think that we can all 
agree that war in Western Europe is incon-
ceivable, largely thanks to these structures. 
When people say that co-operation among the 
European nations is evolving slowly, they should 
not forget what we have already achieved: a war 
between the western democracies is no longer 
possible. 
One reason I came to address the Assembly is 
that, in the north of Europe, changes in the stra-
tegic situation have been less comprehensive 
and less unambiguous than in Central Europe. 
The fundamental security interests of the great 
powers will remain intact for the foreseeable 
future in the North. 
The reductions in military forces which have 
occurred in Central Europe in. recent years have 
not yet spread northwards. On the contrary, 
there are significant indications that the former 
Soviet Union and Russia have reinforced their 
capability in qualitative terms, primarily their 
air and naval forces on the Kola Peninsula, to 
where troops from Central and Eastern Europe 
have been moved. 
As far as Russia and the former Soviet Union 
are concerned, the Baltic Sea has always been 
a vital strategic area for the protection of 
military and civilian centres, for example the St. 
Petersburg region. For very obvious geo-
graphical reasons, this situation continues to 
apply, even after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. 
For some considerable time, the security 
policy situation in the north of Europe - and 
hence for Sweden - will be dominated by devel-
opments in a Russia that is in a state of eco-
nomic, political and military disintegration. 
This is a paradox: the breakdown of the Soviet 
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Union opens up promising opportunities for 
peace and democracy but, at the same time, 
there is considerable uncertainty and a major 
risk that developments will backfire. Perhaps 
Sweden feels that more than other countries that 
are further from Russia - geographically and in 
other ways. 
Let me also mention Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, countries which are particularly 
important to Sweden, since they are close to us 
in various ways. 
Although those three countries regained their 
independence after the failed coup d'etat of 
August 1991, they still have serious problems. 
Russian troops are still stationed on their soil 
and the Baltic countries will not have achieved 
full independence until these troops have been 
withdrawn. This is not exclusively a Baltic or 
Russian problem - it is also a security problem 
in a European context. There are not only many 
conventional Russian troops there, but many 
military installations from the former Soviet 
Union. 
Sweden feels responsible for helping the Baltic 
countries in a number of different ways. Our 
efforts to assist former communist countries in 
Eastern Europe will obviously be focused on the 
Baltic region. That does not mean that we shall 
not also try to do what we can in other areas of 
Central and Eastern Europe, even though we are 
a small country. But there is no doubt that we 
feel a special sense of responsibility towards the 
three Baltic republics. 
Since I became Sweden's Minister of Defence 
last autumn, I have been asked from time to 
time: " How can Sweden be neutral when there 
are no longer two military alliances between 
which to maintain your neutrality? " That is a 
good question, which has become increasingly 
important in the light of Sweden's application 
for membership of the European Community. 
The EC is developing in the direction of a 
European Union, with a common security and 
foreign policy, and possibly a common defence 
policy at some point in the future. 
The conclusion to be drawn from develop-
ments in Europe in recent years is that the 
prerequisities of Sweden's security policy have 
changed. A policy of neutrality can no longer be 
applied as a relevant description of the policies 
we wish to pursue - I mean classical, traditional 
Swedish neutrality, not neutrality in general. 
In the cold war epoch, Sweden endeavoured 
to distance it~elf from any kind of foreign policy 
co-operation which might give other countries 
reason to question the credibility of our policy 
of neutrality. But now the situation is different. 
Sweden has as great an interest as any other 
European country in taking an active part in 
building up a new security architecture in 
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Europe, in order to be able to handle, contain or 
solve the security threats and tension which we 
are likely to face in the future. 
Our application for membership of the EC is 
an expression of the fact that we share the Com-
munity's long-term objectives, as formulated in 
the Treaty of Rome and the Single European 
Act, and that Sweden will work for the 
realisation of these objectives together with 
other member states. As a member of the 
European Union, Sweden will participate fully 
in a common security and foreign policy, as 
established in the Maastricht agreement in the 
autumn of 1991. 
As far as Sweden is concerned, this means a 
commitment to be responsible for our own 
defences so that we can remain neutral in the 
event of war in our neighbourhood. Sweden is 
only responsible for its own defence. 
We are serious about remaining a relatively 
strong military power. Late last night, the 
Swedish Parliament approved a new five-year 
defence plan to decide the main goals and struc-
tures of Swedish defence from 1992 to 1997. 
In one way, that decision is unique. The 
Swedish Parliament's decision yesterday was to 
increase the military budget for the forthcoming 
five years in real terms. I realise that few coun-
tries are doing that now. It must be explained 
that during the 1980s, unfortunately, we did not 
increase defence spending as much as we should 
have in line with other countries, and that 
means that there are many things to be repaired. 
That is exactly what is happening now. That 
defence decision means that we shall complete 
the new JAS 39 Gripen programme; we shall 
buy, in the forthcoming year, new battle tanks 
for the Swedish army; and we shall increase our 
capacity to fight at night. We shall give an 
appropriate place to all Swedish soldiers in the 
main forces, and continue to improve sub-
marine defence. We shall keep the number of 
submarines that we have today through building 
new ones to replace the outgoing ones. We are 
doing that because, in the forthcoming years, 
we can see no alternative to an independent 
Swedish defence system. 
At the moment, the European structure of 
co-operation and security is at a formative stage. 
There are a number of different possibilities for 
continued development in the 1990s. In a recent 
report the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Swedish Parliament stated unanimously that 
Sweden's policy of non-participation in military 
alliances imposes no restrictions on its partici-
pation in European co-operation, and that 
Sweden's security policy is characterised by 
active and full participation in the endeavours 
to fulfil the goals shared by all European 
nations. I am glad to have the Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman of the Swedish Foreign Affairs 
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Committee here today. They, too, are partici-
pating in a WEU session for the first time. 
One could say that this policy is not absolutely 
clear. But it would not be appropriate for 
Sweden to commit itself to decisions that have 
not yet been taken within the EC, WEU, NATO 
and other European bodies, because very few 
members of those organisations have decided 
about the future. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee states that: 
" A decision concerning the issue of WEU mem-
bership is not possible before Sweden _has 
obtained membership of the European Umon. 
Before that, the issue is without relevance. The 
policy of non-participation in military alliances 
still remains. " 
As for the timetable for Swedish membership 
of the European Union, last year, during the 
term of office of the previous social democrat 
government but with the backing of 90% of th_e 
parliament, Sweden handed over a formal apph-
cation for membership on 1st July. At least so 
far, the timetable has been that Sweden should 
become a full member of the EC on 1st January 
1995. We do not know whether we can stick to 
that timetable or whether recent events have 
changed it. We still hope that we ~hall be 
admitted on 1st January 1995. That IS not a 
decision for Sweden but for the member coun-
tries of the EC and that will mean that we can 
also discuss other matters in a more constructive 
atmosphere. 
Without discussing the question of Sweden's 
participation in WEU, I would like to emphasise 
the valuable contributions which WEU can 
make to security policy developments in Europe 
in this context. WEU is undoubtedly contrib-
uting to strengthening the ties between Germany 
and France, and thus to the cohesion of the 
process of European integration. WEU can also 
contribute to meeting the need for forces for 
peace-keeping for dealing with crises. Finally, 
WEU represents an opportunity for Europe to 
apply a purely European perspective to the 
many new security problems which are occur-
ring on our continent, and which unfortunately 
no doubt will occur in the future. 
Let me emphasise, however, that Sweden still 
regards American involvement . in Eu~<?pe as a 
highly important factor, both m politic~ and 
military terms. In this context, I would hke to 
emphasise the importance of the American com-
mitment to the stability of Northern Europe. We 
hope that co-operation in WEU, for example, 
will not develop in a way which will undermine 
the role played by the United States in our part 
of the world. 
I have tried to give you a picture of Sweden's 
security policy situation and the background to 
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the decisions which will have to be made in the 
course of the second half of the 1990s. One 
might compare Sweden's policy of neutrality in 
the post-war period to a number of stone tablets 
which have now been broken. There are no new 
sacred tablets in stock, and as a result, some of 
my fellow countrymen feel a certain disorien-
tation when confronted with the security and 
foreign policy situation in Europe. Furthermore, 
many of them have failed to grasp the. scope of 
the political changes in Europe which have 
taken place since 1989. 
This is why Sweden needs a penetrating and 
balanced discussion about its security and 
foreign policy options, prior to membership of 
the EC. This process is not simple, and there are 
no clear answers here. Never forget that Sweden 
had a policy of neutrality for many years. 
Sweden has not been in a war since 1815. 
Swedish neutrality has been, and still is, 
regarded highly by an overwhelming majority of 
the Swedish people. 
That is something that should be discussed. 
With Europe changing so rapidly we should try 
to make the necessary adaptations in our area. I 
am glad that there is unanimity about this, as 
evidenced by the foreign policy report. Earlier 
we had to say no to many of the options offered 
to us. Now we are not saying no, but we are not 
saying yes either, to all of the options available 
in Europe today. 
The great change for Sweden is that today we 
are prepared to discuss various option_s. We are 
not tied to old formulas. Therefore, m future, 
Sweden be an interesting discussion forum. In 
addition, you will find a Sweden that is prepared 
to make concrete contributions to European col-
lective security. That is new for us. I beg for your 
understanding that such a process is not always 
easy for a small neutral country. We should 
learn a lesson from what happened the other day 
in Denmark. Changes of this kind take time and 
it is extremely important that we take the people 
along with us and that we do not fight them 
when we embark on building a new united 
Europe. 
I personally welcome the discussion about this 
in my country. The time is indeed ripe for 
Sweden to have a discussion about this, not only 
within its borders but together with our fellow-
Europeans. If we can do this together, I am sure 
that in future the Assembly will find Sweden 
active in European policies and taking responsi-
bility for keeping peace, stability and democracy 
in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
Minister for your address. 
I am sure you will not mind answering the 
questions some of our members want to ask you. 
Seven have their names down. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
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Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I welcome my old friend, Anders Bjorck, and 
wish to ask him a two-part question. First, can 
he elaborate a little on what he said about the 
effects that might be rubbed off on the other 
nordic countries following the Danish referen-
dum? Secondly, in the light of what he said 
about the increasing, not decreasing, perils that 
appear likely in the Kola Peninsula, can he 
understand that for some of us it is difficult to 
appreciate why Sweden wants to maintain an 
independent defence, yet if anything happened 
to Sweden, it would expect NATO or some other 
body to come to its rescue? Does it not feel that 
it could go a little further more quickly in its 
own interests? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- What happened in Denmark is a warning sign 
for all of us. We in Sweden hope that it will have 
no impact on the timetable for our membership 
of the EC. I would regret it if there was any 
impact. On the contrary, I think that the effect 
on Sweden will be to mobilise all those in favour 
of European co-operation and Swedish mem-
bership. Many of us in Sweden think that there 
should be an overwhelming majority in the refe-
rendum that we shall have in 1994. Everybody is 
aware that it will not be easy and that will defi-
nitely mobilise everybody on the yes side. I have 
no doubt that in 1994 there will be a substantial 
majority in favour of Swedish membership of 
the EC and that the Swedes will be able to take 
part in European Union. I hope that everybody 
who is dealing with European affairs now will be 
aware that Europe is not self-propelling. We 
need to take responsibility for political affairs 
and not to take support for European ideas for 
granted. 
Sir Geoffrey's second question was about the 
situation in the northern part of Europe, in par-
ticular the massive build-up of Russian forces 
on the Kola Peninsula. We in Sweden are fol-
lowing this closely for obvious reasons. Troops 
from Central and east Central Europe have been 
moved not only to the Kola Peninsula, but espe-
cially to St. Petersburg military district or, as it 
is still called, Leningrad military district. That is 
very close to Sweden. 
Sir Geoffrey is justified in asking whether 
Sweden can reject an attack from a country with 
160 million inhabitants. I do not think that the 
present leadership in Moscow has any intention 
of attacking Sweden or any other country. Yet, 
as a defence minister, I must think about the 
unthinkable. What will happen if the future 
brings changes? Never forget that in such coun-
tries there is always a risk of coups, such as hap-
pened last year. We in Sweden are giving the 
defence of northern Sweden priority in the new 
defence plan that we agreed last night and an 
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attack against Sweden should be so tough and 
hard, and should take such a long time that we 
should be able to consult with others and, ulti-
mately, ask for help. An attack on Sweden, 
Finland and Norway cannot be regarded in iso-
lation. If that happens, there is a grave risk of 
starting another great European war. Then we all 
would have joint responsibility to stop it by 
helping those who have been attacked. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I too am 
very pleased to see you amongst us, Minister, 
and to point out the fortunate coincidence of 
Sweden's presence here on the day on which we 
are to discuss a report which specifically men-
tions the problems you have touched upon, 
including that of neutrality. 
Since you yourself referred to your country's 
wish to study ways in which it could take part in 
the task of ensuring collective security, I would 
like to ask you this question. 
Given the state of non-war in Europe since the 
end of the second world war thanks to the pacts 
countries entered into and given the prospects 
opened up by Maastricht do you not think, on 
the basis of what now binds us together and will 
bind us increasingly together in the future, that 
the notion of neutrality has now been super-
seded by that of solidarity? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- I shall try to answer the interesting question 
put by my old friend, Jean-Marie Caro. Let me 
put it this way. We normally talk not about 
Swedish neutrality but about foreign policy 
with a European identity - that is a bit of 
Sprachregelung, if you will allow me to use that 
expression. I have been accused of many things 
by my political enemies - there are not many -
but I have never been accused of attacking the 
classic idea of Swedish neutrality. 
For Sweden, neutrality was a good thing when 
Europe was divided, but what was right in the 
1950s, 1960s, 1970s and even the 1980s may not 
be right in the 1990s and after the year 2000. I 
am not criticising those who are in favour of 
Swedish neutrality, as I am, but I think that we 
must now redefine our foreign and security 
policy. That is exactly what we are going to do. 
The process is already under way. I quoted 
earlier the views of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee which clearly indicated that there is 
strong unanimous backing for a redefinition of 
Swedish foreign policy. It is important that that 
is backed by a solid majority in parliament and a 
majority of the people. 
I do not think that if you are trying to become 
a member of an exclusive club, such as the EC, it 
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is polite before you have been admitted -
Sweden has not been admitted yet - to tell WEU 
or such organisations exactly what they should 
do and how they should behave. We should wait 
and see a little. Let us see what concepts the EC, 
WEU and other European bodies find and, 
when we have done that, hopefully we will 
become full members of the EC. Then it is time, 
as I said in my speech, to start trying to join in 
what is possible - I hope that many things will 
be possible. But we should not say or do that 
before we have become members. It would be 
very improper to do so. 
When we are joining any kind of European 
collective security system which emerges -
perhaps CSCE - the best thing that we can bring 
with us is, in my humble opinion, a modem, 
strong Swedish defence. That would give us the 
possibilitynf choosing, and we wquld also have 
something substantial that could be for the 
benefit of other countries, especially taking into 
account our geographical location in the tense 
area in the northern part of Europe. That indi-
cates that Swedish defence will remain strong 
and, until we have found something at European 
level, completely independent. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - It 
gives us great pleasure, of course, to have the 
Defence Minister of Sweden amongst us. I thank 
him for his address. 
You present something of a paradox for us 
this morning because, following on the Danish 
referendum, you are now telling us of your coun-
try's determination to be part of the European 
Union and at the same time, as minister of one 
of the neutral countries, you talk to us about 
defence and your country's own particular 
efforts. 
You have not fully satisfied us as regards your 
interpretation of the result of the Danish refe-
rendum. Do you not think that the Maastricht 
approach lays too little stress on political, 
diplomatic and defence aspects in spite of the 
progress that is said to have been made and too 
much on Europe of the traders, through eco-
nomic and monetary union alone, in which 
financial, banking and monetary concerns take 
pride of place? How does Sweden see this 
problem? 
You are also Minister of the only country in 
continental Europe to have increased its defence 
budget. This was the scoop you announced to us 
- coldly I was about to say - this morning. 
Could you give us an idea of how big the 
increase is? 
Apart from the campaigns you told us about, 
how do you intend to explain this decision and 
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win the support of public opinion? Your tech-
nique could perhaps set an example for others. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- I completely agree with my old colleague, Jean 
V alleix, that in the discussion in Sweden about 
Swedish membership of the EC there has been 
too much talk about the economic aspects. I 
very much miss the ideological European 
dimension in our discussions in Sweden, espe-
cially as I was President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. I miss the 
cultural and ideological aspects, the striving to 
build up a common Europe with a European 
identity as something unique in the world -
Europe as a superpower, not just in the eco-
nomic sense. 
As in Denmark, there has been a tendency for 
all that to disappear from the debate. Together 
with many other Swedes, I shall do what I can to 
bring back the European idea for the refe-
rendum which we will have in 1994. If there is 
discussion only about tariffs and such things, I 
can understand why people fear a Europe run by 
bureaucrats. We should avoid that. 
On the question of the defence budget, the 
decision last evening to increase the budget in 
real terms by roughly 3% in five years means 
that we will have full price compensation and 
planning stability during the next five years. The 
idea behind this new defence decision is that we 
should make the peacetime organisation a little 
smaller and instead buy new, modem weapons. 
We have learned the lesson from the war in the 
Gulf, we hope. As I said, the idea is that there 
should be a reduction in the peacetime estab-
lishment and a modem, sophisticated defence 
with the best possible weapons. 
There is another element. We have decided-
it will mean a high cost - to maintain the 
Swedish defence industry in the 1990s. That 
means that we are now seeking European 
partners in that respect. We are a country with 
8.6 million inhabitants. We make military and 
civilian aircraft, submarines, the JAS 39 Gripen, 
and missiles. We have two independent car 
industries, and so on. It is not possible to 
maintain all that without help,. although last year 
the previous social democratic party established 
the first contact with the Ind~pendent European 
Programme Group - which I think is familiar to 
all of us here. We have asked to establish rela-
tions with it and have just started that process. 
This is also something new for us and we hope 
that you will support us. 
Jean Valleix asked also about the reaction 
among the people. Some are against and some 
are in favour. I think that the majority would 
accept it- there was a good majority in the par-
liament. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - I am 
extremely pleased to see our old friend Anders 
Bjorck as Minister of Defence. I wish to follow 
his suggestion and make a more or less ideo-
logical remark. The essential point for me is that 
at Maastricht we decided that there would be a 
united states of Europe. Of course there will be a 
common security policy with elements of 
defence. Why? We want to make Europe safer. 
This institution is not a military one. We are the 
security identity of the Communities. In our res-
olutions we asked our Council of Ministers -
you could be one of them, Mr. Bjorck - to con-
tribute to this attempt to make Europe safer, to 
develop a real security policy and to produce 
creative ideas about the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, about ways of preventing conflict and 
about mediating. 
We in this Assembly have adopted recommen-
dations asking our Council of Ministers to be 
active in promoting respect for Resolution 757 
of the Security Council on Yugoslavia. The 
people there want our help and I would not 
understand if many people in Sweden did not 
agree with that way of thinking and were not 
willing to help. 
We have just two options: a country applying 
for membership is invited to become either a 
member or an observer. Would it be possible to 
include in all these discussions a request like: 
" Please join us in our attempts to make Europe 
safer?" 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- Yes. As I said in my statement, if Sweden joins 
the European Union we will be prepared to 
accept the Maastricht agreement, which pro-
vides for co-operation in both security and 
foreign policies. I tried to explain that perhaps 
the time is not yet right for Sweden, which has 
not yet been admitted, to point and say, "You 
should behave like this. " Most of the countries 
represented here have been members of the EC, 
NATO, WEU and other bodies for many years. 
I fully understand that we cannot join the 
European Union without being prepared to be a 
good partner in building a new Europe. There 
should not be an A team and a B team playing 
on the European ground. Of course, I am talking 
about Western Europe; there could be other 
options for those countries that are newly-born 
democracies with other sorts of economies. 
If I may be a little personal, I must say that it 
is sad that what is happening in Yugoslavia has 
been allowed to continue for such a long time. It 
is the first time since 1945 that there has been a 
conventional war with conventional forces on 
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the European mainland. We must never forget 
what happened in 1945. Europeans should take 
the responsibility for peace, stability and 
democracy on the European continent. 
Like any Swede - or indeed, like anyone here 
- I have nothing against the United Nations 
peace-keeping efforts. They are excellent. 
Sweden has taken part in many such exercises 
since the 1950s in the Congo. We have done 
what we can to support the United Nations. 
However, I hope that in future the solutions to 
such conflicts will primarily lie at a regional 
level. There are obvious grounds for future 
security and military co-operation in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Steiner. 
Mr. STEINER (Germany) (Translation). - I 
too am pleased that the Minister has accepted 
our invitation and addressed the Assembly 
today. I have taken careful note of his com-
ments, and I was pleased to hear him say that 
the policy of neutrality in the conventional sense 
can no longer be upheld because of the change in 
the political situation and that Sweden wants to 
join in the shaping of a common foreign and 
security policy in and for Europe. The Minister 
also added, however, that Sweden could not 
become a member of Western European Union 
until it had joined the European Community. It 
has submitted an application for accession. I feel 
there is an inconsistency here, and I would ask 
the Minister for an explanation. 
If Sweden wants to be involved in the formu-
lation of a new common foreign and security 
policy, it will know that the signal for this was 
given at Maastricht. It was a clear signal, and the 
process has already begun. In other words, we 
are now in the process of establishing this 
common foreign and security policy. Sweden 
wants to participate. It could participate, and it 
could do so directly. It could, for example, be 
involved as an associate member until it 
achieves full membership and bring direct 
influence to bear on the formulation of a 
common foreign and security policy. 
Why does the Minister not envisage the possi-
bility of a transitional solution, especially as 
there is already economic co-operation between 
his country and the European Community? That 
would surely be a transitional solution until a 
decision is taken on Sweden's membership of 
the European Community. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- The Swedish march into Europe should be 
step by step, otherwise there is a risk of setbacks 
in Sweden, perhaps similar to those that 
occurred in Denmark a couple of days ago. I am 
sure that many inside and outside Denmark 
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regret what happened there, but politicians 
should fully respect the will of the people. We 
must not attack the people, otherwise we will 
behave like those former countries behind the 
iron curtain. 
The first matter for Sweden is obviously mem-
bership of the EC and it is important that the 
timetable for that is not delayed. That is my 
message to the representatives here today, all of 
whom are influential politicians in their own 
countries. If there is delay, that could mean 
delays in other steps that Sweden wishes to take. 
We are prepared to discuss all sorts of steps, but 
I would have difficulty explaining to the 
Swedish people that Sweden is trying to join 
other organisations before it has a solid 
platform, which m11st be full membership of the 
EC and full participation in the European Union. 
Many of us are eager to join many 
organisations in Europe, but the timetable for 
joining the EC is 1st January 1995. That is only 
two-and-a-half years away and we are prepared 
to be patient, but we must stick to that time-
table. Mter that, there will be a few new Swedish 
activities. I certainly do not want to risk a 
backlash in the process, such as appears to be 
happening now in other areas. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). - I 
am glad to share the general pleasure at seeing 
Mr. Bjorck here today, particularly because I am 
meeting him here after being with him in the 
Strasbourg assembly for a long time. 
In your speech, Minister, and more especially 
in your replies to other speakers, you made it 
clear that your country has a very advanced 
defence industry, particularly in the aeronautics, 
space, electronics, submarine and naval sectors 
and indeed, in all branches concerned with 
defence and the defence industry. You also said 
that Sweden has a population of eight million 
and therefore called on Europeans to come and 
collaborate with you. 
In Europe we have the Independent European 
Programme Group, IEPG, which until recently 
was a multinational organisation under NATO 
but, as was confirmed by the French Minister 
for Defence yesterday, will pass under the 
control of WEU by the end of the year. It is 
therefore not a matter of joining WEU but of 
applying for accession to the European group 
which handles industrial and scientific planning, 
programming and co-operation in sectors where 
your country can certainly make a contribution 
at a particularly difficult time of economic 
restrictions when resources are limited and joint 
efforts therefore have to be concentrated. 
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As you have said that you will have to move 
step by step towards Europe, and therefore 
replied no to a query by another speaker about 
the possible association of Sweden with WEU, 
precisely because it is a European international 
organisation, might you perhaps be willing to 
accept the accession of your country to the IEPG 
which represents only a multilateral agreement 
and is not an international organisation? 
This would be an effective first step towards 
European co-operation; it might also be a useful 
initiative for your country and for everyone in 
such a delicate area. It could certainly be very 
useful for Europe because you are at the 
moment the only defence minister getting 
increased funds from parliament for improving 
and modernising the defence system. Such col-
laboration might therefore be to the general 
advantage of everyone. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
-It is extremely important for the Europeans to 
have their own independent defence material 
industry. In my country we sometimes 
encounter problems with the release of tech-
nology from America, despite the fact that we 
have excellent relations with it. Sometimes, we 
have to depend on the Americans' good will to 
release modem weapons to us, so we should 
have alternatives. I have been considering the 
matter deeply since I took office and I believe 
that the only solution is to have an independent 
European industry. Sweden is too small to carry 
that heavy burden, and even though many of the 
countries represented here are far bigger than 
Sweden, they too have problems due to the 
enormous cost of developing modem weapons. I 
cannot see why we should not co-operate on this 
matter. 
I have made official visits to the countries of 
many of my colleagues, including Austria and 
Spain. Next week, the French Defence Minister, 
Mr. Joxe, is to visit me and then, in August, the 
German Defence Minister. We shall discuss 
developing co-operative links within Europe on 
defence material. I hope that the Swedish links 
with IEPG, which have just been established 
and have been received favourably, will soon be 
strengthened with seminars, colloquies and con-
ferences. 
I am not here to market Swedish weapons, but 
a small country such as Sweden has to be 
extremely efficient, as we have no extra money 
to spend on military establishments. We now 
develop high-tech weapons at a reasonable cost 
- the only option open to us. We in Europe are 
starting to construct a military alliance, which 
we could develop immediately, without waiting 
for the final decisions on a new European mil-
itary and security structure at the end of .the 
1990s. 
., 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de Puig, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur of 
the Defence Committee. 
Mr. de PUIG (Spain) (Translation). - Later in 
this chamber, Minister, I shall be presenting a 
report on the situation of the CSCE and the Hel-
sinki negotiations. In order to write it I had to 
see a number of people and make several trips. I 
take this opportunity to thank you publicly for 
the kindness you showed me when I came to 
Stockholm. You outlined the Swedish position 
for me as you have also done in your address 
this morning and in your answers to members' 
questions. 
My own question relates to the Helsinki 
process and CSCE. As you know, there are those 
who think the July summit was a great success 
and even a leap forward. Other analysts, 
however, think it could turn out to be a failure. 
It is being said that, as far as the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, the 
guarantees are not sufficient to lead to binding 
agreements. We are also told that some western 
countries do not have the real will to bring 
things to a conclusion. 
You are well informed, Minister, of how the 
Helsinki negotiations now stand and I would 
like to have your view on the subject. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- I am afraid I am not that well informed, but I 
have some experience of CSCE and, as Sweden 
is to take over the CSCE chairmanship later this 
year, we are following developments with great 
interest. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, I think that 
CSCE is a great idea and a step towards the 
establishment of a joint security structure in 
Europe, which is good. However, it is not easy to 
run an organisation with fifty-two members -
there could be more - when they have various 
backgrounds, states of democracy, traditions 
and types of armed forces. 
It is easy for me to be sceptical about the 
diversity of CSCE. However, if we give it time, I 
think that CSCE could develop into an efficient 
peace-keeping organisation in Europe. But we 
should learn something from history; an organ-
isation without the scope to use efficient sanc-
tions or military intervention - which we all 
hope that we can avoid- is normally not strong 
enough to maintain peace. We should consider 
the era between the first and second world wars, 
when there were plenty of treaties, colloquies, 
meetings and conferences which allowed the 
European people to gain a false sense of 
security. 
The worst thing that could happen is that we 
give the CSCE, or any other European organ-
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isation, a false feeling of security. The CSCE 
must be equipped with executive power, 
whether for sanctions or military matters. Oth-
erwise, it will be an organisation without a real 
future. I do not know how that could be done, 
but the time is ripe to take up that discussion. So 
long as we are not working with a consensus and 
as one, we shall not have the necessary quick 
and efficient results from the CSCE. Today the 
CSCE is covering areas which, although far from 
Paris, are not far from Sweden, and where sta-
bility is very limited. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Martinez. 
Mr. MARTINEZ (Spain). - I do not need to 
tell our friend, Mr. Bjorck, how happy we are to 
receive him here. At this stage in the debate, 
most of what one wanted to ask has already been 
asked and my questions have already been 
covered by Mr. Caro and Mr. Stoffelen. 
How does Mr. Bjorck see the possibility of 
Sweden's presence here being more than epi-
sodic? I fully understand his willingness to inte-
grate in the project. I also understand that, 
because of that, he does not want to mention 
affiliation to Western European Union before 
Sweden comes into what I would call the Maas-
tricht " scope ". Does he believe that, as soon as 
special guest status, which he introduced to the 
Council of Europe, is introduced here, the 
Swedish Parliament should be part of our work 
so that we can have a permanent Swedish 
presence in our work, following what we do and 
contributing to what we think about security 
aspects of the European project? Is he ready to 
support the idea of having. Swedish colleagues 
present among us in a flexible but permanent 
way? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. BJORCK (Minister of Defence of Sweden). 
- May I say to my very good friend Miguel 
Angel Martinez that special guest status, which 
we introduced in 1989 in the Council of Europe, 
immediately became a great success. Member 
states of the Council of Europe jointly did a 
good job to give the new democracies in Central 
and Eastern Europe some kind of contact with 
what was for them a brand new world. Without 
special guest status, development would not 
have been as good within the Council of Europe. 
As for special guest status and Swedish partic-
ipation here, this is a parliamentary body, so the 
question should be answered by the Swedish 
Parliament. If I am asked for my opinion - Mr. 
Tarschys nods at me - I think that it should be 
welcomed and that it is a good way to start, with 
informal contacts, without discussing official 
relationships. WEU's contact this week with 
guests from the Swedish Parliament is how we 
should start such relationships. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
again, Minister, for your clear replies. We look 
forward to a future opportunity to resume this 
fruitful dialogue with you. 
7. Arms control: CSCE arul WEU 
(Presentation· of turd debate 
011 the report of the lkfeJU¥ Committee 
turd 11ote 011 the draft recmtimendatio11, Doe. 1306) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Defence Committee 
on arms control: CSCE and WEU and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Document 1306. 
I call Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur. 
Mr. de PUIG (Spain) (Translation). - Ladies 
and gentlemen, when some of you heard that the 
title of my report was to be arms control: CSCE 
and WEU, you asked me why we were dealing in 
this forum with the CSCE, a matter which did 
not concern us. I believe that after the Swedish 
Minister's address this morning, and the ques-
tions which representatives put to him, it is clear 
that we must discuss CSCE in this forum in the 
context of the extent to which it should be 
involved in security in Europe and the various 
levels of organisation of peace and security in 
Europe. 
In order to be able to produce the report I 
have presented to you, I had to contact the 
various organisations in Europe concerned with 
defence and political co-operation, and also visit 
some countries personally. I must thank the 
ministries and departments in those countries 
which received me and gave me details and doc-
uments on views and debates in these organ-
isations. I must thank the Ministry of Defence 
and Foreign Affairs in Madrid, the Ministry of 
Defence in London and the Secretary-General 
and his assistants. I must thank all those 
in Vienna, the CSCE and the Austrian Gov-
ernment who received us and provided us with 
their documents and appraisal. I have already 
thanked Mr. Bjorck who received us in 
Stockholm. I must also thank those in Helsinki, 
at the present CSCE headquarters, and · in the 
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry ofForeign 
Affairs whom I visited and who enabled me to 
provide you with an enormous collection of d<» 
uments which are not so much analyses but 
which could be of assistance in our work. As you 
can see, we have been busy and I must also 
thank those persons who helped me to draw up 
this report; they worked very hard so that you 
could have available to you all the documents 
which might have a bearing on the subject of my 
report. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I said in committee, 
and I would like to repeat here, this is a time of 
great significance for European security. I think 
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this is evident from the fact that we have clearly 
embarked upon a process of change as a result of 
the Maastricht agreements; we see that in Hel-
sinki the new mandate of the CSCE is being dis-
cussed, how it will be organised and what will be 
its functions. We see· that within the Atlantic 
Alliance - and I was in Canada two weeks ago -
they are also reflecting on the future structure of 
NATO, on the reform of the Atlantic Alliance 
and its future role, and they are even discussing 
the future and geographical scope of the Council 
of Europe. 
We have reached a turning point, a time for 
change, leading to the construction of this insti-
tutional and legal framework based on political 
agreements to guarantee the security, defence 
and peace of Europe. Finding ourselves at such a 
point, we are not in a position to make final 
decisions, we must see what agreements are 
reached in Helsinki, how the various institutions 
are affected, how they will relate to one another 
in the near future and how we can all co-operate, 
because the present proliferation of institutions 
is not sustainable. We shall have to find ways in 
which they can work together, co-operate and 
possibly even merge, so that we have institutions 
which are both viable and efficient. 
We have come to the end of a phase in 
history, and stand poised at the beginning of a 
new one. I am referring not only to the cold war, 
but also to the era which started with the 
Charter of Paris. We have gone beyond the 
Charter of Paris and now have different 
problems to solve. This is why it was important 
for WEU to discuss the future of the CSCE. For 
the matters now being discussed in Helsinki, 
and which will occupy the July summit, are of 
great significance and will naturally affect the 
future of the CSCE, but will also have repercus-
sions on the whole European security order and, 
obviously, if we talk about the future security 
order of Europe and the West - and, I repeat, I 
mean not only European but also western, in 
other words the Atlantic link - if we talk about 
these things in WEU, which is the European 
defence plan in embryo, we must take account of 
events in Helsinki and the future role of the 
CSCE. 
There is no doubt that the CSCE is an ambi-
tious project, but it is also contradictory, as 
Mr: Bjorck has said. In Paris the resolutions 
adopted were implemented and the bare bones 
of a structure for the CSCE began to function; 
there were negotiations in Vienna which led to 
the conclusion of agreements on disarmament, 
the reduction of conventional weapons, the con-
clusion of the Open Skies Treaty, which is 
making progress in the search for and agreement 
of confidence-building measures, and there is 
even in preparation a new mandate on conflict 
prevention and management which gives sub-
stance and meaning to the working of the CSCE. 
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I used the word contradictory, however, because 
in the first place, the fifty-one member countries 
of the CSCE, by their sheer numbers, create 
genuine problems of efficiency and even ration-
ality; some of these fifty-one countries are only 
now becoming democratic, cannot yet guarantee 
the stability we would like, and some, like the 
former Soviet Union, have still not resolved 
problems such as who holds and controls the 
weapons, be they nuclear or conventional. An 
agreement on the distribution of armaments has 
still not been reached. When an institution with 
fifty-one members faces problems of this nature, 
it is obvious that this reduces its ability to 
operate efficiently, and there are those who 
believe that we should perhaps let this insti-
tution run down because it has, to a certain 
extent, achieved its principal aim. 
There are those who wanted the CSCE in 
Paris to be a great organisation to enable the 
countries of Central Europe and the East to have 
available an organisation to help them out of the 
vacuum in which they found themselves when 
the wall came down, and obviously the CSCE 
has been of use, it has helped. But now that the 
time has come to ask what its future role may be 
there is no general agreement and the debate is 
open. 
Therefore I told Mr. Bjorck that some of us 
feel that the CSCE was conceived for another 
purpose and that the July summit may, in fact, 
be something of a disappointment because Hel-
sinki is expected to produce a widely-agreed 
mandate on arms reduction and, as I said, on 
conflict prevention, and the committee of chiefs 
of staff should, as Mr. Bjorck also said, have the 
ability to act quickly whenever necessary. All of 
this is shrouded in uncertainty. It is not certain 
that such plans can be approved in Helsinki. 
It has to be said that there is opposition to 
revitalising the CSCE. Such political opposition 
does exist. 
There are also the other problems I have men-
tioned: the fact that the CSCE countries cannot 
give the desired guarantees, the general situation 
of stalemate in which we find ourselves, and, let 
us admit it, there is also institutional opposition. 
In Canada, at the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Assembly, I called this institutional patriotism. 
Certain areas are the remit of other institutions 
and quite clearly for the Atlantic Alliance, which 
sees its task as defending the Atlantic Alliance, 
this means halting the progress of the CSCE. 
That is one opinion. My view, which is reflected 
in my report, is different. I believe that it is per-
fectly possible for the CSCE and the Atlantic 
Alliance to coexist. There could be a reorganised 
CSCE adapted to present-day needs rather than 
to the requirements of Paris, which have been 
overtaken by events, and at the same time, there 
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could and should be a strong organisation with 
Atlantic links and which should be able to adapt 
itself and not simply continue as before. The 
Atlantic Alliance, that is to say NATO, must 
also ask itself what its future role should be, 
because it is not easy to see how NATO can con-
tinue indefinitely with sixteen members, for 
instance, when there are countries knocking on 
NATO's door to be admitted. It is no longer 
tenable that NATO can continue with some of 
the structures it had during the cold war, 
because the old enemy no longer exists. 
Change is needed, as is co-operation, and 
there is also a potential need for joint effort and 
integration with the CSCE. This is what I con-
sider to be necessary and this is what I have said 
in my report. I would like to say that the WEU 
presidency, through Mr. Genscher, has spoken 
in favour of this view. WEU and its Chairman-
in-Office in Berlin reminded us that our insti-
tution was in favour of developing the instru-
ments planned for by the CSCE. He wanted to 
make them more efficient, give the committee of 
chiefs of staff more influence to enable it to take 
action at times of crisis, create this instrument 
of conflict prevention and make progress with 
disarmament or more stringent arms reduction. 
As Mr. Genscher said, the new mandate from 
Helsinki would have to establish new 
confidence-building measures and should, in 
particular, establish channels of political dia-
logue in order to reach the agreements on 
security which would then be translated into 
laws and regulations which would establish the 
European security order. That was Mr. 
Genscher's opinion; it is also mine, and it is 
advanced in my report. 
The CSCE's future has not yet been decided; 
let us see what happens in the month and a half 
of negotiations which remain and at the summit. 
In my report I plead that the organisation should 
be institutionalised to the greatest extent pos-
sible and that, notwithstanding the acknow-
ledged difficulties, this institution should under 
no circumstances be allowed to be run down on 
the ground that it no longer serves the purpose 
for which it was conceived. Therefore, the 
underlying problem is one of political will. This 
political will does exist and I believe that it is in 
the interest of the Europeans and of WEU that 
this is so and that the CSCE emerge 
strengthened from Helsinki. 
I am aware that there are problems of compe-
tition. One of the criticisms that can be made of 
the present situation concerning security institu-
tions is the problem of duplication, redundancy 
and competition between the various institu-
tions; indeed, the Atlantic Alliance created a 
North Atlantic Co-operation Council which is 
becoming a kind of mini-CSCE as far as its 
structure is concerned, but as to resources and 
effectiveness it is very significant. This creates 
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problems. My solution to these problems, after 
having consulted several others, seeking the 
opinion of the ministers of defence and the 
negotiators in Helsinki and discussing this idea 
with the North Atlantic Assembly itself in 
Canada, is to integrate the task and make it a 
joint task - the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council and the programmes and aims of the 
CSCE. 
I am aware that some of you think that this is 
going to extremes, that the proposal to request 
or suggest to our Council of Ministers that our 
representatives in Helsinki should argue in 
favour of the famous NACC being included in 
the work of the CSCE is too bold. Nevertheless, 
although some of you may consider this to be 
audacious, I believe it to be a rational and 
responsible way of solving a totally unacceptable 
problem of duplication and competition 
between institutions. 
I say this fully accepting the Atlantic link and 
the idea that the CSCE also represents the 
Atlantic link, just as NATO does and WEU 
ought to. This is not a question of comparing the 
function of European institutions with the 
United States and Canada or having United 
States and Canadian institutions seizing the lead 
in Europe. It is a matter of working together, 
which is what Mr. Fachel spoke for in Canada, 
and under no circumstances can he be accused 
of being anti-American. He said: I am against 
American hegemony, and against the United 
States acting as the world's policeman. I believe 
that it is the United Nations Security Council 
which should be the world's policeman and that 
we should all work together. 
This is the best solution and this is what I 
have tried to suggest in the conClusion to my 
report. In this ar~a in the field of security I 
believe that WEU has a role to play. It should 
play an active role in both the political and oper-
ational arena. It is my view that we must take 
part in debates, with our own proposals, whether 
it be within NATO where our position, that is to 
say the position of the Nine, should be made 
known, or in the negotiations in Vienna, to 
which we are always invited, or in Helsinki, 
where we have been invited and where the Sec-
retary-General has presented a WEU report, or 
even in the CSCE or in any other international 
forum. This co-operation and contact can be 
with neutral countries, such as Sweden for 
example; it is a contact which I feel should be 
maintained preferably with countries which 
have applied for entry to the European Com-
munity, but also with the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, which we must not 
abandon and with which we must also maintain 
relations. 
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Furthermore, from a more operational point 
of view, I believe that WEU ought to make 
available its capability in the implementation of 
the Open Skies Treaty. There is, for example, 
the satellite observation centre at Torrej6n de 
Ardoz, which could provide technological assis-
tance to aerial verification and to specialised air-
craft. We could also give assistance in imple-
menting the Conventional Forces Treaty as 
regards verification, inspection, training, exer-
cises and evaluation visits. We could co-operate 
and assist in developing security- and confi-
dence-building measures and we could also 
give our opinion on the military forces which 
should be present in Europe given that under 
Maastricht WEU is initially entrusted with a 
European defence policy project. In all these 
instances we should be present, putting forward 
our own proposals. 
In conclusion, Mr. President, I think we can 
say that we have made good progress recently in 
arms control matters - not without problems, · 
but we have progressed. At this crucial moment 
I believe we could continue to create the institu-
tions and the legal and political framework for 
the security of the future. 
An opportunity such as this may not present 
itself again in the coming years and what Mr. 
Bjorck said is true: we may feel safe but we may 
not be as safe as we think. Well, let us set about 
this calmly and with great precision, without 
battles between institutions, and with each one 
of us co-operating and finding it possible to 
compromise, so that we arrive at a unanimous 
and efficient system. I believe that we can make 
progress and that the CSCE process, which is the 
central theme of my report, must, as a result of 
Helsinki, constitute an impetus for co-operation 
in security matters, an impetus for negotiations 
on arms control and that after Helsinki there 
should be a new mandate to continue negoti-
ating; that would be the time to organise conflict 
prevention and management thoroughly and 
effectively, based on a fundamental doctrine: 
this is a time for politics to take precedence over 
military considerations. The cold war was the 
time when military considerations took prece-
dence over politics. Today it is the politicians, 
political agreements and legal agreements, 
together with the capacity to verify and 
implement them, which should motivate us and 
should have precedence. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Moya. 
Mr. MOY A (Spain) (Translation). - Mr. de 
Puig has presented a report this morning and in 
previous sessions in committee which is along 
rather similar lines to a report he presented pre-
viously on arms control, and I think it is of 
interest to point out two important strands of 
thinking about recent events in the report. 
'I 
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One strand of analysis or thought concerns the 
problems involved in arms control; it describes 
how such control is achieved. It does not restrict 
itself to what might be called an x-ray or photo-
graph of how the negotiations progress and how 
they result in arms control in progressive stages, 
but rather the whole process is described in an 
abstract outline, which I believe to be appro-
priate and reasonable, in Chapter VI of his 
report. It is what might be called an arms control 
philosophy which is certainly worthy of 
attention. Indeed, it encapsulates perfectly all 
the progress which is being made with regard to 
the doctrine of the allied countries in relation to 
the conceptual framework of the philosophy of 
arms control. In my view, it is an interesting 
contribution, not confined to giving a list of 
achievements and of progress which might be 
made in the future. 
There is, however, a second aspect, a second 
thread, the one to which he most frequently 
referred in his address. I am referring to the 
network of the security institutions in Europe at 
the present time. In recent months, since our last 
WEU Assembly I would say, there has been a 
series of events which have accentuated the fact 
that the international security situation is at a 
crossroads. In the context of our Assembly and 
WEU, certainly since our last meeting, we have 
seen how the Maastricht agreements have con-
siderably reinforced the role of our institution as 
the nucleus around which the European defence 
identity is to be articulated. There have been 
subsequent initiatives, which we are sure will 
fall within this framework and within the 
framework of co-operation with the alliance, 
such as the Franco-German initiative for an 
army corps as the basis for this future European 
army. 
I believe that this is an important moment for 
us to strengthen and give direction to WEU, 
around which the European defence identity is 
to be articulated as a result of the Maastricht 
summit. 
There have also, however, been important 
happenings and new events in the institutions of 
the CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance, as Mr. de 
Puig said. The analysis contained in his report, 
and which he summarised for us in this address 
concerning the CSCE, well illustrates the funda-
mental shift which has taken place in the CSCE, 
from being simply a conference to consolidating, 
or beginning the consolidation process, as an 
institution. Obviously, this consolidation is still 
in process, as indeed he said, and will have to 
meet important challenges, which we hope it will 
be able to do, at successive summits of the 
CSCE. I am referring in particular to the need to 
obtain a more dependable flow of income for 
the CSCE, the need to adopt mechanisms for 
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decision-making and the ability to apply sanc-
tions. These are essential instruments for gene-
rating confidence in its own effectiveness. We 
also need to be aware of the consequences of the 
volatile environment surrounding the security 
situation at the moment and especially those 
arising from the size of the CSCE membership 
of fifty-one, which makes effective co-ordination 
of security measures extremely difficult. 
There have been other events since our last 
Assembly, also of interest to the alliance, to 
which Mr. de Puig referred. Debates have been 
opened on matters that are still very topical, but 
no decisions yet reached. I am referring, for 
instance, to what has already been announced in 
statements by representatives of the Secretariat-
General of the alliance, namely the possibility 
that the Atlantic Alliance may become a pillar or 
the armed wing of the CSCE. This is a forward-
looking debate - the articulation and devel-
opment of the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council- and I congratulate Mr. de Puig on this 
initiative and for including it in the framework 
of the CSCE as a means of avoiding duplication 
and as a rationalising measure - important tasks 
in the context of the alliance. 
I would like to stress that, for me, the most 
interesting aspect of Mr. de Puig's address is the 
overall spirit of the report, which I feel is worthy 
of mention. There are two stances which can be 
taken as regards the overall security position. 
One is to try to resolve the problem of institu-
tional articulation by means of competition 
between institutions. I think we should avoid 
this. It would be as unhelpful to put the 
emphasis on Europeanism at the cost of the 
Atlantic link as it would be to strengthen that 
link at the cost of European identity. I therefore 
believe that what is important is an attitude of 
co-operation and dialogue between institutions 
in an attempt to find formulas guaranteeing 
security without the need for duplication. I am 
in no doubt that it is such a spirit of co-oper-
ation with other institutions that will lead to the 
strengthening of the CSCE to which Mr. de Puig 
refers. 
(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
Th~ PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fabra. 
Mr. F ABRA (Spain) (Translation). - Madam 
President, first, may I congratulate Mr. de Puig 
on the excellent report he presented to us today. 
It represents much effort and research, and is 
further evidence of the praiseworthy and sus-
tained commitment which our colleague brings 
to Western European Union. His independent, 
perfectionist turn of mind did not permit him to 
feel satisfied with the report he presented to us 
six months ago, so he wanted to add to it and 
bring it up to date. 
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This was a necessary task, because the 
members of this Assembly have a grandstand 
view of the vertiginous changes now occurring in 
the world, in every way. And when the forces 
producing the change are out of control, it is dif-
ficult to think of it as improvement or progress. 
I say this not simply because we are not con-
trolling them, as with the events in the former 
Soviet Union - for in that particular case 
nobody is controlling them, not even they them-
selves, nor is there anybody who should be doing 
so, since the Warsaw Pact no longer exists 
either. 
And we should not only be concerned about 
the A B C weapons - atomic, biological and 
chemical. For nowadays when we talk about 
arms control, we should also be thinking about 
explosives and conventional arms, including 
light arms. Or do we not consider it a threat that 
units of the former Soviet army still stationed in 
the republics of Central Europe are selling all 
their arms in order to survive, and that these 
arms might fall into the hands of Serbs or of 
international terrorists? 
Madam President, before closing I should like 
to ask the Rapporteur to utilise his prodigious 
industry in taking, now or at some later date, an 
initiative that will help to put an end to the lack 
of any control over the arms of the army of the 
former Soviet Union. And if anybody should 
think that that is not our task, it would be clear 
that the time has come to close down our 
present institutions and establish new ones, 
since they would have proved lacking in the nec-
essary flexibility to meet the challenge of current 
events in this changing world. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur, Mr. de Puig. 
Mr. de PUIG (Spain) (Translation). - I am 
going to speak in French to prevent the debate 
being solely hispano-Spanish, the only speakers 
so far having been members of the Spanish Del-
egation. 
I am delighted that Mr. Moya, my colleague 
and friend, endorses the report. He is an 
eminent parliamentarian, head of the delegation 
to the North Atlantic Assembly and well 
acquainted with the subject. He was with me in 
Canada where he made great efforts to explain 
to our Canadian and American friends the 
position of WEU and our views about EC pro-
cesses as I have set them out in my report. 
Thank you Mr. Mo~. I share all your opinions. 
Lastly I note tharmaybe it will be possible to 
simplify the European institutions so as to make 
them more effective. Like you, I believe that 
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WEU has its part to play, a very important part 
that we have to promote. 
I am also very pleased to have the support of 
Mr. Fabra, a member of the opposition in my 
country. I am cheered to find parties that are 
usually my political adversaries approving the 
report. I have to tell Mr. Fabra that during our 
trips to Helsinki we met representatives of the 
former Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe and I thought I detected in them 
a firm resolve to settle the problems of arms 
control. Of course I cannot guarantee that this 
control will be here soon and that all danger has 
ceased. Nevertheless I believe that the political 
will of the authorities in these countries will 
prevent confrontation and lead to the signing of 
agreements. I feel that the Helsinki process and 
the agreements resulting from the July summit 
offer good grounds for hope that the guarantees 
required will be forthcoming. 
The Defence Committee, like all the WEU 
committees, should follow these events with 
close attention and, where relevant, draw up 
further reports on these basic problems. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman of the com-
mittee. 
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation).- Madam President, I want 
to begin by saying that I think it a great pity that 
so few of my colleagues have taken part in the 
debate. Ifl had not had to sit in this seat today, I 
would have liked to take part in the debate on 
this report. 
The Defence Committee has made a very 
extensive and thorough study of the report. And 
with good reason. It is not only a good and inter-
esting report: it also concerns a subject that is 
attracting a great deal of attention, a subject we 
are bound to have to consider regularly in the 
future. 
I should perhaps mention that, when the vote 
was taken on this report in committee, fourteen 
members voted for and four abstained, though 
not because the contents of the report posed any 
problems for them. The only reason for their 
abstention in the vote on this report was that 
they objected to paragraph 9 of the recommen-
dation, which says that chemical and biological 
weapons must be eliminated and the number of 
nuclear weapons must be reduced. As I have 
said, it was only because of this paragraph that 
four members of the committee abstained. 
Madam President, with your permission I 
would just like to say a few words unconnected 
with the report. Not only are we speaking in an 
almost empty chamber at the moment, so that 
this could hardly be called a debate: it is also 
noticeable that only one of the chairs reserved 
for ministers and the Secretary-General is 
occupied. The Secretary-General is not only 
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absent but no one is standing in for him today. 
From Le Monde we see that a meeting of the 
Permanent Council has been convened in 
London today to consider the sanctions imposed 
on the former republic of Yugoslavia. In the first 
place, it is rather unfortunate that the Council of 
Ministers should be meeting at the same time as 
the Assembly of Western European Union, but 
even so we could surely have expected them to 
have sent representatives here. The Presidential 
Committee or other appropriate bodies should 
surely have discussed this with the Council 
of Ministers, and also with the Secretary-
General. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the draft recommendation in Doc-
ument 1306. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or 
more representatives or substitutes present in 
the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote vill therefore be taken 
by show of hands. 
(A vote was then taken by show of hands) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
l. See page 48. 
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8. Adjournment of the. session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, that brings us to the end of the first 
part of the session. 
Before closing the sitting, I would like to thank 
and congratulate Assembly members for their 
attendance and for the quality of their speeches. 
I feel I can also speak for the Assembly as a 
whole in extending my warmest thanks to the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the ministers 
and our Secretary-General who have addressed 
us from this rostrum and been gracious enough to 
answer the questions we have fired at them. 
I also give my friendly regards to all the repre-
sentatives of the press who have followed our 
proceedings and been kind enough to convey 
news of them to the public in our respective 
countries. 
Lastly I wish to thank all the permanent and 
temporary staff- and especially the interpreters 
-who have shown their usual efficiency. 
I look forward, ladies and gentlemen, to seeing 
you all again at the end of the year for the 
second part-session which will, I am sure, be as 
fruitful as those preceding it. 
I now declare the first part of the thirty-eighth 
ordinary session of the Assembly of Western 
European Union closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 11.55 a.m.) 
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